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Introduction 
Within the field of the study of religion(s) the notion ‘Religion’ is both foundational 
and of methodological importance.1 The notion of Religion is presupposed in all 
studies of religion(s) and, as such, founds the legitimacy of any study of religion(s). 
Furthermore, the preconception of what Religion signifies determines how religion(s) 
are interpreted and therein, forms the methodological horizon of the study of 
religion(s). As such, Religion poses two central problems for the study of religion(s): 
the problem of disclosing the meaning of the notion ‘Religion’ upon which the study 
of religion(s) may be founded, and furthermore, the problem of disclosing the proper 
notion of Religion which provides methodological guidance to the study of 
religion(s).2  
 This thesis will attempt to come to terms with the problem of the meaning of 
the notion ‘Religion’ by testing out the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion 
based on Martin Heidegger’s philosophical writings. I have decided to utilise 
Heidegger’s phenomenology, especially his writings preceding and up to Being and 
Time for two primary reasons. First, I have always felt that Religion is an intrinsic 
part of human existence. In this respect, Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology 
as ontology fits with my intuitive sense of the meaning of Religion. Further, as with 
many other readers of Being and Time, I was impressed with the potential of the 
phenomenological method given therein for an interpretation of Religion in relation to 
being human. Herein, the phenomenological method proposed by Heidegger appears 
at first glance to provide a legitimate and powerful way of understanding the meaning 
of Religion. However, with careful study, it became apparent to me that even though 
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Heidegger’s phenomenology does indeed provide a way of addressing the problem of 
Religion, his general thinking and writing actually reduces or overlooks Religion. 
Here, the writings of Heidegger utilise religious traditions and religious thinking as a 
way into philosophy, reducing the meaning of Religion in this process to an ‘ontic’ 
phenomenon within the truth of being. Additionally, Heidegger’s interpretation 
consistently transforms ‘religious thought’ into the question of an authentic existence 
upon which philosophy can be grounded. In this respect, it is the task of this thesis to 
test out the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion (as ontology) that does not 
repeat Heidegger’s reduction of Religion to a phenomenon within the truth of being.  
 The question this thesis proposes to address tentatively is: What does Religion 
mean as a phenomenon? Herein, the region of the question is philosophical, referring 
to Religion as a notion. Moreover, the question posed is ontological; referring to 
Religion as a notion that gains significance in relation to being-human. In other 
words, the question of this thesis constitutes Religion as a phenomenon that belongs 
to the being of humans. The question is, as such: what is the meaning of Religion in 
its ground of being-human?3 
 The structure of the thesis will follow the path of the question of the meaning 
of Religion as a phenomenon through the provision of mutually dependent layers of 
arguments and interpretations. Herein, each part of the thesis will found the parts to 
follow and will be dependent upon, and intrinsically related to, the preceding parts. 
The thesis, in detail, will contain four parts: the problem of Religion, Phenomenology 
as method, deconstructive case studies, and a movement towards an existential 
analysis.  
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The aim of the first part is to set the horizon for the thesis; establishing what 
sort of problem Religion is and how the thesis will address the problem. The second 
part will provide an overview and interpretation of Heidegger’s phenomenology with 
the aim of showing what phenomenology is and providing a theoretical framework for 
a phenomenology of Religion. The third part of the thesis will provide the first phase 
of the test of a phenomenology of Religion through the provision of deconstructive 
case studies of three Pre-Socratic philosophers. The fourth part of the thesis will then 
utilise the deconstructive case studies as the foundation for a movement towards an 
existential analysis of the meaning of Religion and further, the disclosure of some of 
the primary ontological structures of the meaning of Religion as belonging to being-
human.   
 The thesis will provide two interrelated interpretations of the meaning of 
Religion as a phenomenon. The first will disclose the meaning of Religion in general 
as a relationship between being-human and what I will term ‘originary ground’.4 The 
second is that Religion, with regard to its ground in being-human, signifies what I will 
call belief.5 
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Part One: The Problem of Religion 
 
The first part of this research takes up the notion of Religion as a problem. Here, 
Religion as a problem has three primary senses: of questioning why Religion is a 
problem, of what sort of problem Religion is, and finally, of ascertaining the proper 
way of questioning the meaning of Religion. 
 The first chapter will take up the task of problematising the notion of Religion, 
or, of questioning how Religion is generally preconceived, especially in the studies of 
religion(s). In this, the aim is to discuss how the general preconception of the meaning 
of Religion as religion(s), generates the problem of attempts to define Religion. As 
such, the first chapter has as its primary task problematising the preconception of 
Religion as religion(s). Furthermore, the first chapter will also have the task of 
revealing that the proper domain of the problem of Religion is ontology.  
 In the second chapter I will take up Religion as an ontological problem via a 
brief overview of the tradition of ontology. The question to be addressed is what sort 
of ontological system and what notion of being allows the problem of Religion to be 
approached properly. Insofar as Religion is conceived of as a problem in relation to 
the being of humans (being-human), or, of belonging-to the being of humans, the 
question then becomes how to properly approach the meaning of Religion through the 
being of humans.  
 The second chapter, then, begins with and prioritises Aristotle’s writings about 
being. There are two reasons for this prioritisation: first in the fact that Aristotle is the 
first philosopher to pose being (ontology) in a systematic fashion and as a systematic 
problem. Second, that Aristotle’s formulation of being dominates the way being is 
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conceived in the tradition of philosophy. As such, a task of the chapter will be to show 
that Aristotle’s notion of being is a primary constitutive factor in the preconception of 
Religion as religion(s). 
 Insofar as chapter two characterises ontology as a problem (both with respect 
to the notion of Religion and being) it then moves on to a provisional acceptance of 
Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein’s being as the proper way of formulating 
Religion as an ontological problem.6 As this acceptance is only provisional, I also 
outline the limits of this acceptance.  
 Finally, in chapter three, the first part of this research will conclude with a 
formulation of Religion as a phenomenon through which the meaning of Religion 
may be properly disclosed. Here, I will first discuss how phenomenon signifies an 
ontological problem, and then, that this signifies the question of how Religion 
belongs-to being-human: its meaning and ground therein. As a result of this 
formulation, I will then argue that objects of Religion, i.e. God, must be excluded 
from analysis.  
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Chapter One: The Problem of Religion: 
 
The task of setting the background in preparation for ‘a phenomenology of Religion’ 
will begin with a preliminary look at the notion ‘Religion’. To prepare in this sense 
will be taken to be a re-look at the notion Religion as it is conceptualised and 
presupposed, for the most part, in ‘religious studies’ or ‘studies in religion’. 
Furthermore, in the re-look of preparation the aim and task will be the problematising 
of the notion Religion in theoretical approaches to religion(s). To problematise, in this 
sense, will operate as the questioning of the notion Religion in theoretical fields in 
order to point towards the space in which ‘a phenomenology of Religion’ may take 
place.  
 
1. The Problem of Defining Religion: Introduction: 
 
In the theoretical study of Religion the question invariably occurs as to what Religion 
is. This question is generally given as the problem of defining Religion and the 
equivalent question of whether Religion can be defined at all. In the first instance, this 
problem seems inevitably to operate in difference: a) between religion(s), and b) 
between religion(s) and Religion. The first difference here leads to the second insofar 
as the difference between religion(s) is seen to problematise the relation of the 
religion(s) to the notion Religion. The difference between religion(s) leads to the 
question of whether there is some object ‘Religion’, or equally, some notion 
‘Religion’ in a universal sense that defines all religion(s) as such. 
 This problem can be, and has been, re-phrased in a variety of ways; from the 
question of the essence of religion(s) to the question of what consensus can occur in 
regard to boundary making with respect to what the notion ‘Religion’ may refer to in 
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relation to phenomena.  Belying all of these phrasings of the problem, however, is the 
central question of how any and every religion(s) can be determined as Religion. This 
is undoubtedly, in one sense, the problem of defining Religion, of stating the precise 
nature of a thing or word.7 To show how the project of defining Religion is 
problematic will require that the notion of Religion be investigated further with regard 
to the theoretical approaches to religion(s) and the methodological thinking that arises 
from these approaches.  
In this investigation two questions will be kept in mind: what sort of 
preconception of Religion is assumed by the theoretical study of religion(s) and 
equally, of how the notion of Religion is formulated as a type of object from within 
the methodological preconceptions of the study in religion(s).8 What is at stake then, 
is the question of how the essence of religion(s) is presupposed and formulated with 
regard to a universal notion of Religion. Moreover, this is the question of the meaning 
of Religion as that which determines religion(s) as religion(s). 
 
2. The Initial Problem of Defining: In General. 
 
Where the problem of defining Religion is investigated more closely a certain 
circularity appears wherein theorists studying religion(s) begin with the juxtaposition 
of the empirical reality of religion(s) to be analysed without any capacity to define 
Religion as that through which religion(s) could be delimited. In this, the circle 
contains, structurally, three moments: (1) the initial preconception of Religion – as the 
Religion behind the religion(s) in question, that allows the religion(s) to be called 
religion(s), (2) the moment of the religion(s) as phenomena, as the particular 
religion(s) in its expressions, and (3) the moment of returning the particular 
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religion(s) to the notion Religion in view of definition. This movement of 
methodological circularity is often referred to as the process of moving from a 
‘working definition’ to a ‘definition’ proper.9 What occurs, however, is generally a 
failure for the end product of definition proper to eventuate. It is necessary then, in 
attempting to approach the problem of defining Religion in general, to pay attention to 
the structure of this methodological circularity in order to discover how and why this 
problem of definition occurs. 
 In the first moment, that of initial preconception, both the delimiting and 
formulation of methodological approach happens in advance. This is the case insofar 
as the initial preconception already determines Religion as an object of study in a 
certain way with a particular focus already in mind. In the study of religion(s) the 
initial preconception almost invariably refers the notion of Religion immediately back 
to the actuality and presence of the religion(s) to be studied.10 Accordingly, this 
preconception of Religion is often supported by an ‘everyday’ notion of Religion 
wherein the immediate, closest to hand, expression of Religion is given in 
religion(s).11 As such, the preconception of Religion which generally operates in the 
study of religion(s) can be seen to be generated from and refer to the immediate 
presence of religion(s) as a possible object of study. 
 The notion Religion tends to be founded upon the immediate object 
religion(s). This immediate preconception of Religion accordingly has implications 
for the methodological theorising in the study of religion(s) insofar as Religion will 
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inherently tend to be conceived of as a universal object Religion which underlies all 
religion(s), framed generally as the conceptual problem of what essentially 
determines, in a predicate-able way, religion(s) as Religion. In the initial moment of 
preconception, then, there is to be found the central conception of Religion as object 
and object-like. This object-like Religion will accordingly function as ‘Religion-ness’ 
as the essential, necessary and non-contingent dimension of all religion(s). If Religion 
is preconceived as object-ness, the question remains as to what sort of object Religion 
is and how it is to be determined. 
 (Second Moment) The determination of Religion as an object-like-ness in 
advance cannot be said, in general, to follow a clear theoretical exposition of the 
concept Religion, but rather, tends to follow the preconception of an object or 
category religion(s). In this, a majority of textual guides to the methodology of the 
study of religion(s) can be seen to open with a passing analysis of the problem of 
defining Religion which quickly slips into a discussion of Religion as the object 
religion(s). Some theoretical examples of this tendency need to be identified and 
discussed.  
 In Crawford’s text, What is Religion?, the introductory chapter begins 
precisely in this manner, initially identifying Religion in association with the 
everyday concept of religion(s).12 Admittedly, Crawford does question whether 
Religion may be defined via religion(s)13, but this question is soon passed over to be 
replaced by a methodological approach which nonetheless prioritises religion(s) and 
the phenomena associated with religion(s).14 For Crawford, the main identifiable 
problem of Religion becomes that of the failure of definitions to point to the essence 
of Religion. This problem is not, however, framed with regard to theory, but in 
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reference to the interpretation and analysis of the practices, organisation and belief 
systems of religion(s).15 In taking this methodological stance, Crawford drops the 
problem of defining Religion as the essence of religion(s), and replaces it with a 
functional and descriptive definition.16  
 Likewise, Haught, in What is Religion? An Introduction follows the position 
of thinking about Religion with regard to the phenomena of religion(s) to which the 
word ‘Religion’ refers. Here, the phenomena are categorically identifiable as standing 
out from the everyday17. It is in this context, of the phenomena of religion(s) taken as 
data, that religion(s) may be correctly approached.18  
 In brief, the general methodological approach to religion(s) and Religion can 
be viewed as following this path: in Connolly, as the problem of the scope of the 
phenomena that can be called religious19, in Whaling, of the data belonging to 
religion(s)20, in Capps, as the problem of the inclusion and exclusion of phenomena, 
and of a beginning with phenomena that almost everyone will agree as having 
something to do with Religion.21 Some, like Holm, feel it adequate to merely posit 
Religion to be religion(s).22 
 (Third Moment) As a result of this preconception, and then methodological 
approach to the studies of religion(s) attempts to define Religion properly, become 
problematic. This problem gets expressed in two forms; that of the functionality of the 
definitional delimitations, and the question of the essence of religion(s) in the concept 
Religion. In the first case, the recurrent problem of the possibility of a definition 
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proper tends to be framed in regard to the elasticity of the notion of Religion put in 
relation to descriptive-categorical definitions. Here, the attempts to define Religion 
tend to be either too narrow or too broad, of not encompassing the complete range of 
predetermined phenomena, or of encompassing everything, even phenomena patently 
excluded in the predetermination.23 
 The question of the essence of Religion erupts from the first insofar as a 
definition of Religion, ideally and conceptually, pertains to the essence of religion(s). 
The problem of the ‘essence’ of religion(s) in the notion of Religion is twofold: that 
the phenomena of religion(s) does not allow of an essentialist conception of Religion, 
and furthermore, that the essence of Religion has already been predetermined, in the 
preconception, as the object religion(s). Accordingly, where a definition proper is 
considered there is a tendency for either an essentialist definition that is not related to 
the phenomena of interpretation, or, for a definition that denies the possibility of any 
essence of religion(s).  
 Examples of the first tendency can be found in Crawford and Connolly. In 
Crawford, the attempt to provide a definition proper results in a ‘supernatural’ 
definition wherein Religion is defined as ‘the divine’, the ‘sacred’ and a belief in 
‘God’ (“in the broadest sense”).24 Likewise, in Connolly, Religion is defined as 
involving the supernatural, trans-empirical realm.25 Here, however, the definition 
proper is problematic in three ways: in drawing conclusions unsupported by the 
phenomena itself, as merely pertaining to possible objects of religion(s), and 
furthermore, prone to the accusation of a Christian-theological bias insofar as the 
definitions attempt to extend theological and metaphysical concepts to cover non-
Christian religion(s). 
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 On the other hand, many scholars deny the necessity of an essentialist 
definition altogether. For example, Charlesworth asserts that religion(s) have no 
essence which could be called Religion.26 Likewise, Holm argues that there is no 
point in attempting to discover the essence of religion(s) due to the manifest 
differences between religion(s) and also insofar as any essence would exclude the 
realm of Religion as a whole religious life.27 Accordingly, in this position it is argued 
that the notion of Religion as a universal concept must be dropped as an object of 
study from the theoretical field of religion(s).28 
 Throughout the methodological circle that has been broadly and briefly 
outlined, the problem of Religion and the problem of defining Religion can be seen to 
arise out of the preconception of Religion as the object religion(s) and the 
corresponding lack of theoretical investigation into this preconception. In this, the 
lack of theoretical investigation into this preconception of the study of religion(s) 
allows Religion to be conceptualised as the object religion(s) in an unquestioned way, 
thus leading to the methodological approaches which take Religion for granted as an 
object. However, this also leads to the problematising of all definitions of Religion 
and the dismissal of Religion as a universal concept. 
 For the purposes of this paper the general problem of defining Religion as 
discussed operates as the platform for the paper’s own problem. This problem is best 
expressed via a discussion of the question of the essence of religion(s) in relation to 
the methodological circularity. 
 Initially, the problem of Religion arises out of the preconception of Religion 
as the object religion(s). Stated in such a way, it becomes evident that the general 
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preconception of Religion is unworkable and theoretically naïve insofar as Religion 
cannot be posited in a valid sense with regard to any particular religion(s). It is also 
impossible, however, to merely dismiss the notion Religion, as a universal concept, 
insofar as any study of religion(s) necessarily presupposes the notion Religion. For 
example, where religion(s) are compared, even as merely social institutions, the 
comparison is dependent upon the validity of the notion of Religion and also 
dependent upon Religion as the notion by which religion(s) are determined as a 
category of study. Furthermore, to compare religion(s) also depends upon the 
preconception of Religion, even if it is only a vague understanding, to determine 
whether something can be called religion(s) in advance.  
Likewise, the position that dismisses Religion as a universal concept remains 
dependent upon the notion of Religion in some sense, whether in reference to the 
vague understanding that allows religion(s) to be recognised as such, or whether 
Religion has some meaning as a notion which refers to phenomena. Even to adopt a 
new term, such as: ‘religiosity’, ‘religious life’, ‘religious-ness’, does not alleviate the 
necessity of Religion as a notion. 
In its most basic form, the problem of Religion must therefore be viewed as 
the problem of the notion of Religion. Indeed, the very possibility of studies in 
religion(s) as a discipline relies upon the validity and meaningfulness of the notion of 
Religion as a universal concept. This is a self-evident fact: the study of religion(s) 
requires that the category religion(s) be valid. The validity of the category 
‘religion(s)’ furthermore, is entirely dependent upon the notion of Religion.  
This allows of a preliminary formulation of the problem of Religion. Initially, 
the problem of Religion is that of what allows religion(s) to be religion(s). Religion, 
as such, can not be an object, nor established via the object religion(s), insofar as it 
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pertains to the ground of religion(s); the ‘reason-for’, the ‘cause-of’, or, the ‘how-it-
is-allowed-to-be’ of religion(s). Insofar as Religion is no object its meaning as the 
essence of religion(s) will also not be found, or be derivable, from the phenomena 
predetermined as religious. Here, the phenomena, as phenomenal-empirical actualities 
cannot be utilised to identify the a priori, pre-empirical concept of Religion. 
Furthermore, for phenomena to be categorised as ‘religious’ already presupposes the 
notion Religion. 
The problem of Religion, then, is a twofold problem of theoretical grounds in 
the study of religion(s): a) as a problem of that which allows the studies of religion(s) 
to be a valid discipline at all, which is also the question of how Religion is always 
already presupposed in the study of religion(s). As such, the problem of Religion is 
nothing more or less than the question of the possibility of grounding the studies in 
religion(s). b) Equally, the problem of Religion as a universal notion operates in a 
broader fashion as the philosophical question of what allows religion(s) to be 
religion(s). In both ways of expressing the problem of Religion, we must begin with 
the problematising and questioning of the meaning of the concept Religion as it is 
preconceived. Thus, the way into the problem inherently belongs, in some sense, to 
that everyday understanding, or preconception, through which religion(s) are 
identifiable as religion(s). 
 
3. The Phenomenology of Religion: 
 
As the paper aims at ‘a phenomenology of Religion’ the general methodological 
approach called the phenomenology of religion in the studies of religion(s) becomes 
important. The importance, here, is not initially the question of methodological 
approach, but rather, whether the field of study called the phenomenology of religion 
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attempts to address the problem of Religion in an adequate way. As such, where an 
analysis of the phenomenology of religion is given in broad outline, attention must be 
given to whether the notion of Religion is developed in such a way as to uncover and 
deal with the problem of the preconception and presupposition of Religion, or 
alternatively, whether this problem is overlooked and ignored. 
 As an approach to religion(s) the phenomenology of religion is attributed to 
have been first developed by Chantapie de la Saussaye in the late nineteenth century, 
well before the philosophical phenomenology of Husserl was developed.29 In this 
initial stage, Saussaye viewed the task of the phenomenology of religion to be that of 
discovering the essence and meaning of religious phenomena.30 Moreover, this task 
was to be fulfilled by the description of religious phenomena in a typological fashion 
from which generalisations were to be drawn.31 Here, the earliest form of the 
phenomenology of religion is generally depicted as having its impetus and 
philosophical inspiration in Hegel’s philosophical method, especially as it is 
expressed in ‘The Phenomenology of Geist’.32  
 In more detail, Saussaye asserts that phenomenology of religion must be 
closely connected to psychology insofar as it deals with the facts of consciousness.33 
As such, the phenomenology of religion aims to understand Religion as an internal 
feature of human existence, a feature of conscious acts, wherein the religious is 
distinguished from the non-religious via the study of internal relations in the structure 
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of consciousness rather than any empirical phenomena.34 As a methodological stance 
the phenomenology of religion is then given two delimitations: that phenomenology 
must begin with the objects towards which religious consciousness is directed, and 
that furthermore, the problem of Religion must remain with philosophical thought and 
thus also remain excluded from the phenomenology of religion.35 
 The phenomenology of religion, however, soon diversified from Saussaye’s 
position with the work of Husserl in philosophical phenomenology and Rudolf Otto in 
theology giving new impetus for the phenomenology of religion. Furthermore, soon 
after the development of Husserl’s phenomenology, theorists in the social sciences 
also appropriated the phenomenological banner via social-phenomenology, sociology 
of knowledge and phenomenological psychology. Accordingly, the theoretical scope 
of foundations for the phenomenology of religion broadened and produced a new 
diversity of styles and forms. In this diversification and growth two scholars are 
worthy of note. 
 The first of these, van der Leuuw, wrote Religion in Essence and 
Manifestation with a methodological approach which appropriated from both Hegel 
and Husserl.36 Van der Leuuw’s style of phenomenology of religion has been 
interpreted by commentator’s to be heavily influenced by Husserl in regard to 
methodology via the use of epoche and eidos37, and also within an overall Hegelian 
position with regard to the preconception of Religion.38 In this, van der Leuuw 
appropriated (or misappropriated) Husserl’s terms of epoche and eidos, transforming 
them and broadening their use. Epoche then came to signify the basic methodological 
manoeuvre of the ‘suspension of judgment’ wherein the truth, as objective, is 
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dismissed from consideration.39 Accordingly, the methodological notion of eidos was 
also broadened to refer to the accessibility of the essence of religion(s)40 via ‘eidetic 
vision’: empathy and intuition.41 The Hegelian influence upon van der Leuuw’s 
phenomenology of religion is often attributed to the ‘evolutionistic principles’ of the 
early phenomenology of religion42, and also the focus upon the essence of religion(s) 
via its appearances and manifestations.43 Furthermore, this focus also pertains to the 
basic foundation of the phenomenology of religion, as Hegelian, that Religion is the 
underlying unity and essence of the phenomena of religion(s).44 
 Van der Leuuw’s phenomenology of religion as a method, however, lead to an 
ever increasing separation of the phenomenology of religion from philosophy and 
philosophical phenomenology.  In this, it can be seen that the Hegelian influence upon 
the phenomenology of religion as it developed, in assuming that the essence of 
religion(s) was to be found via phenomena, formed a disjunction between the 
phenomenology of religion and philosophical phenomenology. For while the 
phenomenology of religion appropriated terminology from Husserl’s phenomenology, 
it also moved away from the basic intent of philosophical phenomenology: 
investigations into the a priori structures of consciousness. As such, the 
phenomenology of religion as it developed tended to become wary of philosophical 
phenomenology as too complicated and abstract.45 
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 The second theorist of note, for our purposes, Brede Kristensen was 
influenced by Rudolf Otto.46 For Kristensen the phenomenology of religion aimed at 
the systematic grouping of characteristic behaviours in order to illustrate the human 
religious disposition.47 This aim was to be achieved via a methodological approach, or 
attitude, in which the scholar would accept the evaluations of the believer.48 As such, 
Kristensen’s approach can be seen to emphasise the theme of interpretation as a 
methodological question. 
 In its present state, the phenomenology of religion seems to have settled into 
two related forms of studies in religion(s) with shared methodological principles. The 
generally accepted terms for these forms are: descriptive and hermeneutic 
phenomenology of religion.49 
 The descriptive form, or morphological, is the dominant and most commonly 
practised form of the phenomenology of religion. Here, the descriptive form is 
comprised of the formation of knowledge via phenomena, compiled in a descriptive 
manner, which finally, allows the classification of types and the thematic 
determination of what characterises religion(s) in a structural sense.50  The descriptive 
form, following van der Leuuw, also tends to utilise the methodological approach of 
suspension of judgment and empathetic-intuitive understandings.51 The descriptive 
form is also often connected to historical studies of religion(s) insofar as the 
phenomena to be analysed is often only given via historical interpretations of 
religion(s).52 Finally, in its aims and preconceptions, the descriptive form follows the 
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Hegelian influence of preconceiving Religion as the unity and essence of religion(s), 
and moreover, the attempt to define Religion via the manifestations and phenomena 
of religion(s).53  
 The hermeneutic form does not differ to any great extent from the descriptive 
form in actual approach and preconceptions, but rather, tends to have an additional 
theoretical dimension added to it. In this, the hermeneutic form often gets discussed as 
having two historical grounds, the descriptive form of phenomenology via van der 
Leuuw, and the hermeneutic theory based upon the thinking of both Riceour and 
Gadamer.54  
The hermeneutical form grounds its methodological approach in van der 
Leuuw’s methodological appropriation of Husserl’s ‘epoche’ and ‘eidos’, expanding 
and unifying these terms within in a singular notion of ‘attitude’.55 In this, the 
approach is both hermeneutical, i.e., a theory of interpretation, but also 
phenomenological, in van der Leuuw’s ‘Hegelian’ conception of it56. This ‘attitude’ 
gets discussed as an ‘art’ which is grounded in a common human essence, and 
furthermore, is constituted as the genuine attitude of humans.57 In this attitude, then, 
the scholar of religion(s) is purportedly able to reach a critical self-awareness of their 
own situation/situated-ness, which therein allows the scholar to overcome their own 
bias and approach religion(s) in a truly objective, universal fashion.58 
The interpretative and attitudinal approach of the hermeneutical 
phenomenology of religion is described from an external point of view as a 
methodological position wherein the analysis of interpretative attitude is constituted 
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as methodological.59 Alternatively, the hermeneutical form is characterised as a 
descriptive phenomenology of religion(s) grounded in, or driven by, a particular 
theory of interpretation.60  
In general, it is possible to characterise the phenomenology of religion as 
containing two primary dimensions: of preconception and of method. In the first case, 
the common preconception of the phenomenology of religion is that Religion has an 
object-like-ness, a universal essence, determinable via the manifestations of 
religion(s) or religious phenomena. However, the phenomenology of religion repeats 
the problem of Religion, remains in the problem, and furthermore, maintains the 
avoidance of theoretical investigation of the notion of Religion. As such, it is no 
surprise that where the phenomenology turns to the problem of Religion in definition, 
it does so for the most part within the same preconception of Religion as religion(s) 
and religious phenomena.61 In this case, the phenomenology of religion again 
preconceives the notion Religion via the immediacy of religion(s) and the phenomena 
associated with religion(s).62 
This continuation of the problem of Religion is evidenced in one of the 
modern ‘masters’ of the phenomenology of religion, Ninian Smart. In Smart’s text, 
The Phenomenon of Religion, it is argued that the phenomenology of religion must be 
characterised as the descriptive and structural study of the phenomenon of Religion 
and the phenomena of religion(s).63 In this, the phenomenon Religion is discussed as 
being approachable as an object in two ways: as religious phenomena, and as 
religion(s).64 As such, insofar as it is implied that religious phenomena belong 
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inherently to religion(s)65, the notion of Religion must be conceived of as a 
phenomenon inextricably associated with religion(s) and furthermore, as an object-
like phenomenon.66 This is precisely the problem of Religion; the absence of the 
question of what Religion signifies developed and formulated in a theoretical sense. 
For all that the phenomenology of religion may take up a new methodological 
position which broadens the object Religion into the general realm of religious 
phenomena, it nonetheless fails to question the meaning of Religion with regard to 
preconception. Even the additional methodological question of the human 
hermeneutical situation cannot succeed in its approach insofar as it does not first 
question the preconception of Religion as a notion. It has been made evident that the 
phenomenology of religion preconceives Religion as that which is the unity and 
essence of religion(s) and religious phenomena. It has also been made evident that the 
phenomenology of religion presupposes that Religion, as object-like, may be 
approached properly through the phenomena associated with religion(s), as that which 
unifies, and is common to all religious phenomena. Without further questioning, the 
phenomenology of religion becomes prey to Fitzgerald’s assertion that the 
phenomenology of religion operates upon the grounds of a simple categorical 
mistake.67 Furthermore, if the phenomenology of religion is to escape the present 
legitimate charge of reifying Religion as an object68, it is necessary for the 
preconceived meaning of the notion Religion be questioned and grounded properly. 
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4. The Philosophy of Religion: 
Perhaps then, insofar as the phenomenology has ceded the question of the notion 
‘Religion’ to philosophy, it is possible that philosophy of religion has approached the 
problem of Religion. When we turn to the philosophy of religion, however, it 
becomes apparent that there is not one unified philosophy of religion, but rather, a 
whole spectrum of ways in which philosophy relates to what is called Religion. For 
convenience and clarity the philosophy of religion will be divided into two forms of 
the relationship between philosophy and religion; religious philosophy and the 
discipline of philosophy as it approaches Religion. 
 
A. Religious Philosophy: 
Religious philosophy has a common relationship with religions and therein also 
differs in its historic-cultural contexts. In the first instance that which is common to 
all religious philosophies has been called the intellectual dimensions of religion(s) or 
the philosophising of people whose agendas are driven by questions in religion(s), or 
from a religious believer’s perspective.69 As such, that which is common to all that is 
called religious philosophy belongs to the religiosity of the philosopher. 
 Religious philosophy, however, fractures immediately where any attempt is 
made to pinpoint some common element, a common theme or object. In this, what is 
called religious philosophy must then be differentiated, upon very ‘Western’ grounds, 
between philosophical works written in various religious contexts, i.e. Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam… and the objects common to each context or 
religion. Moreover, religious philosophy must then also be differentiated in a grand 
narrative style in regard to the ‘Western’ disjunction of church and state. Say that for 
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the moment the disjunction of church and state is accepted, then the differentiation of 
religious philosophy must also, at least in the ‘Western’ world, follow the disjunction 
of pre and post separation: of pre-separation Christian-centric religious philosophy, 
and post-separation Religious vs. non-religious philosophy. This ‘Western’ 
disjunction, then, immediately returns to, and repeats, the question of and the problem 
of Religion insofar as it operates within a historical partitioning of Church and State. 
Here, religious philosophy, both pre and post disjunction,  will tend to be 
characterised by its religious content and thus also tend to be determined by a notion 
of Religion strongly connected to the Church as a religious institution. Accordingly, 
in regard to non-Christian religious philosophy, this disjunction will also tend to 
operate in the study of religion(s) via the preconception of Religion in relation to 
religion(s). 
 The disjunction of church and state, of religious and secular philosophy makes 
problematic the question regarding the notion Religion. Any philosophising pre-
disjunction, whether it be ‘Western’ or not, will not tend to formulate Religion as an 
object or phenomenon distinct from the rest of life. On the other hand, as a project of 
the disjunction, philosophy pre-disjunction will tend to be interpreted as religious or 
secular according to criteria of what constitutes the religious, i.e. the religious 
tradition. As such, what is called religious philosophy is seen to deal with objects 
which are now (post-disjunction) considered to be religious, theological, or operating 
within a specifically religious context of philosophising.  
For example, many general texts books on the philosophy of religion comprise 
of large sections devoted to themes considered to be religious, such as: the existence 
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of God, Evil, freedom, Immortality of the Soul, and teleology.70 Accordingly, this 
trend and adoption of Greek metaphysics by Christian thinkers allows such works as 
Copleston’s Religion and Philosophy wherein he argues that metaphysics in general is 
‘religious’, or contains intrinsically a religious character.71 As such, what is called 
religious philosophy is entirely dependent upon a disjunction of the religious and 
secular, religiosity and secular living, which itself presupposes a preconception of 
Religion within a certain context and framework, wherein Religion, religious, and 
religiosity are inseparable from religion(s). The very conception of religious 
philosophy therefore belongs to a particular preconception of Religion as an object: 
Church, religious institution, and religious tradition. 
 
B. The Philosophy of Religion: Preconception in its origin. 
The location of this preconception belongs to a particular point in time in the 
‘Western’ philosophical tradition with the eruption of what is now called the 
‘Enlightenment’.  In the 18th century the philosophy of religion was first conceived of 
as a valid philosophical endeavour. In this case, the foundation this new philosophical 
endeavour belonged to a preconception of Religion in which religion(s) could be 
categorised as a valid object of philosophy.72 One of the Enlightenment philosophers, 
Hume, was crucial in this formulation insofar as his philosophical writings 
distinguished between reason and faith73, and rejected the metaphysical-theological 
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arguments pertaining to causality.74 In this rejection of non-experiential causality, 
Hume was also able to problematise the conceived necessity of God’s existence.75 
 In response to and in confrontation with Hume’s philosophy, Kant then 
performed a further separation of reason and religion. Initially, Kant began by 
separating out and denying the purely speculative uses of reason in relation to 
traditional Christian religious objects in the Critique of Pure Reason. Following this, 
Kant shunted the religious, as Christianity, into the realm of practical reason and the 
relation of reason to revealed religion.76 Furthermore, Kant also followed Hume in 
making an essential differentiation between belief, as subjective, and knowledge, in 
reason. In this, Kant formulated knowledge as derived from reason as apodictic 
judging: that which pertains to a universal and objective necessity.77 Conversely, 
belief (as religious belief) is formulated as an assertoric judgment pertaining only to a 
subjective necessity without objectivity.78 
 What is found in both Hume and Kant is a separation of Religion from 
Reason. In this separation, the ground for the formulation of an object or category of 
Religion that can be separated out from the rest of living and thinking is provided. 
This object, or category, contains three distinctive, but related, characteristics: objects 
that belong to religion(s), people who believe, i.e. religious individuals, and finally, 
religious tradition, eg. Christianity that can be distinguished from a secular, reasoned, 
world. In all three characteristics, however, it is presupposed that Religion is a valid 
category, an object-like phenomenon that can be differentiated from human living in 
general. This differentiation, again, operates within a preconception that Religion is 
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inherently connected to religion(s); is only manifested in religion(s) and the 
individual’s free decision to belong to religion(s). 
 This preconception of Religion as religion(s) is followed by many introductory 
texts to the philosophy of religion, such as: Ferre, Brightman, Fisher, and Smart.79 
Common to these texts is the assumption that Religion is object-like; that the 
philosophical analysis of Religion takes its data as religious phenomena belonging to 
religions, and finally, that certain objects belong to the phenomenon Religion. Again, 
therefore, the problem of Religion arises out of the unquestioned preconception of 
Religion as object ‘religion’ which does not, and cannot, approach the meaning of 
Religion as a notion. 
 
C. The Philosophy of Religion: As Philosophical Thinking. 
What is generally called the philosophy of religion, then, does not tend to operate as a 
philosophical investigation of Religion at all, but rather tends to investigate religion(s) 
and what constitutes religion(s) phenomenally-empirically within the preconception 
that Religion can be equated with religion(s).The problem of Religion, however, 
could perhaps be approached in a better way if, in the first instance, the preconception 
of Religion is dropped. In this case, the initial problem then becomes the question of 
what philosophy is. This line of argument is pursued by Fisher who states that the 
philosophical question of Religion is first and foremost the question of 
philosophising.80 In this, Fisher takes Religion to be a second order activity wherein 
what must be established first is the sort of philosophising to be done, i.e., logic, 
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metaphysics, epistemology or ethics.81  In this case, what the philosophy of religion 
is, and how it approaches Religion, is entirely dependent upon which dimension, or 
dimensions, are to be utilised. This is perhaps a better approach than others, and yet at 
the same time has its own problems. Here, the dimension of philosophy utilised in 
approach will guide the way in which Religion is predetermined, and visa-versa, the 
way in which Religion is preconceived will guide the choice of which dimension of 
philosophy to utilise. 
 If the problem of Religion is to be investigated by philosophy, then, it follows 
that two questions need to be addressed: of what the problem of Religion is, and 
which dimension of philosophising properly addresses the problem of Religion. For 
the remainder of this section the paper will attempt to address the first question in a 
preliminary manner to be followed throughout chapter one in more depth. The second 
question will be left until the second chapter. 
 
5. A way into the problem of Religion: 
To enter into the problem of Religion properly it is first necessary to determine what 
can be said about the notion Religion. This will also allow of a discussion of how the 
notion of Religion should be approached. Furthermore, this discussion will aim to 
show a way into the problem of Religion. 
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A. Religion as a Universal Notion: 
The first determination of Religion possible is that Religion is a universal notion. In 
this, the universality of Religion as a notion is threefold: pertaining to preconception, 
presupposition, and essence.82 
 Religion is a universal notion, initially, as the immediate preconception of 
Religion through which religion(s) and the religious may be identified as such. 
Herein, the universality of Religion belongs to the everyday understanding of what 
constitutes the various expressions of Religion which, no matter how vague and 
indeterminable, still allows the notion, or the term, ‘Religion’ to mean something.  
 It can be argued that the universality of the notion Religion in this sense 
extends even beyond those languages and cultures in which the term Religion is 
utilised. This is the case insofar as the immediate everyday preconception called 
Religion here is not necessarily located in the term ‘Religion’, but rather, in the 
possibility of any term and any notion that is directed towards what is here called 
Religion.  
Furthermore, the universality of this everyday preconception of Religion 
becomes more evident if universality is taken in a strictly non-empirical sense, 
wherein universality refers to that which is necessary. As such, the everyday 
preconception must be conceived of as universal insofar as the identification of 
religion(s) and the religious is necessarily dependent upon a preconception of 
Religion as that which allows the religion(s) and the religious to be. 
 In the second instance, Religion is determinable as a universal notion with 
regard to presupposition. Here, the fact that any categorisation of religion(s) as 
religion(s), i.e., a possible region of study, presupposes the notion Religion as that 
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which is somehow universal to religion(s). This is of the utmost importance to the 
study of religion(s) insofar as this discipline is dependent upon the presupposed 
notion Religion for: a) the validity of their object of study, b) the possibility of an 
adequate methodological ground, and c) the possibility of delimiting, properly, the 
area of study. 
 Religion must also be conceived of as a universal notion in a final sense, with 
regard to the essence of religions. In this, Religion is universal as the universal ground 
of religions in general. This, then, is the philosophical question of Religion as that 
which, not only enables the identification of religions as a region of study, but points 
back towards that which enables religions to exist. This, furthermore, is the 
determination of Religion as the notion pertaining to the essence of religions. As such, 
Religion as a universal notion is given its fullest meaning, in a pre-interpreted fashion 
as: the essence of what is called religions and the religious in general. 
 
B. Essence and Ontology: 
In formulating the meaning of Religion as the essence of that which is called 
religion(s) and the religious in general, the problematic of Religion has moved into 
the philosophical field of ontology. Here, the essence, the esse, belongs inherently to 
the being of something, and is often utilised as another term for the being of 
something. This question of essence, moreover, pertains to the question of ‘why’ 
something is what it is: being qua being (983a, 25-30)  
 As an ontological problem Religion does not, in the first instance, immediately 
pertain to an entity in its Being. For religions are not entities: are not determinable as 
entities, and do not have the characteristics of entities with being. Nonetheless, the 
problem of Religion, as the essence of religions, is an ontological problem and must, 
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as such, be determined in regard to an entity and their Being. This is the case due to 
the fact that being is always the being of an entity. 
 As an ontological problem then, Religion can be formulated in two closely 
connected ways: that of the meaning of Religion as it is already understood, and that 
of which entity can also said to be religious, i.e. the ground of religion(s). This 
furthermore, is the question of: which entity understands and is the ground of 
religions and the religious in general? 
 
C. Religion and the being of humans (being-human): 
The problem of Religion, as ontological, finds its proper formulation in the twofold 
question of: which entity understands something like Religion, and which entity 
stands-under that which is called religion? 
 In the first question, that entity who understands the meaning of Religion, or 
something like Religion, is none other than ‘we’ humans. Likewise, the entity that can 
be said to be religious, who stands-under religion(s) is none other than human beings. 
It is the human being, then, who must be the theme of any ontological analysis of the 
meaning of Religion. Furthermore, this ontological analysis can be nothing other than 
the analysis of the being of humans, or of being-human. 
 This analysis will not reach its goal, however, if the problem is taken to be that 
of being-human in general insofar as this analysis will not direct itself towards the 
particular problem of the meaning of Religion. The ontological analysis of being-
human, then, will only pertain to the problem of Religion so long as it enquires into 
the being of humans as the entity who understands the meaning of Religion and who 
stands-under religions as the entity for whom being-religious is a possibility. As such, 
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the ontological problem of Religion must be further formulated and given structure as 
it stands in relation to being-human. 
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Chapter Two: The Problem of Ontology: 
 
In this chapter the problem of the notion of Religion will be formulated in relation to 
ontology, with the aim of providing the ground for characterising Religion as a 
phenomenon in Chapter Three. In order for this to be achieved, this chapter will 
proceed in a number of stages, from a general discussion of the tradition of ontology 
to the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s notion of fundamental ontology. The 
discussion will proceed as follows: the tradition of ontology, the possibility of an 
alternative ontology, and the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s ontology. In this, 
the primary goal of the chapter will be the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s 
ontological system as the proper way of formulating Religion as an ontological 
problem via a critical interpretation of the ontological tradition. 
 There are three points that require preliminary clarification at this stage. First, 
this initial interpretation of the philosophical tradition will be implicitly 
‘Heideggerian’, following his argument that the philosophical tradition contains the 
problematic preconception of being in an objective, abstracted sense, as an ‘always 
presence’. Second, this interpretation will also follow Heidegger’s prioritisation of 
Dasein’s being as the proper point of entry for the question of being. Finally, this 
chapter seeks to provide an interpretation of the traditional philosophical 
preconception of being in relation to ontology, eg., the general concept of being. This 
must be distinguished from the overall aim of the thesis to address the meaning of 
Religion as a regional ontological problem; the problem of being-human. In other 
words, the aim of this chapter, in distinction to that of the entire thesis, is to pose the 
problem of ontology in a general sense – in relation to the question of the proper way 
of approaching the concept of being as a problem.  
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6.  The Tradition of Ontology: 
The tradition of ontology will be discussed with two primary dimensions in mind: the 
general structural components of ontology and in reference to the general conceptions 
of being. These two dimensions will serve as the platform for the discussion of 
Religion as an ontological problem insofar as it will allow of a broad but clear view of 
what ontology is, and furthermore, suggest the necessity of an alternative approach to 
ontology. In this, the discussion of the ontological tradition provided here aims to 
show that the accepted definition of Religion as an object ‘religions’ is founded in 
traditional ontology itself. As such, finding the proper way of formulating Religion 
will require that we find an alternative approach to ontology. To do so, however, 
requires that we first come to terms with the way in which the tradition of ontology, 
for the most part, preconceives being.  
 In light of the aims of this chapter it becomes important to distinguish between 
the interpretation of ‘ontology’ as the science of being and the interpretations that this 
thesis will provide, especially in relation to Aristotle, at later stages. The emphasis of 
this interpretation will be to disclose the general preconception of being that operates 
within the tradition of philosophy. Herein, the interpretation of ‘ontology’ will 
emphasise the problems disclosed by Heidegger as a means of providing a stronger 
ontological foundation for the phenomenological analysis of Religion. However, this 
will result in the semblance of a more ‘Heideggerian’ interpretation of ontology than 
this thesis aims to achieve or subscribes to. Thus, interpretations provided at a later 
stage will also appear at odds with this synopsis of the tradition of ontology insofar as 
a phenomenological interpretation of Religion requires more than a simply 
‘Heideggerian’ formulation of being.  In fact, this chapter will epitomise the way in 
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which I am attempting to utilise a ‘Heideggerian’ beginning, eg, the 
phenomenological way into the question of being via Dasein, without subscribing to 
the path of Heidegger’s thinking or his views on Religion.  
 
A. Aristotle: 
The Greek philosophers were the first to posit the problem of ontology via the 
question of being, and of the Greek philosophers, it is arguably Aristotle who first 
constitutes ontology as a problem in any systematic sense. In the discussion of 
Aristotle to be provided here, I will look at Aristotle’s ontology as a system. 
Furthermore, the focus of this interpretation will be towards three themes of the 
question of being: the preconception, the working out, and the presupposition of 
being.83  
 
Preconception 
What is called preconception here must be outlined first as an interpretative tool in 
relation to ontology as a systematic endeavour. Preconception, in general, will signify 
a view in advance, or, a seeing and experiencing of the world in a certain way. This 
preconceiving takes up its impetus and importance insofar as to see the world in a 
certain way is equally to see some things, or some types of things, more than other 
things. Accordingly, to see the world in a certain way is to be able to see some things 
more clearly, to pick something out, or, to focus on some things rather than others. As 
such, to preconceive in this sense signifies the experiencing or seeing of the world in 
such a way as to prioritise some things over others. As a prioritisation, the 
preconception influences the ways in which the world will be, or can be, investigated. 
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This means that when the question of being is asked, it is already asked within the 
context of a certain view of the world, and a prioritisation of certain things over 
others.  
  Preconception will also refer to the question of origination: the grounds of, or, 
the origination of the preconception of being. In this, preconception as a seeing and 
experiencing of the world can be located in reference to its original location, i.e., the 
historical-cultural location in which the preconception is generated. As preconception 
is something implicit to Aristotle’s system of ontology, the interpretation of Aristotle 
will begin by looking for indications of a preconception of being. 
 When Aristotle introduces the question of being he states that being is spoken 
of in many ways, but is spoken of with regard to one thing and a single kind of nature 
(1003a30-35).  Accordingly, Aristotle asserts, the science that studies being qua being 
has as its object ousia, with the corresponding themes of the arc h and ait ion of 
ousia (1003b15-25). As such, the question of being in its investigative structure 
reveals three themes: ousia (the prioritised thing), arc h (the grounds of things), and 
ait ion (the determined principles of knowing things). As indicators of Aristotle’s 
preconception of being, these three themes must be explicated in more detail. 
 In Book One of the Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the system of first 
philosophy as sofia, with the task of attaining knowledge of principles (arc h) and 
causes (ait ion) (982a20-30). Initially, it is important to note that etymologically arc h 
can be taken to signify origin, source, or ground that generates rules.84 Accordingly, 
ait ion may signify the determined principles of entities (rules).85 As such, arc h and 
ait ion are almost interchangeable in meaning, but are utilised by Aristotle in relation 
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to differing conceptual content.86 This difference of conceptual content is, in this 
sense, the following: that arc h is generally used as the origin or source of something 
in an open-ended determining way87, while ait ion is used to refer to determined arc h 
in a specific sense as the causal categories applicable to things.88 A rc h, then, signifies 
the most universal and highest conception of grounds as determining things as things. 
A it ion, accordingly, is the concrete explication of things as things, or, what is 
predicated of all things that are.  
The conceptual correlation of arc h and ait ion, as such, shows that for 
Aristotle the grounds of a thing itself is also the grounds for knowing the thing, i.e., 
there is little distinction between the object itself and the known object. In part, this 
lack of distinction may be accounted for in Aristotle’s understanding of the log oj as 
revealing the truth of something in relation to reality, or a deep connection between 
language and what something is.89 However, this lack of distinction may also be 
viewed as originating from that type of thing that is given priority in Aristotle’s 
preconception of being. This is the question of the priority of ousia and the framing 
of knowledge as knowing ousia.  
 In relation to arc h (which I will usually refer to as ‘ground’) Aristotle’s 
argument is consistent in positing arc h as singular. In this, being is always discussed 
as having a singular originary ground (prot e arc h) that gets expressed in various 
ways (1003b5-6). Accordingly, where Aristotle discusses arc h specifically it is 
initially characterised as the primary origin within the varying levels of a conceptual 
hierarchy (1012b30 - 1013a24). The arc h is determined as having four levels: the 
thing from which something is produced, the form and shape of something, the origin 
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of change (or its lack) and finally, as a things t eloj; what the thing is predestined to 
be (1012b34 – 1013a24). As such, the notion of arc h is closely connected to the 
notions of essence, form, matter and ousia. 
 Following this, cause is conceived of as the determined arc h of all things 
(1013a24-25). As cause is the determination of ground, Aristotle also posits four ways 
of discussing causes: ousia/essence, matter/substrate, origin of change and, the t eloj 
of change (1013a24-35). Here, the formulation of possible causes follows the 
determination of ground, with additional oppositional poles for the four primary 
grounds of things. That cause is the determination of ground means that cause will 
also be closely connected to essence, form, matter and ousia. In order to see these 
connections it is therefore necessary to discuss in some detail the notion of ousia. 
This will, furthermore, bring this interpretation of Aristotle to the theme of ousia as 
the prioritised thing in Aristotle’s preconception of being.  
 In book four of the Metaphysics Aristotle characterises ousia in four ways: 
the subject as a simple body, the cause of a things being, the delimitations (this-ness) 
of a thing, and the essence (what it was to be) of a thing (1017b10-25). In this, the 
characterisation of ousia always refers to a thing or things. Furthermore, the thing-
ness to which ousia refers can also be characterised as physical, or, a reference to 
physical things. This is evidenced in Aristotle’s discussion of nature and being. When 
nature is discussed as a concept five determinations are given. The two highest of 
these determinations connect ousia to natural-physical things. In this, nature is 
determined in its highest conceptions as the ousia of things with natural being, and in 
regard to ousia in general (1015a5-15). Likewise, the highest formulation of being is 
given as ousia, either potential or actual (1015a19).  
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 In book seven, Aristotle formulates the question of being as the question of 
ousia (1028a30-35). The question of being must therefore refer to the question of 
ousia, the being-ness of concrete particular physical things.90 This is why, in the 
hierarchy of ousia, Aristotle formulates ousia as having two dimensions: the things 
essence, and the thing itself (1031a10-14). As such, ousia is given as the unity of the 
thing and its essence (1032a4-5).91 This unity can be seen to provide the framework 
for working out the relation of arc h and ait ion in things as ousia. 
 It is evident that for Aristotle the thing that has ontological priority is ousia, 
determined as the essence and the thing itself. Furthermore, it is also evident that 
ousia always refers in some fashion to physical things and a physical world. If ousia 
is taken to signify the being of physical things it becomes important to provide an 
argument that draws out the priority of the physical in ousia. This will be provided 
via two themes: the priority of ousia as Aristotle justifies it, and the implicit priority 
of the Physics in the Metaphysics. 
 The priority of ousia is initially a question for Aristotle insofar as being can 
be said in many ways, but is at the same time a unity. In this, the question of priority 
then becomes the question of which way of saying being is primary.92 As ousia is 
characterised as the primary way of saying being the problem of priority thus 
becomes the justification of ousia as primary.93 It is, accordingly, Aristotle’s aim to 
show that all ways of saying being, as things that can be said to be, depends upon 
ousia.94 However, if Aristotle has already preconceived being as in some sense 
physical, it is also inevitable that ousia is given priority. In this, the priority of ousia 
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indicates the preconception of being as physical in a number of ways, each evolving 
from the ‘to be’ of a thing. First, the meaning of being is taken to refer to the being of 
beings (1060b30-1061a5). As such, even though there are many ways of saying being 
and many accounts of being, the primary one will always centre on a single feature, 
i.e., the thing in its being (1061b10-16). Here, etymologically, ousia (to be) is related 
to ousiai (proper entities – entities that are physically present as individual self-
contained identities).95 Because of this relation, the question of being is constituted as 
the ousia of ousiai, the being of things that are. The being of entities, the problem of 
detailing what is primary in regard to entities, will therefore not only inherently focus 
on the physical nature of entities but moreover, constitute the being of entities in 
regard to their physical nature. 
  The priority of the physical is not only evidenced in Aristotle’s question of 
being of entities, but can also be seen in the conceptual origin of Meta-Physics as the 
grounding of Physics and the priority of the Physics in the Meta-Physics. The relation 
of the ‘Physics’ to Meta-Physics is, in the first instance, a relation of grounding. In 
this, the Meta-Physics seeks to ground the Physics and the knowledge gained therein. 
This relation, however, also shows the dependence of meta-physics upon physics 
insofar as the agenda (and preconception) of the Meta-physics will be determined by 
the aims of physics. As such, physics can be posited as having priority in meta-
physics and thus, also in relation to the question of being. The first sign of this priority 
occurs in book one of the ‘Metaphysics’ wherein the discussion of causes is already 
framed as the same causes of physics (983a23-32). It is evident, therefore, that the 
primary agenda of the ‘Metaphysics’ already constitutes itself in subservience to the 
‘Physics’ (983b1-5). 
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 In the ‘Physics’ the primary question with regard to things is of movement and 
change.96 In this, two problems arise, the grounds of physical things in their being and 
the question of a things being in the context of movement and change. In the first 
case, unless being is preconceived as the being of a physical individual entity, physics 
will have no proper grounds and can achieve no certain knowledge.97 For physics to 
be properly grounded, the being of entities as it is constituted in meta-physics will 
necessarily correspond to the problem of the being of things in regard to change and 
movement. This is why, when being is determined as ousia, the problem becomes the 
twofold determination of arc h and ait ion, originary ground and concrete 
determination of the categories belonging to a physical thing, as it is present.98 
Accordingly, the preconception of being in Aristotle must be viewed as the physical, 
and the question of being reiterated as the question of the being of physical entities.99 
It is therefore, for our purposes, the question of just what being-physical is. 
 
 Working Out 
In order to move towards the theme of presupposition I will now turn to the theme of 
‘working out’. The ‘working out’ will signify two processes in Aristotle’s meta-
physics: the ‘working out’ from the preconception of being as the being of physical 
entities and the ‘working out’ of the presupposition.  In this, two issues will be 
addressed: how Aristotle’s question of being (ousia) gets informed by the 
preconception of being, and how this requires the positing of a presupposition (a 
presupposed object as ground). In the following interpretation of Aristotle’s ‘working 
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out’ the question of being I will utilise two interpretative theses: that Aristotle’s 
metaphysics is consistently hierarchical, and that arc h and ait ion are the two notions 
through which the metaphysics is worked out. As such, the interpretation of 
Aristotle’s working out will begin with a discussion of arc h and ait ion. 
 Initially, cause (ait ion) can be characterised as determined principles (arc h). 
In this, causes are both principles that are determined in relation to things and the 
primary determining principles of things as things. As such, cause can be viewed as 
principles, which determine things as particular things, and the principles of all 
particular things. Accordingly, causes refer to things that are (present) and categorises 
that which constitutes the presence of particular things in general. In other words, 
cause functions as a determination of presence: that all things present in particulars 
are present in all particulars, and thus in the universals said of these particulars.100  
This is also to say that all universal things (causes) present in particulars are things 
predicated in all other presented things.101 
 Causes, as such, can be constituted as the universal necessary dimensions of 
physical things in their presence and also those features that are accidental to 
presented things.102 In this, cause has its highest expression in the categories wherein 
all causes therein are primary, the universal predicates of things that are present, and 
what can be said of all entities as presented.103 What can be said of entities is divided 
into primary features of all entities and the accidental features of entities. As the 
essential and accidental are constituted in relation to each other it follows that the 
categories as causes are formulated expressly with the aim of determining every and 
any physically present entity in regard to its individual identity within a conceptual 
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structure of universal predicates of all physically present things. Thus, when Aristotle 
discusses cause as a notion, it follows that the focus will be upon the primary 
dimensions of what constitutes a thing as present, or, potentially present. As such, the 
characterisation of cause must refer back to the question of arc h as the ground of 
things in particular. Furthermore, cause will refer back to the prot e arc h in relation 
to a primary origin (1013a20-21). 
 What is the relation of cause and presence? This is the question that shows 
how Aristotle’s meta-physics works out of his preconception of being as the being of 
physical-entities. In this, the relation of cause and presence operates in the realm of 
the justification of the priority of ousia: in knowledge, definition, and time.104   
The first two justifications are interrelated, wherein both the possibility of 
knowledge and definition relies upon the presence of the subject as a physically 
present thing.105 In order to define something, this something must be self-contained, 
i.e., it must have its own identifiable presence. Likewise, to know the object-itself, the 
object must present itself in some way. As such, the thing must be present (have 
matter) as the identifiable subject that also contains a knowable physical dimension 
that allows of grounding.106 It follows that central to the possibility of defining and 
knowing a thing as a thing is the thing’s matter: that it has physical presence. Matter, 
however, is not what a thing is because it is not the thing’s ground. Rather, matter is 
the bare substratum of concrete ousia (physical presence) that allows further 
determinations of the being of physical things.107 In other words, presence is the this-
ness of ousia in its primary sense, the bare physical self-delimitations of a thing as 
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present/presented.108 As such, the preconception of being as the being of physical 
things is worked out as presence and the re-presentation of things. This remains an 
issue in relation to the arc h.  
With respect to cause and time, the presence of a thing must be considered as a 
temporal determination. When a thing is present, it is present now, in the present. 
Accordingly, the possibility of definition of knowledge, insofar as it requires 
presence, must also be seen to prioritise a temporal sense: the now, whether in 
reference to the thing as here/there-now or as re-present-able (brought into the 
present). Furthermore, if cause is given this temporal sense, then it would follow that 
the present also has some significance for the arc h.  
Aristotle formulates arc h in two ways, in relation to the ground of particular 
things framed in a universal sense, and in relation to a singular unitary originary 
ground. The first formulation of arc h aims to find the ground of physical things in 
relation to their particularity and determinable identity. Accordingly, the first 
formulation of arc h can be viewed as the grounding of the categorical causes. In this, 
arc h in the first sense will focus on the grounds of physically present things as 
determinable. As such, the first sense of arc h involves the discussion of the essence 
and form of physically present things.  In book four of the Metaphysics Aristotle 
discusses the notion of arc h as: the ends, the intrinsic, origination of change, and as 
that by which a thing is primarily what it is (1013a24-35). These ways of conceiving 
the arc h focus upon the notions of essence and form. 
Essence can be determined etymologically ( t i ein einai) in English as ‘what 
it was to be that thing’ (1028b33-34).109 In this, essence may be interpreted as having 
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two significations: the entirety of a thing temporally (its temporal origination, its 
becoming, and its completion) and the entirety of a thing as a unified whole (complete 
presence). The essence of something, as such, is the thing’s unity as a whole, or, a 
complete account of what it is/was/always-will-be to be that thing.110 Accordingly, the 
essence of something is the twofold ground of something as an independent thing: its 
form and matter.111 
The essence of physical things, of substantial things, is always twofold: 
containing its composition of form and matter. However, the composition of a 
physical entity is secondary, hierarchically, wherein ‘this-ness’ (matter) only 
determines the individual presence of a thing, but does not reveal what the thing itself 
is.112 Furthermore, a thing’s matter is also secondary to its form insofar as a thing’s 
presence may only be potential, may consist of accidental causes, and finally, insofar 
as the matter of a thing may change in its shape. In this sense, there is a close 
connection between shape and form. It is therefore the form of a physical thing that 
must be prioritised in relation to essence. This is so, because the form of a thing, like 
essence, is in some sense trans-temporal in relation to an individual entity whereas 
matter is not. Additionally, what makes something what it is ‘as a whole’ (essence) is 
equivalent to what it becomes or what it ought to be (form). As such, it is form that 
can be constituted as what truly differentiates one thing from another as their primary 
essence.113 The theme of arc h given in the question of essence must, therefore, be 
determinable in relation to form. 
The characterisation of form is, as the primary essence of what a thing is, 
fundamentally temporal. In this, the determination of a thing’s form, as its unity as a 
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whole, will be inherently constituted in regard to time insofar as a physical thing 
moves and changes over time. As such, the interpretation of form will necessarily 
focus on how form is constituted in relation to time.  
Initially, form is characterised in relation to the physical problem of how 
physical things are generated and corrupted while remaining what they are (unified 
whole/unified over time).114 In this, form is related to natural things in two ways: as 
self-generating and as self-completing.115 In this regard, form is determinable as the 
shape ( m orph) of a thing and the inner cause ( t eloj) of what a thing is meant to 
become.116  As such, form is utilised in two ways: literally as the form (shape) of the 
thing and the inner cause of the thing. Of these two senses of form the second is the 
higher and primary one.   
The second use of form is inherently temporal, referring to an origin, 
becoming, and completion in time. In this, the unitary whole of form will necessitate a 
conception of form that somehow unifies the temporal dimensions of a things 
presence. The primary dimension of a thing in time is its completion, or, what it is 
meant to become.117 As such, it would seem that form points towards a teleological 
notion of essence: that what something is represented as is essentially its completion, 
i.e., that the seed becomes a tree.118 This is certainly the case insofar form designates 
the completed presence of a thing, rather than its literal end (death, corruption). This 
completed presence, then, is no purely temporal t eloj, but rather a t eloj of highest 
presence: a peak (fulfilment) rather than end.  
Form, as the completion of an entity and the entities highest presence views 
the essence of a thing as ultimately in time as the present. This is the case for at least 
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two reasons: first, the things origin (past) is viewed as already containing its complete 
presence, and furthermore, the things future is contained in its highest presence. In 
another sense, the way in which form signifies temporality must be conceived of as 
present, in the now, because form like essence is static, i.e., it is a universal 
determination of what a thing is. For something to be determinable in this way, in 
Aristotle’s philosophical view, means that the thing is present and re-presentable, 
even always-present. This is the case, more than anything else, because Aristotle does 
not distinguish between thought and object epistemologically. This, however, leaves 
us with the question of how the essence of something may be constituted in its highest 
mode as the ground of the presence of something in a trans-temporal way. 
It is first worthy of note that the formation of things in becoming what they 
already are always follows fixed eternal patterns.119 Likewise, the coincidental factors 
of becoming never follow the eternal.120 As such, the formation of a thing, the 
becoming of form, always becomes in a certain way. 
The temporal determination of presence is also pivotal in the possibility of 
knowledge, that something can be known for what it is, and equally, that something 
gives itself as an identifiable presence. In this, for a thing’s essence to be known the 
thing must be present and re-presentable.121 As such, a knowable thing in its ground 
must in some sense be constantly present, eternal (aei).122 If the arc h, essence and 
form of a thing were not in some sense always present the object could not be known 
and therefore never present in its arc h. Furthermore, the always present structure of a 
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thing in its arc h also dictates that reality (in its originary ground) must also be 
constituted as eternal – always present (aei).123  
The necessity of the eternal (aei) as always presence of the grounds of reality 
returns to the way in which Aristotle’s meta-physics works out of the ontological 
preconception of being as being-physical. In this, the discussion will move from the 
working out from preconception to the presupposition. 
 
Presupposition 
There are five ways that will be utilised to show why the always-presence (aei) of 
reality is necessary in Aristotle’s meta-physics: matter, the categories, motion/change, 
modes of being-present, and finally, thinking as movement. 
The first of these, matter, returns the discussion to the basic presence of reality 
as physical. In this, the material substratum of reality is formulated as universal.124  In 
the preconception of being as being-physical there is a necessity that reality also be 
formulated as physical. This physicality of reality must refer to the physical matter 
that constitutes real things as a universal substratum of the presence of things. The 
universality of matter constitutes every thing as a bare physical presence.125 As such, 
the universality of matter, the bare presence of reality, can be expressed in two ways: 
as everywhere (spatial) and always (universal over time).126 If this were not the case, 
there would be no-thing to be present. Thus, the bare physical content of reality 
necessitates the eternal, always presence of the real. 
The categories also indicate the necessity of conceiving the real and reality in 
regard to always presence. In this, the categories as cause, the determined arc h of 
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things, function as universal determinations. However, the universality of determined 
causes is dependent upon the reality of always-present ways of being present. If there 
was no always-present reality, or ways of being real, there could be no arc h of 
things, no determinable t eloj, origination, or primary ousia of a thing. This is the 
case insofar as arc h inherently determines things with regard to their presence in the 
present, actual or possible. 
The central theme of change/motion shows the necessity of an always-present 
reality in three related ways. Initially, the reality of movement (its presence) means 
that there must be a reality that contains and allows this movement. This reality, 
however, is one that may only allow movement in not being moved itself: it contains 
change without itself changing. In this sense, reality must be always present as a 
presence that does not change, that facilitates change while also being beyond change. 
Likewise, the arc h and causes found in first philosophy only pertain to the always 
present aei (1026a17-18). This is the case because the arc h and its determinations 
are unchanging, not affected by movement/change in the subject/ousiai (1026a27-
32). As such, the highest presence of a physical thing, when it is determined, is real as 
always present. 
Finally, in relation to movement and change, Aristotle asserts that movement 
always has its originary ground in a mover: something by which things are changed. 
In this, a mover may refer to a particular thing in its self-originary grounds, but also, 
in relation to reality as a whole (1074b1-14). Accordingly, the prime mover (in 
relation to reality as a whole) is not moved but rather contains movement in itself as 
the activation of all movement (1072a25). This mover, as such, is eternal: is always 
present as the generator of movement (1072a26).  
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The modes of being present also shows the necessity of the always presence of 
reality. In this, the modes of being present function as a hierarchy of presence and 
dependence. The modes of being present are threefold, but contain two fundamental 
distinctions: of sensible and non-sensible presence. The first of the two types of 
sensible presence is the finite or perishable mode of a physical thing (1069a31). The 
second is the always-present thing (1069a30-31). Insofar as sensible things in general 
are constituted in change/movement of nature it follows that this distinction of 
sensible things is the distinction of individual entities as mortal/finite or 
immortal/heavenly (1069a31). Non-sensible presence is then constituted as singular 
and unmoved, an always-present thing (1069b1-2). This eternal and non-sensible 
thing, insofar as it is the originary ground of reality as a whole, must also be 
constituted as the presupposition of being, i.e., the object that is necessarily 
presupposed as ground. 
Finally, Aristotle characterises thinking itself as a way of movement and 
change (1072a25-35). In this, thought is movement in being moved, having its 
originary ground in a mover of thought (1072b1-5). Accordingly, the intrinsic moved-
ness of thought is expressed in its highest form where it is directed towards the mover 
(1072b6-10). As such, the originary ground of thought and its highest expression 
belong to the mover of thought, the self-thinking thought, in the always-present entity 
(1072b10-15). Thus, the movement of thought also reveals its ground in the always-
present thinking and the entity who is always present as the originary ground of 
thinking in general. 
The working out of the preconception has shown that insofar as reality and the 
real is necessarily constituted as always present, there is also necessarily an originary 
ground of the always-present. In this, the problematic of first philosophy becomes 
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twofold: in ontology, that all real things are determined in their own arc h or always 
being-present; and furthermore, in theology, that reality as a whole is determined in 
relation to its highest mode of always-presence - the divine (1026a10-33, 1071b3-
1074b14). Ontology, as such, is the working out from the preconception of 
determining things as what they are, and what they must be, in being-present. 
Theology, accordingly, is the positing of a presupposition, a presupposed thing, 
constituted as the originary ground of things in general (reality). This presupposed 
thing is necessary insofar as being is always the being of a being. 
However, the preconception and presupposition are inherently connected, both 
belonging to an experience and interpreting of the world. Aristotle details this 
connection in various statements, but none more poignant than that wherein the prime 
mover (the divine) is posited in relation to primordial beliefs of Greek ancestors 
(1074b12-14). The theological dimension of first philosophy has, as such, often been 
associated with a Greek deification of nature.127 
The connection of preconception and presupposition in Aristotle’s 
‘Metaphysics’, as ontology and theology, can be said to be the primary theme of 
influence passed down into the tradition of ontology in ‘Western Philosophy’. In this, 
ontology has often been referred to as theology without distinction128, a factor in the 
discrediting of ontology as a problem. What is more important to this paper, however, 
is the question of whether the preconception of being in Aristotle (being as being-
physically-present) gets passed down. This is the case insofar as any preconception of 
being as being-physically-present will influence how Religion may be formulated as 
an ontological problem. As such, the paper will now turn to a brief discussion of the 
tradition of ontology solely in regard to the question of preconception. It is my 
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contention that the preconception of being will continue to determine how being is 
formulated, and furthermore, what ways of being are prioritised. This will lead into 
the question of whether there are alternative ways of preconceiving being that allow 
the notion of Religion to be addressed as an ontological problem. 
 
B. Scholastic Ontology: 
In this brief discussion of scholastic ontology I will aim to provide a general view of 
how Aristotle’s preconception of being as physical presence is carried over into a 
Christian theological environment. In this, there are three themes to be addressed; that 
of the ontological presupposition, the question of essence and existence, and finally, 
the reduction of being to presence. 
The primary focus of a Christian philosophy, the ontological presupposition of 
God, defines scholastic ontology. In this, scholastic ontology does not originate in a 
philosophical school with a singular methodological approach, but rather, is the name 
for the philosophical endeavours of ‘Christendom’.129 Accordingly, the ontological 
presupposition of scholastic philosophy was God in the sense that philosophy was 
theology, and that there was no other possible primary object of thought.130 As such, 
the context of ontology, in the system of meta-physics, changed from the discovery 
and grounding of first principles to the philosophical construction and apologetics of 
the doctrine of God. Philosophy, thus, operates as dogma: the explanation of church 
doctrine in metaphysical terms.131 The ontological problem, in this context, was no 
longer the problem of knowing what originary ground could be called, but rather, the 
                                               
129
 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures On The History Of Philosophy: Vol. 3, Medieval and Modern Philosophy,  
E.S. Haldane & H. Simson (trans.) p.38. Hegel refers to ‘Christendom’ as the faith of the Church for 
the greater part of a thousand years. 
130
 Ibid.p.40. The doctrine of God equally constituted as speculative concept of God, and thus, theology 
determined as nothing less than philosophy itself. 
131
 Ibid.p.61. “The building up of the dogmas of the Christian Church.” 
 59 
problem of establishing knowledge about things from the already  presupposed truths 
of God’s nature, and the effects of these truths upon the way in which reality could be 
constituted. 
In relation to the question of preconception, scholastic ontology can be seen to 
make an important distinction between essence (esse) and being (ens). This distinction 
operates as the question of being where the originary ground of being is already 
presupposed. In this, the problem of ontology remains as the working out of the 
presupposition (and implicitly, the preconception) solely in regard to the problem of 
the difference between essence and being. This difference becomes a priority of 
philosophical endeavour in that, following Greek philosophy, essence is constituted as 
inherently belonging to the arc h (originary ground of being). Where the prot e arc h 
is presupposed to be God, the problem of ontology becomes a question of whether 
individual entities have their own ground, and furthermore, whether being as a 
problem refers to originary ground at all. Three scholastic philosophers will be 
interpreted in relation to this question of difference: Thomas Aquinas, Dun Scotus, 
and Suarez. 
Aquinas is credited with attempting to make theology philosophical and 
systematic.132 This attempt was made within the context of Aristotle’s meta-physics, 
wherein Aquinas grappled with Aristotle’s texts themselves without the neo-platonic 
accretions common to other interpretations of Aristotle of that time.133 As an 
Aristotelian, Aquinas can be interpreted via his (interpretative) adherence to 
Aristotle’s system of meta-physics. In this, Aquinas follows Aristotle in formulating 
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metaphysics as dealing solely with the question of being.134 Likewise, Aquinas also 
follows Aristotle in conceiving being (ens) as that which is common to all things.135 
Furthermore, Aquinas also follows Aristotle in positing the problem of being as 
ousia (substance).136 
Substance is characterised as signifying the real, the being real of presence.137 
In this, however, a difference arises between two ways of being real: either as the 
originary ground of the reality of all present things (God), and as the dependent reality 
of present things; the form and matter of individual physically present entities.138 As 
such, there are two ways of being real, God as essence and the physical reality of 
present things. Insofar as being is that which is common to all things it follows, then, 
that being signifies the reality of the existent.139 On the other hand, the reality of God 
refers to the reality of cause and originary grounds: the essence of what is real.140 
This determination of the real as twofold amends the Aristotelian system of 
ontology insofar as it denies the possibility of self-originary-ground for individual 
things. In this, the Aristotelian connection of matter, form, essence and arc h comes to 
be divided into two ways of being real: a) God - originary ground and essence, b) 
being - matter and form. This implies, however, that the question of being is 
contained in the problem of determining that which is common to all physically 
present things, eg., something like the categories. As such, Aquinas reduces the 
question of being to presence in the present, actuality and existence. Furthermore, 
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insofar as beings can be known in essence, it will always pertain to an external object 
as the ground, i.e., a ground that does not belong to the particular thing itself.141 
If we consider the problem of Religion for a moment, it becomes apparent that 
Aquinas’ conception of being allows only two possible approaches to Religion: either 
the description of ‘its’ matter and form (as a present object) or an essentialist 
definition of Religion which gets determined via an external object, i.e., God, the 
divine, and so on.  
In interpreting the position of Dun Scotus and Suarez on essence and 
existence, I will aim to show that they both can be seen to reinforce the distinction 
provided by Aquinas in their own ways. In Dun Scotus the distinction between 
essence and (being) existence is formulated as a distinctio modalis, or, a distinction 
between modes of being: created and non-created.142 In this, Scotus asserts that the 
essence of created beings (finite beings) is that they are created.143 Accordingly, the 
essence of each particular thing is the essence it was given by God. Furthermore, God, 
as essence in general, is non-created/self-creating.144 As such, being is determined as 
existence: the presence of created entities.145 
In Suarez, the distinction of essence and being is formulated as a distinctio 
rationis, or, a conceptual difference applicable to created entities.146 The question of 
what something is, its essence, is therefore conceptually differentiated from its 
presence.147 In this, Suarez takes being to signify existence, the actuality or presence 
of something.148 The distinction of essence and being is not real and does not refer to 
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differing modes of being, but rather, is inherently co-constituted in the entity’s 
presence.149 This is to say that what something is, its essence, is co-presented in the 
actual presence of a thing. As such, what is presented in regard to essence in a thing’s 
presence is its created-ness, its finitude. Thus, the essence of a finite being is present 
as a dependency upon something else for its existence. 
In summary, the brief discussion of scholastic ontology has brought two 
ontological problems to light: that being continues to be formulated in relation to 
physical presence, and furthermore, that in scholastic ontology being and essence are 
disconnected. As such, the problem of ontology has been re-enforced as the problem 
of the physical presence of things and, additionally, been reduced to the mere 
presence of things dependent upon some external thing for its ground (essence). This 
twofold problematic of ontology must be kept in mind in relation to ‘Enlightenment’ 
ontology.  
 
C. Enlightenment Ontology: 
In turning to the problem of ontology in Enlightenment philosophy I will follow the 
general schema that has been followed thus far. In this, the discussion of 
Enlightenment philosophy will be focused upon the question of how being is 
preconceived. As such, the discussion of Enlightenment philosophy will frame the 
problem of ontology in regard to three themes: the prioritisation of presence, the 
conception of being as presence, and the conception of being as the being of physical 
things. Of the broad spectrum of Enlightenment philosophers I will delimit the 
discussion to Descartes and Kant as the philosophers who exemplify Enlightenment 
philosophy in this sense.  
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Descartes: 
Descartes, I will attempt to show, must be viewed as retaining the same ontological 
problem as the tradition before him in conceiving being as referring to things that can 
be said to be present. However, Descartes also amends this conception, positing the 
problem in relation to the problem of knowing.  As such, the discussion of Descartes 
will focus upon indications of the ontological in his central work Meditations on First 
Philosophy (1642). 
In the first meditation Descartes sets the scene for the ontological problematic 
in regard to the question of certainty, or, of knowledge that can be said to have 
indubitable certainty.150 In this, Descartes posits a balancing act, a set of scales per se, 
between knowing and living. In the first instance, knowing begins, methodologically, 
with complete scepticism, derived from the recognition that the senses are 
unreliable.151 Juxtaposed to the problem of knowing, however, is the necessity in 
ordinary life to get on with it: to suspend complete scepticism and accordingly 
presuppose some meaning by which everyday life can be grounded.152 Insofar as the 
task of philosophy is constituted as the grounding of certain knowledge, the problem 
is going to begin with absolute scepticism. 
The second meditation is an attempt to begin this task, denying the senses, the 
reality of the world and the everyday presupposed grounds. In this, Descartes finds 
that the ‘I am’ or ‘I exist’ is the only necessary fact to begin with.153 The ‘I am’ is 
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posited as a necessary condition of thought, the self-awareness of the self-thinking.154 
As such, Descartes asserts, nothing is more manifest to me than my own mind.155  
In the indubitable certainty of the ego (cogito) Descartes finds his ground of 
knowing. Without further explication, however, it is already evident that in the cogito 
Descartes has already produced an ontological argument in reference to knowledge: 
that it is the being who can know, in the way that it may know, that is the ground of 
knowledge. In this, the cogito of res cogitans is self-giving: it is present(ed) to the self 
as the self-thinking. Accordingly, the indubitable certainty of the cogito is posited via 
its necessary presence, its manifestation to perception. As such, the problem of 
knowing must be constituted as the grounding of knowledge via the presence of 
thinking to the entity who thinks. Furthermore, the cogito ergo sum is necessarily the 
positing of being, of existence, via the presence of thought to the thinker. Therefore, 
to discuss Descartes as having an ontological problem with regard to knowledge is to 
discuss the prioritisation of a being in its being (self-present-ed). This is nothing other 
than a certain prioritisation of presence.  
In the third meditation, Descartes turns to the problem of knowing in regard to 
its objects. In this, the problem of knowledge is twofold. Ideas (as knowledge) are 
given as either the being of res cogitans (innate) or external sources (nature).156  
Nature, for Descartes, is constituted as a problem: that somehow objects come to be 
imposed upon res cogitans from outside.157 Accordingly, the problem of objects is 
given as that of effect, and the question of what causes these effects.158 These affects 
upon the cogito, in their perfection (the seamlessness of their presentation), must then 
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be independent of the cogito.159 This leads to the presupposition of God, the ground of 
nature (res extensa) and of these effects; infinite substance, the cause/creator of all 
beings.160 
What we have in Descartes formulation of the ground of knowledge is an 
ontological system. This system contains two types of beings, res cogitans and res 
extensa, both of which have their grounds in infinite substance. In this, the ontological 
problematic of knowing means that both types of being are constituted in their 
presence: res cogitans by its self-presence in the awareness of the self-thinking, and 
res extensa by its presented-affects upon the cogito.  
In the discussion of Descartes, it has been shown that Descartes follows the 
tradition of ontology in preconceiving being as presence. Furthermore, Descartes also 
follows the scholastic philosophers in presupposing God dogmatically with regard to 
the ground of reality. Descartes, however, also adds to the tradition via his absolute 
scepticism, which leads to the prioritisation of res cogitans as a knowing entity. In 
this addition, the question of being is degraded as a philosophical problem. The 
question of being is reformulated through the question of grounding knowledge and 
res cogitans and thus leads to a focus upon the problem of epistemology. This could 
only occur due to the disconnection of ground (arc h and essence) from being, and the 
corresponding preconception of being as the presence of physical things.  
This is perhaps, exactly where philosophy finds itself with Kant. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that in attempting to ground knowledge, Kant’s philosophical 
thinking engages in an ontological exposition of the Being of humans as knowing, 
with its own ontological preconception of Being. 
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Kant 
In Kant, the discussion of the ontological problematic reaches its philosophical 
culmination with regard to the tradition that has been discussed thus far. In this, the 
discussion of Kant will culminate in the question of whether Kant implicitly 
conceives being in reference to physically present things, and whether in Kant there is 
a possible alternative to this preconception. These questions are of the utmost 
importance insofar as they constitute the place in which Religion gets characterised as 
object-like and the possibility of an alternative approach to Religion.  
Kant’s refutation of the ontological proof of God’s existence indicates Kant’s 
conception of being. In the first instance, Kant’s refutation belongs to the statement 
that “Being is obviously not a real predicate”.161 The conception and dismissal of 
being belongs to the term ‘real’ and in the phrase ‘real predicate’. The real, in its 
meaning for Kant, can only be understood within the context of Kant’s systematic 
agenda: the metaphysical problem of reality. As such, the conception of being must be 
introduced via a more general discussion of Kant’s critical agenda. 
Kant’s critical agenda is first introduced as an attempt to rescue the sinking 
ship of metaphysics based upon the insight that Reason, an inherent mode of human 
thinking, consistently transcends its own powers.162 In this, metaphysics as a tradition 
becomes dogmatic, making and attempting to enforce claims that have no real 
legitimacy.163 Accordingly, the dogmatism of metaphysics has led to its downfall; that 
it becomes a questionable agenda, and produces only controversial knowledge.164 
Kant’s agenda, in this light, is to find a ground for metaphysics that is not dogmatic 
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via a tribunal of Reason.165 This tribunal, the critique of pure reason, takes as its 
primary task the grounding of reason; as self-knowledge. Furthermore, this tribunal 
intends to find this ground, and security, in the faculty of Reason itself; independently 
of all experience.166  
In the preface of the second edition, the agenda of the critique is framed within 
the context of science and logic; wherein both have produced certain knowledge.167 In 
this, Kant’s search for certainty (ground) is associated with the sciences insofar as the 
sciences work.168 Furthermore, this working nature of the sciences, Kant claims, only 
came about via revolutions in the methodological principles by which they attained 
knowledge.169 As such, it seems necessary that metaphysics also undergo a 
methodological revolution, to which Kant has his own answer. “Hitherto it has been 
assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend 
our knowledge… have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make 
trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we 
suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.”170 
The critical revolution, often called the Copernican revolution, also 
revolutionises the notion of reality in relation to knowledge. In this, Kant takes issue 
with the traditional notion of reality (as the self-given-ness of objects to humans) and 
picks up on the hidden clause in the traditional formulation: ‘as humans see them’, 
making this clause the central question of philosophy.  Furthermore, insofar as 
metaphysics belongs to humans in the faculty of Reason, Kant will also constitute 
knowledge via an investigation of the structures of Reason as producing knowledge. 
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This investigation of Reason will not merely reveal the structures of knowing, but will 
also attempt to show how reality itself is constituted in Reason as it produces 
knowledge. This is not to say that humans create or produce reality itself, but rather, 
that humans have a relationship with reality, via knowing, in such a way as to 
constitute reality as knowable. 
The constitution of reality, of real objects, in Reason (as that which enables a 
knowing relation with objects) means that Kant’s conception of reality differs from 
the metaphysical tradition. In this, reality is first and foremost a concept of reason; as 
that which contains all predicates within itself in regard to the complete determination 
of anything in a totality.171 The real, as such, belongs to the determinable and 
determination of things.172 The concept of reality, thus, must ultimately signify that 
which explains how objects of experience and thought are possible for humans.173 
This is to say that reality can only be conceived of primarily within the structure of 
knowledge, i.e., how objects are present and re-presentable for humans.174  
Even though reality and the real is constituted in the structure of knowledge 
Kant also posits an unknowable dimension to reality. This takes place in Kant’s 
system of transcendental idealism and empirical realism. It is not possible, here, to 
delve into this issue fully, but it is necessary to give at least the broadest outlines of 
this system. In this, it is possible to outline the transcendental/empirical system via the 
claim that “all our knowledge begins with experience”.175 This means, initially, that 
the problem of a priori knowledge (metaphysical knowledge) must be restricted to the 
investigation of the principles of the possibility of experience.176 If this restriction is 
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applied to the concept of reality then it follows that what is real can only be 
investigated in relation to experience; insofar as the thing is given to experience and 
in relation to the a priori structures of that experience. The objects thus presented to 
experience are only known in their presentation, re-presentation, and the way in which 
they get presented. On the other hand, the object-in-itself is not given, but only known 
through experience.177 
This distinction of the real, between a knowable and unknowable dimension of 
reality, means that for humans the knowable is the presented (in experience). 
Furthermore, the presentation of objects to humans, in its structure, is the sole 
question of metaphysics; the question of what is determinable of things in their 
presentation, i.e., of real predication. In this, the ‘real’ of real predication inherently 
belongs to the possibility or actuality of a things presence in experience that allows of 
determinations. This is why, when Kant discusses being, he asserts that the reality of a 
thing must be distinguished from its possible existence (Da-Sein).178 The possible, or 
posited, existence of something cannot be added to the concept of a thing, for it is the 
identity (concept) of the thing itself, possible or not. The content of real predication, 
as the determination of a thing, operates solely within the realm of the object’s 
presence in experience and the a priori structures of that experience.   
If we return to Kant’s view of the problem of being it comes as no surprise 
that being is not a real predicate. In this, there are two primary dimensions to the 
concept of being that need to be discussed: the concept of being, and being as the 
copula.  
In regard to the former, Kant posits being as signifying a possible object.179 
Being is the positing of a thing as existing.180 As such, the concept of being signifies 
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nothing in itself, but rather, merely asserts existence.181 This positing of being 
operates in two ways: either as the positing of an object in relation to its concept, or 
the positing of something as existing.182 The positing of an object in relation to its 
concept is analytic, i.e., it merely posits the identity of a thing. Likewise, being as the 
existence of a being signifies the content of a presented thing as an analytic 
determination, i.e., identity.183 Thus, the unity of the concept (being) and existence is 
given as an analytic signification, as the bare framework of identity. This means, 
overall, that being as the positing of existence is contingent; requiring the presence of 
the thing in experience, and furthermore, underpinned by the structure of reason as 
constituting the presence of things. This makes sense, in light of the ‘Copernican’ 
revolution, for if the object in its being-present-in-itself is rejected (the traditional 
formulation) then the concept of being must be reduced to being-possibly-present as 
the conceptual identity of a thing within the framework of how things get presented 
via reason. In this case, being is not only preconceived as being-present, i.e., 
existence, but is furthermore, reduced to the identity of presence – the mere concept 
of a thing as identifiable as a particular thing. 
The second way Kant discusses being, as the copula (the ‘is’) in many ways 
clarifies Kant’s conception of being. In this, Kant formulates being as position or 
relation,184 wherein the ‘is’ posits the relation of subject and predicate.185 The relation 
of subject and predicate (S is P) means that being never adds anything to a subject at 
all other than its position as a possible/impossible or actual/non-actual object.186 
Being, as such, can only be constituted as a modality of presence: actual or possible. It 
                                                                                                                                      
180
 Ibid.p.505 
181
 Ibid.p.505 
182
 Ibid.p.505 
183
 Ibid.p.506 
184
 Ibid.p.505 
185
 Ibid.p.505 
186
 Ibid.p.505 
 71 
follows that being is not a real predicate because it does not determine anything about 
an object other than that it is an identifiable object of experience. Being, therefore, 
signifies the modality of identity in the copula; either present or possible. If it is a real 
object, then, its being (conceptual identity) is undifferentiated from its existence 
(actual identity). Accordingly, being must be viewed as subservient to the a priori 
structures of reason that allow presence in the first instance. 
In regard to this paper’s aims, the discussion of Kant has thus far shown that 
the critical agenda conforms to the tradition of ontology in conceiving being in 
relation to presence, or, the being-present of physical (experience-able) things. For 
Kant, this conception of being means that being gets dismissed from metaphysics as a 
primary concern. The task given to metaphysics by Kant, however, may also be 
viewed as producing an implicit ontological revolution and a new way of conceiving 
being. As such, the discussion of Kant will now consider the implicit possibility of an 
ontological revolution via the analysis of the subject, i.e., the Being of humans. 
In discussing Kant’s conception of the subject it will be at first necessary to 
investigate the subject merely as a knower, i.e., via the Critique of Pure Reason. The 
discussion will aim to provide a bare outline of how Kant’s critical agenda may be 
characterised as an ontological argument. Kant conceives the self in two ways; as 
appearance and as a thing-in-itself.187 In this, the subject as knowing is itself viewed 
as a knowable object. Accordingly, the subject as knowable, rather than knowing, is 
conceived of as both an unknowable thing in itself and an appearance in 
experience.188 So much for the subject as knowable. 
On the other hand, the subject is knowing; it is the being that can know. If 
Kant supplies a structural account of reason, that shows how humans necessarily 
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experience the world as knowable, could it not be said that this account is implicitly 
ontological: an ontological account of the being of humans as knowing? Furthermore, 
if ontology is the study of beings in their being, would it not also be true that Kant’s 
structural analysis of the necessary conditions of experience must be constituted as an 
ontological analysis? This is precisely the argument that I would make here!189 If this 
were true, it would mean that Kant has achieved an ontological revolution of sorts: 
that ontology is no longer the study of present objects themselves, but rather, the 
study of how objects become present as knowable for humans in our Being.  
Following this claim, it would seem that Kant’s formulation of the Being of 
humans is not enough in the Critique of Pure Reason, for a proper ontology must 
consider the being of a being in its unity/entirety, and not simply with regard to one 
particular region of that being. Furthermore, in relation to Religion, Kant’s analysis of 
the structure of knowing is not ontologically viable; for the reason it fails as 
mentioned above, but also insofar as it fails to address the question of human 
activities in relation to our Being. As such, if Religion is to be constituted properly as 
an ontological problem it must also be possible for the problematic of ontology to 
extend beyond the region of human knowledge, into such regions in human actions, 
such as: ethics, culture, religion(s), economics, and so on. Before this is possible, 
however, an ontological system must be found which is able to incorporate all ways 
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of being (all regions) within its structure. To further this aim, I will now turn to ethics 
as a possible source of a proper ontological system.  
 
7. An Alternative Approach to Ontology:  
If Religion is to be properly formulated as an ontological problem we must first work 
out the best way of formulating ontology itself, as a whole. In this, the discussion 
provided thus far has shown that, for the most part, the tradition of ontology has failed 
to produce a workable basis for the question of being, and therefore, a basis for 
Religion as an ontological problem. The problem that has been encountered thus far 
has been the preconception of being as the presence of physical entities. Furthermore, 
this has also led to the presupposition of some object as the ground of being.  For 
Religion to be properly formulated as an ontological problem we must first find an 
adequate ontological system which is non-ousia-logical: not preconceiving being via 
the prioritisation of physical objects. Equally, the paper must attempt to find an 
ontological position that relates to the being of humans properly and completely. In 
order to achieve this aim, the paper will first attempt to interpret the Ethics of 
Aristotle and Kant within the context of an ontology that relates to the being of 
humans. 
 
A. Ethics and Ontology: 
 Aristotle. 
In Aristotle, the problem of Ethics is formulated as a twofold question: of what the 
highest good is, and the proper way of approaching this good. In this, Aristotle claims 
that there are two rational aspects of the soul; that which refers to the invariable and 
that which refers to the variable (1139a5-10). These two aspects of the rational, 
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however, are not differing ways of thinking, but rather, belong to two possible 
directions of thought (1139a11-17). As such, Aristotle’s conception of the proper 
approaches to the good implies that there is a single highest intellectual virtue in nouj 
(intuition/intellect) that may have two possible objects.190 In order to draw out the 
ontological implications of this formulation the discussion of Aristotle will focus on 
the following themes: the highest good and fronhsij as an intellectual virtue. 
 Aristotle poses the question of the good as that of the object of life. In this, it 
is stated that every human activity can be viewed in relation to an aiming for good 
(1094a1-17). Accordingly, if actions all aim at some good, there must also be things 
that are good for their own sake; that are not for the sake of some other end (1094a18-
24). This good for its own sake is the Good: the supreme Good (1094a23). 
Furthermore, the supreme good towards which humans should aim towards is a fixed 
good, following the sciences, whose aim is knowledge of things that are not deficient 
(1097a1-6). When Aristotle turns to the question of the highest good for humans, it is 
something self-sufficient that makes life proper: a happy life (1097b7-21). As such, 
the highest good is an object towards which humans may relate and which results in 
happiness. As a result of this formulation of the highest good as an object, Aristotle 
may then characterise the highest good as the divine and the divine in humans 
(1177a11-18). Equally, the divine as the object of highest good is reached only insofar 
as the human practices, and is able to practice, the virtue of contemplation in sofia 
(1177a18). 
 Humans, however, are not able to engage in contemplation as a whole life as 
practical considerations, i.e., sustenance, a place to live, the need to work, and relate 
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to other people, draws even the philosopher away from contemplation (1177b26-
34).191 In this, the primacy of the highest good (of seeking the divine) is also 
practically subservient to politics, the supreme good for humans in relation to our 
being (1181b10-23). In a practical sense, of living life, the highest good for humans is 
humans-themselves: the way humans are. Insofar as humans are inherently social 
beings the highest good in life is posited as the good for the community - polij 
(1194b3-11).  
 This means, for Aristotle, that there are two possible highest goods: the 
practical and the contemplative. In this, the contemplative good in its mode (sofia) 
with its corresponding object (the divine - qeioj) is the highest good that can be 
striven after. Nonetheless, this aim is practically impossible, which means that the 
highest achievable good is politics: the good for the community. This is derived from 
the claim that the being of humans is inherently social; dependent and not self-
sufficient. If the being of humans is to be known, it follows that there will be an 
intellectual virtue that intuits the object of human good (the community) properly, and 
will intuit the good of human activities in life. For Aristotle, this intellectual virtue is 
fronhsij. 
 Fronhsij is, in Aristotle, the highest intellectual virtue in relation to grasping 
the good for humans (1140b20-21). In this, fronhsij is posited as being concerned 
with human goods, or, those things about which deliberation is possible (1141b8-12). 
This shows that to be human is to be able to choose, to deliberate over actions with 
regard to their outcome. Accordingly, fronhsij intuits actions in two ways: with 
regard to the universal and the particular (1141b14-16). The particular is the intuiting 
of the proper-ness of an action in relation to specific goals and circumstances 
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(1141b15-20).  The particular, as such, stands in subservience to the universal scope of 
fronhsij, wherein fronhsij views particular goals in reference to the goal of life as 
a whole and the structural content of every action (1141b21-22). This means that 
fronhsij, in intuiting the universal, performs two tasks: it sees the particular in 
relation to life as a whole and it sees action in regard to its proper structure, i.e., 
shows what proper deliberation is. This implies that fronhsij is able to intuit what it 
is to be human properly: that to be human has a dimension of what is proper to action 
(that to be human is to act), and furthermore, to be human is to intuit and interpret life 
as a whole (to have a sense of the meaning of life). Insofar as Ethics is the question of 
good, the proper, then the aim of fronhsij is to reveal the being of humans in praxij 
as it is most proper rather than otherwise (1142b30-35, 1143a30-1143b6). 
 
Kant. 
In Kant, the question of Ethics in relation to the being of humans becomes heightened, 
in that the question of proper action (what ought I to do?) is deprived of any empirical 
elements. In this, the problem of ethics is posited as the question of whether reason by 
itself, and independently of all appearances, commands what ought to happen.192 The 
ontological problematic of the being of humans is explicitly formulated as the 
question of rational being. “Since moral laws have to hold for every rational being as 
such, we ought rather to derive out principles from the general concept of rational 
being…”193 The ethics of Kant can be viewed, in this, as the attempt to ground what 
ought to happen in human existence upon an analysis of the being of rational 
entities.194 For Kant, however, humans are not necessarily the only rational beings. 
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This means that Kant’s explication of ethics will necessarily attempt to reveal both the 
being of rational entities in general and the specific nature of being human as a 
rational entity. This discussion of Kant’s ethical writings, as such, must pursue both 
formulations of being-rational. 
 The being of rational entities in general is given as existing as an end in 
itself.195  An end, in this sense, is not merely an activity, but rather, the determination 
of being-rational as being-an-end. Furthermore, the end is not the act itself, but 
belongs to the entities who are able to act; entities with a will. Kant determines the 
will, in this sense, as a ground of self-determination.196 As such, to determine the 
being of rational entities as an end in itself is to determine being-rational as 
fundamentally self-grounding, self-willing, self-determining. This, furthermore, is to 
characterise the will as free; a free causality with regard to action. This is why the 
‘categorical imperative’, as the ought of determining action, can also be called the 
‘natural law’. “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a 
universal law of nature.”197 To understand this formulation of the ought it is first 
necessary, in brief, to outline the function of causality in Kant’s philosophy. 
 In Kant, causality belongs inherently to the problem of possible knowledge, 
or, the distinction between experience-able objects and objects in themselves. In this, 
the possible objectivity of knowledge demands that phenomenal experienced events 
happen according to rules, or, that events be explained in relation to causality.198  
Causality, as such, is the temporality of phenomenal events as they can be 
experienced, via the a priori structures of intuition, by humans: as how humans must 
experience physical events. Natural causality, in this sense, refers to the way that 
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humans experience nature as knowable, that events occur according to rules.199 
Natural causality is always conditioned200, reliant upon spatio-temporal effects given 
by intuition, and does not refer to noumenal objects themselves. On the other hand, 
free causality belongs to a type of noumenal object, rational beings, in two ways. 
First, free causality is a freedom-from: a freedom from natural cause.201 Free causality 
is also a freedom-to: a being able to act spontaneously.202  
 In reference to being-rational as an end in itself, this means that the ought of 
free will can only be re-presented to us in the actual living of life. In this, the living of 
life designates the phenomenal realm, the natural world, thus conjoining the moral 
ought to the natural causality of experience. As such, to know the being of rational 
entities, and also what these entities ought to do, must be inextricably linked to natural 
processes – natural cause. This is especially poignant with regard to the being of 
humans, who are inherently affected by natural causality.203  Humans always tend, 
Kant asserts, to be affected by our own subjective natures as they appear to us. These 
affections are not in harmony with our being-rational (objectivity). As such, the ought 
in humans is a ‘necessitation’: that we determine our will according to objective 
law.204  However, insofar as we can know, in our being, the only objective law is that 
of nature. Thus, the ought of human actions is ironically posited in relation to natural 
law and not, as hoped, in relation to the being of rational entities. 
 Kant, however, also posits a practical imperative grounded in the concept of 
the being of rational entities. In this, the ground for the practical imperative belongs to 
a typology of ways of being: things and persons. Natural objects, those entities that 
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are solely determined by natural causality are called things.205 Those entities that are 
rational are called persons, having absolute value.206 This typology allows of the 
practical imperative: “act in such a way that you always treat humanity… never 
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”207 Thus, Kant determines 
the being of humans as: a) being-rational, and b) having absolute value as an end in 
itself. 
 In summary, the interpretation of Aristotle and Kant in relation to ethics has 
drawn out some possible determinations of the being of humans. In Aristotle, four 
basic characteristics are given: that humans are relational (community), that humans 
are praxij (proper/improper – can always be otherwise), that humans are 
interpretative/intuitive in our ability to deliberate (we perceive actions in relation to 
interpretation/intuition of life as a whole: as purposive), and finally, that humans are 
circumstantial (we always deliberate and act within a particular context/horizon). In 
Kant, three basic characterisations have been given: that humans are deficient 
(‘necessitation’ – overcoming natural affects, inclination), that humans are rational 
(being a will), and that humans are an active will (directed towards things/persons in a 
world).  
 However, these characterisations must be considered lacking with regard to 
the problem of Religion. Both Aristotle and Kant determine the being of humans as 
secondary, as not having priority in their system of thought. In Aristotle, the being of 
humans is subservient to the possibility of being divine, while in Kant, the being of 
humans (as a whole) comes after the possibility of knowing (present objects). 
Furthermore, both preconceive being as the physical presence of things. This 
prioritisation means that other ways of being (regions) in which physical presence is 
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not the primary characteristic are excluded from possible analysis. Finally, even 
though both Aristotle and Kant draw out interesting possibilities for analysis, in 
relation to the being of humans, these possibilities cannot be developed without a 
proper ontological system, and a proper formulation of the question of being.  
The proper formulation of the question of being, and the resultant proper 
ontological system, requires that two demands be met: first, that it is inclusive of all 
possible ways (regions) of being; and second, that it finds the right entity (insofar as 
being is always the being of an entity) to prioritise. In other words, the question of 
being, an ontological system, must find the entity through which all ways of being are 
either included or encountered. The paper will now turn to an analysis of Heidegger’s 
question of being and Dasein as a way of properly formulating the question of being, 
an ontological system, and thus also, Religion as an ontological problem.208 
 
B. Dasein and Non-Ousiological Ontology: 
In viewing Heidegger’s ontological system, and his question of being, as a possible 
way into Religion as an ontological problem, the interpretation to be provided must 
contain two tasks: of showing how Heidegger’s question of being can be viewed as an 
adequate ontological system; and how Heidegger’s characterisation of Dasein allows 
of a preliminary characterisation of Religion as an ontological problem. With regard 
to the former, I will attempt to interpret Being and Time as providing the framework 
for this proper ontological system. With regard to the latter, I will discuss two of 
Heidegger’s early works as providing a basis for formulating Religion as a problem. 
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The Question of Being: 
Heidegger introduces the question of being as a problem of what is meant by being.209 
This is not initially a question of the everyday semantic or grammatical sense of the 
word ‘being’, but rather a philosophical conceptual problematising of the notion of 
being. Accordingly, where Heidegger explicitly problematises the notion of being he 
does so within the context of three traditional formulations of the sense of being. 
 The first of these traditional formulations of being is that being is a universal 
concept.210 This is so for three reasons. First, being is presupposed wherever entities 
are apprehended211, and as such being is universal to the apprehension of entities. 
Second, being is formulated as ‘transcendent’,212 as transcending any and every entity. 
As such, being is universal as above and beyond every concretely situated entity. 
Finally, being is considered as a unity of analogy in contrast to generic concepts.213 
Here, being is some vague universal unity which allows of the categorisation of 
entities in their modes of being, eg., quantity, quality, relation and modality. In all 
three of these formulations of universality, however, being is not merely vague but 
also merely presupposed. As such, Heidegger states that this formulation of being has 
no clarity. In that Being is universally presupposed in ontology Being is also the 
darkest, the most hidden, concept of all.214 
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 The second traditional formulation of being that Heidegger discusses is the in-
definability of being.215 In this, being is taken to be indefinable in so far as being is 
not an entity which contains definable characteristics.216 Even though being is not an 
entity and cannot therein be defined being is none the less utilised. This utilisation of 
being does not require any definition but rather always already entails a sense of 
being. As such, the formulation of being as in-definable, although correct, has hidden 
the problem of the way in which being is always already has a sense; that is, Being is 
already presupposed and understood in some vague and indefinable way. Therefore, 
the problem of the in-definability of being is that it obscures the question of this sense 
of being.217 
 The final traditional formulation that Heidegger considers is that being is self-
evident.218 This self evidence is contained in the ‘copula’ of each sentence as the ‘is’, 
‘am’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ and other such structures. The self evidence of being here 
merely indicates the familiarity of use and a familiarity with being in language. This 
familiarity with being pertains to the vague understanding of being that human’s have, 
but not to the sense of being which is presupposed by understanding.219 
 Heidegger’s discussion of these three traditional formulations of being has 
problematised these formulations of being and thus the tradition of Ontology. In each 
case Heidegger points out that the philosophical tradition has not gone far enough in 
the question of being. In this the tradition shares a common, but as yet undiscovered, 
failing which prevents the question of being from proper formulation. This failing has 
something to do with a distinction between possible points of origin for formulating 
the question of Being; between grounding ontology in the vague understanding itself, 
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or the potential of grounding ontology upon the sense of Being which is a 
presupposition of this vague understanding. Insofar as the failure of the tradition of 
ontology belongs to the ‘not far enough’ its failure lies in grounding ontology upon 
the vague understanding of being and entirely forgetting that being always already has 
a sense in this understanding. Heidegger’s question of the sense of being can be seen 
therefore as the attempt to show how ontology can be grounded upon the sense of 
being. 
In order to enter into the question of the sense of being properly Heidegger 
begins with a structural analysis of questioning in general which is followed by an 
analysis of the question of the sense of being. 
 In the first case, that of questioning in general, Heidegger posits a threefold 
structure of questioning viewed as a relation between questioner and questioned. The 
former is viewed as an entity whose behaviour has the character (Being) of 
questioning.220 As such, any question expresses the being of the entity who questions. 
With respect to the latter, any question is guided by what is sought221, i.e., the 
questioned shows itself as something to be questioned. The third component of the 
question lies in the relation between the two comprising such themes as what is asked 
by the questioner of the questioned and what is to be found out by the question.222 
These elements of the question express a relation between questioner and questioned 
as mutually delimiting. In this, the questioner interrogates the questioned in a certain 
way with certain aims in mind. Equally the questioned delimits the parameters of 
what can be, and will be, found because of what it is and how it shows itself. 
 Heidegger develops this threefold structure of questioning as the proper 
formulation of the sense of being. Here, Heidegger begins with being as the 
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questioned. In this, the former notion of guidance becomes formulated as the 
availability of the sense of being.223 The initial parameter of this guidance is given as 
the preliminary notion of being given in ‘what is asked about’.224 Being here has the 
sense of that upon which entities are already understood.225  
 Accordingly, what is to be found out via the relation between Being and the 
questioner is the sense of being of entities.226 In this case, however, the sense of being 
belongs to a particular entity,227 the entity which already has a sense of being.228 
 As such, it is Dasein229 (as the questioner) who is the locus of the question of 
the sense of being that needs to be analysed in regard to its Being.230 In this Dasein 
contains all three elements of the question; Dasein in the questioner, Dasein is guided 
by Being in that Dasein understands Being231, and finally, Dasein has questioning as 
its behaviour, i.e., as a way of Being. 
 In this way Heidegger’s analysis of the formal structure of the question of the 
sense of being indicates three related components of the question. In the first instance 
the questioner is an entity which has its own Being. Furthermore, being’s sense is 
always that of the being of an entity. Finally, the sense of being only ever belongs to 
an entity who is capable of having a sense of Being. Therefore, the question of the 
sense of being in its proper formulation revolves around the relation between 
questioning and sense.  
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 The relation between the questioner and sense is taken up by Heidegger as the 
task of proving the relatedness of the questioner to the question.232 In this, the proof 
will be given as the proof of two related priorities; the priority of an entity in regard to 
its being233, and the priority of the question of the sense of being.234 This is why the 
priorities as argued by Heidegger may be stated as the priority of the question(er). In 
this, Heidegger provides three priorities of the question(er); ontological, ontical and 
ontico-ontological. 
 The first priority, the ontological, is divided up via the themes of motive, aim 
and function. In this the motive is derived from the lack of proper formulation in the 
tradition of ontology.235 The functional priority of the question belongs to its priority 
for the sciences, both ontological and ontical.236 Here, being is always taken as the 
being of an entity derived from pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting 
the sense of being.237 As such, the aim of the ontological priority is the ascertaining of 
the a priori conditions of the sciences and ontology.238 The ontological priority, then, 
belongs to the traditional philosophical and metaphysical problem of ontology as 
grounding science. It is, therefore, the priority of properly addressing the sense of 
being in order to ground science. It is also important to note, in regard to the 
ontological priority, that the Being of the questioner is already implicitly involved in 
this priority as having a way of Being, i.e., questioning, that makes the sciences 
possible. 
 The second priority is called the ontical priority which focuses on the being of 
the questioner (Dasein). Here, Heidegger begins with the claim that science is a 
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manner of Dasein’s being.239 As such, being is an issue for Dasein.240 Equally, being 
can only be an issue for Dasein in so far as Dasein can also understand Being pre-
scientifically. Thus, it is also a characteristic of Dasein’s Being to understand 
Being.241 In this way, the ontical priority of the question(er) is based upon the fact that 
Dasein is ontically distinctive in that Dasein is ontological.242 This being-ontological 
is first and foremost pre-ontological, i.e., not formulated.243 The way of being that 
Dasein has is called ‘existence’.244 In this, existence is Dasein’s way of Being-
Ontological, where Dasein understands itself as the possibility of being itself or Not 
Being itself.245 Furthermore, this question of existence never gets worked out except 
via existing itself.246 As such, existence as Dasein’s way of being is first and foremost 
oriented around Dasein’s capabilities of understanding – in general and for itself. 
Existence, however, also pertains to Dasein’s understanding of Being via a world and 
the Being of entities.247 Existence as Dasein’s way of being is therefore the nexus of 
Dasein’s understanding in all its primordial forms, including Dasein’s formulations of 
questioning in the ontical and ontological sciences. Accordingly, Heidegger states that 
whenever ontology focuses on entities not-Dasein it has its foundations and 
motivation in Dasein’s ontical structure, including the pre-ontological understanding 
of being.248 The question of the sense of being must therefore be viewed as having its 
foundation and motivation in Dasein’s existence and the corresponding understanding 
of Being. This is to say the question of the sense of being is initially grounded in 
Dasein’s understanding of the being of entities. 
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 The third priority, the ontico-ontological, is founded upon the previous two 
priorities and is stated as that wherein Dasein has the capability to understand the 
being of entities that are not Dasein.249 In this, the priorities explicitly belong to 
Dasein in this way; ontically, Dasein’s being has the character of existence. Likewise, 
ontologically, existence is determinative for Dasein. Thus, ontico-ontologically, as 
constitutive of existence Dasein understands the being of entities not Dasein. As such, 
Dasein’s Being-Ontological, i.e., Dasein’s understanding in general, founds the 
question of the sense of being in and via existence. Thus the questioner and question 
are unified in existence. 
 In so far as the priorities have unified questioner and question in existence the 
priorities have implications for, and guide the way in which the sense of being is 
approached via an existential analytic. There are four implications that Heidegger 
draws out from the priorities for the question of the sense of being. The first is that the 
existential analytic must disclose the ontical structure of existence.250 This will allow 
Heidegger to reveal the ontological structure of Dasein, i.e., Dasein’s being. From 
this, Heidegger plans to show how Dasein’s being, as containing an ontico-
ontological character, may reveal the sense of being.251 Finally, Heidegger states, the 
question of being is nothing other than the radicalisation of the pre-ontological 
understanding of being.252  
 The priorities, in unifying questioner and question, thus reveals the proper way 
into the question of the sense of Being. The basic ground of this approach belongs to 
the recognition of a relation between Dasein and the sense of being. This relation, in 
general, is that the sense of being belongs to Dasein. If the sense of being belongs 
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solely to Dasein (the questioner) as a possibility then it follows that it is Dasein’s 
being that must be discovered. Accordingly, where this sense of being is understood 
initially via existence, the question becomes an existential analytic. This existential 
analytic will begin with the ontical and work back to the ontological. This process of 
uncovering, in finding the structure of Dasein’s being will also provide the proper 
ground of discussing the sense of being as it belongs to Dasein. This, however, is not 
the final aim of the question of the sense of being, for Heidegger also wants to show 
how being can be talked of in general, or for itself. 
 In Heidegger’s question of being, and the ontological system provided therein, 
both demands have been met. In this, the first demand; that it include all possible 
ways (regions) of being, is met via the prioritisation of Dasein’s being. In the 
prioritisation of the question of Dasein’s being, Heidegger finds the entity through 
which all ways of being are incorporated, either as they are understood, or as ways of 
Dasein’s being. However, the question of being and the resultant ‘fundamental 
ontology’ is not complete, as Heidegger admits, in that it does not disclose the 
complete range of ways Dasein may be or the ways in which Dasein understands. As 
a starting point Heidegger’s question of being, especially ‘fundamental ontology’ can 
be viewed as providing the basic characterisation of being-human from which 
Religion may be constituted as an ontological problem.  
 
The Basic Characterisation of Dasein’s Being 
In Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity Heidegger frames his exposition of 
Dasein’s being explicitly in relation to the problem of ontology. In this ontology is 
formulated as an open-ended questioning of being which must necessarily ground 
 89 
each and every region of life within the one system and the one question.253  It is 
Heidegger’s argument that traditional ontology is inadequate for this task in that it 
prioritises the objectivity (presence) of objects and cannot, therefore analyse the being 
of Dasein.254 
 It is Heidegger’s aim to provide an exposition of Dasein’s being via a 
hermeneutics of facticity. In this, facticity is constituted as Dasein’s being:  a being 
finite, being-there/here for a while in a particular time.255 The way of further 
explicating facticity is hermeneutics: an allowing something to be seen, or a self-
interpretation of existence – of factical life.256 As a living of life facticity must, 
furthermore, be characterised as an encountering the world.257 This is to say that 
facticity, as it can be interpreted, takes place in a world, or, as a relationship of Dasein 
with the world. This relationship wherein the world is encountered by Dasein reveals 
ways that Dasein is via the structure of the relationship. 
 Heidegger asserts that three ways of Dasein’s being is revealed via an 
encountering of the world. First, it shows that Dasein’s being is such that it allows the 
world to be disclosed. This disclosure of the world takes place in advance, i.e., it is 
contained in Dasein’s being and constituted by Dasein’s ways of being.258 
Furthermore, this disclosure of the world is equally a ‘with-world’, a world in which 
Dasein is with other people.259 Finally, the world is also encountered as an ‘in order 
to’, that Dasein’s being is such that we grasp things in relation to an ability to act or 
achieve goals.260  As such, the disclosed-ness of the world as encountered shows that 
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Dasein’s being may be characterised as ‘being-in-the-world’: purposive and 
relational.  
 Heidegger further develops the latter two characterisations via the terms ‘care’ 
and ‘concern’. In this, Heidegger argues that ‘care’ signifies the basic constitution of 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world as ‘being-with’: relating to other persons.261 Accordingly, 
the ‘in order to’ (concern) is posited as the practice of care (its actualisation) in 
Dasein’s dealings.262 Dealings, as such, signifies human activities in the world as they 
come to be directed towards encountered entities, and what may be achieved via these 
entities. Entities in the world cannot be viewed as isolated things, but rather, things 
that mean something to Dasein in regard to goals.  
These two basic characteristics of being, however, may be levelled. In this, the 
levelling of care and concern occurs in ‘everydayness’ wherein entities lose their 
meaning ‘for us’ and become viewed as merely present to us.263 
In Heidegger’s paper ‘Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to 
Aristotle’, the being of Dasein is developed further along these lines. In this, Dasein’s 
being is posited as fundamentally interpretative, in that Dasein sees the world as a 
‘how’.264 This ‘how’ is ‘care’, that to be human is to care: to be directed out towards 
something.265 Accordingly, concern is the actualisation of care, wherein the way the 
world is interpreted comes to be fulfilled in activities or relations with other entities in 
the world.266 Furthermore, insofar as Dasein tends to get it wrong (interpretatively), 
Dasein has a tendency not to be-one’s-self, and care may also be taken up explicitly as 
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a ‘how’ to be-one’s-self: to see one’s-self-properly. Heidegger calls care in this sense 
circumspection.267 
 Following this train of thought, where the being of Dasein is fundamentally 
determined as equally being-in-the-world and as a question of being-one’s-self (or 
not), Heidegger argues that circumspection reveals three primary elements of 
Dasein’s being in existence. First, Dasein is a ‘how’: that life is always interpreted as 
significant.268 Furthermore, Dasein is ‘directed’: always being-out-towards the 
world.269 Finally, Dasein has its being only through living (existence): engaging in 
ways of relating to other entities (the practical).270  
I would contend that these three determinations of Dasein’s being provide a 
way into the problem of Religion. This is the task of formulating Religion as a 
phenomenon. Before attempting this task, however, I will first outline the provisional 
acceptance of Heidegger’s ontology. 
 
8. The Provisional Acceptance of Heidegger’s Ontology: 
Although Heidegger’s question of being can be viewed as providing the ontological 
system which allows entry into the problem of Religion, the question of being, as 
Heidegger’s path of thinking, must only be accepted in a provisional manner. This 
provisional acceptance, in part, belongs to the differing aim of this paper to 
Heidegger’s question of being. In this, the question of Religion takes up two places of 
origin in Heidegger’s question of being: the ontological system (the prioritisation of 
Dasein) and Heidegger’s characterisation of Dasein’s being. The paper will accept 
Heidegger’s determination of Dasein’s being (and sense of being) as a fundamental 
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ontology. However, the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s question of being will 
also be delimiting, i.e., a non-acceptance. In this, there are dimensions to Heidegger’s 
question of being, as a ‘path of thinking’, which are unacceptable to the questioning 
of Religion as a notion. As such, the provisional acceptance of Heidegger’s question 
of being, both in its positive and negative senses, requires further elaboration. 
 
A. Fundamental Ontology: 
Heidegger calls the process of his own question of being, initially, a fundamental 
ontology. In this, Heidegger’s argument is, as I have already outlined, that ontology is 
only properly formulated in the investigation of the being of the questioner. The being 
of the questioner as it is to be investigated is then constituted in two ways: in its 
fundamental being (its most basic determinable characteristics), and equally, as the 
being who understands being. Heidegger hopes to achieve, via this fundamental 
ontology, a way of showing how Dasein, in our being, understands being (has a sense 
of being) and thus, also what fundamentally constitutes Dasein’s understanding of 
things that are not Dasein (things in the world).271 In this aim Heidegger also 
intentionally overlooks other possibilities, like Religion, calling this fundamental 
ontology merely ‘provisional’.272  
 For the purposes of the research, it is worthwhile outlining the structural 
content of Heidegger’s question of being. For convenience and clarity, I will posit this 
structure as containing three moments: fundamental ontology, Dasein’s sense of 
being, and being-itself (‘being’). First, fundamental ontology has the task of 
disclosing the basic structures of Dasein’s being, the bare framework from which 
every other region can be investigated. Second, in engaging in a fundamental 
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ontology, Heidegger also tailors the ‘existential analytic’ to the question of how 
Dasein understands entities other than itself. This means that Heidegger takes 
fundamental ontology and develops merely one avenue of possible development, the 
sense of being. This results in the thesis that time (or better: Temporality) is Dasein’s 
sense of being. Finally, Heidegger attempts to move from Dasein’s sense of being, via 
a ‘turn’ (kehre), to the way in which being gives itself to Dasein273.  Fundamental 
ontology, as such, is merely the first stage of a path towards the question, or thinking, 
about being. This has obvious implications for the possibility of formulating Religion 
properly insofar as Heidegger’s question of being is problematic in regard to Religion. 
This can be seen more clearly in relation to the notion of the ‘nothing’. 
 
B. The ‘No-Thing’: 
In the theme of ‘no-thing’, or non-being, the question of being reaches its highest 
point of exposition. In this, the question of the ‘no-thing’ comes to signify three 
dimensions of the question of being: the origin of Dasein’s being, the ground of 
Dasein’s understanding of being(s), and finally, the question of being-itself (‘Being’). 
These ways of saying the nothing, their significance, is in some sense the nexus of 
ontological thought.  
 First, the ‘nothing’ as the ground of Dasein’s being signifies the 
finitude/temporality/mortality of Dasein. In this, the nothing initially signifies 
‘finitude’,274 as the temporality of Dasein’s being temporalising, and Dasein’s 
mortality; that Dasein may always also not be-there.275  It is Heidegger’s claim that 
the ground of Dasein’s being, in this sense, is nothing: a possibility of not being-there 
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(Da-Sein).  Nothing is, furthermore, the ground of Dasein’s understanding of being. In 
this, it is nothing (as transcendence) that allows Dasein to understand entities that are 
not Dasein.276  Transcendence is framed as an ‘overcoming’ of beings, or, being able 
to grasp the being of beings and the world as a whole.277  Thus, Dasein’s being is 
essentially this transcendence/nothing: Dasein is no-thing (not a thing but person), and 
grounded in no-thing (the possibility of not being-there). 
 This verbal play on Da-Sein (being-there/here), which is also a play on Kant 
and Husserl’s formulation of existence, is an attempt to ground the ontological 
preconception of presence and re-presenting in Dasein’s being as that which 
constitutes the presence and presenting of things in temporalisation. Furthermore, the 
use of Da-Sein also shows that the ground of understanding is no-thing: in the sense 
of Dasein’s being, but also, in reference to Being-itself. In this, Heidegger argues that 
to understand anything at all Dasein must already understand Being and the nothing 
together.278  
 ‘Being’ is constituted as no-thing: Being is not a being. Moreover, as a 
concept, ‘Being’ is equivalent to ‘Nothing’279.  This means that ‘Being’, as the term 
signifying the ground of all beings and the world as a whole, of reality, is nothing at 
all: it is otherwise than being(s).280 As such, the path to knowing non-being, the 
nothing, and ‘Being’ is impossible.281 ‘Being’, the ground of the world and the being 
of entities, therefore, is no knowable object. It is, rather, the ground of Dasein’s being, 
and Dasein’s being understanding.  
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 If Heidegger’s ultimate question of ‘Being’ is placed in relation to the tradition 
of ontology, it can be seen that the nothing plays the same role as the divine, or God. 
In this, the claim that the divine or God cannot be known (seen) by human effort is no 
surprise. Likewise, the turn to hearing ‘Being’ itself parallels the notion of revelation, 
especially in relation to the hermeneutics of a sacred text. If there is a limit to the 
acceptance of Heidegger by this paper, it will accordingly be Heidegger’s question of 
‘Being’ (the truth of being, the emergence of being). This is not only due to the 
parallels between the tradition of ontology and Heidegger in this regard, but also 
insofar as it could be possible to characterise Heidegger after the turn as thinking 
about something other than being when he thinks the nothing. The paper must, 
furthermore, be cautious in relation to Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein’s 
understanding of entities that are not Dasein. 
 
C. Provisional as Delimitation: 
Rather than entering into a detailed discussion of the contested notion of the turn 
(kehre) what is needed here is a general outline of why the turn (the question of being-
in-general) must not be accepted in this research.  
 It is my contention that the notion of Being must be conceived of, somehow, 
as otherwise than being. This is to say, generally, that I would contend that being is a 
misconception of sorts. To support this contention it is useful to re-look at what could 
be called a hierarchy of the senses of being as a notion. In this, the lowest sense of 
being refers to entities: that entities are (present somehow as identifiable things). 
Being also signifies, a second sense, the being of an entity:  what makes something 
what, or who, it is. Furthermore, being has a third sense as the being of the world, the 
real of reality (the world as a unified whole). Finally, there is the sense of being where 
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it gets called ‘Being’: the notion of first cause, originary ground, the divine, the 
unconditioned, absolute spirit/reason (log oj) and so on. It is this final sense of being 
that I would call a misconception, or, at least like to remain open to this possibility.  
 If we follow Heidegger’s path on the question of Being, via nothing, it is a 
valid question as to whether, if Being surpasses all human abilities to understand, 
‘Being’ can be constituted as being at all, and whether it would be better to find some 
other way to frame the question. In any case, the sense of being as ‘Being’, which also 
gets called the divine and God, seems to me to relate some ‘how’ to the question of 
the being of humans as we are able to, and must, interpret the world. Furthermore, it is 
also possible that what gets called ‘Being’ may be better thought via ‘Religion’. What 
philosopher, including Heidegger, has not framed this question (if they ask it) in a 
Theo-logical or religious sense? As such, Heidegger’s turn could be nothing more or 
less than a religious turn - and there is much to support this contention if it were to be 
made.282 What is important, for the purposes of the paper, is to leave this question of 
‘Being’ or ‘otherwise than being’ open: to leave it as a question that ‘A 
Phenomenology of Religion’ could possibly address.283 Thus, in the question of being 
(in general), the paper reaches its delimitation of an acceptance of Heidegger’s 
ontological thinking.  
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Chapter Three: Religion as a Phenomenon 
It has come time to formulate the notion of Religion, and in the formulation, aim for a 
proper notion. In this, the task is to formulate Religion properly as an ontological 
problem, and furthermore, to show that this formulation is properly that of a 
phenomenon. I will attempt to show how Religion may be formulated and therein 
accessed as a phenomenon of existence, of belonging-to the being of humans in the 
structures of living. This must also involve, in the formulation, a denial/exclusion of 
the object(s) of Religion. As such, this chapter will contain three sections: Religion as 
a phenomenon, Religion and Existence, and, the exclusion of the object(s) of 
Religion. 
 
9. Religion as Phenomenon (As Belonging-to) 
In formulating Religion as a phenomenon there are two issues to be addressed. First, 
the notion of phenomenon must be addressed, paying attention to Heidegger’s general 
(formal) conception of and, additionally, the conception of phenomenon as 
ontological. This will enable the second discussion, of Religion as a phenomenon, 
insofar as Religion is to be formulated as an ontological problem. 
 
A. The Meaning of ‘Phenomenon’ 
In Being and Time Heidegger produces two interrelated conceptions of phenomenon: 
formal/ordinary and ontological. In this, the formal conception is the platform upon 
which the ontological gets developed. As such, I will address the formal/ordinary 
conception of phenomenon first, attempting to deal with some of the complexities of 
the argument. 
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The Formal/Ordinary Conception of ‘Phenomenon’ 
Heidegger discusses both conceptions of phenomenon within the context of showing 
how phenomenology, as a method of ontology, will be posited. It is therefore 
necessary, insofar as method is not being discussed here, to recognise initially that 
Heidegger’s conception of phenomenon is inseparable from both ontology and 
phenomenology. Insofar as I am attempting, here, to draw out the concept of 
phenomenon, I will also attempt to defer the question of method (phenomenology) 
and emphasise the ontological. 
 The discussion of the formal/ordinary conception of phenomenon begins with 
an interpretation of the term as it gets used in Greek philosophy. In this, the term 
‘phenomenon’ is posited as a derivative of ‘fainesqai’ (to show itself).284 In general 
then, phenomenon signifies ‘that which shows itself in itself’, the manifest.285 
Accordingly, the term ‘phenomena’ signifies the ‘totality of what can be brought to 
light’, or, entities.286 However, entities show themselves in many ways, not merely in 
the way they give themselves, but also, depending upon the way in which they are 
accessed.287 Already, then, it can be seen that the conception of phenomenon in its 
broadest outline posits some relation between entities, as they show themselves, and 
the entity who sees. This theme of relationship, which is also a pivotal question, will 
become heightened the further Heidegger gets into his discussion of phenomenon. 
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 Following the general outline of the meaning of the term ‘phenomenon’ 
Heidegger argues that there are two primary significations of phenomenon: ‘showing 
itself’ and its privation.288 The privative signification of phenomenon gets called 
‘semblance’.289 Furthermore, it is implicit to this argument that the primary 
signification, at least in a formal sense, is that of ‘showing itself’. This is evidenced in 
Heidegger’s argument that the two significations of phenomenon are interrelated: that 
semblance is dependent upon ‘showing itself’, and likewise, that ‘showing itself’ is 
the fundamental signification of the term phenomenon.290  
 In conceiving phenomenon in this general way, Heidegger is also concerned 
with distinguishing phenomenon from appearance. In this, Heidegger is primarily 
attempting to address Kant’s notion of appearance, attempting to draw out the 
conceptual structure of Kant’s notion of phenomenon and show its foundation. Kant’s 
conception, furthermore, is precisely what Heidegger is writing about when he posits 
formal and ordinary together. 
 Appearance, then, is distinguished from phenomenon. Heidegger initially 
argues that the two significations of phenomenon discussed thus far have nothing to 
do with appearance, and still less, ‘mere appearance’.291 Appearance, rather, indicates 
(indizeren) something that does not show itself.292 As such, appearance is the entity as 
it announces itself, which is not a showing itself, but is also not a semblance.293 
However, Heidegger asserts, appearance is only possible on the ground of ‘showing 
itself’, i.e., phenomenon proper.294 Heidegger then proceeds to outline four 
significations of appearance: announcing (not showing itself), that which does the 
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announcing (indication of something not shown), the thing itself (Kant’s formulation 
of noumena), and finally, as an indication of something which cannot be 
manifested.295 As such, the difference between a phenomenon and appearance can be 
given. A phenomenon is the way in which something can be encountered, while 
appearance is a reference-relation in regard to an entity itself.296 It becomes quite 
clear, therefore, that the primary signification of ‘showing itself’, upon which 
appearance and semblance are founded, is that of encountering entities. Furthermore, 
this encountering is such that it is the being of the entity that gets encountered in the 
‘showing itself’. In order to draw out this claim in more detail I will attempt to 
‘unpack’ the relation of appearance and phenomenon further, attempting to look at the 
subtleties in Heidegger’s argument thus far.  
 Initially, the relationship between appearance and phenomenon can be 
explicated further via the term ‘indication’. In this, I would argue that appearance 
(erscheinung: to shine forth)297 as ‘announcing’ indicates nothing less than the being 
of an entity. Appearing (adparare: to come forward)298, as such, is the given-ness of a 
symbol, the sign, and an indication.299 It is connected to Husserl’s categorical 
intuition, the intuition of being, and the use of indication (anzeichen) therein as the 
showing of ways things are of that which does not show itself.300 It is the noumenal in 
Kant that does not show itself (get manifested); the thing itself, the thing in its being. 
That which is not manifest, i.e., is not an entity, is being. This is why the manifest 
(phenomenon) in a formal sense has as its plural: entities (phenomena). Furthermore, 
insofar as appearance announces, and thus indicates, the thing itself, it does so in not 
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being manifest. That this lack of manifestation is not privative means that appearance 
must be connected to something about an entity as it shows itself that cannot be made 
manifest. Again, this is nothing less than the being of the entity.  
 So when Heidegger distinguishes between phenomenon and appearance it can 
be seen that phenomenon signifies the way in which Dasein may encounter entities (in 
our ways of being), while appearance refers to a formal distinction between the 
manifested entity and the being of an entity. The formal conception of phenomenon, 
as such, is in general ‘what shows itself’: remaining open to this showing itself being 
the entity itself, or, characteristics of the entity’s being.301 Kant’s notion of a 
phenomenon, as appearance, accordingly gets called the ordinary conception because 
it posits a distinction within the formal conception itself: that there is a difference 
(albeit of the ability to know) between the manifest and the non-manifest, wherein the 
non-manifest, the un-manifest-able is not considered via indication properly. Thus, 
the formal and ordinary conceptions of phenomenon are conjoined in Kant wherein 
‘showing itself’ is reduced to manifestation. Reduced to manifestation, appearance 
may also contain, without realisation, the variant of semblance. For example, a 
flushed cheek, in its appearance, becomes merely present-to-hand.302 This is why 
Kant’s conception of phenomenon as the ordinary (or vulgar) is often interpreted as 
improper or deficient.303 Accordingly, Heidegger implies that the conception of 
phenomenon in the ordinary or vulgar sense will fail to realise the way in which the 
entity in its being will only show itself via the proper way in which Dasein sees. Thus, 
the criticism of Kant follows that directed towards Greek philosophy, Aristotle in 
particular, that fainesqai only signifies fusij (emergence) of entities and not their 
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being… and thus fails to see the being of Dasein and time (temporality).304 As such, 
the vulgar concept of phenomenon is that fusij, the physical gets prioritised over and 
against the being of humans: that entities are grasped (in semblance) as present-to-
hand. 
Nonetheless, Heidegger argues, the notion of appearance in Kant opens up the 
question of an ontological conception of phenomenon insofar as space and time (the a 
priori forms of intuition: structures of the way in which humans intuit things) are also 
phenomena.305 As such, the proper (most complete) conception of phenomenon must 
focus on the ‘encounter’, or, the way(s) in which Dasein intuits/understands the being 
of entities. 
 
Phenomenon as Ontological 
In discussing Heidegger’s conception of phenomenon as ontological I will, for the 
sake of clarity, emphasise two themes: that phenomenon proper refers to the being of 
entities, and that phenomenon proper must have as its foci the being of the entity who 
sees being. I am claiming, in this, that the proper conception of phenomenon, as 
posited by Heidegger, is constituted as ‘belonging-to’ the being of humans.306 This 
belonging-to signifies that a phenomenon, as ontological, is only ever a showing itself 
of the being of an entity in the human encounter with-in the world that allows being to 
be shown. A phenomenon, as such, is always a belonging-to the ways that humans 
can be (in the world). 
 When Heidegger discusses the term phenomenon as an ontological concept he 
gives two determinations: that phenomenon signifies, for the most part, a hidden-ness, 
and additionally (via hidden-ness) the possibility of the showing itself of the being of 
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entities.307  In this, hidden-ness signifies that being has not yet been discovered and/or 
has been covered up.308 I write and/or here because, as I interpret Heidegger, being 
has not been discovered precisely due the fact that being has already been covered up. 
This explains the ‘destruction–construction’ process of Being and Time and Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. On the other hand, the phenomenon (being) is already 
grasped: intuitively and originarily.309 This allows the hope that in the proper 
approach to the intuitive and originary, being may be grasped by thinking (through the 
proper being-understanding of Dasein).  
 In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger reiterates the conception 
of phenomenon as belonging-to. In this, phenomenon is connected to the 
understanding of being belonging-to Dasein.310 Accordingly, the ‘showing itself’ of a 
phenomenon belongs-to the authenticity/inauthenticity of Dasein.311 This is to say that 
being/phenomenon gets understood in such a way that either the phenomenon shows 
itself or it disappears.312 As such, the manifestation of phenomena in differing 
modifications belongs-to the temporality of Dasein’s being.313 The concept of 
phenomenon, therefore, primarily and properly refers to the ways in which showing 
itself belongs-to the being of humans. The following problem, of determining what 
gets shown and how it gets shown, for Heidegger and this paper, is the question of 
proper method, i.e., phenomenology.  
 In the concept of phenomenon proper, as ontological, there are thus two 
dimensions within the phrase ‘belonging-to’. In the first instance, the phenomenon 
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signifies being: the intuition of the being of an entity,314 the emanation of being,315 
how being is indicated,316 as showing itself through/for us,317 and finally, that which 
lies behind everyday appearances.318 Furthermore, phenomenon signifies equally: the 
proper/improper ways of seeing being,319 and of uncovering/discovering being.320 
Here, both dimensions of the concept phenomenon, as ontological, operate as a 
belonging-to insofar as being is grasped (intuited/understood) via Dasein’s ways of 
being: proper or improper. 
 
B. Religion as a Phenomenon: 
All the structural and conceptual pieces are now in place, and we are ready to 
formulate Religion as a phenomenon. In this, it is first necessary, on the basis of 
previous groundwork, to conceive Religion as the ways in which Religion may be 
said to belong-to the being of humans. Following this, it is then necessary to 
determine how Religion shows itself and accordingly, where Religion shows itself. 
 In the first case, Religion may be said to belong-to humans, in our being, in 
three ways. First, we humans understand Religion, we grasp the meaning of Religion. 
In this, Religion belongs-to us in the way we are understanding. Accordingly, for all 
that humans are understanding we also get it wrong: we misunderstand and thus fail to 
see Religion as it belongs-to us. As such, Religion as a phenomenon belongs-to us, in 
the first instance, primarily insofar as we misunderstand it, i.e., constitute Relgion as 
an object or object-like, and the possibility therein that we may understand it properly. 
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 Second, Religion is a phenomenon belonging-to the ways in which we humans 
encounter the world. In encountering the world, we are able to constitute Religion (or 
not) as a way of engaging in the world as it shows itself: and thus shows itself in 
Religion. In this, we may encounter the world both socially (religions) and 
individually (religiosity) in Religion, constituting the world via Religion. Religiosity, 
here, also has the signification of an encountering of the world, that all humans may 
encounter the world religiously. As such, the possibility of religiosity shows that 
Religion is ontological, i.e., a way humans may be, and thus, in this sense prior to not 
being religious. In this way the primacy of religiosity does not belong to a formulation 
of humans as being individuals, but rather, shows how individuality (as identity) 
belongs-to the notion of being. 
 Finally, Religion as a phenomenon signifies our being: the being of humans. 
In this, Religion has its highest formulation and its primary sense of belonging-to. To 
say that Religion is our being is not merely to say that Religion is that name for a way 
we can be. Rather, Religion is our being, inseparable from who we are. This is not to 
say that we are religious and nothing else, but rather the necessary conclusion that if 
we can be religious, it is a possible way of being-human, then Religion must be 
constituted as an ontological problem – as belonging-to being-human. 
 This argument requires more careful consideration, and certainly more than 
can be provided here. Let me first begin by stating that there is no certain or proper 
way of showing that Religion belongs-to the being of humans as our being except 
through working it out, i.e., actually providing a ‘Phenomenology of Religion’. As 
such, it is in part, the task of the entire paper to support this argument. However, I will 
take the risk of a preliminary stab at it. We can start by saying that religions are a fact 
of existence, i.e., that there are such things as religions in such a way that they can be 
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called religions. Likewise, humans can be religious, and may call ourselves 
‘religious’, equally factual in relation to existence. As such, there is some concept 
which gets called Religion that pertains to the human living of life.  Philosophically, 
we must exclude empirical reductionist accounts of the notion of Religion insofar as 
they originate with the empirical and utilise empirical ‘evidence’ to produce causal 
accounts. So, psychological, neuro-physical, naturalist, and materialist accounts must 
be excluded. The question of philosophy, in regard to Religion then, has two primary 
possibilities: how humans are able to have the concept Religion, and what it is about 
humans (in our being) that enables us to be religious. The former is the question of 
human understanding. The latter, exemplified in Kant’s question of ‘who am I?’, or, 
‘in what may I hope?’321 These questions are conjoined as the ‘who am I?’ question 
insofar as the other implicitly requires that we come to terms with the first: that I am 
able to understand myself. This is the question of the being of humans as a whole, 
which then allows differing ways of being-human to be determined. The question of 
being, as such, is always primarily the question of being in the sense of entirety (the 
unified whole, a complete structural account). Therefore, if any way of being is to be 
formulated properly, it must first be formulated in relation to being (a unified whole). 
Thus, if we can state that Religion is a possible way of being-human, it is also 
necessary to determine this possibility in relation to being-human as a whole. 
Furthermore, if Religion indicates a way of being-human in life, Religion must also 
be conceived of as indicating something about the being of humans as a whole.  
 If we state that humans are religious, in that it is a potential way of being-
human, the problem of Religion as a phenomenon must be formulated in relation to 
the way in which our being shows itself. In this, the question of Religion is twofold in 
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its broadest sense: first, of how to characterise the way in which humans are in our 
being are religious, and also, what are the determinable characteristics of Religion in a 
ontological sense, i.e., in what way is Religion integral to the human encountering of 
the world?  These questions, initially, belong together in the phenomenon of Religion, 
and furthermore, are the primary questions of a ‘phenomenology of Religion’. In 
order for Religion to be formulated in this way as a question, we must first return to 
the dimensions of the ways in which the world gets encountered in existence. 
 
10. Religion and Existence: 
The phenomenon of Religion, in belonging-to the being of humans, must be 
characterised initially in relation to the way in which humans exist: encountering the 
world (being-in-the-world), live a life, properly or improperly. I will follow 
Heidegger’s early characterisation of existence (factical life) as threefold: mode, how, 
and directed-ness.  
 Mode in this sense determines that humans, in our being, encounter the world 
as an activity (praxij). In this, the phenomenon of Religion must also be 
determinable as activity. Religion, then, signifies a way in which the world gets 
encountered in what Heidegger calls ‘concern’: of our dealings with other entities in 
the world. The task of interpreting Religion as a phenomenon, then, is initially that of 
discovering/uncovering the way in which humans, in our dealings, are religious. This, 
however, is dependent upon what Heidegger calls ‘care’. 
 What Heidegger calls ‘care’, I will here break down into two terms implicit to 
Heidegger’s early characterisations of factical life: the ‘how’ and ‘directed-ness’. In 
this, the ‘how’ signifies the way in which humans are inherently interpretative in our 
encountering the world. The ‘how’, as such, is our encountering the world as 
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significant, or, meaningful. As a phenomenon belonging-to our being, Religion then 
signifies the determination of life as meaningful. It is in part ‘how’ we interpret life 
and living as such.  The question of Religion, then, is given the task of 
discovering/uncovering the way in which we humans are religious in our 
constituting/interpreting existence as meaningful. Thus, we are attempting, in this, to 
characterise Religion as a meaning-full-ness that informs our dealings: our mode of 
being in the world. 
 In part, this will require a virtual (ideal) separating out Religion from the 
‘how’ in general, but must also carefully constitute Religion as inseparable to the 
‘how’ of being-human in general. This is a difficult proposition to make, insofar as it 
implies an inseparability of such terms as belief and knowledge, or, faith and reason. 
Nonetheless, in characterising Religion as a positive phenomenon it will be no longer 
possible to prioritise knowledge/reason over belief/faith, or, idealise one to the 
detriment of the other. Rather, the question of Religion as a phenomenon signifies an 
equalising of knowledge and belief insofar as they are both phenomenon belonging-to 
the being of humans. As equal, they are what Heidegger calls ‘equiprimordial’, and as 
such, co-dependent and co-constituting. Furthermore, in equiprimordiality, these 
phenomena must be determined in their ground: the being of humans. Insofar as the 
aim is in regard to Religion, this co-constitution will not be developed fully, but rather 
implied through the interpretation of Religion. 
 This is no less evident than in the final way of characterising Religion as a 
phenomenon belonging-to the being of humans, and thus, showing itself in existence 
which I will call ‘directed-ness’. In this, directed-ness signifies the being out towards 
the world, or otherwise, in being directed out towards being (or otherwise than being). 
Directed-ness, as such, has four primary dimensions: towards entities, towards other 
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human beings, towards the world as a whole, and towards the ground of existence. 
Accordingly, directed-ness is a being-able to relate to the things, persons, world, 
ground - to be able to have relationships with these regions of being (or otherwise).  
 Humans are, in our being, able to be in relation to entities in our directed-ness 
in such a way that they show themselves to us. This means, initially, that directed-
ness as being able to relate, must also be determined as understanding, or, being-
ontological. Here, Religion as a phenomenon belonging-to our being thus signifies the 
question of the connection of being-ontological and being-religious. In this way, the 
first three dimensions of directed-ness: entities, people, and the world, must be 
questioned/interpreted via Religion as that of religious-understanding, but also, 
understanding in general as religious in some sense. This is no more evident, or 
necessary, a question than in regard to the problem of being-in-general, or, the ground 
of existence. This, I have already pointed out, may be constituted as otherwise than 
being. The question of Religion as a phenomenon, then, has its highest expression via 
the term directed-ness insofar as this signifies the ability of humans, in our being, to 
relate to and question the originary ground of existence. 
 This question inherently engages in the traditional problem of metaphysics but 
intends to formulate it in regard to Religion as a phenomenon belonging-to the being 
of humans. In this, the question of originary ground and the human ability to be 
directed towards the otherwise than being, shows that some-‘how’ originary ground 
also gets understood in some way. This brings us to the task of interpreting Religion 
as the way in which existence gets grasped in its ground. This is initially the question 
of why, throughout ‘Western philosophy’, originary ground gets determined, for the 
most part, in relation to the ‘religious’. The paper, however, must attempt to pursue 
this question further in a phenomenological way, by opening up the relation of 
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originary ground of existence and what gets called Religion as a question. 
Furthermore, this question must be asked properly: in interpreting Religion as a 
phenomenon belonging-to the being of humans and also via phenomenology. In 
regard to the former, I will, in the next section, discuss why the objects of Religion 
must be excluded from this interpretation. In regard to the latter, I will deal with 
method in the second part of the paper. It is my aim to show that the phenomenon or 
Religion in its highest and most general ontological sense, directed towards the 
originary ground of existence, is nothing other than what gets called belief. Belief, as 
such, is a relationship with existence directed towards that which is otherwise than 
being, and thus, a directed-ness towards that which cannot be seen by humans in our 
being. This claim can only be worked out via an interpretation of existence: the fourth 
and final part of this paper. 
 
11. The Exclusion of the Objects of Religion: 
In formulating Religion as a phenomenon it becomes necessary to exclude the objects 
of Religion, such as God, from the interpretation to be provided. In a general sense, it 
is necessary to exclude the objects of Religion in a merely negative sense: that it 
would be dangerous not to. In this, there are three primary dangers of accepting 
objects of Religion: of objectivity (object-like-ness), anthropomorphism, and of 
covering up the phenomenon of Religion.  
 In the first case, the danger of including objects of Religion is that it may tend 
to lead the interpretation of Religion into the space of presupposing objects that 
determine Religion, and thus, of determining Religion as object-centred and object-
like. Furthermore, in predetermining objects of Religion we would also run into the 
danger of these objects informing what can be said about Religion. For example: 
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predetermining God as omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent may lead us down 
the garden path of determining Religion as a mere desiring (wishful thinking) for 
what we are not. Additionally, these predeterminations tend to lead to a confusing and 
conflation of the world and the ground of existence producing differing styles of 
‘naturalism’.  
 Likewise, the positing of objects of Religion leads to the danger of 
anthropomorphism: of predetermining objects of Religion as human-like. In this, the 
interpretation of Religion enters into a vicious circle wherein the everyday conception 
of what a human is gets written onto the objects of Religion, and thus, in turn re-
writes and re-enforces the everyday conception of what it is to be human and what 
Religion is. 
 Both of the above dangers of accepting objects of Religion are conjoined in 
the third danger; that in positing objects of Religion we will tend to miss the being of 
humans, and thus the way in which Religion as a phenomenon belongs-to being-
human, and can be characterised properly as such.  In objectivity, the interpretation is 
tied to objects, to the priority of things, and the formulation of all things as object-
like. This obscures and denies the proper possibility of interpreting Religion as a 
phenomenon. Likewise, in anthropomorphism, the interpretation tends to merely 
presume and re-enforce a shallow everyday conception of being-human, hiding the 
question of Religion from proper exposition. As such, the objects of Religion must be 
excluded from a phenomenology of Religion, initially, in a negative sense. 
 In exposing Religion (as a phenomenon) as the way in which being-human 
gets lived, objects of Religion cannot be, initially, characterised in themselves, or for 
themselves, but rather can be seen to belong-to the way in which humans live. In this, 
the primary determination of objects of Religion only gets carried out via the 
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dimension of directed-ness; that objects of Religion are possible objects of human 
directed-ness in relation to the ground of existence. As such, the problem of Religion 
as a phenomenon is not the possible objects of Religion (determining them as such) 
but rather the way in which humans are able to relate to these objects at all. 
Furthermore, the question of Religion in conjunction with directed-ness brings us to 
the possibility of these objects properly insofar as it shows the character of being-
human that is able to relate to these objects. 
 Religion, as it is formulated as a phenomenon, is ontological. In this, it 
becomes necessary to exclude the objects of Religion in another sense: that they are 
not human (that they are otherwise than human and otherwise than being). As a 
phenomenon, the primary signification of Religion is its belonging-to the being of 
humans. Accordingly, everything that is not human (in its being) must therefore be 
excluded.  
 Finally, the objects of Religion must be excluded insofar as we aim to remain 
open to the question of ‘otherwise than being’. In this, humans in our being have the 
ability to relate to and grasp our own being. This ability, in one sense, is that of 
knowledge, but may be better expressed as an ability to see. Here, when we turn to the 
objects of Religion I am associating them, as philosophy generally does, not only with 
the ground of existence, but also with that which is impossible to see in general. This 
is not in the sense of a distinction between ontical and ontological, but rather, the 
distinction of ontological and the otherwise than being: that which is a sheer 
impossibility to see – the unconditioned, pure nothingness, absolute spirit (Geist) and 
so on… To remain open to the impossible to see, as such, is to attempt to characterise 
Religion as belonging-to humans as that which constitutes our ability to relate to the 
absolutely non-see-able (the impossible). Finally, in this sense, objects of Religion as 
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the impossible (to see, to know, to understand) can only get worked out, and related 
to, through existing itself, through a living of life. This is a location that 
phenomenology only attempts to interpret ontologically, i.e., in regard to the being of 
humans as it can be characterised structurally in relation to existence. The 
determination of the impossible, as such, cannot be worked out by phenomenology: 
except in relation to the possibility of the impossible.322 The impossible, rather, only 
gets determined in the actual encountering of the world as a relationship that can be 
thought only in its possibility. This possibility I call Religion. 
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Part Two: The Formulation of a Phenomenology of 
Religion 
The primary question of this part of the research is that of how to formulate a 
phenomenology of Religion. In this, insofar as Religion has been posited as an 
ontological problem, the question then becomes: how to formulate a phenomenology 
of Religion that is ontological? In order to address this question, the second part of the 
research is then given the task of interpreting Heidegger’s formulation of 
phenomenology as ontology, and therein, of grounding a phenomenology of Religion.  
 The task of interpreting Heidegger’s phenomenology will be divided into two 
distinct approaches: the first of characterising Heidegger’s phenomenology in context, 
the second of discussing the central structures of Heidegger’s phenomenology as 
ontology.  
Chapter four will approach Heidegger’s phenomenology in its context or 
background, showing what phenomenology entails from the perspective of a broad 
overview of theorists that influence Heidegger and from whom Heidegger 
appropriates themes and ideas. Here, the aim is to show what phenomenology is for 
Heidegger from the broad perspective of the history of thinking, the philosophical 
tradition, and the incorporation by Heidegger of various ways of thinking into a 
phenomenology that is ontological. 
 Chapter five will provide an interpretation of the central structures of a 
phenomenology as ontology. Here, the chapter will first discuss the two central 
theoretical components of Heidegger’s phenomenology: fundamental ontology and 
ground. Following this, the chapter will then provide a discussion of how Heidegger’s 
phenomenology works out in deconstruction and existential analytic. The aim of this 
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chapter, then, is not merely to show what is central to Heidegger’s phenomenology, 
but additionally, to show how Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology may be 
utilised as the ground for a phenomenology of Religion. Thus, the chapter will also 
discuss openings that allow of a phenomenology of Religion and how Heidegger’s 
formulation of phenomenology may be adapted or amended for that task. 
 Part two concludes, in chapter six, with a formulation of a phenomenology of 
Religion. This formulation will be grounded upon the interpretations of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology as ontology and will tailor this style of phenomenology to the 
problem of Religion. Herein, the primary characteristic of a phenomenology of 
Religion is given as the uncovering/discovering of the meaning and originary ground 
of Religion in being-human. This chapter also provides a discussion of the 
delimitations of the formulation of a phenomenology of Religion insofar as it is only a 
preliminary and preparatory investigation of the meaning of Religion. Finally, this 
chapter also provides an outline of how a phenomenology of Religion, in this sense, 
will be worked out through deconstructions and a movement towards an existential 
analytic. 
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Chapter Four: Background\Context 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a clear as possible overview of the 
background, or context, of Heidegger’s phenomenology; which itself is the 
background to the style of phenomenology to be engaged in the research. In this, the 
primary aim of the chapter will be to provide an account of the socio-historical and 
philosophical context in which Heidegger’s phenomenology developed. This will 
require a broad overview of Heidegger’s biography and also that the philosophical 
indebted-ness and appropriations of Heidegger’s phenomenology be traced. This 
overview will be utilised as a way to provide a better understanding of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology (in its background/context) and, moreover, allow of a more rigorous 
and flexible development of any ‘phenomenology of Religion’.  
 In providing an overview of Heidegger’s background and context, I will be 
aiming to provide three related interpretations of Heidegger’s phenomenology in its 
background-context. Initially, I will provide a brief biographical account of 
Heidegger’s early life and career. In this, there will be two aims: of showing some 
broad socio-cultural themes of Heidegger’s context, and of providing an account of 
the biographical layering of Heidegger’s philosophical development. As such, the 
biographical component to be provided has the task of revealing some elements of the 
socio-cultural context that plays a role in Heidegger’s view of philosophy as a 
philosophical life and furthermore, of showing through biography, some of the 
foundational appropriations of Heidegger’s philosophical endeavours.  
From this biographical account (S12), the second task (S13) will be to fill in, 
or expand in more detail, some of the primary dimensions of Heidegger’s 
philosophical context. In this, I will show how Heidegger takes up (appropriates) 
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various theoretical positions, how the question of being (the seinsfrage) develops and 
finally, how Heidegger approaches phenomenology as a way to deal with the question 
of being. As such, the main aim will be to show that Heidegger comes to 
phenomenology already having appropriated a wide range of philosophical thinking, 
and furthermore, having already decided what the question of philosophy properly is. 
This has implications, then, for how Heidegger will view phenomenology and what 
phenomenology will become.  Thus, the third and final task, (S14), will be to provide 
an outline of Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology within the framework of his 
background.  
 
12.  Biography: 
Heidegger was born in 1889 in Messkirch, a rural, conservative, and pious town.323 
His early life was dominated by religious and cultural tensions between the ‘Old 
Catholics’ and the Roman Catholics.324 The ‘Old Catholics’ were a dominant minority 
of generally wealthy liberal and ‘modernist’ Catholics who had control of, and 
predominant use of, the town’s cathedral; forcing the predominantly poor, peasant, or 
rural Roman Catholics to meet elsewhere.325 Early in Heidegger’s life, however, the 
situation changed and Heidegger’s father, a master cooper and the Roman Catholic 
sextant, moved into the small house adjoining the cathedral.326 As such, Heidegger’s 
early life, for the most part, consisted of a life marked by the routines and world of the 
church: of ringing the bells, being an altar boy, and so on…327 Although Heidegger’s 
family were not poor, they were also not wealthy enough to finance Heidegger’s 
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education.328 Because of this, Heidegger was dependent upon church funding for his 
education, a fact which would have ramifications for Heidegger’s relationship with 
Catholicism. Heidegger’s early life, overall, was marked by a conservative rural 
worldview that contained corresponding anti-modern and anti-urban attitudes.  
 As Heidegger was considered to be a gifted student, he was given a 
scholarship by the church to attend a gymnasium in Constance.329 Here, in Constance, 
the early context of anti-modernism and anti-liberalism was exacerbated by the fact 
that Heidegger lived in a seminary while attending the gymnasium that strongly 
encouraged opposition to the liberal modernity of the city.330 Heidegger, was therein 
caught between two conflicting worlds insofar as he appreciated some of the anti-
institutional and even anti-Catholic views of his gymnasium teachers, but was also 
fully involved in the seminarian portrayal of the secular world as shallow.331 At the 
gymnasium in Constance, Heidegger fell in love with German and Greek literature (as 
well as some Greek philosophy via Franz Brentano) but also engaged in the anti-
modernist religious conservatism of the seminary. 
 From Constance Heidegger moved to Freiburg, again with funding from the 
Catholic Church, to study theology.332 At Freiburg, Heidegger continued his reading 
of German and Greek literature while also denouncing his age as decadent via an 
idealisation of rural life.333 Here in Freiburg, Heidegger also encountered Carl Braig, 
a complex and subtle anti-modern/liberal thinker who accused modernity of having its 
own secular faith in science, reason and humanism.334 It is also likely that during this 
period Heidegger also read Braig’s work On Being in which the Greek notion of time 
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is traced etymologically back to the word ‘tanumi’: “I stretch myself”.335 At this 
stage, then, Heidegger somehow manages to combine interests in German and Greek 
literature with conservative Catholic theology and a growing interest in philosophy; 
especially the question of being. 
 It appears that at this stage, in Freiburg, Heidegger’s misgivings about his 
relationship with the Catholic Church comes to the fore. In this, Heidegger begins to 
study (1911-1912) science and mathematics which then results in a doctoral 
dissertation (1913) on ‘The Theory of Propositions in Psychologism’.336 This move 
away from the Catholic tradition was complex: a mixture of disliking his financial 
dependency, his disagreements with Catholic theology (its limitations), and his 
growing interest in philosophical questions that are independent from Catholic 
doctrine. Furthermore, this ambivalence would have been heightened by the repeated 
rejections of Heidegger for Catholic philosophical tenure-ship on various occasions. 
In the meantime, Heidegger, with the view of attaining a lecturing position as a 
‘Catholic Philosopher’ began his post-doctoral habilitation dissertation on Duns 
Scotus’ doctrine of categories and meaning.  
 World War I interrupts Heidegger’s progress, in a small way, but due to his 
‘health’ his war service only consisted of light work for the postal service.337 
Ironically, this interruption also provides Heidegger with an outlet of freedom from 
financial dependency upon the Catholic Church. In 1916 Heidegger finishes his 
dissertation that now, in its final chapter, stresses the importance of the theme of ‘life’ 
in philosophy.338 At the same time, Heidegger’s hopes of obtaining tenure as a 
Catholic philosopher is destroyed as he is considered to be both too young and 
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dangerous by the Catholic nominators.339 With the loss of this hope, however, 
Heidegger becomes more ‘unsafe’ for Catholicism insofar as he now aims to pursue 
philosophy alone: excluding and perhaps even antipathetic towards Catholicism as an 
institution.  
 More important, however, to Heidegger’s changing relationship with 
Catholicism is that he meets, in Autumn 1915, Elfride Petri: an economics student 
from a well off Protestant family.340  Sadly, there is little discussion of Elfride Petri in 
most biographical accounts of Heidegger, for it seems that, directly or indirectly, their 
relationship formed the platform for many changes in Heidegger’s development. The 
little written about Elfride Petri notes that she was a member of an early form of the 
German women’s liberation movement, exemplified by her studies in economics at a 
time when it was considered a ‘male’ domain.341 Although the effect of this 
relationship in their lives, and in this case especially Heidegger’s, it undoubtedly 
formed a large part of the changes that took place in Heidegger’s thought during this 
period. For instance, soon after marrying Petri, Heidegger formally separates himself 
from Catholicism and calls himself simply a ‘Christian’.342 Additionally, it is during 
this period of Heidegger’s and Petri’s early relationship, that Heidegger also begins to 
study a wide range of Protestant theology, historical theory and hermeneutics.343   
 The final biographical element I will discuss occurs in the same year as 
Heidegger finishes his dissertation on Duns Scotus, with the arrival of Edmund 
Husserl (1916) in Freiburg.344 Heidegger had previously encountered Husserl’s 
‘Logical Investigations’ as a theology student, but now, with Husserl’s presence and 
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Heidegger’s move away from Catholicism, Heidegger begins to study under Husserl. 
Here, Heidegger continues to change his philosophical views via a broad range of 
philosophical and theological texts, while also appropriating some of Husserl’s 
phenomenological themes. 
 It is important to note, however, that the relation of Husserl and Heidegger 
may be characterised right from the start as one of misunderstanding and perhaps 
even misdirection. Heidegger’s background in Messkirch and Constance is marked by 
an anti-modernist stance that borders upon an anti-scientific one. At the same time, 
Heidegger was ambivalent about his background in the Catholic faith\thinking, his 
financial dependence, and was also by this stage antipathetic towards Catholic 
philosophy to some degree. As such, Heidegger’s relationship with Husserl was likely 
to have been motivated not only by Heidegger’s appreciation of phenomenology, but 
also by a desire to escape his financial and intellectual dependency upon Catholicism. 
Accordingly, it is likely that Heidegger down-played, in part, his theoretical 
disagreements with Husserl’s Phenomenology in their relationship with the hope that 
Husserl could provide him with career possibilities as well as non-Catholic 
philosophical status. Husserl desired to have disciples, who would not only develop 
phenomenology, but would continue phenomenological endeavours along the 
methodological lines he had founded. As such, Husserl was likely to have overlooked 
Heidegger’s differences, at least at first, in the hope that Heidegger would become a 
disciple-proper to phenomenology as a methodological endeavour.  
 It is quite clear, in hindsight, that Heidegger never really became, nor intended 
to become, a disciple of Husserl’s phenomenological method, as Heidegger’s early 
lectures of this period emphasise only the sixth investigation of the ‘Logical 
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Investigations’ and some extracts of ‘Ideas I’.345 In this, Heidegger took the sixth 
investigation to be the point of origin for phenomenology while Husserl viewed it as 
merely the preliminary breakthrough that allowed phenomenology to be developed.346 
When Heidegger lectured on Husserl’s ‘Ideas’ he was critical of the Cartesian 
dimension of phenomenology, and became more so as Husserl developed 
transcendental phenomenology.347 At the same time, Heidegger was developing 
phenomenology in relation to the question of being, and thus emphasised categorical 
intuition,348 history (hermeneutics), and time (temporality).349  
 Likewise, Husserl’s and Heidegger’s views of what phenomenology is also 
diverged. In this, Husserl viewed phenomenology as a method of rigorously scientific 
philosophy, returning again and again to methodological questions.350 Heidegger, on 
the other hand, already had the question of being and was already imbued within the 
tradition of philosophical thinking to the degree that phenomenology became a point 
of entry, or, a way into the question of being rather than a method. Here, the ‘way’ of 
philosophy is marked by ‘furrows’ (the plodding farmer ploughing the field): the 
progression of questioning and arguments that more persistently towards, and are 
directed by, the philosophical question to be asked.351 As such, phenomenology never 
constituted a ‘method’ for Heidegger, but rather, a way of seeing.352 Thus, Heidegger 
takes up phenomenology in an entirely different sense to Husserl’s formulation: not 
only in that Heidegger was already fixed on the question of being, but also of what 
phenomenology was to entail as a way of philosophical ‘seeing’. 
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13. Philosophical Appropriations and Indebtedness:  
In order to cover the range of theoretical positions that get appropriated and 
incorporated in Heidegger’s philosophy; especially in relation to his formulation of 
phenomenology, I will draw upon the brief biographical sketch as the basis for a 
broad overview of the development of Heidegger’s phenomenology. In this, the areas 
of Heidegger’s philosophical development worth noting on their own behalf can be 
divided into five loose themes: Catholicism, Neo-Kantianism, Protestant theology, 
hermeneutics, and Husserl. These thematic areas, of course, are not anywhere near the 
complete range of Heidegger’s developed philosophical position, but rather, are the 
main influences upon Heidegger as he developed his views on phenomenology.  
 
A. Catholicism – Neo-Scholasticism – Towards Aristotle 
In Heidegger’s studies in Catholic theology and philosophy the dominant theme is 
that of being. Reportedly, Heidegger first encountered the problem of being when he 
was given a copy of Brentano’s On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle while in 
high school.353 Additionally, as a theological student in Freiburg Heidegger reads Carl 
Braig’s work On Being.354 Even if Heidegger had not read these two works, the 
question of being would undoubtedly have been a central component of his student 
years in theology and Catholic philosophy, via such thinkers as: Aquinas, Duns 
Scotus, and Suarez.355   
 For Heidegger, the question of being originated in his studies in Catholic 
theology and philosophy as a question of reality and truth: of logic, the categories and 
                                               
353
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger's Ways, J.W. Stanley (trans.) p.168 
354
 Safranski, Op. cit. p.16 
355
 van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, p.55. 
 124 
the divine grounds of the categorical and history.356  If, then, the question of being 
arises for Heidegger in the context of Catholicism it does so in two distinct ways. In 
the first instance, Heidegger’s emphasis upon Brentano’s work as an inspiration is, if 
anything, a backhanded compliment insofar as the question of the sense of being, its 
unity and meaning/sense without reference to entities, is something entirely missing in 
Brentano’s writings.357 Furthermore, the question of the sense of being also travels a 
path through Catholic theology/philosophy through scholasticism back to Aristotle. 
As such, even in Heidegger’s earliest student days, the philosophical influence of 
Catholicism points back out of Catholic thinking to metaphysics and Greek 
philosophy. 
 On the other hand, Heidegger retains much of his Catholic upbringing and 
education in the form of an intellectual antipathy towards secularism, science and 
modernity (technology). Heidegger, however, was not a believer in biographical or 
historical contextual accounts of a philosopher’s thinking: a view that stands in the 
way of discussing his background.358 At any rate, there is a great deal of evidence in 
his personal and theoretical writings to suggest that Heidegger maintained these views 
throughout his life.359  
 In general, it appears that from Catholicism Heidegger posed the question of 
being and set himself the task of viewing metaphysical questions in relation to their 
genesis in Greek philosophy. Even so, Heidegger had not yet discovered the crucial 
theme of time360, seeing himself as a Neo-Scholastic-Aristotelian with the task of 
                                               
356
 Ibid.p.56 
357
 Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, p.168 
358
 van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, see chapter’s 1 and 2. Here, 
Heidegger is documented as maintaining strict control over his writing and its editing, insisting on his 
own biographical accounts, and even of possibly destroying/losing or changing earlier texts to suit his 
later philosophical outlook.  
359
 See: Heidegger, ‘Why I remain in the Country’, Heidegger: The man and the thinker, Thomas 
Sheehan (ed.) 
360
 van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, p.57 
 125 
reviving the wisdom and mystical dimension contained in the genesis of philosophy 
with the help of modern philosophy; Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology.361   
 
B. Neo-Kantianism 
Neo-Kantianism was the predominant force in German philosophy in Heidegger’s 
student days. In this, however, Neo-Kantianism like many such ‘periods’ of 
philosophical endeavour was both complex and contained a wide range of differing 
questions. In order to show the context of Neo-Kantianism in Heidegger’s 
phenomenology, then, it is useful to consider both its broad unity (that allows the title 
‘Neo-Kantianism) and the particular style of Neo-Kantianism Heidegger was exposed 
to.  
 In its broadest sense, Neo-Kantianism signifies a German philosophical 
movement post Kant and Hegel, developing throughout the nineteenth century, and 
antipathetic to Hegel and German Idealism/Romanticism. In the first instance, Neo-
Kantianism originated in such theorists as Helmholtz, who conjoined philosophy and 
science as a ‘scientific philosophy’.362 The motive source for early Neo-Kantianism, 
as such, was the impact of the natural sciences, especially in the fact that science 
worked, i.e., provided certain verifiable knowledge. Here, Neo-Kantianism followed 
Kant’s awareness of the work-ability of the natural sciences and that philosophy (as 
metaphysics) was losing credibility in the process.363 Accordingly, two themes came 
to the fore in philosophy: the question of how philosophy can be ‘scientific’ (and thus 
work-able) and how philosophy could play a role in understanding the workability of 
the natural sciences.  
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 Neo-Kantianism then stabilised in the 1860s as ‘Erkenntnistheorie’ (theory of 
science).364 In this, Neo-Kantianism begins to confront the growth of the ‘human 
sciences’ within the framework of Kant’s practical reason.365 Furthermore, in this 
period, the Neo-Kantian Fischer appropriates Kant via Fichte’s interpretation; 
resulting in the foregrounding of experience as the problem of philosophy.366 
Accordingly, the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant emphasised the transcendental 
analytic (the a priori structure of reason – understanding), overlooking both the 
aesthetic and dialectic.367 Neo-Kantianism, as such, was epitomised in the thinking of 
Otto Liebmann, who studied mathematics and natural science before turning to 
philosophy.368 Liebamann coined the phrase ‘back to Kant’369, while also attempting 
to overcome Kant’s distinction between the thing-itself and phenomena.370  
 Neo-Kantianism, in general, signified four main themes: the critique of pure 
reason, an anti-Hegelian stance, the attempt to found individual sciences via 
‘Erkinnistheorie’ rather than ‘Weltanschauungen’, and finally, the attempt to find the 
limits of philosophy in a scientific sense.371 Within these four general themes Neo-
Kantian thinkers then ranged in their philosophical endeavours from philosophy of 
science, through to proto-analytic logic, aesthetics, and value/ethical systems via 
practical reason.  
 The form of Neo-Kantianism that forms an aspect of Heidegger’s context was 
called the ‘Marburg School’, dominated by such thinker’s as: Hermann Cohen, Paul 
Natorp and Nicholai Hartmann.372 The Marburg school was overwhelmingly 
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Protestant in their outlook and general cultural horizon, to the extent that Gadamer 
recalls that the university did not have a copy of any writings of Thomas Aquinas 
until the arrival of Heidegger.373 The Marburg school of philosophy in this context 
contained two primary agendas: that philosophy is to serve as the methodological 
effort to achieve transparency as to the ground of the sciences with a corresponding 
aim to serve as the conscience of the sciences.374  
 The founder of the Marburg school was Hermann Cohen, a philosopher 
opposed to the dominance of empiricism, positivism and materialism in philosophy.375 
Cohen interpreted the Critique of Pure Reason to be a critique of experience, or, a 
philosophical exposition of experience wherein objectivity gets constituted.376 In this, 
Cohen argued that the a priori construction of objects constitutes experience, and 
accordingly, the a priori structures of experience produces the form of the object.377 
As such, objects originate as the content of intuitive perception and form the product 
of intuitive perception of object content.378 Here, Cohen has been viewed as a 
Platonist insofar as the notion of beholding objects in their form is attributed to 
Plato’s notion of intellectual intuition.379 Apparently, Cohen’s motto was: ‘that we 
know a priori of things only what we ourselves have put in them’.380 
 However, the main agenda of Cohen’s philosophy is that of 
‘Erkinntnistheorie’, which is neither a Kantian form of transcendental idealism nor 
epistemology.381 Rather, ‘Erkinntnistheorie’ aimed to discover, and make transparent, 
the fundamental preconceptions and presuppositions that operate in science in such a 
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way as to allow them to work.382 In this, the question of experience signifies a 
scientific view, or, as Husserl calls it: the natural attitude.383 Through this questioning 
of experience it was found that the natural sciences are made possible by an a priori 
‘Entwurf’ of nature.384 As such, the Marburg school of thought stood for the argument 
that ontological views of nature, or ontological systems in general, are produced by 
epistemological assumptions as to what constitutes knowledge.385  Thus, the main 
thesis of Marburg Neo-Kantianism was that ontological systems are always founded 
in experiential or ontical motive sources.386 This means that within the structure of 
knowing there is a movement from epistemic motives to method and thus ontological 
systems. Here, the ontological system reflects the motive source which generates the 
preconceptions upon which the methodological/epistemological concerns operate. 
 In Natorp, Marburg Neo-Kantianism then signifies a philosophical questioning 
of unity; the relation of subjectivity and objectivity, which both operate within the 
constructive/projective process of experience/knowing.387 In this, science no longer 
signifies a narrow field of epistemological conditions, but rather, embraces life as a 
whole as experience.388  In turn, methodological determinations are then viewed in 
reference to a relation of thinking and being wherein to think reality engages in the 
primordially concrete: the Log oj – the significance of being that precedes the 
rational.389 Again, in Natorp, Plato plays a dominant role insofar as being (reality) is 
framed as the primordially concrete then generates via the Log oj the laws (ideas) of 
what is – the rational processes – in relation to the world.390  As such, the neo-
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Hegelian and Platonist impetus of Marburg Neo-Kantianism signifies a philosophical 
question of the unity of being and thought, made possible in primordial living of the 
concrete: the Log oj.391  
 In Marburg Neo-Kantianism, then, philosophy moves beyond a scientific 
reflection upon the way the sciences work into the question of what constitutes the 
experiences of things in the world in general, and moreover, what constitutes the 
‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ of such experiences. In this, the notion of rational 
process breaks free from notions of epistemic conditions and may signify any 
experience that constitutes objectivity; values, aesthetics, ethics. Furthermore, 
Marburg Neo-Kantianism, in attempting to make the sciences transparent in their 
grounds, also renews the question of being insofar as ‘Erkinntnistheorie’ and 
‘Entwurf’ discloses the structure of knowledge and ontological systems via 
foundations in ontical motive sources.  
 For Heidegger, Marburg Neo-Kantianism was fertile with possibilities with 
regard to the question of being. In this, there are two main themes in Marburg Neo-
Kantianism that becomes important to Heidegger’s question of being: the relation of 
being and thinking and furthermore, the disclosure of the rational process of 
experience as constituting objectivity. 
 In the first case, the question of the relation of thinking and being, Natorp 
determines as the primordial life characterised by the log oj in ideas constituted via 
intellectual intuition. In this, the intuitive and the log oj combine as disclosing being 
in thought. Furthermore, this relation is characterised as operating within a primordial 
living. Here, the former gets appropriated into Heidegger’s phenomenology as the 
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notion of a truthful disclosure (log oj and alhqeia) of being (phenomenon) that 
operates as an intuitive and discursive possibility of living (a philosophical life).392 
 In the second instance, the Neo-Kantian disclosure of the constitution of 
objects provides Heidegger with an opening for an ontological revolution that 
reverses Kant’s Copernican turn.393 In this, Heidegger initially appropriates the 
disclosed structure of the constitution as an ‘Entwurf’ wherein the originary motive 
source determines epistemology and then the ontological system. Here, Heidegger 
reverses the Neo-Kantian notion that this motive source is epistemic, arguing against 
what, in The History of the Concept of Time, he calls the primacy of the theoretical.394 
Rather, Heidegger argues, the originary grounds of epistemological concerns can be 
found in ‘everydayness’: that experiences are grounded in an ontological ‘Entwurf’ of 
function/use and significance.395 This reversal of Neo-Kantianism has two primary 
significations: first, that the originary ground is characterised as pre-ontological 
(being-ontological) rather than epistemologically motivated.396  Additionally, it also 
strengthens the Neo-Kantian claim that somehow human thought, in primordial living, 
constitutes both subjectivity and objectivity. In Heidegger, it is the being of Dasein 
(being-human) that replaces thought as the question of the constitution of subjectivity 
and objectivity: the in-between of subject and object.397 
 
C. Protestant Theology 
One of the primary sources of appropriation within which Heidegger developed his 
early conception of phenomenology is Christian thought. This stage of appropriation 
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began within the period wherein Heidegger distanced himself from Catholicism, 
married Elfride Petri, and studied under Husserl. In this, Heidegger reportedly began 
to study in depth such thinkers as: Kierkegaard, Luther, Augustine and Paul. There are 
two primary ways of interpreting Heidegger’s appropriation of Christian thought; first 
in regard to how Heidegger utilises Christian thinking/experience to oppose and 
critique various dimensions of the tradition of philosophy, and furthermore, how 
Heidegger appropriates Christian thought as a positive transformation of philosophy. 
 In light of Heidegger’s general context in a philosophical sense it can be seen 
that the destructive element of Christian thought contains three main movements: 
towards Catholicism and thus Aristotle, towards Neo-Kantianism, and finally, towards 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Together this destructive movement forms a critical 
reversal of the tradition of philosophy: the tracing back of thinking from 
contemporary philosophy to the originary source of philosophy. In this, Heidegger 
appropriates Christian thought in order to overcome Husserl’s notion of the natural 
attitude and furthermore, the primacy of the theoretical view of the world. Likewise, 
Heidegger appropriates Christian thought in order to overcome the notion of the 
epistemic (ontical) genesis of thought that dominates the Neo-Kantian task of 
‘Erkinntnistheorie’. Finally, in his appropriation of Christian thought Heidegger finds 
a way of tracing back through Catholic philosophy/theology the concept of being as 
physical-always-presence to the Greek philosophy and context from which it was 
generated.  
 This destructive movement is only made possible within Heidegger’s positive 
appropriation of Christian thought as disclosing the proper point of origin for 
philosophical endeavours in the relation of the being of humans (Dasein) and a 
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genuine/proper life. In this, Heidegger’s positive appropriation of Christian thought 
also contains its own path of tracing back through history. 
 In Kierkegaard, Heidegger finds two interrelated themes of appropriation: that 
of the notion of being and anxiety. In this, Heidegger interprets Kierkegaard as 
showing how the tradition of philosophy has completely overlooked the significance 
of being in relation to non-being (no-thing) and purpose ( t eloj).398  Additionally, 
anxiety gets interpreted in regard to the notion of being: a fear of loss in relation to the 
world of physical/material things, and a fear of the no-thing; even though the no-thing 
is sheer possibility itself, i.e., freedom.399  
 From Luther, Heidegger appropriates five main themes: a typology of 
manifestation, death, time, hqoj and fronhsij. Here, Heidegger appropriates Luther’s 
discussion of the theologia crucis in opposition to theologia gloriae of the Catholic 
Church.400  In this, the opposition is transformed from a discussion of the proper 
conception of God into a philosophical question of the proper way to view being. This 
amounts to a distinction between being as it gets manifested to humans within a 
proper life and being-for-itself as hidden from human sight. Likewise, Heidegger 
appropriates Luther’s view of death in life (“right from birth we begin to die”401) as 
signifying the being of humans as finite and anxious in the face of death (no-thing-
ness).402  In finitude Heidegger appropriates Luther’s views on life as signifying a 
sense a ‘Chairological’ time403: wherein humans in our being constitute time 
authentically in actualisation, non-objective performance (significance), becoming 
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and care.404 Chairological time can then be opposed to the linear time of philosophy 
(Cronoj) that loses its sense of significance and thus authenticity.  
 These themes then enable a broader appropriation of Luther, in relation to 
hqoj and fronhsij, wherein Luther’s critique of Aristotle is utilised by Heidegger in 
opposition to the tradition of philosophy and science in general. From hqoj, 
Heidegger appropriates the notion of an authentic existence, a genuine being Dasein 
in life; now characterised as a faithful-dwelling and the interpretation of life 
significance in situated-ness.405 Fronhsij, accordingly, gets appropriated as the 
actualisation of this faithful-dwelling (hqoj) wherein the being of Dasein becomes 
transparent to itself, allowing of a proper understanding of being.406  
 A further step back finds Heidegger appropriating Augustine; with similar 
themes as before pointing towards a notion of the proper life: and this proper life as 
the disclosure of the being of humans. In this, Heidegger’s appropriation of Augustine 
follows that of other Christian thinkers via such themes as: factical life (a proper 
performative life407), care and concern (cura and uti408), fallen-ness and temptation 
(curiosity409), and death/fear.410 Likewise in Augustine, Heidegger finds the 
distinction between faithful living (parousia) and living through that which can be 
seen.411 
 Finally, in Paul, Heidegger finds the highest expression of Christian thinking 
to be appropriated. In this, Heidegger interprets Paul’s writings to signify a basic 
schematism, or dual potentiality, of human existence: of authenticity (the light) or 
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inauthenticity (darkness).412 This basic schematism, which is taken to signify the 
potential ways of being Dasein in life, then gets applied throughout the dimensions of 
human existence: temporality, world, life. The authentic life, as such, generates a 
Chairological temporality; of waiting, anticipation, and hope – all of which 
constitutes life as performative/interpretative and imbues life with significance.413 
Likewise, the world is authentically constituted in anxiety, care and concern. Life, 
then, gets determined in terms of finitude and mortality: death and weakness. 
 All of these expressions of authenticity have their corresponding inauthentic 
modes. Chairological time becomes chronological time; a time constituted as linear 
and which measures time out by the appearance (presence) of things in the world.414 
The relation to the world, of constituting the world, now becomes a rampant curiosity 
(a mere looking/seeing) wherein things lose their significance.415 Accordingly, 
relationships between humans no longer take up care, but rather, falls into idle talk 
and use-valuating (objectification).416 Finally, life itself falls from performance 
(becoming) and significance into darkness: empty fear of losing the things of the 
world (possessions), of seeing one’s self through the world as a thing, and of 
becoming enthralled (possessed) by the world.417 
 In Heidegger’s appropriation of Christian thought in general, then, he finds the 
proper originary content of the philosophical question of being. In this, if Heidegger 
has already decided that the proper way into the question of being is to be founded in 
the question of being-human in life, then Christian thinking provides him with an 
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exposition of the being-proper of humans as a proper life or hqoj (faithful-dwelling). 
From this foundation Heidegger then has the opportunity to disrupt the tradition of 
philosophy in its abstract grounds through the ground of facticity.418 Furthermore, in 
the notion of facticity as a faithful-dwelling, Heidegger also has the grounds to talk of 
an authentic philosophical life: a faithful-dwelling in the truth and questioning of 
being.419 As such, Heidegger’s appropriation of Christian thought enables two 
primary dimensions of his phenomenology: the disclosure of an authentic faithful-
dwelling of Dasein and the possibility of an equally authentic philosophical hqoj. 
 The possibility of a proper phenomenology-ontology then becomes a question 
of a genuine philosophical life which can access the authentic being of Dasein, and 
thus Dasein’s sense of being. This possibility, however, also rests upon hermeneutics 
as the proper way of interpretation and temporalising (history). Accordingly, the issue 
of hermeneutics and history becomes important to Heidegger’s development of 
phenomenology. 
 
D. Hermeneutics 
For Heidegger, the ‘hermeneutical turn’ serves as the unifying theme that draws 
together the diverse range of theoretical positions incorporated in response to the 
question of being: the philosophical tradition and facticity unified as a fundamental 
ontology. The hermeneutical turn was not a sudden revelatory change in Heidegger’s 
thought, but rather, the combination of a long process of confronting the tradition of 
philosophy and theology, which finally results in a breakthrough facilitated via a short 
intense period of study (1919-1922). As such, this overview of the context of 
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hermeneutics will aim to cover the major themes of this context, such as: mysticism, 
Dilthey, Augustine, and a turn to Greek philosophy. Here, I am claiming that the 
context of hermeneutics provides a unifying force in relation to both facticity (as the 
object of philosophy) and philosophy (a way of living) that enables of formulation of 
phenomenology as a philosophical ‘how’ (hermeneutic).  
 In the first instance, hermeneutics enters into Heidegger’s thought via the 
mysticism of Meister Eckhart.420 Heidegger, in the midst of studying and confronting 
Catholic thought, engaged in the question of the log oj: the ‘breaking-forth’ or 
emanation of the divine in life.421 This ‘breaking-forth’ or manifestation of the log oj 
is then posited in Eckhart as a disclosure of true actuality and actual truth that reaches 
into and gets expressed out of both the personal and historical situated-ness of 
living.422 On the other hand, this emanation is difficult: it is rare, with life for the most 
part dominated by a concealment and absence.423 In Eckhart, then, Heidegger sees a 
prototype of hermeneutics wherein the question becomes that of how the log oj gets 
disclosed in and through the living of life (personal and historical) and the being of 
humans in which the truth breaks-forth. 
 In Heidegger’s studies of Dilthey, especially the correspondence with Count 
Yorck, the question of hermeneutics and personal/historical living begins to take 
shape.424 In this, the inspiration for hermeneutics is more a reaction against Dilthey 
found in the writing of Count Yorck. Here, Yorck responds to Dilthey by conceiving 
history in relation to the being of humans: that human life is the foundation of the 
historical.425  Accordingly, for Yorck, the problem with historical studies is that it 
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tends to see history through an ‘eyepiece’ of time as presence or presentation, thus 
losing sight of life itself in its significance.426 For Yorck, then, the question of history 
is more poignantly that of human possibilities in living, and furthermore, a religious-
ethical question of the highest possibilities of human life.427 
 For Heidegger, hermeneutics develops as a possible alternative to Jasper’s and 
Dilthey’s philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie).428 In this, Heidegger attempts to 
counter the dualism of the rational and irrational division of life wherein history and 
the personal life get formulated as irrational.429 Additionally, Heidegger develops his 
view of hermeneutics in opposition to subjectivism and psychologism, exemplified in 
Schleiermacher’s writings.430 As such, Heidegger’s notion of hermeneutics becomes a 
question of the being of humans in life: a questioning of ‘how’ to access the 
temporality of life (personal/historical), and of what it means to be historical.431  
 Heidegger then turns to Augustine for inspiration and therein finds two central 
claims to be appropriated:  that life is inherently interpretative432 and that ‘to doubt is 
to live, in living a human thinks’.433 In regard to the former, Heidegger appropriates 
as a fundamental expression of being-human, i.e., to be-human is to interpret 
significance. Thus interpretation gets constituted as a fundamental expression of 
being-human: the object of philosophy. In regard to the latter, questioning then gets 
appropriated as a characteristic of philosophy (a genuine philosophical life). 
Philosophy as a genuine life, as such, is not only fundamentally hermeneutical but is 
also a life in the face of the sheer questionability of life. Thus, the question of 
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hermeneutics in philosophy becomes a question of the integral relation between 
genuine living and philosophy. Insofar as philosophy is the proper arena for the 
question of being, it follows that the question of hermeneutics will prioritise the 
question of a genuine philosophical life and thus the proper way into the proper object 
of philosophy. On the one hand, then, the proper object of philosophy is facticity. On 
the other, the question of being leads into the question of a proper philosophical life: a 
double reflection of philosophy upon itself as a life.  
The question of a genuine philosophical life leads Heidegger back to Greek 
philosophy, evidence by his writing and lectures in the years 1921-1923. The first of 
these, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (1921-22 lectures) takes up the 
question of the history of philosophy.434 However, the question soon becomes that of 
‘what is philosophy?’ and then, ‘what is the originary ground of philosophy?’435 Thus, 
Heidegger’s question of what philosophy is then becomes a return to Aristotle and 
Plato in order to make transparent the originary source of philosophy.436 In other 
words, Heidegger posits Greek philosophy as the originary source of philosophy as a 
genuine way of living: a genuine factical situation. As such, the originary ground of 
philosophy is determined as a ‘primal decision’.437  
In 1922, Heidegger put together a paper called Phenomenological 
Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle for the purpose of attaining a lectureship in 
philosophy at Marburg. In this, the paper refines the hermeneutic question in two 
ways: through the schematism of authenticity/inauthenticity and philosophy/life. The 
paper begins with an assertion that the proper question of philosophy is being; and 
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moreover, the question of the being of humans.438 Philosophy then gets framed as a 
question of authentic living, or, a factical life.439 In this, Greek philosophy is 
interpreted as having the character of authenticity, insofar as Greek philosophy moved 
in response to the Greek life-situation in a genuine way.440 Following this, philosophy 
‘today’ is characterised as inauthentic on two counts: that philosophy has lost the 
genuine impetus of Greek thought, and that philosophy has become inauthentic in the 
melding of Greek and Christian thinking.441 As such, Heidegger argues, the possibility 
of an authentic philosophising will only be found in further interpretations of Aristotle 
and Plato.442  
The final piece of writing relevant to hermeneutics in this sense is a lecture 
series from 1923 entitled Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity. In this, 
Heidegger reiterates the connection and unity of hermeneutics in relation to facticity 
and philosophy via his opening claim that being-human in life is fundamentally 
interpretative, which in turn allows of the possibility of a genuine philosophical 
life.443 Here, hermeneutics is characterised as a genuine way of being-human wherein 
we communicate our ways of being to ourselves: we become self-transparent.444 
Heidegger then goes on to claim four dimensions of hermeneutics as a ‘how’ of 
human existence: life as questionable, self-transparency discloses our being-temporal 
(finitude/historical), and finally, that in hermeneutics we are able to understand 
being.445 From these four claims, the rest of the lectures builds general determinations 
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of a hermeneutics of facticity; from a determination of the being of humans (in 
traditional hermeneutics) through to a preliminary formulation of a 
phenomenological-hermeneutics which moves from everydayness to the disclosure of 
the being of humans in its structures. 
In general, hermeneutics as a context of appropriation in Heidegger’s 
phenomenology allows two important breakthroughs. First, the hermeneutical theme 
provides Heidegger with a proper philosophical object through which the question of 
being can now be asked in a positive sense. In this, the very interpretative dimension 
of facticity allows of a new formulation of temporality constituted through the 
interpretation of significance. Thus, history and existence get prioritised in 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. Furthermore, the theme of hermeneutics provides a 
genuine ground for phenomenology wherein it achieves validation upon the 
foundation of a genuine philosophical life. This possibility is then give two ‘equi-
primordial’ foundations: in Greek philosophy as the historically genuine originary 
ground of present-day philosophical thought, and, in the ‘existential’ foundation of 
the sheer question-ability of life. Thus, the context of hermeneutics gets appropriated 
in Heidegger’s phenomenology as the ground (a genuine philosophical life) and 
designates the proper originary object.  
 
E. Husserl and Phenomenology 
When Heidegger eventually ‘officially’ becomes a disciple of Husserl’s 
phenomenology he does so having already broken away from Husserl. In this, 
Heidegger was by no means unfamiliar with Husserl’s phenomenology, but rather, 
utilised his apprenticeship to develop his own philosophical questioning and his own 
version of phenomenology. This is evidenced by the lectures given by Heidegger at 
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the time that not only focus upon Husserl’s early developments of phenomenology but 
also additionally provides critical interpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology as a 
platform for his own style.446 As such, Husserl’s phenomenology; for Heidegger, 
provides a measure, or counterpoint, to his own formulation. 
 For Heidegger, phenomenology operates as a way into the question of being 
and a way of interpreting the initial object of philosophy as such: the question of 
Dasein’s being. In this, Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology as a ‘way’ is 
itself, in part, an appropriation of Husserl’s conception of philosophy: as a way of 
seeing and a way of living. Initially, as a way of seeing, Heidegger appropriates 
Husserl’s prioritisation and emphasis upon the intuitive.447 However, this intuitive 
seeing is only possible insofar as it is validated by phenomenology itself as a way of 
living.448 Here, phenomenology is implicitly validated insofar as it is a genuine way 
of living: of analysis and solitude; that has the ability to reveal the being of the 
constituting consciousness.449 As such, in Husserl phenomenology attains its 
validation in a distinction between ‘natural consciousness’ that constitutes the world 
actively450 and phenomenological consciousness that properly ‘sees’ this constituting 
in its a priori structures.451 For Husserl, this implicit grounding of phenomenology as 
a way of life only ever gets conceived of via a conjunction of philosophy and science: 
as science. In other words, for Husserl, the implicit validation of a philosophical life 
gets framed as a question of methodological approach: of genuine consciousness. 
 Juxtaposed to Husserl’s methodological questioning, Heidegger attempts to 
formulate phenomenology (in its valid ground) with explicit regard to the question of 
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a genuine philosophical life. This then leads Heidegger, as I have shown previously, 
into the realm of hermeneutics that reveals the parallelism of an authentic life and 
authentic thinking, i.e., philosophy. As such, the first and possibly the most important 
of Heidegger’s appropriations of Husserl’s thinking is the move from implicit 
validation of philosophy as a way of life/seeing to an explicit formulation of 
phenomenology as such, and upon this ground. Thus, in Heidegger’s initial 
appropriation of Husserl’s thought, phenomenology gets transformed from a question 
of methodology into a question of genuine living. 
 As a way of living, which is equally a way of seeing, phenomenology then 
becomes a ‘way’ in various senses. These senses of phenomenology as ‘way’ enables 
further appropriations from Husserl’s phenomenology, especially with regard to: 
intuition, intentionality, indication/reduction, and temporality. Rather than show the 
differing dimensions, or senses, of phenomenology as ‘way’, I will show how 
Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s methodological conceptions within these ways. 
Intuition: 
The first sign of Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology as a way 
appears with Heidegger’s fascination with the sixth logical investigation dealing with 
categorical intuition. This emphasis upon intuition forms Heidegger’s most basic 
notion of phenomenology as an applied way insofar as phenomenology gets 
actualised as a phenomenological way of ‘seeing’. In this, intuition gets appropriated 
by Heidegger as a seeing of being, or, a way of seeing that allows being to show 
itself.452 Here, the foundation of phenomenology as a way of living differentiates 
itself from the everyday living of life and the theoretical (objectified) views of life. 
Phenomenological seeing is differentiated insofar as it grasps the ontological 
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structures of both everydayness and the ontical (scientific/theoretical) living of life. 
This, however, requires that phenomenology be marked out by its way of seeing and 
have a way of seeing that allows the ontological to appear. The phenomenological 
‘sight’, as such, is intuitive, albeit what Husserl calls the categorical intuition. 
 In Husserl, categorical intuition operates as a founding/founded act in relation 
to acts of meaning within the context of meaning-fulfilment (objectification).453 
Heidegger, then, takes up this relation as one of intuition and logos, conjoined as a 
discursive-intuitive disclosure of being.454 In Husserl, intuition is a seeing which then 
fuses with meaning-intention in a meaning-fulfilment expressed logically in judgment 
or assertions.455 For Heidegger, however, this relation is not clear with regard to any 
differentiations between the intuition and the expression. In part, this is explained by 
Heidegger’s criticisms of Husserl’s notion of intuition and expression, especially that 
Husserl fails to distinguish between factual truth and the truth of being.456 The failure, 
Heidegger argues, belongs to Husserl’s ‘logical prejudice’ wherein ontological facts 
are derived from ‘natural consciousness.457 In a positive sense, however, the 
ambiguity of the relation between intuition and log oj, for Heidegger, lies in the way 
Dasein is and has access to being.  
 I would argue that the clue to the relation of intuition and log oj returns to the 
theme of hermeneutics insofar as hermeneutics signifies the intrinsic belonging 
together of understanding/grasping and discourse/communication. As such, the 
concept of categorical intuition as fundamentally interpretative will necessarily be 
determined as log oj: disclosing discourse. Heidegger’s appropriation of intuition, 
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then, aligns with three primary dimensions of phenomenology as way. First, 
phenomenology as way signifies a proper philosophical living of life wherein life is 
taken up and questioned with regard to being. Accordingly, phenomenology is a way 
of seeing properly; of intuiting being. Finally, phenomenology is a way of disclosing 
being properly wherein being gets disclosed (communicated): ‘log oj 
apofant ikoj’.458 Thus, the connection of intuition and log oj signifies the way 
humans are in our being: that in interpretation we communicate. As such, it is evident 
that Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s notion of intuition is central to his 
formulation of phenomenology as way. This will remain apparent as I discuss other 
terms of appropriation. 
 
 
 
Intentionality/Comportment 
For Husserl intentionality implicitly contains two types; that of ‘natural 
consciousness’ that constitutes the world, and philosophical intentionality that sees 
the structures of natural consciousness.459 Intentionality, as such, signifies a directed-
ness towards objects that is a constituting of objectivity or world. In Heidegger’s 
phenomenology the term ‘intentionality’ gets appropriated as ‘comportment’; 
designating both a wider usage and a multiplicity of modes. In this, Heidegger agrees 
with Husserl’s notion of intentionality (as a primary structure of lived experience and 
the belonging together of ‘subject’ and ‘object’460), and also extends its use in a 
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broader sense. As comportment, intentionality is appropriated as designating any way 
in which humans (in our being) may be directed towards the world. 
 In Heidegger’s early formulation of comportment, however, there are three 
main forms talked about: theoretical, practical, and phenomenological. In the first 
case theoretical comportment signifies a directed-ness towards the world wherein the 
world is passively observed and objects are prioritised with regard to their 
presence.461 Accordingly, the second form of comportment is everydayness: the 
world-building of the active, practical participant in life.462 Here, the everyday is 
posited in opposition to Husserl’s ‘natural consciousness’, viewed by Heidegger as a 
derivative form of the theoretical. Finally, there is philosophical comportment proper 
that comports towards being: precluding subject-object and seeing the ‘worldhood’ of 
the world.463 
 The appropriation of intentionality as comportment, then, signifies a widening 
of the term intentionality; designating a broad interpretative directed-ness towards the 
world. As such, Husserl’s notion of intentionality gets appropriated by Heidegger as 
comportment: a term signifying the fundamental interpretative-directed ways in which 
humans are, and can possibly be.  
 
Phenomenological Reduction and Indication: 
For Husserl, one could say, the phenomenological reduction is the primary 
methodological technique that reveals the eidetic ego and thus the fundamental 
structures of consciousness (the being of the constituting consciousness). For 
Heidegger, however, the phenomenological reduction signifies a general movement 
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from the apprehension of beings to their being.464 Accordingly, the phenomenological 
reduction gets appropriated explicitly as: ‘leading phenomenological vision back from 
the apprehension of a being… to the understanding of the being of this being.465 
However, the phenomenological reduction is not a central component of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology, but rather, is merely a negative starting point – an aversion.466 The 
phenomenological reduction, as such, signifies a way of phenomenological seeing but 
also signifies the first phase of this seeing, or even merely a preparation for seeing.  
 As a way of seeing the phenomenological reduction is closely tied to intuition, 
or, as Heidegger sometimes calls it: “a priori cognition”.467 In this, a priori cognition 
begins with the phenomenological reduction: apprehending beings with regard to their 
being and then averting the ‘gaze’ from the entity to being.468 As such, the 
phenomenological reduction only takes place insofar as being is already apprehended 
in some fashion. On the other hand, the phenomenological reduction is a positive 
movement of phenomenological seeing as well, insofar as it aims at an understanding 
of being, and intrinsically contains within it a way to understanding. Again, 
Heidegger appropriates a Husserlian term ‘indication’ as this positive way of the 
reduction. 
 The central component of the phenomenological reduction lies in the term 
‘indication’ (in Husserl – Anzeichen, in Heidegger – indizieren)469 which signifies a 
mediation of intuition and the symbolic/sign.470 In this, the disclosure of being 
(phenomenon) is always initially mediated by signs and symbols through which 
intuition gets expressed, and furthermore, which indicates the being as it shows 
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itself.471 In other words, the way in which a phenomenon appears to intuition is 
initially mediated in both the intuition and through the intuition’s intrinsically 
communicatory function (expression, sign, symbol). As such, in the intuition of being 
there is already a structure of mediation which in itself indicates the phenomenon 
proper (being). Thus, the understanding of being provided through the 
phenomenological reduction operates as a tracing back from apprehension through 
indication to the phenomenon itself.  
 Indication, then, leads to the positing of a ‘formal indication’ as the way of 
phenomenology which is both a seeing and communicating. Initially, formal 
indication is given in opposition to Husserl, via Natorp: that Husserl’s concept of 
indication is static (freezing life) and only operates within a language which 
generalises and objectifies.472  On the other hand ‘formal indication’ is developed as a 
way of communicating ‘way-traces’: of saying the unsayable.473 In this, the problem 
of being, for phenomenology, becomes a hermeneutical ‘indirect communication’ 
(Kierkegaard).474  This indirect communication occurs due to the way that the sense of 
being is given in existence: in a temporal flux of situated-ness.475 So, 
phenomenological seeing must not only contend with the indirect communication of 
disclosure (intuition-indication-sign) but also with the situated-ness of ways in which 
things get given in experience. This means that, for Heidegger, phenomenology must 
be formulated as a way of seeing-communicating that gets determined by the thing as 
it gives itself (indication) in living life (situation).476 Formal indication, as such, 
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signifies the way of phenomenology that follows traces of being in its sense477, or, 
how it is for us to be here/there. Thus, formal indication is a movement which traces 
back from the apprehension of entities to their being via the sense of being (of 
Dasein) that mediates. Furthermore, formal indication draws out the problem of 
mediation as that of Dasein’s sense of being. To understand being, then, requires that 
the sense of being for humans be explicated first as that which mediates beings and 
being. 
 
Time-Consciousness and Temporality: 
The final theme of appropriation that I will discuss is that of Husserl’s notion of time-
consciousness. In this, the lectures on time-consciousness and Heidegger’s brief 
remarks on them serve as a poignant example of how Heidegger appropriates 
Husserl’s phenomenology, and furthermore, how their formulations differ. As such, I 
will provide a brief analysis of Husserl’s lectures on time-consciousness and 
Heidegger’s response. 
 Husserl begins his lectures on time-consciousness by stating that the task is 
that of gaining an understanding of how temporal objectivity is constituted by 
subjective time-consciousness.478 This is also framed as performing an analysis of the 
phenomenological content of lived experiences of time.479 Initially, then, the notion of 
‘objective time’ must be excluded; wherein objective time signifies the notion of a 
singular external object-time.480 For Husserl, objective time as the appearing of time 
must be excluded insofar as it is given only through existing time: the immanent time 
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of the flow of consciousness.481 Objective time, as such, is presupposed as self-
evidential in an empirical sense (objectivity), constituted as objective being (Sein) – 
of one infinite objective time in which all things have temporal position: 
chronology.482 This is not the time to be analysed by phenomenology, but rather is 
shown via the results of the analysis of cognition that describes the characters of 
apprehension and regularities which make the empirical possible – and thus objective 
time.483 
 Next, Husserl distinguishes phenomenology from psychology, wherein 
phenomenology is concerned with theory of knowledge and psychology with the 
origin of concepts constitutive of experience.484 In this, phenomenology has as its 
task, from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge, of disclosing the essence of 
experience.485 Phenomenology is concerned with the question of the origin of time: 
the primitive, or, fundamental structures of consciousness that reveal ‘authentic’ 
distinctions in the consciousness of time.486 Thus, the question is that of the 
fundamental authentic structures of time-consciousness insofar as they are lived and 
through this, exhibiting the a priori truths of time consciousness that constitute 
objective time: the origin of objective time.487 
 What follows in the lectures, then, exemplifies Husserl’s phenomenological 
reduction wherein he methodically traces back from the experience of temporal 
objects as they are comprehended (moment and endurance) to an analysis of the core 
authentic structures of time-consciousness (the temporal constitutive flux, retention 
and protention). In this, Husserl prioritises the ‘now’, as primal now, but also 
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characterises this now as extended: that the now is a moment/phase that extends to 
(unifies) that past as it gets held (retention) and the future (protention) as it is not yet – 
but anticipated.488 Most importantly, this temporal flux as an extended now is asserted 
to be ‘absolute subjectivity’: the source point of consciousness.489 
 When Heidegger comments upon Husserl’s notion of time-consciousness he is 
full of praise, but praises in such a way as to at once show Husserl’s limits and where 
Husserl has unintentionally overcome his own phenomenological position. Heidegger 
asserts that time-consciousness in Husserl is the question of time in relation to 
intentionality, consciousness-of, in lived experience. This, Heidegger states, is the 
question of time asked genuinely and for the first time in its structures (retention, 
protention, and the primal-now).490 However, Heidegger asserts, these interpretations 
provided by Husserl also remain within the traditional ontological framework that 
prioritises presence and thus the object-objectivity.491 Heidegger’s final comment, 
then, both praises and criticises Husserl’s phenomenology as having inadvertently 
shown that what is called time-consciousness is time itself: temporality.492 Implicit to 
Heidegger’s final comment is Husserl’s assertion that the temporal flux is ‘absolute 
subjectivity’, or, that which constitutes time itself; temporalises. But this comment, as 
Heidegger infers, shows that Husserl’s phenomenological agenda of disclosing the 
structures of consciousness is itself dependent upon a further step back (behind 
subjectivity) of showing what constitutes consciousness primordially – being. In 
asserting that the temporal flux is absolute subjectivity Husserl, in Heidegger’s 
interpretation, reveals the sense of being of Dasein that is prior to consciousness. 
Thus, Husserl’s disclosure of the temporal unifying flux as absolute subjectivity (the 
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grounds of consciousness) also denies the fulfilment and validity of the agenda of 
Husserl’s phenomenology that prioritises consciousness.  
 The theme of temporality epitomises the way that Heidegger appropriates 
from Husserl and how their formulations of phenomenology differ. In this, the 
distinction between their formulations of phenomenology rests upon the question of 
the ‘matter’ (Sache) of philosophy and then, what philosophy (phenomenology) is in 
pursuing this question. Here, it is Heidegger’s claim that the matter of philosophy is 
being, and furthermore, that being is prior to consciousness and thus subjectivity and 
objectivity, that distinguish their formulations. Additionally, Heidegger also 
formulates phenomenology as a way of philosophy, following philosophical tradition 
in pursuing questions without attention to methodology in a scientific sense, i.e., fixed 
methodological systems. Thus, in Heidegger, phenomenology becomes the genuine 
philosophical way of pursuing questions in holding faithfully to the ‘matter’. Husserl, 
on the other hand, views philosophy as in need of science; as scientific philosophy, 
and thus prioritises method. It follows, then, that Heidegger’s phenomenology will 
prioritise ways of being (existence, facticity) over consciousness and also, over any 
theorising of knowledge. 
 Accordingly, if we look at Heidegger’s appropriations from Husserl’s 
phenomenology there is a parallel transformation of methodological concerns into 
questions about authentic ways of being in the world, wherein key phenomenological 
terms/concepts get framed as dimensions of a genuine philosophical life. Likewise, 
the content and objects of phenomenology get transformed from a theorising about 
knowing things (presencing) into ways and traces of the sense of being that shows 
itself (gives itself) via existence.  
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14. A Preliminary Characterisation of Heidegger’s Phenomenology:  
In providing a broad outline of the background/context of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology it has been shown that the primary formulation of phenomenology is 
that of ‘way’: a philosophically genuine way of living. It is then necessary to show 
how this formulation gets worked out in Heidegger’s characterisation of 
phenomenology in more detail. As such, this section will attempt to provide an 
interpretation of phenomenology in this way via Being and Time and the Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. In this, the section will be divided into three parts, 
dealing with: ‘the things themselves’, log oj, and the characterisations of 
phenomenology provided by Heidegger. 
 In Being and Time Heidegger asserts that phenomenology has as its maxim ‘to 
the things themselves’.493 This maxim, then, designates a how of research, the 
how of the question of being.494 In this, phenomenology is construed, not merely as a 
style of philosophy, but philosophy itself, its ‘how’ and its proper matter. 
Accordingly, the proper question of philosophy is being, which phenomenology 
grasps in the maxim ‘to the things themselves’. 
 Initially, the proper matter of philosophy is being. However, Heidegger 
claims, the tradition of philosophy has not addressed this matter properly; has not 
found the proper way.495 The pivotal determination of being, that being is always the 
being of an entity,496 then allows Heidegger to ask in which entity is the matter of 
being to be found, or, which being has a way of being – a sense of being? This then 
leads into Heidegger threefold claim that it is Dasein that is the entity to be prioritised 
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with regard to its being. In relation to the maxim ‘to the things themselves’ then, it is 
precisely Dasein that signifies the things themselves in three ways.  
 First, Dasein is the being that has a sense of being, or, who understands being. 
This understanding of being can be directed towards three dimensions of being: the 
being of Dasein, the being of entities that are not Dasein, and being-in-general (being-
for-itself, being differentiated from entities). Accordingly, if the question of being is 
to be asked the path to be travelled by phenomenology is precisely this: through the 
being of Dasein as understanding, to the sense of being that grasps the being of 
entities not Dasein, to the understanding of being-in-general. This is the first way in 
which Dasein is the things themselves. 
 Second, Dasein is also the things themselves as a phenomenon. In this, the 
task of philosophy of questioning being requires that some thing (some entity) show 
itself in its being in such a way that philosophy can see it. Here, Dasein then becomes 
the thing itself as the phenomenon through which philosophy may address the matter 
of being. As such, Dasein is the thing itself as the thing that shows itself in its being 
and its understanding of being. Therefore, in Dasein, a being shows itself in its being, 
and furthermore, in understanding of the being of entities not itself and thus being-in-
general. 
 Finally, Dasein is the thing itself insofar as we can be philosophical. In this, 
the philosophical question of being belongs to the being of the entity Dasein. 
Accordingly, philosophy is not only a way in which the being of Dasein shows itself, 
but is also the originary ground of the question of being itself. Furthermore, in being-
philosophical as a way of living, the matter of being also has its sole possibility of 
being understood genuinely. Dasein as philosophical, therefore, is the thing itself in a 
third sense. 
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 If phenomenology is to approach the matter of being properly, and insofar as 
being is a philosophical question, it must take up the third sense of Dasein as the thing 
itself as primary (in a methodological sense). In this, the term log oj comes to the fore 
as the proper way of philosophy. The log oj is determined by Heidegger as discourse 
(Rede).497 Here, the proper signification of discourse is given as that of making 
manifest what one is talking about in one’s discourse.498 Accordingly, log oj is 
intrinsically communicative as it lets what is being talked about be seen by 
someone.499 Furthermore, if the log oj is genuine then what is said relates to the very 
thing that the discourse is about.500 As such, log oj designates a way in which Dasein 
(as philosophical) can see being, pointing it out, and allows it to be seen by Dasein.501 
The primary sense of log oj as genuine, then, is that of truth (alhqeia): of taking 
something out of its hidden-ness and of discovering.502 Finally, log oj signifies a 
threefold communication: of grasping, of exhibiting, and of relating (a 
relationship).503  
 Phenomenology, as a genuine log oj of phenomenon (being), is formulated by 
Heidegger as a grasping of the matter in such a way that the discourse exhibits and 
demonstrates the thing directly.504 As log oj, phenomenology is also a description of 
how the thing gets encountered as a relationship.505 As such, phenomenology is a 
genuine way of log oj: an original and intuitive grasping that communicates the 
matter of being properly.506 As a genuine log oj phenomenology is intrinsically 
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hermeneutical, initially as it is a genuine way of being Dasein,507 but also insofar as 
the grasping of being by Dasein is inherently hermeneutical: that this hermeneutic 
belongs to Dasein’s existence (the existentiality of existence).508  
 In the Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger reiterates this formulation 
of phenomenology as way, and also outlines the structural process of this way. 
Initially, Heidegger asserts that phenomenology cannot be viewed as a movement in 
the history of philosophy (as a method) but rather is seen through what it deals 
with.509 In this, the point (Heidegger states) is not to gain some knowledge about what 
philosophy is (as a subject), but rather, in phenomenology to learn how to be able to 
philosophise.510 Phenomenology, as such, takes place as paths of reflection.511 
 Phenomenology, then, takes its path of reflection via an orientation towards 
the matter of philosophy. In this, being is the sole and proper theme of philosophy.512 
Accordingly, philosophy cannot take its task to see entities, but rather must seek in 
principle only to relate to being itself.513  However, being is only given insofar as it is 
already grasped in some sense via the entity Dasein as existing.514 This means that 
philosophy (phenomenology) has an ontical foundation insofar as philosophising is 
bound up with Dasein’s existence.515 In other words, the first task of phenomenology 
is to make philosophy transparent to itself by showing that philosophy is a way of 
being that Dasein has with its own ontical foundations, i.e., motive source/originary 
ground. So, phenomenology is a genuine way of philosophising because: a) it is a 
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genuine way of living, b) it makes philosophy transparent to itself, and c) relates the 
two (as one) in the pre-ontological understanding of being. 
 The second task of phenomenology then arises out of a difference between 
beings (entities) and being.516 In this, the problem is that of how Dasein (as being-
philosophical) transcends beings to an understanding of being. This, however, is the 
question of a genuine philosophical way of living: as seeing, or, as Heidegger 
sometimes frames it – the structure of a priori cognition.517 Phenomenology, as such, 
is a double seeing: it sees the proper structure of a priori cognition (intellectual 
intuition – sofia, fronhsij) and through this, sees being properly. At any rate, it is 
the structural components of a priori cognition that constitute phenomenology as 
way.518 
 The first structure of a priori cognition Heidegger calls the ‘phenomenological 
reduction’ that signifies a movement from the apprehension of beings to the 
understanding of being.519 Here, the phenomenological reduction is characterised as a 
pure aversion from beings: a merely negative exclusionary movement (scepticism).520 
Following this, a priori cognition then performs a positive movement of ‘Entwurf’ 
(free projection).521 Here, free-projection is a name that describes the positive 
intuitive grasping of being: the antecedent (pre-ontological) grasping of being as it 
gives itself.522 As such, the second component of a priori cognition is called 
‘phenomenological construction’.523 The third and final component of a priori 
cognition is then addressed as a movement towards the genuine originary grounds (of 
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philosophising) that is a discovery of the sense of being.524 At the same time, 
however, this final component is also destructive insofar as it must first destroy the 
tradition of ontology as concealing the sense of being.525 
 As a whole, then, Heidegger formulates phenomenology in two ways. First, 
insofar as phenomenology is a priori cognition properly implemented, then a priori 
cognition and phenomenology get unified as a de-construction: the unification of 
uncovering (destruction) and discovery (construction).526 Furthermore, 
phenomenology gets formulated as the genuine way of a priori cognition that contains 
three dimensions: the grasping of being (reduction), the development of 
understanding (construction) and historical cognition (destruction).527 
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Chapter Five: Heidegger’s Phenomenology 
 
Thus far, in interpreting Heidegger’s phenomenology through its background and 
context, the research has disclosed general themes of appropriation, and additionally, 
enabled a characterisation of Heidegger’s phenomenology as ‘way’. It is now 
necessary to provide a characterisation in more depth; disclosing the theoretical core 
and working out of Heidegger’s phenomenology. In this, there will be three main 
issues to be dealt with: the theoretical core, the working out, and the delimitations of 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. Initially, the research must come to terms with the two 
central aspects of Heidegger’s phenomenology in a theoretical sense: of fundamental 
ontology (S15) and the problem of ground (S16). This will be followed by an account 
of the working out of Heidegger’s phenomenology as a de-construction and 
existential analytic (S17). Finally, in (S18) this chapter will attempt to determine the 
delimitations of Heidegger’s phenomenology.  
 The overall agenda of this chapter, however, is twofold. In disclosing the 
theoretical core, working out, and delimitations, I will attempt to show what is central 
to Heidegger’s phenomenology, and additionally, attempt to provide openings for a 
phenomenology of Religion. In this, the chapter will also view Heidegger’s 
phenomenology with regard to necessary distinctions between a fundamental 
ontology and Religion, philosophical tradition and religion(s). Furthermore, it will be 
necessary to keep in mind the possibility of a phenomenology that is ontological 
(containing an existential analytic and de-construction) without pertaining to a 
fundamental ontology.  
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15. Fundamental Ontology 
 
The notion of fundamental ontology is inextricably linked, and pivotal to, Heidegger’s 
phenomenology. There are three poignant questions, then, with regard to fundamental 
ontology: what is fundamental ontology? Why does fundamental ontology necessarily 
entail an existential analytic of Dasein and de-construction? What is the relation or 
distinction between phenomenology and fundamental ontology? In dealing with the 
first question I hope to provide a characterisation of the core of Heidegger’s 
theoretical path of phenomenology. The second question operates as a way of 
pinpointing what fundamental ontology is with regard to how it works out. The final 
question is posed as a way of showing the possibility of a phenomenology of 
Religion. In attempting to deal with these three questions four explicit tasks become 
apparent: of disclosing the aim of fundamental ontology, of disclosing the ground of 
fundamental ontology, of disclosing the working out of fundamental ontology, and 
finally, of distinguishing between phenomenology and fundamental ontology in 
relation to the existential analytic. 
 
A. The Aim(s) of Fundamental Ontology 
In discussing the aim(s) of fundamental ontology, fundamental ontology will be 
disclosed in regard to what it is and the problem it addresses. Heidegger characterises 
fundamental ontology in general as the ‘founding of ontological enquiry in 
philosophy’.528 Here, fundamental ontology is a notion which recognises two 
dimensions of ontological research in philosophy: that ontology requires founding 
(properly) and additionally, that philosophy is itself founded in Dasein’s factical 
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possibilities.529  As such, fundamental ontology may be characterised as the 
grounding of ontology as a philosophical endeavour through the recognition that 
philosophy is itself a way of living with its own genuine possibilities. In this 
recognition, then, a further question arises insofar as ontology, the core of philosophy, 
is a life. That is: what is presupposed in a philosophical life, and furthermore, what is 
presupposed about being?530 Therefore, fundamental ontology in its broadest sense 
signifies an awareness of the problem of grounding ontology insofar as being gets 
presupposed and thought about through a philosophical life.  
 The essence of fundamental ontology, then, is the question of ‘ground-laying’; 
of foundation and, furthermore, of the recognition that the ground of philosophy, and 
thus ontology, is the being-human of philosophy.531 In this recognition, the aim of 
fundamental ontology is revealed as the twofold question of being-human: about 
Dasein’s being and qua Dasein’s being (philosophical).532  
 This is then explicated by Heidegger as the ‘idea of fundamental ontology’; 
the ground-laying of the inner possibility of the understanding of being.533 Here, the 
ground of understanding being is posited as the fundament of Dasein’s being finite.534 
Accordingly, fundamental ontology is determined as unveiling the being of Dasein in 
such a way that the understanding of being is disclosed in its structures.535 As ground-
laying, fundamental ontology aims to disclose the being of Dasein insofar as Dasein 
understands being. Fundamental ontology, then, aims primarily to lay the ground of 
ontology through a characterisation of the being of Dasein as understanding being, 
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i.e., as philosophical. In this way, fundamental ontology is nothing more or less than 
the aim to provide the ontological foundation of philosophy. 
 However, fundamental ontology is also more than this ground-laying of 
philosophy, for its ultimate goal is also the fulfilment of philosophy. In this, 
Heidegger posits the goal of fundamental ontology as the problem of being as such 
(being in general).536 There is then a question with regard to Heidegger’s formulation 
of the goal of fundamental ontology in relation to: what is the difference between 
being in general, the understanding of being, and sense of being? Heidegger’s 
writings are unclear in this; sometimes these terms utilised almost synonymously, but 
also at times pointing towards clear distinctions. Unfortunately, the question of these 
distinctions is central to any determination of what fundamental ontology is.  
 Initially, we can distinguish between the understanding of being and the 
question of (the sense of) being insofar as the understanding of being is an aspect of 
living, i.e., ontical. In this, the understanding of being is characterised by Heidegger 
in three interrelated ways: in relation to everydayness, as ontical, and as pre-
ontological. In regard to everydayness, the understanding of being can be 
characterised as preconception: how being is understood vaguely in the living of life. 
As ontical, the understanding of being likewise operates as a preconception of being 
that allows entities to be known (in a scientific, experiential sense), eg., as 
present/represented. Finally, as pre-ontological, the understanding of being is 
constituted as also constituted as a preconception. However, in this case the emphasis 
is upon the facticity of the understanding; indicating the possibility of a formulation 
and structural description of the understanding of being in an ontological sense. Here, 
the understanding of being signifies the ‘fact’ that in life Dasein has an understanding 
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of being (preconception) and that furthermore; this indicates the being-ontological of 
Dasein. In other words, the understanding of being indicates that Dasein is ontological 
in our ontical endeavours: being is an issue for us. Thus, overall, the understanding of 
being can be determined as a preconception of being that belongs to living and 
therefore indicates something about the being of humans. This can clearly be 
distinguished from the sense of being as an explicitly ontological formulation and 
determination. Furthermore, it can also be distinguished from the question of being in 
general as the fundamental question of ontology.  
 The difficulty in distinguishing between the question of the ‘sense of being’ 
and ‘being in general’ lies in Heidegger’s own writing and the resultant interpretations 
of fundamental ontology. In this, Heidegger at times explicitly formulates the 
question of fundamental ontology as that of the sense (Sinn) of being.537 On the other 
hand, Heidegger also posits the ultimate aim of fundamental ontology as that of 
disclosing being (itself)538, the problem of being as such539, something like being540, 
and finally, the possibility of understanding being in general.541  This problem of 
distinction is made more evident in the conclusion to the unfinished Being and Time 
wherein, even though the sense of being has been disclosed as temporality, Heidegger 
yet asks whether the question of being in general can be answered.542 It is clear, then, 
that in some fashion the ‘sense of being’ and ‘being in general’ can be differentiated.  
 The sense of being can be determined as the ground of Dasein’s understanding 
of being.543 In this, the sense of being is the ‘fundament’ of the ways in which Dasein 
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may possibly understand being in living whether it be that of everydayness, science, 
regional ontologies, or philosophy as metaphysics. In other words, fundamental 
ontology as disclosing the sense of being lays bare the fundamental ground of 
Dasein’s understanding of being in all its possibilities. Herein, fundamental ontology 
may be determined as having the aim of disclosing the sense of being where this 
signifies the ground of any human way of understanding being. 
 The final possible signification of fundamental ontology as that of disclosing 
the understanding of being in general, or, being-for-itself, is an aim unfulfilled in 
Heidegger’s early writings. Where it is approached later, in what gets called 
‘Heidegger II’, it is no longer within the framework of fundamental ontology, nor 
within phenomenology as way. This has led some interpreters to conclude that 
fundamental ontology fails insofar as it aims to disclose being in general.544  
 As a final way of showing what fundamental ontology is, via its aims, it is 
worthwhile discussing some of the various interpretations of fundamental ontology. 
One way of interpreting fundamental ontology is to posit that it contains two distinct 
aims: the grounding of regional ontologies and the question of being in general.545 
Here, the interpretation allows of a distantiation of fundamental ontology as 
grounding and fundamental ontology as completing. On the one hand, then, 
fundamental ontology can be viewed as determining the sense of being-for-Dasein or 
Dasein’s sense of being as temporality. Temporality, as such, is the horizon for any 
(human) understanding of being whatsoever; and therefore the ground of regional 
ontology’s, the sciences and the everyday average understanding of being.546 On the 
other, the question of being in general is viewed as a categorical mistake: a failure.547 
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Here, the question of being in general is interpreted to be the question of being-itself; 
distinct from beings altogether, and of Being; a universal and univocal determination 
of being. This interpretation, however, is somewhat problematic insofar as there is no 
clear evidence to suggest that in asking the question of being in general Heidegger 
was referring to a notion of being that signifies total independence, self-sufficiency, or 
some absolute being. Rather, this goes against the grain of all of Heidegger’s critical 
interpretations of the ousia-qeolog ikh/  of traditional metaphysics. 
 Another way of interpreting the relation of the question of the sense of being 
and being in general is to view them as two ways of asking the same question. This 
interpretation returns to Aristotle’s question of the unity of being in relation to its 
manifold senses.548 As such, the question of the sense of being (in general) can be 
determined as the question of the unified sense of being within its various origins, or, 
the unitary sense of being.549 Accordingly, if fundamental ontology succeeds in its 
aim to disclose the sense of Dasein’s being, i.e., the ground of Dasein’s understanding 
of being, then this is nothing other than the unified sense of being for Dasein and thus 
also for philosophy. The sense of being, therefore, discloses the unique unifying 
centre of intelligibility (the unity of being in its meaning).550 Fundamental ontology, 
then, grounds ontology insofar as it discloses the unitary sense of being for Dasein: 
the entity from which the manifold meanings of being can be clarified.551 
 In comparing these two interpretations, however, it appears that both are 
correct in respects. On the one hand, fundamental ontology can be viewed as 
addressing the question of being in general through Dasein’s sense of being. At the 
same time, Heidegger does not appear to have been satisfied with the results of 
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fundamental ontology, not merely in the fact that he never completed the planned 
outline of Being and Time, but also insofar as he later drops the agenda of 
fundamental ontology for the task of thinking: of language – of how being gives itself 
to Dasein and how Dasein ‘hears’ being. Certainly, in this respect, the disclosure of 
the sense of being (as belonging-to Dasein) cannot address the question of being 
distantiated from entities altogether, i.e., from Dasein. As such, Heidegger’s own 
writing can be viewed as evidencing a lack in the agenda of fundamental ontology 
insofar as it could allow of some discussion of being-for-itself. As it stands, it is 
possible to claim, whether fundamental ontology fails or succeeds, that it signifies 
certain concrete aims: the analysis of the human understanding of being which results 
in the disclosure of temporality as the sense of Dasein’s being/Dasein’s sense of 
being, and thus, the ground/unity for any understanding of being whatsoever.  
 
B. The Foundation/Justification of Fundamental Ontology 
The argument that founds fundamental ontology also equally justifies it as an 
existential analytic of Dasein. This argument takes place in two forms, one which 
builds up to a claim of the intrinsic connection of fundamental ontology and an 
analytic of Dasein, the other arguing for the priority of Dasein as the entity to be 
analysed. In the first case, the build up to fundamental ontology provides two clauses: 
that existence is the constitution of Dasein’s being and that all sciences and 
disciplines (that relates to entities that are not Dasein) are founded in the pre-
ontological understanding of being.552  
 In more detail, the first argument in the build up can be called the ‘existentiell’ 
argument. In this, the ‘existentiell’ signifies a relatedness of the question of being and 
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living wherein, Heidegger states, Dasein always understands itself in terms of 
existence or the possibilities of ways of being: to be one’s self or not.553  Furthermore, 
the question of being (of one’s existence) only gets worked out through living: a 
living which founds an understanding of existence and thus being.554 Thus, the 
question of being is an intrinsic affair of living – it determines existence. 
Paradoxically, the fact that being is a question intrinsic to living does not signify that 
being is understood, nor that it has been analysed philosophically in a proper 
ontological manner.555 If being is to be understood properly, then, phenomenology 
must make the ‘existentiell’ transparent in its ground: its ontological structure, i.e., 
existence/existentiality.556  
 The second argument then takes a different tack, referring to the sciences and 
disciplines. In this, the sciences and disciplines are conceived of as ways of being 
Dasein that comport towards entities that need not be Dasein.557  Here, Heidegger 
argues that Dasein’s living essentially contains a being-in-the-world; signifying that 
Dasein understands being only insofar as Dasein understands something like a world 
and the entities which become accessible through the world.558 As such, Heidegger 
claims, whenever ontology takes up for its theme entities which are not Dasein it does 
so upon the grounds of Dasein’s own ontical foundations and motivations, including 
the pre-ontological understanding of being.559 
 In general, Heidegger’s two founding arguments make two pivotal claims. The 
first refers solely to the being of Dasein and is the claim that the question of being 
belongs intrinsically to being alive – to existing. As such, the first claim posits an 
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implicit relation between the being of Dasein and the question of being. The second 
argument then addresses the question of being as it gets developed and preconceived 
in the sciences and disciplines that theorise about entities, the world (reality) and 
being. Here, it is Heidegger’s claim that the notion of being that gets formulated 
(understood) in theoretical endeavours is also intrinsically linked to existence and the 
being of Dasein. This is the case insofar as theory, thinking, sciences and disciplines 
that refer to entities belong-to humans: are human endeavours. Furthermore, it is 
Heidegger’s claim that thinking about entities that are not human, the ontological 
theories therein, and attempting to gain knowledge of entities, are also inextricably 
linked to the being of Dasein. Thus, if ontology is to be grounded properly, then the 
being of Dasein must be made transparent first. This is why, as Heidegger states, 
fundamental ontology must begin with an existential analytic of Dasein.560 
 The existential analytic is also justified in another way which Heidegger calls 
the ontic-ontological priority. In this, if fundamental ontology is taken to signify the 
ground-laying for the question of being it must somehow show how an existential 
analytic provides access to being. Here, Heidegger determines the ontic-ontological 
priority as that of the possibility of ontology.561 Ontology is made possible, then, 
insofar as Dasein not only understands existence (in the sense of our own being) but 
also in existence understands (grasps) the being of entities that are not Dasein.562 In 
other words, in existence Dasein has the ability to transcend; of transcending our own 
being.563 As such, the existential analytic is only a fundamental ontology so long as it 
remains fixed upon Dasein’s transcendence.  
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C. The Tasks of Fundamental Ontology 
There are two primary ways of disclosing the tasks of fundamental ontology; the first 
showing the phases of development towards the aim, the second of showing what is 
implicitly at stake in fundamental ontology.  
 In the first case, the phased tasks of fundamental ontology follow the path 
from the existential analytic to the disclosure of the sense of being.564 Here, the path 
of fundamental ontology (given in Being and Time) contains three primary phases of 
analysis: being-in-the-world, Dasein’s being as care, and the ground of care as 
temporality. In this, insofar as the question of the sense of being dictates the agenda of 
the existential analytic, these phases focus on, and trace through, the understanding of 
being belonging-to Dasein. Accordingly, ‘being-in-the-world’ provides a general 
analysis of what it is to exist as Dasein which is tailored to the situation of 
understanding. Likewise, the analysis of care takes up the explication of Dasein’s 
being; positing care as a fundamental characteristic of Dasein’s being (a whole), but 
nonetheless explicating care in relation to the understanding of being, and 
furthermore, to the question of the being of entities that are not Dasein. This means, 
finally, that in the exposition of time/temporality as the fundament (ground) of 
Dasein’s understanding of being, the priority is not that of Dasein’s being (itself), but 
rather, the being of Dasein as understanding being.  
 Implicit to these phases of fundamental ontology, then, is something other 
than an existential analytic. What is implicit, rather, is the existential analytic as 
disclosing the structure of understanding that belongs to Dasein’s being. Fundamental 
ontology, as such, is the question of the phenomenon of understanding being 
belonging-to Dasein’s being. What is at stake in a fundamental ontology, then, is 
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precisely the phenomenon of understanding in general, which then foregrounds the 
understanding of being.  
 Initially, the foregrounding of the understanding of being signifies the 
question of being-philosophical; of a philosophical understanding of life. This is the 
case insofar as the question of being is the philosophical question par excellence, and 
furthermore, insofar as an existential analytic of understanding discloses the authentic 
ways of philosophising. This is evidenced, as previously discussed, in Heidegger’s 
repeated and incessant claiming that being is the question of philosophy and that the 
ground of philosophy is to be found in being-philosophical as the questioning and 
understanding of being in life. 
 As the explication of the phenomenon of understanding, fundamental ontology 
also grounds the sciences. In this, the disclosure of the phenomenon of understanding 
shows how the sciences work from within the ontological structures of existence, 
revealing their ontic-ontological motives, their pre-ontological understanding of 
being, and finally, how the sciences belong-to Dasein’s being understanding. 
 On the other hand, the analysis of the phenomenon of understanding also 
denies, or covers over, other dimensions of the being of Dasein. This denial takes two 
forms: initially that the foregrounding of understanding only barely covers the central 
structures of existence (as Heidegger acknowledges),565 and moreover, does not 
explicate the being of Dasein in regard to life itself as it belongs-to Dasein in various 
ways.566 In other words, the task of fundamental ontology follows the tradition of 
philosophy in determining what is central to philosophy (metaphysics): the being of 
entities in their sense of the structures of presencing.567 Herein, fundamental ontology, 
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in determining the being-understanding of Dasein as temporality also determines 
Dasein as the entity who presences (brings to presence).568 Therefore, as Heidegger 
repeatedly affirms, fundamental ontology has the task of grounding philosophy, and 
therein the sciences, through the disclosure of Dasein’s sense of being as temporality. 
As such, fundamental ontology has the task of disclosing the phenomenon of 
understanding without consideration of what could be called the ‘meaning’ of the 
world or life for Dasein.  
 
D. The Distinction between Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology? The 
question of the existential analytic 
The possibility of a ‘phenomenology of Religion’ in this case is dependent upon the 
possibility of distinguishing between phenomenology as fundamental ontology and 
phenomenology as ontology (but not fundamental in Heidegger’s formulation). As 
such, the possibility of a ‘phenomenology of Religion’ belongs to a distinction 
between phenomenology and fundamental ontology, or, of a distinction between an 
existential analytic that is fundamental ontology or not. In this, the possibility I will 
discuss initially is that of Heidegger’s notion of the possibility of a 
‘phenomenological anthropology’ that is not a fundamental ontology. 
 In Being and Time Heidegger provides a distinction between a 
phenomenology that is fundamental ontology and a phenomenological anthropology, 
both of which are constituted in an existential analytic. In this, it is initially asserted 
that fundamental ontology discloses essential characteristics of being Dasein 
contained in any/every possible way of being.569 This means, then, that such 
characteristics as ‘being-in-the-world’, concern/care and so on are central (essential) 
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characteristics of Dasein’s being. Following this, Heidegger delimits fundamental 
ontology to the question of the sense of being: that it cannot provide a complete 
ontology, merely bringing to light the being of the entity of Dasein.570 So, on the one 
hand, fundamental ontology reveals the essential structures of being-human without 
developing these ‘pieces’ further.571 On the other, the existential analytic also has the 
possibility of further development: the complete analytic of Dasein.572 As such, any 
further developments would require a questioning of the being of Dasein in such a 
way as to disclose its meaning.573 
 In the delimitation of fundamental ontology, then, lies the possibility of further 
developed phenomenological investigations of Dasein’s being. In this, fundamental 
ontology provides the most basic determinations of Dasein’s being upon which these 
investigations could be founded; either through more complete explication of the 
structural pieces, through additional structural pieces not yet shown, or finally, 
through the question of the meaning of Dasein’s being in general.  
 At any rate, in Heidegger’s disclaimer of the delimitations of fundamental 
ontology, he also provides various possible ways of developing the existential analytic 
in ways which do not foreground the phenomenon of understanding. This amounts to 
a distinction between phenomenology as fundamental ontology and phenomenology 
as the ontological exposition of Dasein’s being. This is also a positing of a 
phenomenology-ontology that is a developed analysis of Dasein’s existence.574 
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16. Phenomenology and Ground:  
 
Even though I have discussed ‘ground’ with regard to Heidegger’s phenomenology 
previously it is nonetheless important to provide a more detailed analysis of ground. 
Due to the fact that Heidegger’s phenomenology can be best characterised as a way, 
the question of ground does not arise as a specifically methodological issue. Rather, 
as I will show, the problem of ground refers back to the question of philosophising; 
what it is essentially, and equally, how philosophy gains its foundation in the essence 
of philosophising. The approach I will take with regard to the problem of ground is to 
divide the discussion into two parts: an initial general overview of the question of 
ground in its various senses, to be followed by a more detailed analysis of the problem 
of ground in Heidegger’s writings. The aim of this section, as such, is to provide a 
detailed account of the problem of ground, which furthermore, reveals the foundations 
of Heidegger’s phenomenology as way. 
 
A. The Origin - Ground: 
Initially, the problem of origin can be viewed as the general philosophical problem of 
ground; of finding the proper place to begin and found philosophical endeavour. In 
this the origin signifies the problems of defining what philosophy is, on what ground 
does the validity of philosophy rest, of what the proper object of philosophy is, and 
finally, of what the proper method of philosophical endeavour is.  
 For Heidegger, the question of origin takes on these significations in its own 
unique and complicated way in so far as the act or life of philosophising is interpreted 
via itself; in its situation, original generation and impetus. In this, the question of 
origin for Heidegger is both the question of grounding philosophy as a ‘science’ and 
also the question of the historical and ontological origins of philosophy. As such, the 
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origin of philosophy can be viewed, generally, in relation to three areas; the historical 
origin, the origin in the factically existing human and in the ontological 
foundation/motivation of philosophical endeavour.575 
 Heidegger defines philosophy, at this early stage of his career, as a radical 
questioning576 and a fundamental questioning that seeks answers via research.577   
Here, philosophy is interpreted in itself as visible via the act of philosophy; the living 
of a philosophical life.578  As such, philosophy is the historical grasping of life and 
comportment towards life itself.579 Accordingly, the two basic questions of 
philosophy are ‘what really matters’ (the proper object) and ‘what is the genuine way 
of asking questions?’580 Thus, the two questions of philosophy in reference to itself 
are object and method. 
 In so far as philosophy’s object is itself, it becomes apparent that the question 
of philosophy must revolve around the entity that philosophises, the life of that entity 
and the generation of philosophising in that entities living. As such, Heidegger states 
that the object of philosophy is human Dasein in its Being character, and furthermore, 
the mode of living which generates philosophical endeavours.581  
 Accordingly, where Heidegger discusses the problem of method in general he 
provides three potential determinations of the object; where the object is originally 
accessible, the situation of life in which the object becomes accessible, and finally, the 
basic intention (motive) that generates the experience of accessing the object.582 All 
three potential determinations of the object relate to the problem of origin – as the 
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origin of access, the origin of situation, and the origin of motive. In so far as the 
object to be determined is the Being of human Dasein as comporting philosophically, 
the philosophical problematic becomes the question of the origin, in various senses, of 
philosophical comportment. 
 Origin, as such, operates as the locus of both object and method of philosophy 
insofar as the method is determined by the object – fits to the object characteristics, 
and insofar as the ‘object’ (human Dasein) produces the method in and of itself. It is 
not merely enough, however, to find any arbitrary origin. Rather, the origin must be 
determined as it belongs, genuinely, to the three possible determinations of human 
Dasein as philosophical; historical, factical and ontological.  
 
The Origin of Greek-Christian Culture: 
This first sense of origin, of Greek-Christian Culture, indicates in a preliminary way 
the historical situationality of origin, i.e., that the ‘Western World’ today originated – 
or has its origins in two historical situations that have melded in some way. In this, the 
origin of Greek-Christian culture is first and foremost an indication of present viewed 
as being affected by the past. As such, the origin in the past discloses the present, and 
the present discloses the past as remaining effective.583 It is, then, only through the 
disclosure of the past-origin that the present may be taken on authentically.584 
 To take on the present in an authentic way is no dismissal of the past, 
especially the origin, but rather involves both a movement forward and backward 
between the past and present. The movement forward, marked by the effectivity of the 
past in the present, involves the critical analysis of what has been transmitted in the 
meld between Greek and Christian culture forward and remains effective in the 
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present. As such, the movement forward for Heidegger requires a destruction of what 
remains hidden of the past in the present.585 The movement backwards is a proceeding 
towards the beginning; the situation and time from which the present has been 
generated.586 This movement backwards is marked by a search for what has been lost 
in the past that belongs to the origin.587 As such, the movement backwards is a search 
for the original way of living that has generated the present. 
 For Heidegger, in so far as he conceives of his present as Greek-Christian, the 
origin of the present belongs to two distinct historical situations; the Greek and the 
Christian. For these distinct historical situations to come together into one the 
movements forward and backward aim to disclose what has been transmitted and lost 
of each historical situation in order to fully disclose the present authentically.  
For Heidegger, the origin of Greek-Christian thought reveals that Greek philosophy 
lives on in ‘our’ philosophy and ‘our’ lives in such a way that it is not realised.588 The 
origin in this sense, then, is to appropriate the original interpretation of life/world in 
the past through the acknowledgment that ‘we are the past’.589 This acknowledgement 
allows the origin to show how the present sciences and philosophical endeavours 
belong to the past – as an expression of original life/world interpretation.590  
 In this, the origin of Greek-Christian thought enables a threefold analysis of 
theory; the original idea of human Dasein’s Being,591 the disclosure of original motive 
sources in life for theory,592 and the generating experience/interpretation of life.593 
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This sense of origin points towards a stronger sense of analysing the origin – as 
primordial. 
 
Origin and the Primordial: 
As it has already been briefly discussed, Heidegger conceives the original expression 
of theorising in Greek-Christian culture/history to be presupposed by an interpretation 
of the world and life that generates original conceptions in philosophy. It is likewise 
the case that these interpretations of life-world are presupposed by original primal 
experiences of life and world that occur both pre-theoretically and pre-life-worldly.594 
These primal experiences, for Heidegger, function as an origin of dismantling return 
towards the motive sources of philosophy.595 In this, primal experiences are such 
experiences as ‘wonder’,596 anxiety and uncertainty.597 However, these primal 
experiences are not freestanding or isolated, but rather occur in the context of a living 
of life and a historical situation. As such, even motive sources point towards, or are 
presupposed by, a further sense of origin – the context of primal experiencing. 
 The context of primal experiencing is a historical and life situated-ness that is 
original in the sense of ‘primordiality’.598 In this, the context is both pre-theoretical 
and pre-life-world and yet is at the same time situated in life and the historical. As 
such, the context of primal experiencing points towards a conception of life as it is 
experienced pre-conceptually and pre-culturally (life-world). This context, then, refers 
to an original life, a life as characterised in its origins and in its basic possible 
characteristics in any and every concrete situation. Heidegger calls this sense of 
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primal experiencing in life ‘factical life’ or ‘facticity’.599  Facticity, here, refers to the 
basic origin of the historical, the theoretical and the individual existence of human 
Dasein.600 In this, factical life contains the complete possibilities that characterise 
human existence; history, individual existence, and world. As such, factical life is the 
proper place of access for philosophy and its object; the human in our own mode of 
Being,601 the sense of Being of human Dasein,602 and the sense of Being of factical 
life.603  
 Insofar as factical life is the basic possible characterisation of human life, 
factical life must also be the originary location of all possible expressions of human 
existence. Initially, factical life can be viewed as the originary generation of history, 
of self-understanding and of the conceptualisations of primal experiences. In this, 
however, factical life as originary contains at least three differing possible directions 
of analysis; the characterisation of factical life in general, the characterisation of 
factical life in its extreme possibilities and as an enabling of ontological analysis. For 
Heidegger, all three directions of analysing factical life are interrelated, especially in 
reference to the problem of origin as the search for proper philosophical foundations.  
It is important, here, for proper ontological research that the entire complete 
characterisation of factical life be given, insofar as ontology refers to the entire 
possible Being of the entity. On the other hand, the entity in question (human Dasein) 
also contains the oppositional potentiality for Being, i.e., it can always also be 
otherwise.604 As such, an ontological analysis of factical life also requires the proper 
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access into these oppositional possibilities of factical life. For Heidegger, this is the 
question of genuine origin. 
 
Origin and the Genuine: 
Oppositional poles are determined as the basic directions of Dasein’s potentiality for 
Being; of Being one’s self and of not Being one’s self.605 In this, it is a possibility of 
factical life that in any given concrete situation human Dasein may genuinely be itself 
or not. For Heidegger this oppositional possibility occurs in factical life 
simultaneously.606  As such, authenticity and inauthenticity are equiprimordial 
characteristics of factical life and thus of Dasein’s Being.607 - the oppositional origin 
of factical life. On the other hand, the Being of human Dasein is only genuinely 
expressed as itself, i.e., in the possibility of Being one’s self. As such, it becomes the 
problem of proper access to the genuine origin of factical life in Being one’s self. 
 It can be seen that Heidegger formulates two concurrent ways of accessing the 
genuine origin of factical life in Being one’s self; via facticity as containing a genuine 
historical situation of origin and via Being one’s self as an ontological problematic. In 
the first case, Heidegger intends to reveal ‘primal Christian experience’ as the 
historical location of genuine facticity,608 and the second, reveal the primordial 
insights into Dasein’s being itself in Greek philosophising.609 For both of these ways 
of access, Heidegger states, the analysis must proceed towards the origin, its time,610 
aware that the genuine is derived from Being and indicated in everyday life.611 As 
such, the way to access both genuine origins is to seek in everydayness that indicates 
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the genuine. The genuine origin, then, is both situated in a time (historical location) 
and in modes of being that indicate the genuine. 
 Heidegger aims to show how ‘primal Christian experience’ (indicated via 
interpretations of Luther, Augustine, and Paul) is a historical location of genuine 
facticity. In this, factical life experience as an indication of genuine facticity is shown 
to be the proper object of philosophy, or the location of the object in which it is 
originally accessible.612 As such, the primal Christian experience enables access to the 
genuine object, the character of genuine life as it is lived. The genuine life, then, is 
characterised as containing the ontological sense of human Dasein in its Being and the 
characterisation of factical life freed of its traditional misunderstandings.613  
 As the genuine object of philosophy, however, the primal Christian experience 
of life is not yet theorised, i.e., analysed ontologically, nor can it provide the genuine 
philosophical mode of access in so far as it is bare living of life genuinely. In this, it 
remains problematic for Heidegger that the genuine mode of philosophical access 
cannot be found in primal Christian experience. As such, Heidegger turns to Greek 
philosophy as the location of the genuine origin of philosophical access to life. 
 
Origin and Philosophy 
For Heidegger, the question of the proper mode of access revolves around the 
assertion that philosophy is a mode of comporting towards life, or a way of living that 
grasps living in its facticity and the historical.614 In this, any attempt to find the 
genuine origin of accessing life philosophically must take into account factical life 
itself; in its historical-ness, its living and its genuine possibilities for philosophical 
comportment. 
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 Initially, Greek philosophy offers itself up as the original location of 
philosophical endeavour belonging to the present, i.e., tradition of philosophy. In this 
sense, Greek philosophy is literally the origin of philosophy in the shallow historical 
sense. In this, however, Greek philosophising also contains the genuine originary 
generation of philosophical thought as the factical historical location of experiencing 
life primordially in such a way that philosophy is generated.615   As such, the question 
of proper access belongs to the analysis of that concrete factical living which 
generated philosophy.616 In order to fully explicate the genuine origin in this sense, 
Heidegger aims to reveal the genuine modes of comportment towards life underlying 
this factical situation of the Greek philosophers.617 
 Insofar as philosophy is conceived as a mode of living, and thus of factical life 
itself,618 the question of proper philosophical access belongs inherently to the task of 
revealing philosophy as a genuine mode of factical life.619 In this, Heidegger’s 
analysis of Greek philosophy cannot attempt to merely extrapolate genuine 
philosophical comportments620 from Greek philosophy, assuming that comportment is 
separable from living, but rather must attempt to reveal just what characterises a 
genuine factical life of philosophising; its comportments and the experiences that 
motivate this life. As such, what is at stake for Heidegger in analysing Greek 
philosophy is not merely a problem of method that stands on its own, but the 
characterisation of an entire factical life in its comportments as origin and originary 
                                               
615
 John D. Caputo, Demythogolising Heidegger, pp.1-2 
616
 Ibid. p.4 
617
 Heidegger, Phen.Int.Aristotle, p.142 
618
 Ibid. p.122 
619
 Heidegger, Phen.Int.R.Aristotle, p.370 
620
 Note: Comportment is related to intentionality as the directedness of cognitive states, but also 
implies relation to world, interpretation of world and concrete activities directed towards the world in 
certain ways. 
 181 
ground. Thus, Greek philosophy as a factical life pertains to the possibility of a 
genuine origin to philosophical endeavour (method).621 
 
B. The Problem of Ground 
In the 1928 essay, ‘On the Essence of Ground’622, Heidegger takes up the problem of 
ground in detail. In this, the problem is initially posed via Aristotle as to the question 
of the arc h.623 Here Aristotle is interpreted to be struggling with the multiple senses 
of the ground; what-being, that-being, and being-true, attempting to find the essential 
unifying arc h.624 Heidegger takes this to imply the question of whether one arc h; 
one of the already posited grounds, has priority as the unified ground.625 As such, the 
entry point into the problem of the essence of ground, for Heidegger, is that of the 
arc h that unifies, and thus has priority. 
 Heidegger then proposes to enter into the problem via Leibniz’s formulation 
of the principle of sufficient reason, an analysis that dominates the first stage of the 
essay.626 However, it is Heidegger’s thesis that the problem of ground may only be 
entered insofar as its proper domain is set out in advance. In this, it is then proposed 
that transcendence is the proper domain of the essence of the ground; as the way of 
philosophy and as a finite endeavour marked by ‘non-essence’ in its essence – by 
lack.627  It is evident that the problem of ground is already, in transcendence, 
characterised as belonging to being-philosophical (and thus being-human). Thus, 
transcendence is already drawn out as the proper domain of being-philosophical; in 
effect, the essential domain of being-philosophical. Heidegger then concludes his 
                                               
621
 Heidegger, Phen.Int.Aristotle, p.115. 
622
 Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Essence of Ground (1929)’ Pathmarks 
623
 Ibid. p.98 
624
 Ibid. p.98 
625
 Ibid. p.99 
626
 Ibid. pp.99, 100-107 
627
 Ibid. p.99 
 182 
introduction to the essay by setting the phases through which the problem of ground 
will be resolved: the problem of ground (in general), transcendence as the domain of 
the question of the essence of ground, and finally, the essence of ground.628  
 The problem of ground is approached in a general way via Leibniz’s principle 
of sufficient reason. In this, it is noted initially that for Leibniz the problem of ground 
belongs to the theme of truth, and furthermore, that the essence of truth is identity (a 
nexus).629 Identity, then, is determined as a unitary accord, not founded in 
predication/judgment, but rather given through a human relation with being.630 This 
relation is one wherein entities in the being first become manifested, which then 
shows that the essence of truth is ‘unveiledness’ in the sense of a relationship that 
reveals.631 This relationship, Heidegger maintains, is one between Dasein and being; 
an ontic-ontological relationship that generates the possibility of truth (being-true).632 
As such, truth is founded in the essence of Dasein, transcendence, via the 
understanding of being and the comportments towards beings.633 Thus, the essence of 
truth is related to the essence of ground in transcendence.634 However, this 
relationship may only be disclosed in the being-true of Dasein’s transcendence; the 
proper transcendental relation of Dasein to being.635 
 In order to get to the essence of ground, then, transcendence must first be 
disclosed for what it is with regard to the being of Dasein: being-philosophical. The 
meaning of transcendence in this sense, Heidegger asserts, is to surpass; a possibility 
belonging to the entity that is transcendent.636 This surpassing is a relation that is 
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called a ‘towards-which’, or, a relation with a world which is surpassed.637 
Transcendence, as such, is a relation between Dasein and world. Heidegger then 
provides a characterisation of world, not as an object, but rather as a having a whole 
in advance.638 A world, then, cannot be construed as some universal object (universe), 
but is rather an act of unification: a unification of existence belonging to Dasein.639 
Additionally, transcendence then gets characterised as world-forming: that Dasein 
projects its own possibilities (Entwurf), and in doing so casts these possibilities over 
beings as a world (Uberwurf).640 As such, transcendence is Dasein’s being as the 
relation between Dasein and being in which the world(s) gets formed. In other words, 
transcendence can be constituted as the human ability (ground of awareness) that 
unifies all that possibly is (beings) within a projected form called ‘world’. 
 Insofar as transcendence pertains to the essence of ground, Heidegger states, it 
has its own essence in freedom.641 Here, transcendence is conjoined to the essence of 
ground as the human freedom for grounding, or, the freedom to establish possibilities 
and accordingly, limit possibilities.642 Accordingly, the essence of ground is the 
essence of Dasein’s being-in-existence; the freedom to ground belonging to free 
projection.643 Therefore, Heidegger asserts, the essence of ground is nothing other 
than (Dasein’s) freedom.644 As Dasein’s, freedom is both positive and privative. On 
the one hand, Dasein is free to ground.645 On the other, this freedom is an abyss; the 
nothingness of the possibility of non-existence.646 
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 In Heidegger’s discussion of the essence of ground there are implicitly two 
ways of characterising ground. Initially, grounding in the sense of world forming is 
essentially who Dasein is, i.e., Dasein inherently forms worlds in existing. In this 
sense grounding is simply the activity of being alive as a human – of projecting 
possibilities and thus forming a world. However, the question of the ground for 
Heidegger is not merely this disclosure of the being of Dasein, for he is also aiming to 
show how philosophy has its ground. This is implied in Heidegger’s positing of a 
connection between being-true and ground, which furthermore, indicates a notion of 
proper or authentic grounding. This is the case insofar as a being-true cannot signify a 
mere being-true from me (individual Dasein).  Equally, insofar as the proper ground 
Heidegger seeks is ontological it cannot be a matter of adhering to objects in their 
objectivity. Rather, if there is to be a proper ground of philosophy it must be founded 
in the being-true relation of Dasein and being. Heidegger hints at this in the 
conclusion to the essay through the argument that grounding is to be found in ‘true 
nearness’ to being and a willingness to ‘listen’ to being.647 
 This theme is developed further in Heidegger’s work Basic Concepts as the 
problem of ground-concepts.648 In this, the question is taken to be that of the 
equivalence of Dasein’s essence, everything that Dasein takes for being, and the 
ground of everything.649 These are then united as the question of Dasein’s 
philosophical relation to that which is essential.650 The philosophical relation to the 
essential is then taken in two ways: the history of philosophy and the readiness 
(resolution) to face the essential.651 Insofar as ground is concerned, then, the question 
of the history of philosophy is then formulated as the necessity of uncovering the 
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originary grounds of philosophy in the ‘Greeks’.652 This uncovering is called a 
‘remembrance’ of the essential.653 Accordingly, the readiness to confront the essential 
gets formulated as seeking the ground of beings (being), of facing what is thought-
worthy through a truthful living, and finally, of grasping being (‘being embraced by 
the essence of the ground).654 
 Heidegger’s provision of the ground of philosophy (as phenomenology) can be 
viewed, therefore, as a dual grounding. First, the ground of philosophy can be found 
in its historic-ness; of the essential that gets carried through the tradition of 
philosophy and that has its originary ground in Greek philosophising. Furthermore, 
the ground of philosophy is also found in a being-true that is a relationship with being 
in the truth. This relationship with being is an authentic/proper being-philosophical: a 
faithful-dwelling in the truth of being. 
 In the preceding discussion of the problem of ground it has been revealed that 
phenomenology as way, for Heidegger, is nothing more or less than the authentic 
being-philosophical of Dasein characterised by a ‘being in the truth’. This means, 
however, that phenomenology is a way of being that is world forming; an Entwurf and 
Uberwurf. Furthermore, if phenomenology is such a world forming it is also a way of 
grounding ‘truthfully’ with respect to being. As a grounding, then, phenomenology 
necessarily follows, in its very constitution, the two paths of grounding: the path of 
historical originary ground and the path of existential ground (being-human). Thus, 
when we turn to the question of how phenomenology gets worked out it will follow 
that the paths will be that of the historical trace of the proper originary ground (de-
construction) and the structural analysis of the proper being-human (existential 
analytic). 
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 This also has implications for a phenomenology of Religion, which must now 
signify the task of disclosing the phenomenon of Religion as that which is the ground 
of religion(s), via the phenomenological disclosure of ground: deconstruction and 
existential analytic.  Furthermore, insofar as there are various traditions of religion(s) 
it follows that any de-construction will necessarily follow multiple paths of tracing the 
originary ground. I will discuss this in further detail in the next section and chapter.  
 
 
17. DeConstruction and Existential Analytic: The working out of 
Heidegger’s phenomenology: 
 
What has been disclosed thus far is that phenomenology, for Heidegger, is a way of 
proper philosophical hqoj (dwelling) that aims at the ground and the essential of the 
phenomenon in question. In this, the structural composition of the existential analytic 
has also been disclosed in some depth as a phenomenological interpretation of the 
central (essential) components of the being of Dasein. Rather than repeating this view, 
this section will aim to consider the existential analytic in terms of its relation to the 
deconstructive dimension of Heidegger’s phenomenology. As such, this section will 
foreground the deconstructive dimension of phenomenology, and through 
consideration of deconstruction, show in more detail how Heidegger’s 
phenomenology works out. 
 In focusing on deconstruction, this section will take up three approaches, 
initially engaging in an interpretation of Heidegger’s writings/statements about 
deconstruction, to be followed by a interpretation of deconstruction as containing 
three primary dimensions, and finally, an analysis of the relation of deconstruction 
and the existential analytic. Initially, then, I will provide a brief overview of Being 
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and Time, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and the History of the Concept of 
Time. This will be followed by an interpretative analysis of deconstruction in context. 
Finally, I will provide a discussion of the relation between deconstruction and 
existential analytic with regard to their unity and their differences; the two-fold 
originary ground of being-philosophical. 
 
A. De-Construction in Heidegger’s Writings. 
Being and Time is the most often utilised source for interpretations of Heidegger’s 
formulation of deconstruction. In this, however, the formulation therein often leads to 
confusion about what deconstruction is: whether it is a phase of fundamental ontology 
or whether it is a more general aspect of phenomenology. Equally, this question often 
gets framed as that of whether deconstruction operates outside of the aims and 
programmatic agenda of Being and Time. Rather than engage in this debate 
immediately, this overview of deconstruction in Being and Time will identify both the 
programmatic ‘phased’ dimension of deconstruction (as ‘Destruktion’) and its more 
general context. 
 As a phased dimension of the agenda of ‘Being and Time’, deconstruction 
(Destruktion) tends to get translated as either ‘destruction’ or ‘destructuring’.655 In 
either case, ‘Destruktion’ is formulated in a systematic sense as a phase of Being and 
Time to follow the existential analytic and the exposition of time/temporality. Here, 
Heidegger posits three sub-phases to the Destruktion: an analytic of Kant, an analysis 
of Descartes and Medieval ontology, to eventuate in an analysis of Aristotle which 
aims to find the ground and limits of ‘ancient ontology’.656 However, as mentioned 
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previously, this part of Being and Time was never published, leading to the debate 
about whether other lectures/writings contain these sub-phases of deconstruction.  
 Outside of this programmatic view of Destruktion, Heidegger also provides 
general formulations of Destruktion. These can be divided into five primary 
characterisations: of discovering the originary ground of philosophy,657 of disclosing 
the positive possibilities of the tradition of philosophy,658 the Destruktion of ‘today’s’ 
ontology,659 of disclosing phases in the tradition of philosophy,660 and finally, of a 
Destruktion of the concept of Time.661 In the broadest sense, these five formulations 
of Destruktion can be determined as containing two primary themes: the history 
(tradition) of philosophy with regard to the temporality of Dasein’s being and the 
question of the genuine/non-genuine. In the first case, it can be seen that each of these 
formulations of Destruktion above intrinsically pertain to the temporality of being-
philosophical, either through the interpretation of tradition or explicitly through the 
concept of Time. Equally, insofar as the Destruktion aims at a true disclosure and in 
that the being-true of philosophical thinking, then the Destruktion also aims to 
disclose the authentic and inauthentic within the tradition of philosophy. This is why 
Heidegger states that Destruktion aims at an authentic historiography founded in 
temporality as the meaning of care.662 
 In the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger’s formulation of 
deconstruction can be viewed as following a similar programme as in Being and Time. 
Here, the sub-phases of deconstruction are almost exactly the same as proposed in 
Being and Time, containing: an analysis of Kant on being, a tracing from Medieval 
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ontology to Aristotle, an analysis of Descartes res extensa and res cogitans, and 
finally, an additional analysis of modern logic on the copula.  Likewise, the general 
themes of deconstruction are posited in a similar fashion as a concern for the 
tradition/history of philosophy and the concern for the genuine.663 Distinctly different, 
however, is the formulation of deconstruction as phenomenology itself and the claim, 
furthermore, that the deconstruction must precede the existential analytic.664 Here, 
Heidegger claims that it is only through a deconstruction that genuine concepts are 
possible, which would also include the possibility of the genuine concepts provided in 
the existential analytic.665 
 In the lectures on The History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger characterises 
deconstruction as an analysis of the philosophical notion of Time (its history) and also 
as a ‘repetition’. Initially, then, these lectures cover part of the agenda of the 
Destruktion in Being and Time that was to be an analysis of the concept of Time. 
Furthermore, deconstruction gets formulated in more detail as repetition and 
remembrance.  
 Initially, Heidegger formulates the aim of deconstruction to be that of a 
‘bringing back to life’ wherein the questions and originary ground of philosophy in 
Aristotle and Plato are revealed and then repeated in a genuine way.666 At the same 
time, this repetition is also formulated as a return to the origin of philosophy and thus 
to a genuine way of asking the question of being.667 Deconstruction, Heidegger states, 
is therefore an ‘assumption of tradition’: a genuine repetition.668 In this, 
deconstruction is formulated as an opposition to the prejudices of the tradition, of 
                                               
663
 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp.22-3 
664
 Ibid. p.22 
665
 Ibid. p.22 
666
 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, Theodore Kisiel (trans.) p.136 
667
 Ibid. p.137 
668
 Ibid. p.138 
 190 
traditionalism, which is also a critical analysis of the self-evidence of certain 
preconceptions about being and time.669 However, as repetition/assumption, 
deconstruction also aims to achieve contact with the genuine in the tradition.670 
Finally, as a repetition, deconstruction also aims to disclose the genuine originary 
ground of the tradition of philosophy and repeat the question of being in the light of 
the limits of Greek ontology.671  
 Deconstruction, then, can be seen to contain three interconnected aims: to 
destroy the non-genuine dimensions of the tradition of philosophy (self-evidence, 
dogmatism), to reconnect to the genuine dimensions of the tradition, and to repeat the 
genuine originary ground in such a way as something new is discovered. 
 
B. Deconstruction in Context. 
Here, the aim is twofold, to provide an overview of deconstruction in context and to 
provide a discussion of the various scholarly interpretations of deconstruction. 
Initially, a brief discussion of the various interpretations will be utilised as the setting 
for my interpretation. In this, the primary interpretative point of contention is whether 
deconstruction must follow the path set in Being and Time, or, whether deconstruction 
is a more general movement in Heidegger’s phenomenology. 
 The first interpretative thesis, that deconstruction must follow the path set in 
Being and Time, views deconstruction as signifying the Destruktion of ontology based 
upon the analysis of human temporality.672 In this view, deconstruction is determined 
solely in relation to the agenda of fundamental ontology.673 Thus, the deconstruction 
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(singular) is posited as the last phase of fundamental ontology674, which also means 
that deconstruction is interpreted to find its ground solely in the existential analytic.675 
As such, in this interpretative thesis, deconstruction is determined as Destruktion, to 
the exclusion of any writings external to Being and Time and fundamental 
ontology.676  
 The second interpretative thesis sets any attempt to determine what 
deconstruction signifies within the broader context of Heidegger’s general 
philosophical endeavours. Within this interpretation, then, there is a wide range of 
possible characterisations such as: within the context of the question of being, in the 
context of metaphysics, of an opposition to the philosophical context of Heidegger, 
and within the context of a search for ‘what has been forgotten’. 
 In the context of the question of being, deconstruction is then characterised as 
‘recollection’; the search for the proper ground of the question of being.677 In this, the 
emphasis is placed upon deconstruction as it engages with Greek ontology, disclosing 
its genuine and non-genuine dimensions.678 Equally, deconstruction is viewed as the 
disclosure of the history of being (the tradition of philosophy), a genealogy of 
transitions and epochs.679  
 Within the context of metaphysics, deconstruction is viewed as an 
‘overcoming’ of the self understanding generated by the tradition of metaphysics680, 
and an overcoming (Uberwindung) or sundering of the preconceptions that dominate 
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philosophy.681 In this, the preconception is revealed as that of everydayness, of nature 
(object-objectivity) and theorising abstracted from life.682 Accordingly, 
deconstruction reveals the destructive (inauthentic) way of being of ‘Western culture’ 
generated through and in relation to the tradition of metaphysics.683 Finally, then, 
deconstruction is viewed as disclosing the onto-theological ground of metaphysics, 
the prioritisation of always-presence and the physical thing.684 
 As opposed to the present of tradition, deconstruction is interpreted as a 
destruction of self-evidence and dogmatism.685 In this, the destruction is not merely 
aimed at metaphysics and ontology, but additionally, towards the impetus of the 
natural sciences: the idea of progress, ‘culture’, Weltanschauung, spirit and 
traditionalism.686 Furthermore, in this interpretation, deconstruction aims to destroy 
the preconceptions that allow the humanities to imitate the natural sciences.687 Thus, 
as a destruction of the present preconceptions of thinking (philosophy, the sciences 
and humanities) deconstruction appropriates the tradition of philosophy with regard to 
its originary ground and its authentic traces.688 
 Finally, deconstruction is interpreted in its broadest sense to signify a ‘paying 
attention to the matter of thinking’; of what is thought worthy and the essential.689 
Here, deconstruction as it works out is interpreted as containing two parallel 
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dimensions: of tracing (spur) the genuine through the tradition to its originary ground 
and of appropriating (repeating) the genuine that has been forgotten.690 
 Deconstruction in context, then, can be characterised in three ways. Initially, 
deconstruction operates in Heidegger’s earliest writings/lectures as a familiarity with 
the tradition of philosophy. Here, in such works as Phenomenological Investigations 
with Respect to Aristotle, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, and Plato’s 
Sophist, Heidegger engages in historical research into the tradition of philosophy and 
‘Greek-Christian’ culture which serves as a preliminary arena (or sketch) for further 
analysis of the question of being in regard to the genuine, originary ground, and time. 
As such, deconstruction can initially be characterised as a familiarity, or relationship, 
with the tradition of philosophy and ‘Western culture’ through which the question of 
being may be brought to light.  
 Later, in the existential analytic itself, deconstruction operates as a dialogue 
within the tradition of philosophy; a destruction of the non-genuine and a disclosure 
of the genuine through which the being of Dasein (existence, being-in-the-world, care, 
temporality) gets shown. Here, deconstruction serves two purposes, disclosing the 
genuine and this, disclosing temporality. The existential analytic must be framed as 
operating within such a deconstruction (dialogue within tradition) insofar as the 
existential analytic directly confronts traditional preconceptions, indirectly challenges 
many traditional problems and answers, and finally, takes place within the tradition of 
philosophy as a philosophical endeavour. Thus, as a dialogue within the tradition, 
deconstruction may be constituted as a destruction of the improper dimensions of the 
tradition, or, a clearing of traditional presuppositions and preconceptions of being.  
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 Finally, deconstruction also operates upon the ground of the existential 
analytic. Herein, the disclosure of the genuine and temporality then allows of a 
repetition and renewal of the questions belonging to the tradition of philosophy, 
which furthermore, is also an opening to asking the question of being in such a way 
that something new may be discovered.  
 This threefold characterisation of deconstruction follows its formulation in the 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology wherein phenomenology is determined as 
‘intuition’, ‘destruction’, and ‘construction’. Deconstruction, in this sense, is nothing 
other than phenomenology itself as a genuine way of being-philosophical. 
 
C. Deconstruction and the Existential Analytic: 
In the more general interpretations of deconstruction, the relationship between 
deconstruction and existential analytic, for the most part, gets characterised as an 
inherent mutual dependence, or, a hermeneutical circle. Taking Heidegger’s 
philosophical endeavours as a whole, the relationship between deconstruction and 
existential analytic tends to spiral. Initially, the disclosure of Dasein’s being is clearly 
situated in a context with and dependence upon the tradition of philosophy.691 This is 
evidenced by Heidegger’s early lectures and writings where there is undoubtedly a 
deconstructive dimension to his analysis of the tradition of philosophy. At the same 
time, deconstruction, even in its earliest formulations is also dependent upon the 
analysis of facticity (a prototype of the existential analytic) as it is factical life 
revealed in primal Christianity that forms a basis for opposing the non-genuine of the 
tradition of philosophy.692 This basis of deconstruction, primal Christianity, is 
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evidenced in the term itself ‘Destruktion’, appropriated from Luther in his critique of 
Greek metaphysics.693 
 Overall, the mutual dependence of the relationship between the existential 
analytic and deconstruction is disclosed in the theme of time. In this, the nexus of 
Dasein’s being as existence and Dasein’s being-understanding is given as the 
temporality of Dasein’s being: temporality is Dasein’s sense of being, temporality 
generates the historical, and finally, it is genuine temporality that discloses the 
genuine of philosophy. Via genuine temporality, a genuine notion of Time, 
deconstruction is given its aim of destroying the non-genuine in the tradition and also 
the aim of seeking an originary ground both of which are temporal determinations. 
Through the existential analytic, genuine temporality is revealed as the sense of 
Dasein’s being, a determination allowed only via a deconstructive relationship with-in 
the tradition. 
Equally, the existential analytic and deconstruction can be determined as 
unified in the same sense that Heidegger interprets the unity of fronhsij and sofia 
in Plato’s Sophist as the same insight/intuition directed in differing ways to the 
question of being. Deconstruction, as such, is phenomenological intuition directed 
towards the question of being via Dasein’s being-temporal as historical and with 
regard to the dual possibilities of genuine/non-genuine. Likewise, the existential 
analytic is phenomenological intuition directed towards the phenomenon of 
understanding via everydayness and thus its ground of temporality.  In deconstruction, 
temporality is intrinsically the ground as Dasein’s historic-ness. In the existential 
analytic temporality is disclosed as the ground of understanding. Neither, however, 
must necessarily precede the other insofar as they both belong to phenomenological 
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intuition directed towards the being-philosophical of Dasein: the question of being 
and time, time and being. 
For all that deconstruction and existential analytic may be unified as 
phenomenological intuition, nonetheless, they are not identical. This follows, I would 
argue, the dual grounding of phenomenology mentioned previously: that philosophy 
as tradition is historic and that philosophy is also a living in the truth. What can be 
called deconstruction is a philosophical relationship with the historic originary ground 
of philosophy. The existential analytic is directed towards the question of being-
philosophical as a truthful-dwelling, disclosing its fundamental structures and its 
originary ground. The former approaches the question of being via the historical 
originary ground, the latter via the originary ground of being-philosophical as the 
phenomenon of understanding (that which constitutes living in the truth of being). 
 
18. Delimitations: Metaphysics and the Question of the Sense of Being. 
In this section, I aim to elucidate a delimitation of Heidegger’s philosophical 
endeavours and thus also an area excluded from analysis in his phenomenology as 
ontology. In this, I will initially attempt to show that Heidegger’s question of the 
sense of being is in some way metaphysical even in its aim to overcome metaphysics. 
Here, I will argue that the question of being remains ‘metaphysical’ in the sense that it 
foregrounds the question of ‘how’ the being of entities (not Dasein) get understood, 
and thus, can be viewed as dealing with the traditional metaphysical question of 
reality – the what of entities in their being. 
 At the same time, I will also attempt to show that Heidegger, in excluding 
what is traditionally called the theological dimension of metaphysics, also excludes a 
valid and central dimension of metaphysics, namely: the ‘why’. The ‘why’ in this 
 197 
sense, includes such important questions as: what is the meaning of the world? What 
is the meaning of human existence? And so on… These are questions that refer to the 
‘why’ of Dasein’s being (being-human, ‘who-being’), of purpose, meaning, good and 
highest possibility. These are questions that cannot be dealt with in the problem of 
‘how’: of what-being and ‘why is there something rather than nothing’? In this, it will 
be important to discuss the basis of Heidegger’s rejection of theology and the question 
of ‘why’ with regard to being-human, but also to show the inherent problems and 
delimitations this leads to in Heidegger’s philosophy. Primarily, I will attempt to 
show that the exclusion of the ‘why’ question with regard to who-being (being-
human), even in its merely ontical sense, deprives Heidegger’s characterisation of the 
being of Dasein of fundamental structures and interpretative scope. This argument, on 
my part, will then lead into the poignancy of the question of Religion as a 
phenomenon belonging-to being-human and thus the ‘why’ of who-being. 
 As such, this section will be divided into three discussions. The first will 
involve a broad characterisation of metaphysics. The second will involve a discussion 
of Heidegger’s quest to overcome metaphysics and the exclusion of theology. Finally, 
the third discussion will take up Heidegger’s exclusion of theology from metaphysics, 
showing how this also excludes the question of ‘why’ for being-human.  
 
A.  A Characterisation of Metaphysics: 
When Aristotle’s writings were compiled the texts referring to first philosophy 
became called ‘t a m et a fusikh’.694 In this, first philosophy became named 
‘metaphysics’ insofar as it was deemed to refer to either ‘what comes after the 
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physics’, or, ‘what lies beyond the physics’.695 Here, metaphysics intrinsically 
contains three dimensions: first philosophy, universal understanding of reality, and 
reason/wisdom (sofia): thinking beyond, or to the exclusion of, the senses.696 Thus, 
metaphysics can be viewed as containing three basic themes: of seeking fundamental 
concepts of philosophy, of seeking universal truths about reality, and as a way of 
thinking philosophically. 
 Aristotle’s Metaphysics begins with a discussion of what wisdom (sofia) is in 
comparison to sensory knowledge. Initially, sensory/experiential knowledge is 
determined to be knowledge of particulars, while wisdom is determined as knowledge 
of universals (981a12-981b12). Wisdom is then given a central role in first philosophy, 
as a way of thinking pertaining to the highest degree of universal knowledge: first 
principles and causes (981b25-982a2). Wisdom, as such, is characterised as a way of 
thinking (pursuing knowledge or truth) that is furthest away from the senses (982a20-
25).  
 Metaphysics (as ontology) is characterised by Aristotle as the science that 
studies being qua being (1003a22).  In this, the first causes or principles, Aristotle 
argues, can only be found via the study of being as being (1003a25-31). There are, 
however, many senses of being (1003a33-35). Aristotle then poses the question of 
being as that of which of the various senses of being have priority as the unifying and 
central sense of being (1003b15-18). In other words, the various senses of being (to 
be) have a singular originary ground - prot e arc h (1003b5-6). Metaphysics, as 
ontology, thus signifies the investigation of the various senses of being and ousia as 
the primary sense of being (1004a10-33). Therefore, a primary characteristic of 
metaphysics can be called ontology: the investigation of the sense of being. 
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 For Aristotle, however, metaphysics also contains a second primary 
characteristic: the question of the ground and highest mode of being. This is initially 
the question of the ground, or first cause, of ousia: the super-sensuous, the 
immovable, and the prime/first/unmoved mover (1026a10-33). This, for Aristotle, is 
nothing other than the divine ( Q eoj): both the ground and highest mode of ousia 
(1026a20). As such, metaphysics is also qeolog ikh: the highest and most universal of 
philosophical problems (1026a19). Thus, theology is the best of all, for it deals with 
the highest of existing things (1064b1-5). 
 Both Leibniz and Kant also follow this threefold structure of metaphysics. 
Leibniz characterises philosophical thinking as ‘a priori reason’: either a priori 
synthesis (from principles to categories) or a priori analysis (the disclosure of 
principles).697 A priori Reason, in both its forms, excludes experience and seeks 
universal knowledge. In Kant, metaphysical thinking is characterised as pure reason: a 
thinking that is purely conceptual and completely isolated from experience.698  
 For Leibniz, the problem of metaphysics is given as the question of: why, in 
nature, there is something rather than nothing?699 In this, Leibniz conjoins ontology 
and theology together as the question of the reason for everything: being of entities 
and ground of everything as unified.700 This is the case insofar as the being of entities 
is their existence and the ground of existent entities (entities in their being) is found in 
a ‘real’ (actual) entity.701 Thus, in Leibniz, metaphysics contains both ontology and 
theology in the same way as in Aristotle: that theology has priority over ontology.  
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 In Kant, the division of metaphysics into ontology (the question of being) and 
theology is criticized as entirely speculative. However, Kant nonetheless divides 
metaphysics into two realms: theoretical and practical. Theoretical reason 
incorporates much of what constitutes ontology in Aristotle: the task of universal 
knowledge of reality, or, the determining of causes/principles/grounds (laws) of 
reality, as humans can know it.702 Practical reason follows, in part, Aristotle’s notion 
of theology (as the realms of theology and ethics). Here, practical reason incorporates 
two questions: ‘what ought I to do?’ and ‘in what may I hope?’ The first of these 
questions is that of morality, involving the analysis of the will, moral law (law of the 
good) and freedom as the being of rational entities. Additionally, practical reason also 
pertains to what in metaphysics is traditionally called theology: the question of 
freedom and the existence of God.703 
 Overall, Kant defines metaphysics as the full and complete development of 
human reason and the grounds of all the sciences through principles.704 As such, Kant 
can be seen to also follow the tripartite structure of metaphysics: pure reason 
(analogous to sofia), forms/causes/laws (arc h/ait ion), and (qeolog ikh) highest 
possible being (highest good – moral law, highest possible being – freedom/God). 
 
 
B. Heidegger and Metaphysics: 
Heidegger is credited with the ‘overcoming’ of metaphysics via phenomenology that 
is ontology and the question of being. At the same time, however, Heidegger’s 
‘Seinsfrage’ is also the most traditional of metaphysical questions.705 This brings into 
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question just what ‘overcoming’ metaphysics signifies and whether is does not aim at 
the dissolution of metaphysics per se, but rather, at its renewal. As such, the first 
question to be pursued here is whether Heidegger’s question of being contains 
metaphysical traces or dimensions. Equally, Heidegger’s renewal of metaphysical 
questioning, in this sense, also excludes the theological dimension of metaphysics. 
Thus, the second question to be asked is why Heidegger excludes theology from the 
question of being. A final question arises: does Heidegger’s exclusion of theology 
also in some sense exclude valid problems from questioning in phenomenology as 
ontology? 
 An indication that Heidegger’s question of being aims to renew metaphysical 
questioning is found in his conception of log oj and the ‘a priori’. In Being and Time 
the conception of log oj plays an essential role in the formulation of phenomenology. 
Here, Heidegger acknowledges the traditional metaphysical translation of log oj as 
reason, judgment and logic,706 while also overcoming these conceptions by a renewed 
understanding of Aristotle. In returning to Aristotle, Heidegger then conceives the 
log oj as properly signifying a truthful (being-true) discourse that allows being to 
show itself.707 Likewise, in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger 
overcomes the traditional notion of a priority. Here, rather than leaving the meaning 
of a priority as a ‘coming before’ or ‘preceding’, Heidegger conceives the a priori as 
intrinsically referring to being.708 Accordingly, a priori reason is conceived anew as a 
priori cognition (the renewal of Aristotle’s notions of: nouj, sofia, fronhsij).709 
Thus, in both cases, what gets called reason in traditional metaphysics is critiqued via 
a return to Aristotle and renewed in relation to ontology. 
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 Heidegger’s question of being also overcomes and renews metaphysics in the 
same way. Heidegger admits to this in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, stating 
that his phenomenological approach to the question of being seeks what the tradition 
of metaphysics has sought.710 Furthermore, Heidegger explicitly follows Leibniz’s 
formulation of the question of metaphysics mentioned previously, i.e., why is there 
something rather than nothing?711 Equally, Heidegger also follows Hegel’s assertion 
in the Science of Logic that pure being and pure nothing are the same.712 It follows 
that if Heidegger’s sole question is that of being, then his endeavours are ultimately 
metaphysical, i.e., the renewal of metaphysical questioning, even as he overcomes the 
tradition with its sedimentations of self-evidence. 
 Another feature of Heidegger’s overcoming of metaphysics is his constant 
avowal and exclusion of theology in a metaphysical sense from the question of being 
and thus philosophy. In this, Heidegger presents two main arguments for the 
exclusion of theology from the question of being: the overcoming of metaphysics as 
onto-theology. 
 The first argument is aimed primarily at the prioritisation of ousia (and its 
translation as substance) in metaphysics, but also by extension dissolves the 
theological component of traditional metaphysics. In this, the critique of the primacy 
of ousia, the critique of the primacy of categorical being (what-being) and always-
presence,713 also critiques the God of metaphysics: the divine, the first mover, being-
itself, and highest being. If ousia is not the primary sense of being, as Heidegger 
claims,714 then the theological component of traditional metaphysics can be dismissed 
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as dogmatic thinking that simply supports the preconception of being as always-
presence. In other words, theology has no cogency to the question of being if being is 
not preconceived of as ousia. In the first instance, then, the exclusion of theology 
from metaphysical questioning, for Heidegger, is merely a negative derivative result 
of the critique of traditional metaphysics in its preconception of being. 
 However, Heidegger also provides a positive argument for the exclusion of 
theology from ontology, directly in this sense, as an argument against theology as an 
ontic ‘science’ (a positive science) rather than ontological. In this, Heidegger’s 
argument connects theology ( Q eoj) to the question of highest being based upon 
Aristotle’s metaphysical writings.715 For Aristotle, highest being is not simply a 
highest entity, but also a highest mode of being, i.e., the highest good (1072b24-31). 
For Heidegger, however, the question of the highest good is simply an ontical rather 
than an ontological question.716 Additionally, as an ontical question, the question of 
the highest good, and the highest mode of being, may only be worked out through 
existing – through living life.717 As such, theology as an ontic affair is excluded from 
the question of being insofar as it can be thought ontologically.718 
 Furthermore, Heidegger extends this argument to the exclusion of theology 
from the question of being insofar as it gets determined as one source of the dogmatic 
preconception of being as always-presence. In this, theology is not merely construed 
as supporting the preconception of being (as ousia), but also of producing it: as the 
understanding of being (Greek pre-ontological understanding),719 and of claiming 
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what beings are already in advance in their proper and highest modes.720 Theology, as 
such, is the unity of the preconception of being in traditional metaphysics and faith 
(Greek-Christian). Thus, theology signifies faith (dogmatism): the indifference to the 
question of being721 and the mortal enemy of philosophy.722 
 
C. The Implications of the Exclusion of Theology 
One interpretation of Heidegger’s exclusion of theology from metaphysics is that he 
was attempting to acknowledge and affirm the validity of theology in its own right, or, 
of rescuing theology from metaphysics.723 This interpretative thesis, in general, 
follows Heidegger’s argument in ‘Building, Dwelling, Thinking’ and elsewhere that: 
a) the destruction of traditional metaphysics liberates the divine, b) that it destroys the 
God of metaphysics, and c) it is only from the truth of being that the holy/divine can 
be thought.724 Thus, the question in an ontological sense is how the divine comes to 
presence.725 
 There are, however, two problems with Heidegger’s exclusion of theology 
from the metaphysical – from the question of being. The first is that in excluding 
theology Heidegger’s phenomenology is then delimited in its ability to interpret 
religion(s) and the meaning of Religion insofar as he preconceives Religion as 
signifying the divine as it comes to presence. The second is that in excluding 
theology, Heidegger’s phenomenology is also unable to come to terms with both 
senses of ‘why’ as it is posited in Aristotle and the tradition of metaphysics, i.e., why 
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do I exist? (what is the meaning of human existence: what is our highest good, our 
highest possibility/possible relationship?) 
 In the first case, Heidegger’s exclusion of theology from the question of being 
also hides and obscures the question of what Q eoj means in general, i.e., in regard to 
Religion. This means, then, that Heidegger cannot with assurance write of the divine 
except through what he already preconceives about the divine: through Christianity 
and Greek philosophy. In other words, Heidegger’s restriction of the question of the 
divine to its emergence (fusij) in dwelling remains entirely metaphysical. This has 
further implications for any proper phenomenological interpretations of theology, and 
more importantly, of the meaning of Religion. 
 The more fundamental problem of Heidegger’s exclusion of ‘theology’, in this 
sense, is the exclusion of the ‘why’ of Dasein’s (being-human) existence. In this, 
Heidegger’s exclusion of theology can be viewed as excluding the second sense of 
‘why’ in Aristotle’s metaphysics: of highest possibility and highest good.726 This 
becomes problematic in the light of Heidegger’s reversal of the ontological question: 
the prioritisation of Dasein’s being (who-being) over categorical being (what-
being).727 
 In this reversal, rather than disclose the sense of being from the mode of the 
being of entities in the world (what-being, ousia), Heidegger prioritises the sense of 
Dasein’s being as the being who understands being, and through this, discloses the 
unified sense of being (implicitly, the sense of being for Dasein). This orientation to 
ontology, then, directs itself towards the question of the being of entities in the world 
via a reversal of traditional ontology, through Dasein as the being who brings to 
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presence. On the other hand, this reversal that prioritises the being of Dasein also 
restricts itself to the question of being as a question of the emergence of entities in the 
world.  
A fundamental limit of this reversal, when combined with the exclusion of 
‘theology’, is the inability of Heidegger’s phenomenology to direct itself towards the 
being of humans (being-human) in itself, for itself, and thus: how being-human is the 
ground of the question of ‘why do I exist’ – meaning, purpose, good, possibility. This 
limit cannot be explained by its ontical foundation and expression. Rather, in the 
reversal of ontological priority brought about through Heidegger’s phenomenology, 
the question of the ‘why’ in this sense only gains greater urgency. For, ontological 
questioning always has an ontical foundation. If, then, it is possible for Heidegger to 
ask: ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ (What-being), then it is equally 
possible to ask: ‘why do I exist rather than not?’ (Who-being).728 
These two problems, therefore, reveal a delimitation in Heidegger’s question 
of being insofar as it shows that Heidegger fails to either recognise or develop 
properly both senses of the ‘why’ implicit to the question of being. This is an 
important limit to recognise insofar as what is called ‘Religion’ lies at the centre of 
this limit (oversight/hidden-ness): the question of the meaning of being-human and 
the existential structures of this question. 
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Chapter Six: A Phenomenology of Religion 
 
It is the aim of this chapter to formulate and outline ‘a phenomenology of Religion’ as 
it will be worked out in the next two parts of the research. This chapter, as such, has 
two aims: the first is a formulation of a phenomenology of Religion grounded upon 
the discussions already provided and second, is outlining the content and agenda of 
this study. Thus, both aims of the chapter are transitional, as a movement from the 
groundwork provided thus far to an outline of the preliminary and preparatory 
phenomenological interpretation of the meaning of what is called Religion: a test of 
the possibility of a phenomenology of Religion that is ontological. 
 The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first (S19) will provide a 
philosophical-theoretical formulation of a phenomenology of Religion. The second 
(S20) will discuss the delimitations of the working out of a phenomenology of 
Religion to be provided. Finally, (S21) will outline the systematic content of a 
phenomenology of Religion as both a deconstruction and a ‘towards an existential 
analytic’. 
 
19. A Preliminary Formulation of a Phenomenology of Religion 
 
A. Phenomenon. 
A phenomenon, in an ontological sense, signifies being. Insofar as being is always the 
being of an entity, within the modalities of ‘what-being’ or ‘who-being’, a 
phenomenon signifies how the being of an entity gives itself. Here, the given-ness of 
being thus has two basic possibilities: of what it is in its being (entities not Dasein) or 
 208 
who it is in its being (being-human). In both cases, a phenomenon is characterised 
properly as a belonging-to. 
 Belonging-to, in this sense, has two dimensions: the grasping of belonging-to 
(understanding) and of who or what it belongs-to. In the first instance, the grasping of 
belonging-to is itself an expression of the being of Dasein (being-human). Here, 
Dasein’s grasping of being as it is given is intuitive and interpretative in its basic 
character. Furthermore, the grasping that belongs-to being-human also intrinsically 
contains the possibilities of understanding and misunderstanding (of proper and 
improper grasping). Thus, in the first instance, the belonging-to of a phenomenon is 
determined as the grasping by Dasein in being-human of the given-ness of being. 
 Here, the primary signification of grasping by Dasein is that of 
misunderstanding: that there is a tendency for humans to improperly grasp what is 
given. Thus, there is a tendency for entities to be grasped with regard to their 
presence, and from presence to presuppose ground, i.e., being. This eventuates in a 
view that constitutes being as that which underlies the entity, or, as that which does 
not appear but is nonetheless presented as the unity of the phenomena that make up 
the phenomenon. This tendency to misunderstand, moreover, can be characterised as 
the formulation of being as a presupposition that is worked out from everyday 
preconceptions of what something is. Therefore, the primary character of 
misunderstanding, of improper grasping, is that of unquestioned preconception – of 
self-evidential grounds of understanding being and thus a phenomenon. 
 Equally, then, the possibility of proper grasping is founded upon the revealing 
and questioning of preconceptions, the clearing away of preconceptions that 
determine what is found. In this, the possibility of proper grasping of a phenomenon, 
of being, hinges entirely upon the possibility of the proper itself: of proper 
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questioning, of proper understanding, and thus ultimately, of a proper notion of being-
human. For, the possibility of the ‘proper’ of questioning and understanding is itself 
intrinsically connected to the question of ‘who’ it is to be-human. Accordingly, the 
possibility of any proper grasping of being is founded upon the proper grasping of 
being-human in advance.  Insofar as this formulation of phenomenology is derivative 
of Heidegger’s, as mentioned before, it will also accept Heidegger’s determination of 
the basic characteristics of being-human: existence, being-in-the-world, concern, care 
and time. However, the grasping of being-human in advance, here, will be determined 
primarily in regard to the basic threefold characterisation of being-human as it is 
given in existence: mode (actualisation), how (interpretation), directedness.729 
Second, a phenomenon is a belonging-to insofar as it belongs-to an entity with 
a modality of being. Here, insofar as there are two primary modalities of being: ‘what-
being’ and ‘who-being’, the determination of the belonging-to of a phenomenon has 
its ground in the distinction between modes of being. For ‘what-being’, the belonging-
to of a phenomenon has its ground in the ontic-ontological relationship of being-
human via the phenomenon of understanding. Thus, with regard to categorical being, 
or, entities not Dasein, the question of being refers to that of presencing (given-ness) 
originating within Dasein’s dwelling (hqoj) in a world. On the other hand, for ‘who-
being’, the belonging-to of a phenomenon has a doubled ground: of self-
understanding and of an immediate ‘belonging-to (our) being’. Thus, at issue in a 
phenomenon of ‘who-being’ is not merely the presencing-givenness relation (as with 
‘what being’) but also a question of how does this phenomenon belong-to being-
human as a whole.  
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 The problem of interpreting Religion as a phenomenon, then, is first of all a 
question of what the meaning of Religion is with regard to its given-ness: of how 
Religion is given in human existence. This is the question of understanding: of the 
structure of what is understood about Religion (of how and where Religion is given), 
and the disclosure of the proper and improper of understanding.  
 The problem of interpreting Religion, as a phenomenon is equally that of what 
Religion means as it belongs-to being-human. Here, the meaning of Religion is only 
accessible insofar as the being of humans is given, and thus characterised in its given-
ness at the outset. In this respect, there are two primary dimensions of the given-ness 
of being-human: the where and way. The where of the given-ness of being-human is 
the determination of how being-human gets given in existence: determinable as 
horizon - the past and everyday living. Equally, the way of being-human reflects a 
twofold potentiality of the actualisation of being-human: to be one’s self or otherwise, 
proper or improper, being-true or being-false. Religion as a phenomenon, therefore, 
can be disclosed via an interpretation that characterises the meaning of Religion as it 
belongs-to being-human given to presence in the where and way of existence.  
 
B. Logoj 
The concept of log oj to be utilised in this research, for the most part, will follow 
Heidegger’s conception in Being and Time.  The primary meaning of the log oj is, in 
my interpretation, a discursive relation that allows being to be given. Thus, as a 
discursive relation, the log oj is being-true, or, a truthful relationship with being. The 
possibility of log oj is founded in intuition that is inherently interpretive: the 
interpretative (and thus communicated) grasping of being as it gives itself. 
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 Insofar as the log oj, in this sense, is directed towards the phenomenon of 
Religion, the log oj must be characterised as an interpretive-intuition of the meaning 
of Religion as it gets given in existence, and in belonging-to being-human, the ground 
of religion(s)/religiosity in being-human. 
 
C. A Phenomenology of Religion 
For this research, phenomenology will signify an intuitive hermeneutical discourse 
that has the task of disclosing the ground of the phenomenon, Religion, as it belongs-
to being-human. A phenomenology of Religion, then, has as its task the disclosure of 
the meaning of Religion as it belongs-to being-human. 
 This is initially a task of what is called transcendence, of tracing from how and 
what Religion gives itself as, via indication, to an ontological interpretation of the 
meaning of Religion. In general, this transcending movement, towards which a 
phenomenology of Religion aims, will only succeed upon the ground of a preparatory 
interpretation of tradition(s) of understanding Religion that project and maintain 
preconceptions of what Religion means. These preparatory interpretations will be 
deconstructions, the critical analysis of tradition(s) within the context of the way 
Religion is understood. In this, the interpretation will necessarily be ‘critical’ in the 
sense of the ways Religion may be understood and actualised in life: proper and 
improper. Here, the deconstructions to be provided have two tasks: a) revealing and 
critiquing the improper, b) revealing the proper. 
 In pursuing the proper and genuine understanding/actualisations of Religion, 
via the ‘destruction’ of the improper, the task of the deconstructive dimension of 
phenomenology has as its primary characteristic the disclosure of the proper 
indications of the meaning of Religion. As such, the deconstructions to be provided 
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will be the groundwork of a phenomenological interpretation of the meaning of 
Religion in existence (being-human). 
 Once the groundwork is provided, it will then be possible to trace from the 
indications disclosed in the deconstruction to the ontological-existential structures of 
being-human that show the meaning of Religion, and furthermore, allow the 
interpretation of originary ground. This tracing, via indication, is nothing other than a 
movement towards an existential analytic: the movement from everydayness to 
existential structures and ground. The foundation of this movement of indication is 
the relationship between entities and being, that being gives itself in entities, and the 
reverse, that entities show being. Thus, indication signifies the phenomenological 
movement from the grasping of a phenomenon as it is actualised to the determination 
of the belonging-to of that phenomenon: an entity in its being. Moreover, in a 
phenomenology of Religion indication signifies the movement from what shows itself 
as Religion in actualisation [religion(s)/religiosity] to the determination of the 
meaning of Religion as belonging-to being-human, and what can be called the ground 
of Religion in being-human.  
The movement towards an existential analytic, as such, contains two stages. 
The first stage is the movement from the actualisation of Religion to the 
determination of the meaning of Religion as belonging-to. In this, the task is to 
disclose the meaning of Religion within the existential structures of being-human. The 
second stage is a movement from these existential structures to the determination of 
what can be called the meaning of Religion in its ground.  
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20. Delimitations 
A. The Possibility of a ‘Phenomenology of Religion’ 
The first delimitation arises from the preliminary and preparatory character of this 
research. The research is preliminary, in this sense, insofar as it is a question of 
possibility. Thus, the primary question of the research is not to provide a 
phenomenology of Religion, but rather, to establish the possibility of a 
phenomenology of Religion. As such, the preliminary character of the 
phenomenological interpretations to come can best be called groundwork.  
 The research is preparatory, in this sense, insofar as it aims to prepare for a 
more complete phenomenology of Religion. The phenomenological interpretations to 
come, then, aim to be foundational: as methodological-theoretical questioning that 
grounds, and thus prepares for the further phenomenological investigations. Here, the 
way towards a phenomenology will be prepared for via the disclosure of the meaning 
and ground of Religion. 
 
B. Foregrounding of Foundational/Methodological Problems 
The preliminary and preparatory character of the phenomenological interpretation of 
Religion, then, implies limit: of questioning and content. Initially, this means that the 
content of the investigations must be limited, heavily weighted towards the concerns 
of groundwork: of characterising the problem, of formulating the way of approaching 
the problem and of establishing proper conceptual grounds. The first two parts of the 
research, to which this discussion is the finale, exemplify the concern for groundwork 
in this sense.  
 More poignant, however, is the limits of the phenomenological interpretations 
to come, and the emphasis upon the task of working out the possibility of a 
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phenomenology of Religion. Here, the foregrounding of foundational problems leads 
to the delimiting of the scope of the investigations: restricting the investigations to the 
question of the meaning of Religion and what can be called its ground.  Accordingly, 
the scope of the deconstructions and existential analytic to be provided will also be 
limited. 
 With regard to deconstruction, the foregrounding of foundational problems 
will then lead to three main limitations. Initially, this means that the deconstructive 
dimension will contain only the first preliminary movement of deconstruction: that is, 
a critical relation within the tradition(s) that clears a way for grounding, disclosing 
existential characteristics and originary ground. As such, the deconstruction to be 
provided will not seek to move further than preparing the ground for an existential 
analytic. 
 The deconstruction to be provided will thus also be limited in relation to 
interpretative content. In this, the priority of foundational concerns signifies the 
restriction of critical analysis to those tradition(s) intrinsically connected to the 
possibility of a phenomenology of Religion. Accordingly, the deconstruction of 
tradition(s) will begin with the point of origin of the ‘Western’ philosophical tradition: 
the tradition from within which phenomenology is made possible. 
 The final delimitation that requires discussion is the limit to be imposed upon 
the existential investigations. In this, the final part of the research could be better 
termed as ‘towards an existential analytic’ insofar as the ontological interpretation of 
existence to be given will only pertain to the question of ground and meaning. Due to 
this aim, the final part of the research will only outline the existential characteristics 
of Religion, moving towards an existential analytic through the disclosure of ground.  
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21. Outline of ‘A phenomenology of Religion’ 
 
A. Deconstruction 
The deconstruction herein will contain an interpretation of the philosophical tradition 
in its Pre-Socratic origins as it understands Religion. There are four questions to be 
addressed in the deconstruction of the philosophical tradition. 
(1) What are the indications of the meaning of Religion as belonging-to being-
human given in the origins of the philosophical tradition? (de-constructive 
case studies of Pre-Socratic thinking) 
(2) The question of ‘why’? (Why do we exist? what is the meaning of our 
existence? what is the highest possibilities of existence? What is the highest 
good of existence?) 
(3) The question of belief.  
(4) The question of the otherwise than being: the nothing and arc h. 
 
B. Towards an Existential Analytic 
The second part of the investigation into the possibility of a phenomenology of 
Religion will move towards an existential analytic of the meaning of Religion with 
regard to ground. In this, the movement towards an existential analytic will take place 
in three phases: indications, the transition from indication to being-human, and a 
preliminary outline of the meaning of Religion. 
 The first phase will provide various preliminary arguments that will draw out 
the essential of that which has been indicated in Pre-Socratic thinking. Herein, the 
indications given via Pre-Socratic thinking will be refined so as to pose the meaning 
of Religion as a question in its own particular way, determined by the unique 
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character of Religion as a phenomenon. Moreover, the unique character of Religion as 
a phenomenon will be disclosed through a discussion of being and non-being and the 
radical distinction between being and arc h. As such, the first phase of part four will 
attempt to show that the meaning of Religion intrinsically belongs-to being-human in 
relation to non-being as arc h and then to draw out the implications of this relation. 
 The second phase, of transition, will move from the implications drawn out of 
the indications of the meaning of Religion to an outline of the ontological-existential 
characteristics of Religion given therein. This phase, then, will attempt to disclose 
how the indications of the meaning of Religion are founded in existential structures 
within the potentiality of an ‘equiprimordial’ proper/improper. The aim, herein, is to 
provide an interpretation of the existential meaning of Religion via what has been 
disclosed in the deconstructions wherein the deconstructions will operate as the 
foundation for the movement towards an existential analytic: disclosing the improper 
and proper with regard to Religion as a phenomenon. This, as such, is the task of 
making the transition from indications to existential analysis via the groundwork 
provided by the deconstruction: the disclosure of the proper. 
 The third phase, then, will attempt to disclose the meaning of Religion. To 
disclose the meaning of Religion in this sense is the task of showing what Religion 
means as a phenomenon belonging-to being-human in a structural way, i.e., 
existential characteristics. Furthermore, to disclose meaning in this sense is to show 
what can be called the ground of Religion: of that which in being-human generates the 
possibility of being-religious and thus religion(s). Herein, the primary aim will be to 
provide an interpretation of belief as that which can be called the ground of Religion 
and to provide an outline of the meaning of Religion through belief as ground.  
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Part Three: Deconstructive Case Studies: 
 
In providing deconstructive case studies of the Pre-Socratic thinkers; Anaximander, 
Heraclitus and Parmenides, the ultimate aim is to interpret these thinkers in a 
phenomenological way. Furthermore, the question at hand is the phenomenon of 
Religion with regard to its meaning and its character of belonging-to being-human. 
The phenomenological way of interpretation posits the thinking of philosophy as 
indicative of the primary phenomenon to be addressed. That is, a deconstruction aims 
to show how, and in what sense, the thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus and 
Parmenides discloses via indications the phenomenon of Religion. 
 As such, there are three questions to be posed in relation to Anaximander, 
Heraclitus and Parmenides as thinkers. Initially it must be asked: how have the Pre-
Socratic philosophers been interpreted? Here the question is twofold: through whom 
have the pre-Socratic thinkers been interpreted, and, what kind of preconception 
informs the interpretation of their thought? The second question is thus the 
corresponding: how have the pre-Socratic thinkers been translated? Here, the question 
signifies the relation between the preconception of what pre-Socratic philosophy is all 
about and the way in which the Greek gets translated within the tradition of 
philosophy as technical terminology. Finally, the third question is a purely 
phenomenological one: what does the thinking/textual fragments of these pre-Socratic 
thinkers indicate? Again, the question is twofold: with regard to being-human and 
with regard to the meaning of Religion. These three questions, as such, reflect the 
path of the deconstruction; the movement from preconception and destruction to 
indications and construction.  
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 The first question will be taken up as the ‘how of interpretation’. In this, two 
poignant themes arise: of how Aristotle takes up the role of the thinker through whom 
the pre-Socratic thinkers may be interpreted and then, secondly, how the pre-Socratic 
thinkers are preconceived therein as philosophers of nature or natural theologians. As 
such, the problem of the ‘how of interpretation’ takes up as a question the ways in 
which the pre-Socratic philosophers get subsumed into the tradition of metaphysics. 
Likewise, the question of translation is the corresponding problem of how such terms 
as fusij and Q eoj are translated and transformed in being incorporated into the 
tradition of metaphysics. 
 In the third question, the problems of philosophy will be taken up as indicative 
ways. Herein, the presumed unity of arc h and being will be shown to be problematic. 
Furthermore, the preconception of a strict duality within pre-Socratic thought will also 
be questioned. A pivotal question in this investigation will be the notion of Q eoj, 
especially with regard to how this notion is equated with, and thus given the identity 
of, both arc h and being as that which constitutes presence.  Equally, the third 
question will also take up the theme of being-human: of what the pre-Socratic 
understanding of human existence indicates about being-human. 
 Thus, the primary question leading towards indication is this: how does it 
stand with Q eoj? How does it stand with Q eoj in relation to the structures of 
thinking/understanding reality? How does it stand with Q eoj in relation to being-
human as understanding? Here, the notion of Q eoj is not taken up as an object, let 
alone an object of Religion, but rather, will be taken as a philosophical question which 
discloses characteristics of being-human and furthermore, the meaning of Religion as 
belonging-to being-human. 
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Chapter 7: Case Studies In Pre-Socratic Philosophy: 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides. 
 
22. The How of Interpreting the Pre-Socratic Thinkers. 
 
The translation and interpretation of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides is 
fraught with ambiguity and paradox. Taking Aristotle’s commentary as a point of 
origin there is to be found, therein, an interpretation that characterises these thinkers 
as confused and struggling with a lack of conceptual language for the task they 
engaged with (986b1-897a9). Here, the pre-Socratic thinkers are described as both 
fusikos and qeolog i (983b20)730; conjoining the question of the arc h of fusij with 
Q eoj within the notion of a singular identity. However, academic interpretations of 
these thinkers tend to draw out or prioritise one of these two notions, either fusij or 
Q eoj. Thus, aside from Aristotle’s commentary upon the pre-Socratic thinkers, the 
tendency is to preconceive either fusij or Q eoj as the primary questions of pre-
Socratic thought.  Before entering into a discussion of how Anaximander, Heraclitus 
and Parmenides are interpreted as individual thinkers, it is first necessary to place 
these interpretations within a general context, i.e., Aristotle, philosophy of nature and 
theology. 
 
A. Pre-Socratic Thinking in General: via Aristotle, F u s i j and Q e oj. 
Aristotle’s commentary on pre-Socratic thought, for the most part, can be found in the 
first book of the Metaphysics. Here, the general context of the commentary lies in 
such themes as wisdom, science and first principles (982a1-983a23). Aristotle goes on 
to comment that pre-Socratic philosophy as a whole is characterised by the conception 
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of the identity of arc h and matter; that matter is both the principle/ground and 
element of all that is (Meta 983b5-15).731 Equally, Aristotle comments, pre-Socratic 
thinking tends to view the divine as material – elemental (Meta 983b28-984b23). Thus, 
for the most part, pre-Socratic thought eventuates in the conception of reality as a 
single entity; Q eoj and matter conjoined (Meta 986b8-987a2). For Aristotle, then, pre-
Socratic thought is interpreted to display three features: a) the association of arc h and 
matter, b) the association of arc h and Q eoj, and thus c) the identity of Q eoj and 
fusij.  
 In the academic interpretations of pre-Socratic thinking in general there is, as 
previously mentioned, a tendency to draw out either fusij or Q eoj as the primary 
theme of pre-Socratic investigation. The dominant academic interpretative tendency is 
to prioritise fusij, viewing pre-Socratic thought as natural philosophy. As 
philosophers of nature, pre-Socratic thought is interpreted as posing four interrelated 
questions: fusij as nature, fusij as becoming, fusij as cosmos, and fusij as arc h. 
On the other hand, where pre-Socratic thought is preconceived of as theological, it is 
then found that the primary problem is that of the notion of Q eoj as a theme of 
philosophical investigation.732 In this, pre-Socratic thinking is viewed as the 
questioning of mythic narratives of the divine, attempting therein a de-
anthropomorphic notion of Q eoj and equally, a divinisation of fusij. As such, pre-
Socratic thought is conceived as the foundations of rational and natural theology, thus 
being precursors to m et afusij proper. 
 Both of these interpretative tendencies, however, can be seen to implicitly 
follow the broad outline of Aristotle’s commentary in the Metaphysics as precursors 
                                               
731
 “Most thought the principles which were of the nature of matter were the only principle of all 
things…” 
732
 Jaeger, The Theology of Early Greek Philosopher’s, p.4 
 221 
of metaphysical thinking within a text on metaphysical thought. As such, the general 
drift of academic interpretations may be characterised as a doubled Aristotelian 
reading: the interpretation of pre-Socratic thought via Aristotle and within Aristotle’s 
systematic view of metaphysics as science. Thus, as in Aristotle, academic 
interpretations tend to view pre-Socratic thought as the emergence of reason: of 
natural science (fusikh), philosophy of nature (metaphysics) and the metaphysical 
thinking of the identity of being as Theology. The discussions and analysis of these 
interpretations of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides to follow will draw out 
these Aristotelian and metaphysical interpretative tendencies as the groundwork for a 
deconstruction. 
 
B. Anaximander: 
It is Anaximander, rather than Thales, who is generally considered the first 
philosopher proper. Anaximander is credited with the first philosophical text of which 
some fragments remain. In general, Anaximander’s thinking is credited with two 
crucial themes: the question of arc h and the notion of natural law (order). 
 In the first instance, Anaximander has been credited with the utilisation of the 
term apeiron in a technical sense, referring herein for the first time, to the arc h, or, 
the idea of the arc h.733 In this way, the apeiron has been interpreted to have the 
following general significations: the ground of all things734, not elemental but some 
other apeiron (infinite) nature735, the ground of physical law736, and finally, the 
genesis of the notion of the non-perceptible.737 The ap e i r on, as such, is interpreted to 
be a technical term related to the question of first principle; the ground of reality in 
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general738, and the ground of determinate things.739 The apeiron, furthermore, is also 
associated, via extrapolations from the fragments, with the structure of reality and aei/ 
(the eternal).740 
 Equally, Anaximander is also credited with the origination of the idea of 
natural order; that everything occurs within and under law and necessity.741 In this, 
fragment one has been interpreted as signifying a temporal arrangement in the 
processes of becoming that is necessary and universal in association with justice. 
Thus, fragment one is interpreted as the positing of a general principle of justice at 
work in the physical world.742 Here, justice is associated with governance; physical 
law and order.743 Furthermore, insofar as fragment one contains reference to both 
apeiron and justice, there is also an assumed connection between them, i.e., the 
apeiron is given the attribute of justice.744 As such, it is assumed that justice can 
therefore be constituted as a property of the apeiron.  
 Once these two themes are ascertained in their generalities, however, the 
subsequent interpretations as to the significance of the apeiron, justice and their 
identity tends to become divided according to the presumed general aim or focus of 
Anaximander’s thinking: either fusij or Q eoj. 
 A classic example of the interpretation of Anaximander as a philosopher of 
nature (fusikoj) can be found in Burnet’s work: Greek Philosophy. In this text, 
Burnet argues that the notion of apeiron is derived solely from “Greek physical 
thinking”, that is: the appearance of opposites and the subsequent question of the 
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unifying ground of opposites.745 As such, the concept of apeiron is defined as the 
name for the material principle; the stuff from which all things arise and to which they 
return again.746 It follows, then, that justice is the order of physical relations: the 
balancing out of opposing elements.747 Finally, Burnet interprets Anaximander to be a 
“polite atheist”, utilising the term Q eoj in a non-religious sense as the personification 
of natural phenomena.748 There are, therefore, three main themes associated with 
Anaximander conceived of as a natural philosopher: material ground, natural law, and 
the personification or deification of both of the above.  
 This interpretation of the apeiron, in the first instance, follows Aristotle’s 
commentary on Anaximander’s thinking wherein the apeiron is viewed as an 
intermediate substance.749 This is evidenced, initially, by the definition of the apeiron 
as some other apeiron nature than the elements.750 Thus, the apeiron cannot be 
construed as an element, but nonetheless is interpreted to signify substance. As such, 
the apeiron must be (it is argued) a substance that lies in between the elements: that 
acts as their principle and source of matter.751 
Three justifications are then given for this interpretation of the apeiron as an 
in-between substance rather than a determined singular originative substance. First, 
the apeiron allows the elements to develop and undergo transformation only insofar 
as it is distinguishable from the elements.752 Second, the apeiron also serves as an 
indefinite substance: an infinite source material for determinate things.753 Finally, the 
apeiron as this in-between and non-determinate substance may be connected with 
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justice: the origination and destruction of determinate things and thus the retention of 
matter in this process.754  
From the context of this Aristotelian interpretation, the apeiron is then 
generally defined as primal stuff; a material substratum that is not yet determined.755 
In this, the apeiron is also given the property of a common stuff from which 
everything arises, containing the potentiality of everything, which is also a neutral 
indeterminate unity.756 Thus, the primary character of the apeiron is non-determinate 
matter, or, material ground. 
Various attempts to provide definitions and translations of the apeiron have 
also been given via etymological surveys. In the most general sense, apeiron, from 
a-perat a signifies lack of boundaries.757 In this, perat a has a spatial connotation, 
which would then signify non-bounded or unbounded.758 There is, as such, a general 
consensus that the apeiron, at the very least, has some spatial signification. Equally, 
the apeiron is also translated, on the basis of usage, to signify without limit or 
definition.759 Another early use of apeiron is that of surrounding: of binding, and the 
circular/spherical.760 Finally, there is also consensus that Anaximander’s use of the 
term apeiron signifies arc h, principle or ground. 
At this stage, however, the consensus dissolves with regard to further and 
more determinate philosophical connotations of the apeiron. Some assert that the 
apeiron must have a physical or material signification761, others refute the physical 
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identity of the apeiron762, and some argue that the apeiron is both material and non-
material insofar as there is no distinction in Pre-Socratic thinking between matter and 
form. 763 Thus, even amongst those who interpret Anaximander to be a philosopher of 
nature, there is no certainty as to what the apeiron signifies in detail as a material 
ground. The question, therefore, is whether the apeiron as material ground may be 
constituted as substance as Aristotle argues? Nonetheless, the essential definition 
given by commentators of the apeiron is “material ground”, which is in agreement 
with the general gist of Aristotle’s commentary. This is evident in the repeated 
characterisation of the apeiron as primal stuff, signifying some non-determinate 
substance. 
The second theme, of justice as natural law, is then posited as the notion of 
balancing opposites, or, the management of waste. In this, the assessment of time and 
necessity are interpreted to signify natural law: the processes of nature, becoming, and 
the flux of opposites.764 On the one hand, then, it appears that Anaximander posits a 
harmony, or unity, of opposites: that opposing elements relate within an ordered 
process of balancing out.765 Equally, it also appears that there is an ordering or 
lawfulness to the process of becoming and destruction. Justice, as natural law, is also 
interpreted as the management of matter (conservation of matter).766 Herein, justice is 
interpreted as a primitive idea of natural law wherein determinate things come out of 
and return to the material substratum, thus preserving the quantity of matter in the 
universe. In general, as such, the interpretation of justice as natural law can be seen to 
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imply a vague governance of fusij: of becoming and the relations between 
opposites.767 
The question then arises as to what relation there is, if any, between the 
apeiron and justice. Here, the fragments of Anaximander provide no clear evidence 
or argument for any relation, simply positing that the apeiron is the source of all 
things and that to which all things return upon destruction. Rather, if anything, justice 
is associated with necessity and time: “according to necessity… according to the 
arrangement of time…” (Fr: 1). Another possibility is that justice is the relation of 
existing things themselves: “for they give justice and make reparation for injustice…” 
(Fr: 1) 
Strangely, but unsurprisingly, those who interpret Anaximander to be a natural 
philosopher tend to assume a relation between the apeiron and justice wherein justice 
is an attribute or property of the apeiron. This is unsurprising for two primary 
reasons. First, in Aristotle arc h signifies first principle or cause, that is: the unity of 
first cause as the ground of causality and Q eoj as the id-entity of causality. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of the apeiron as material ground also makes this 
relation necessary insofar as it is necessary for the arc h to signify unifying ground, 
i.e., the unity of what something is and the relations between entities (causality). 
Thus, if the apeiron is defined as material ground, then the apeiron must also 
predetermine what is thing is and how things relate. Therefore, the apeiron as 
material ground signifies the unity of form and matter, or, a lack of distinction 
between them. 
This assumed relation between the apeiron and justice then leads into the 
problem of Q eoj. Here, Q eoj is characterised as a name for, or, personification of, 
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this unity of the apeiron and natural law. In other words, the term Q eoj can be 
characterised as the subsumption of natural law under material ground. In this, the 
notion of Q eoj gets interpreted as either a personification of, or the positing of 
intelligence to, the apeiron. In the first instance, Q eoj is defined as a response to the 
moral potentiality or significance of the natural order,768 or more bluntly, as a politic 
inclusion of the religious culture in which Anaximander lived.769 Accordingly, 
divinity is attached to the apeiron insofar as it may be constituted as an intelligent 
agent (thus incorporating natural law): as enfolding and directing the process of 
fusij.770 
Ironically, the logical conclusion of the interpretation of Anaximander as a 
natural philosopher and the apeiron as material ground is the threefold identity of 
apeiron, justice and Q eoj. In this, the only possible result of the interpretation is 
much the same as Aristotle’s: that Anaximander, in defining the apeiron as material 
ground, must conclude that the universe is a single entity. The inevitability of this 
conclusion must be shown. 
The interpretation of Anaximander as a natural philosopher finds three 
primary philosophical themes in the notion of the apeiron: material ground, arc h and 
Q eoj. The first means that the apeiron must be constituted as physical in some sense, 
eg, as an idea of atoms or the idea of some basic constitutive building block of the 
physical universe. Equally, the apeiron is defined as signifying the arc h in a 
metaphysical sense, eg, the unifying ground or first cause upon which both causality 
and the essence of things are founded. Finally, as Q eoj, the apeiron is also associated 
with the metaphysical concept of the identity of the first cause as an intelligent 
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agency. What is found, therefore, in the unity of these three themes is a definition of 
the apeiron as a divine physical substance that unifies and causes all that is. The 
apeiron, as such, is the universe as a unified physical whole, operating according to 
natural law, and also given the attribute of divinity. Thus, the inevitable conclusion of 
this interpretation of Anaximander as a natural philosopher is the identity of the 
apeiron as a universal entity. The question then remains: Does an interpretation of 
Anaximander as a theologian produce differing results? 
The interpretation of Anaximander as a theologian views his thinking as 
containing two general trends. First, Anaximander is interpreted to be a thinker who 
poses the divine as a problem for reason.771 In this, the mythical narratives of the 
divine are questioned via reason and furthermore, also with regard to the notion of 
fusij. As such, Anaximander is interpreted to conceptualise Q eoj via fusij; of 
being a natural theologian for whom theology is an outgrowth of fusij.772 Thus, 
Anaximander is considered to be a natural theologian who takes up the ultimate 
metaphysical question: from whence comes the origin of everything (or) why is there 
something rather than nothing?773 
As a natural theologian, it is argued, there are three primary dimensions of 
Anaximander’s thinking: Q eoj, kosm os and kosm oi. Initially then, the divine is 
associated with the apeiron and arc h. Here, the apeiron is viewed as signifying the 
general concept of Q eoj774, and thus refutes the reading of the apeiron as material 
substratum. The apeiron is defined as: the ground of all things775, and mind/love.776 
As such, the apeiron is identified with the idea of arc h in a strict sense, referring to a 
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non-material ground of all that is. This is also a metaphysical interpretation of the 
apeiron insofar as it is interpreted to be merely a name for the arc h to which 
Aristotle refers (first cause). 
The second dimension of Anaximander’s theology arises out of the notion of 
cosmos. Here, cosmos is viewed as referring to the problem of the structure of reality, 
and accordingly, the way in which things happen.777 In this, the notion of cosmos is 
characterised as the unity of divine justice and natural law as the same.778 Thus, 
Anaximander is interpreted to be arguing for the idea of the divine as the intelligent 
agent that is the source and the guarantor of natural law. 
The third dimension is then kosm oi, or, the notion of sub-divinities. Here, 
Anaximander is interpreted to be providing an argument that distinguishes between 
the idea of the divine in general (the apeiron) and divinities (heavenly bodies, the 
gods, and so on…).779 In this, Anaximander is viewed as not only introducing a 
distinction between traditional gods and a universal God,780 but also opposing the 
traditional conception of the divine as created.781 Thus, in this interpretation, 
Anaximander can be viewed as a religious reformer who utilises reason in relation to 
the question of fusij in order to query the Greek religious tradition. 
Overall, the interpretation of Anaximander as a natural theologian reaches 
three primary conclusions. Initially, the characterisation of the apeiron as divine and 
as arc h leads to the conclusion that the divine is the ground of fusij.782 Likewise, 
the second conclusion follows that the apeiron, as divine, is a religious conception of 
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the abstract notion of arc h.783 However, these conclusions also lead to a variation in 
the translation of fusij. For, while those who interpret Anaximander to be a natural 
philosopher translate fusij as ‘nature’, those who interpret Anaximander as a 
theologian tend to translate fusij as ‘becoming’.784 Thus, fusij is often viewed as 
signifying growth, life and movement in juxtaposition to nature or matter.785 In this 
sense, the translation of Anaximander’s notion of apeiron is transformed from 
material ground to the ground of all becoming and destruction.786 
Each of these conclusions, however, is problematic! The first conclusion is 
based upon fragments that are viewed to be questionable. Here, it has been argued that 
the assertion of the divinity of the apeiron is either a very loose paraphrase by 
Aristotle, or, in fact Aristotle’s interpretation of the apeiron as Q eoj.787 As such, it is 
possible that the assertion of the divinity of the apeiron belongs to Aristotle’s 
philosophy rather than Anaximander’s writings.788 Likewise, the association of the 
apeiron and arc h (in a technical metaphysical sense) is in doubt. Here, the problem 
lies in the sources of the fragments, which all provide general summaries of the notion 
of the apeiron rather than direct quotes.789 As such, the problem has three 
possibilities: 1. Did Anaximander utilise the term ‘arc h’ at all? – Is the reference to 
arc h a later insertion by metaphysical commentators? 2. If Anaximander did utilise 
the word ‘arc h’, was it in a technical sense? 3. Even if Anaximander did utilise the 
term ‘arc h’ in a technical sense did it have a metaphysical significance as often 
assumed?  
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Those who interpret Anaximander to be a theologian will necessarily answer 
that he did, indeed, utilise arc h in a technical sense, and furthermore, in a 
metaphysical sense as well. This is the case insofar as the preconception of 
Anaximander as a natural theologian requires that the apeiron signify arc h in a 
technical and metaphysical sense as the basis of the cohesion, coherence and 
systematic unity of the theological system. On the other hand, interpreting 
Anaximander to be a philosopher of nature requires that the apeiron signify arc h, or 
at least a proto-metaphysical idea of arc h, for the necessary unity of apeiron and 
natural law. 
The third and pivotal problem of the interpretation of Anaximander as a 
theologian is that of the relation of preconception and translation. Herein, the 
interpretation of Anaximander can be seen to inform the way in which the fragments 
are translated within both interpretative trends. Those who interpret Anaximander to 
be a theologian also, for the most part, translate fusij as becoming and the apeiron 
as God in the most abstract terms. In translating fusij as becoming, however, the 
ap e i r on will also inevitably be viewed as another name for Being.790 This is the case 
due to the fact that preconceiving Anaximander as a natural theologian necessarily 
results in the translation of the fragments within the context of technical terminology 
belonging to metaphysics and its outgrowth natural theology. Thus, the fragments will 
get translated with an eye to key words that connect Anaximander to natural theology. 
Furthermore, the inevitable conclusion of the preconception of Anaximander as a 
natural theologian is that the apeiron is Q eoj, and Q eoj is Being: the unifying ground 
of fusij. 
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It can be seen therefore, that both interpretative trends preconceive 
Anaximander through the philosophical tradition and metaphysics within the two 
extreme possibilities contained therein. Thus, these two dominant interpretative 
tendencies also follow the extreme possibilities of Aristotle’s metaphysical system; 
physics and onto-theology. In the first case, the interpretation of Anaximander as a 
philosopher of nature draws out and emphasises a way of thinking about fusij as 
nature through the commentary of Aristotle. Here, the preconception is that all there 
is; is fusij – physical nature. This leads to the problematic conclusion that fusij is a 
single entity. On the other hand, the preconception of Anaximander as a theologian 
results in the identity of apeiron and Being, or, the God of metaphysics. Again, this 
results in the idea of the apeiron as a universal entity, albeit a supernatural entity 
called Being. 
 
C. Heraclitus: 
The interpretative preconceptions of Heraclitus’ thinking follows three potential 
paths. Unlike Anaximander, Heraclitus’ thinking resists a traditional Aristotelian and 
metaphysical interpretation, but rather, can be taken via the extremes of natural 
philosophy and oracular theology through to the nexus point of metaphysics. In this 
way Heraclitus tends to be preconceived initially as either a radical philosopher of 
nature (the first epistemologist) or as a radical religious thinker: one of the few pre-
Socratic thinkers who explicitly confronts the religious traditions of Greece. As with 
Anaximander, however, there are a few key concepts in Heraclitus’ thinking of which 
the divergent trends of interpretation centre, namely: the hidden essence of fusij, 
pur and log oj.  
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Heraclitus as Fusikoj: 
For those who interpret Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature, these three notions are 
viewed within the context of translating fusij as nature. In this, the pivotal notion of 
the log oj is generally interpreted to signify natural law.791 Furthermore, the idea of 
log oj is interpreted to support a theory of perpetual change: flux.792 Equally, the 
notion of pur is interpreted to signify world stuff: a primal form of matter and 
identical with the cosmos (translated as universe).793 Finally, then, there is the concept 
of fusij, or the idea of nature as process – of eternal causal law.794 
 It is worthwhile drawing out this interpretation in greater detail. Here, the 
interpretation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature tends to develop four primary 
themes: epistemology, fusij, pur, and log oj.  
Heraclitus the ‘epistemologist’ begins thinking with the question of knowing 
or wisdom. In this, the question of wisdom presents two related problems: that of 
fusij (what fusij really is) and the problem of human knowledge (what is the 
nature of knowledge). The truth of fusij, its essence, is hidden: fusij loves to 
hide.795 As the epistemologist, Heraclitus is viewed as beginning with the problem of 
appearances, wherein the non-apparent essence of nature is hidden and the apparent is 
characterised as illusory.796 As such, the primary consideration of Heraclitus’ 
epistemology is the human dimension of knowing, or, the human potential to know 
the truth of nature. 
 Heraclitus characterises humans in various disparaging ways, calling humans 
foolish, living deaths, deaf, ignorant, unknowing, blind, sleepers, liars, deceived, 
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children, barbarians and wicked.797 There are two primary themes of this assault upon 
human awareness; the first that humans, for the most part, fail to grasp the essential 
truth of life and fusij. The second, accordingly, compares this human failing to the 
divine as the exemplar of wisdom. The interpretation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of 
nature takes the first theme to signify the epistemic problem of the senses. Thus, the 
human failure to grasp the essence of fusij is associated with the deceiving ways of 
the senses; the ways in which fusij appears to us.798 Likewise, the statement: 
“human nature has no insight, while divine nature does”799 is interpreted to signify the 
potentiality of human knowing via reason: the intellect (nouj), log oj and wisdom 
(sofia).800 Thus, in the first instance, the divine is already viewed as a way of 
naming wisdom and thinking properly.801 Furthermore, this wisdom that reveals the 
truth of fusij, that draws fusij out from hiding, also subsumes the primary 
characteristics of the divine into itself: eternal, universality and justice.802 As such, in 
this interpretation, the divine may be characterised as wisdom about or the truth of 
fusij. In an epistemic sense, the divine signifies the human potential for proper 
method and thinking in juxtaposition to the everyday awareness of fusij gained via 
the senses.  
With regard to fusij, then, there are three primary dimensions: how fusij 
appears, what fusij essentially is, and finally, the arc h of fusij. In the everyday 
world of appearances, fusij is misunderstood as it is grasped by the senses. In this 
the senses lead to an idea of opposition and differentiation. For instance, the senses 
tend to lead humans to the idea that opposites are non-unifiable and distinctly separate 
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individual agents of change. Here, the senses grasp fusij as a collection of individual 
things, full of chaos with innumerable discrete forces all randomly changing with no 
regard to others. Thus, to human understandings of fusij via the senses everything is 
differentiated, individual and disordered. This, as such, is how fusij appears to 
humans in the phenomenal sense. 
 Likewise, humans appear to each other and our selves in the same manner. In 
this, the sensuous understanding of human beings is twofold: we understand ourselves 
to be individuals with individual worlds803, and furthermore, we view our life and 
history on the basis of differentiations: good/evil, just/unjust, life/death…804 
 Heraclitus, then, in his famous statement posits the essence of fusij to be flux 
or becoming: “It is not possible to step twice into the same river”.805  Thus, the 
essence of fusij for both humans and in general, functions as flux.806 Fusij, as such, 
is essentially an ordered process of change (becoming, destruction and 
transformation) and furthermore, the relationship of opposites.807 As a natural 
philosopher, then, Heraclitus’ characterisation of fusij is interpreted to develop three 
primary ideas. The first of these is natural law, or, the intrinsic order of the processes 
of flux and becoming.808 This idea of natural law reveals two things: firstly, that the 
essence of fusij is becoming809, and additionally, that the becoming of fusij is 
universally and necessarily ordered.810 This law of the ordering of becoming is often 
called the theory of perpetual change, signifying an eternal law of the way elements 
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relate and things originate and dwindle from existence.811 This law, as such, does not 
merely show how flux must occur, but also shows how this is the essential character 
of fusij. Thus, the essence of fusij is fusij: the processes of becoming under its 
own law.812 
 The second primary idea in relation to the essence of fusij is called the unity 
of opposites. In this, the unity of opposites takes two primary forms: the unity of 
opposing notions and the unity of opposing material elements or forms. With regard 
to the former, the essential unity of opposing notions posits the non-differentiation of 
sensuous notions, eg, life/death, justice/injustice, war/peace and so on… Here, the 
positing of unity forms a refutation of the human understanding of fusij. In this 
refutation, Heraclitus establishes the essential unity of opposing notions within the 
structures of the whole and belonging together.813 An example of the structural unity 
of the whole is that of a whole day.814 Here a day is only complete in the unity of both 
day and night. Thus, as a concept, a day is only complete in the unity of apparent 
opposites, and furthermore, the proper concept of day must view day and night as a 
unified whole rather than two differentiated opposites. 
 Heraclitus also gives examples of the essential unity of opposing concepts as 
belonging together. Take for instance, the unity of life and death, and justice and 
injustice.815 First, the direction, task and end of life is death. As such, life and death 
are a unity of belonging together insofar as the t eloj of life is death. Furthermore, life 
and death belong together insofar as they belong to each other as potentialities of the 
same notion: death is the potential of life and life is only actual on the basis of death. 
In other words, the concept of life intrinsically signifies both the present absence of 
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death and the inevitability of death in life. Neither concept has any significance 
without the other. Likewise, Heraclitus states, humans would not grasp justice without 
the presence of injustice.816 Thus, these notions belong together as mutually 
dependent concepts. 
 The second dimension of the essential unity of opposites relates to the material 
and elemental forms of fusij. Here, this essential unity is also twofold; with regard 
to the relatedness and transformation of the physical.817 In this, the relatedness of 
opposites is shown via their simultaneous belonging together within the one identity 
or subject.818 Some examples Heraclitus gives is that of things like mud, rubbish, gold 
and the sea. In each case, a single thing has various opposing effects for differing 
entities, ie., differing relations between entities, which are, nonetheless unified in 
what they are and the relations between them. However, implicit to this unity of 
determinate relatedness is a broader notion of identity. In this, the relatedness of 
objects has a universal sense, signifying a necessity of the coherence of the relations 
between objects. In other words, there is an essential unity of material opposites and 
the effects of their relations insofar as they are always the same and within the same 
identity. Thus, the essential unity of relations signifies the characterisation of fusij 
as essentially the relation itself rather than determinate or discrete individual 
objects.819 So, the essential unity of opposites is nothing other than the 
characterisation of the essence of fusij as relations between things (under law and 
necessity) and thus the unity of things. 
 The unity of material and elemental forms of fusij also pertains to 
transformation. In this, the unity refers to the processes of change, succession and 
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becoming. Accordingly, Heraclitus is interpreted as outlining the unity of natural 
processes; the unity implicit in succession and transformation.820 An example of the 
first is that of water. Herein, water has differing successive states: ice, liquid, gas, and 
as such, has a unity which incorporates the opposites: cold and heat. Equally, 
however, this also applies to relations between seemingly opposite elements: water 
douses fire, fire heats water. As such, differing elements and differing material forms 
are also characterised within an essential unity. Here, the unity is grounded in the 
actualising processes. The way in which elements and material forms actualise in 
succession both internally (identity) and externally (relation) are all unified as phases 
of a single or universal process of becoming: of changing states, of effect and 
continuation within flux. Thus, again, the essential character of fusij is an internally 
self-regulating unity of becoming: of the actualisation of matter under the law of 
actualisation. 
 The unity of the transformation of opposing elements and material forms also 
gets called ‘sameness’.821 In this, Heraclitus is interpreted as positing a direct 
sameness between opposing elements insofar as they become one another. For 
example, Heraclitus describes in fragment 31, the transformation of elements into one 
another: fire to sea and earth, earth to sea… Here, the unity is twofold. First, opposing 
elements are unified in transforming into one another; they are the same. Furthermore, 
their transformations are unified under law; they are balanced out (harmonised) and 
transformed in a regulated fashion.  Thus, the essential unity of opposing elements 
and material forms in transformation is threefold: the essential sameness of the 
stuff/matter of which they are constituted, the essential unity of transformation of 
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form as potentialities, and moreover, the essential unity of the process of 
transformation as law. 
 So, we find that the second dimension of Heraclitus’ characterisation of fusij 
leads to the third, namely, that of a primary substance of form or matter. In the 
interpretation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature it is often assumed that the 
notion of pur is both a primal substance (material substratum)822 and also the 
originary form of all matter.823 However, many interpreters deny this claim, refuting 
the possibility of equating pur with the apeiron (of Anaximander) or some other 
notion of primal stuff.824 As such, the primary question with regard to pur is whether 
may be constituted as the material substratum, or the alternative, of primal form. This 
question is made more difficult insofar as pur is also connected with both the log oj 
and Q eoj in the fragments of Heraclitus. For, as Nahm argues, if pur is indeed a 
material substratum and primal form of matter, Heraclitus’ thinking may be viewed as 
a more complex and developed version of his predecessors, especially 
Anaximander.825  This is, in fact, precisely Nahm’s argument: that the notion of pur 
in Heraclitus exemplifies the idea of an infinite cosmos of substance, the idea of 
natural law as ordered change, and thus equivalent to such ideas as the conservation 
of matter within changes of states.826 Furthermore, Nahm also claims, pur is not 
merely the primal material essence of fusij, but it is also the arc h that directs the 
universe; forming all things out of itself, according to its own internal law.827 Thus, as 
a philosopher of nature, Heraclitus is interpreted to be a highly developed and subtle 
thinker intrinsically grounded in the thinking of the fusikos before him. 
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 On the other hand, some such as Kirk argue that pur must properly be 
interpreted as signifying primal form or ground.828 Here, pur is viewed as signifying, 
in a strict sense, ‘world order’ (the same of all) that, moreover, discloses the essence 
of pur as that which unifies.829 In this, rather than being a substratum or primal 
matter, pur is associated with form and world forming. As such, pur is characterised 
as an element rather than substratum for it is determined as a part of the cosmos.830 
Thus, in this reading, the notion of pur must be dismissed from consideration as the 
material substratum. 
 Rather than pur, then, it is suggested that the notion of cosmos signifies the 
idea of material substratum. Unfortunately, however, Heraclitus’ outline of the 
cosmos, as the amalgam of elements unified under law831, makes the cosmos an 
unlikely contender for the role of primal substance. Moreover, the notion of cosmos is 
often identified as pur.832 As such, many conclude, as does Kirk, that even though 
Heraclitus is a philosopher of nature par excellence with regard to the notion and 
development of natural law, his thinking stands on the edge of a new philosophical 
tendency towards the rejection of nature.833  
When we turn to the notion of pur explicitly, in its own right, we find that pur 
has in this interpretation of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature both a primary and 
secondary signification, namely: as the originative form of matter, and as sofia/nouj. 
 As discussed previously, pur in its primary sense signifies such themes as 
form, unity, element and ground. It is worthwhile, then, to draw out these themes of 
pur in greater detail. The first and most obvious of these is the role of pur as the 
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primal form of matter. Initially, pur in this role is interpreted to signify an argument 
that all matter, in its original or primal state, is pur or has the form of pur.834 In this 
way pur as primal form and element discloses itself in two ways. First, pur is viewed 
as the original state of all matter. In other words, pur is the basic form which all 
matter begins as, and the form upon which all other forms of matter are based. Thus, 
fusij, in its original material state or form is pur. Equally, pur is viewed, as 
elemental, to signify the original element upon which all other elements are based and 
thus grounded. Therefore, pur as primal form and element points towards two more 
general characteristics of pur: as unity and ground. For, in the first case, pur as the 
original state of all matter also reveals pur to be the unity of matter in its origin. 
Furthermore, pur as the primal element also discloses pur as the ground of fusij: it 
is the element upon which all other elements depend. 
 As unity, pur is a primal unity, or the unity of fusij in general. In this, pur 
can be seen to unify nature as a whole as the form/element through which all other 
forms/elements are unified835: the unity of opposites836 and the identity of the unity of 
reality.837 Likewise, pur is also interpreted as ground; as that from which all other 
things become. Initially, then, pur signifies ground as the ground of differentiation, 
or, that which allows differentiation.838 As ground, pur is also viewed as signifying 
the ground of fusij as law.839 As such, pur is that which, in itself, directs becoming, 
i.e., contains within itself the law of becoming that determines how and what things 
become.840 Therefore, in the most general sense, pur is a name for arc h841, as first 
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cause, the ground of fusij and the law of self-regulation of fusij. P ur, as such, is 
nothing more or less than the essence of nature and the essence of natural self-
regulation. 
 In the fragments of Heraclitus, however, pur also appears to signify Q eoj, 
either through explicit naming, through the attribution of divine attributes, or finally, 
explicitly connected to Zeus. For those who interpret Heraclitus as a philosopher of 
nature, the divinity of pur is generally argued to be a secondary or derivative aspect 
of pur. Furthermore, in this interpretative tendency, the notion of Q eoj is viewed 
implicitly as non-religious, and accordingly, containing a naturalist or physical 
signification. For example, Nahm dismisses the possibility of any religious content in 
Heraclitus’ fragments on the basis of his supposed renunciation of priestly offices.842 
As such, the appearance of religious terminology and style in the fragments can be put 
down to his religious education, i.e., a style of thinking and writing that lends itself to 
an oracular and esoteric character.843 Thus, the associations of pur and Q eoj can be 
understood simply as an inculcated habit of mind.844 
 More subtle interpretations of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature 
acknowledge the ambiguity of the quasi-religious significance of pur. In this, the gist 
of the interpretation follows two arguments. Initially, the divinity of pur is interpreted 
to have a naturalised meaning: signifying the concepts of law (justice) and intellect 
(nouj). 
 With regard to the former, then, it is argued that pur signifies the notion of 
formal ground to which Q eoj may be added as a secondary characteristic by 
traditional association. As such, it is argued that pur primarily refers to, and names, 
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the arc h, which can then be called Q eoj. Thus, the naming of pur as Q eoj in this 
derivative sense may be constituted as either a religious awareness of nature845, or as a 
polite deferral to cultural traditions.846 Certainly, this is the interpretation given to 
Heraclitus explicitly by Vlastos (the former) and Burnet (the latter), and also applied 
as a general rule applied to all the Pre-Socratic thinkers preconceived of as 
‘fusikos’. Thus, the relegation of Q eoj to a secondary attribute of pur belongs to the 
general preconception inherent in interpreting Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature. It 
is, furthermore, a preconception that serves as a basis of the interpretation of Q eoj as 
a naturalised concept. 
 The naturalisation of the notion of Q eoj, then, is given two related meanings. 
First, Q eoj is interpreted to signify the natural concept of intellect (nouj) and thus 
associated with wisdom.847 In this, pur is viewed, in addition to its meaning as arc h, 
to signify the intelligent or sentient capacity of fusij in its ground. Thus, as a 
secondary, and doubtful, characteristic of pur, fusij may be constituted as directed 
by an intelligent agent or force.848 However, this idea of the sentience of fusij may 
be watered down or dismissed entirely. Here, pur as Q eoj is then determined as the 
idea of the intellect in general, or, the possibility within fusij that sentience may 
arise and thus grasp the essence of fusij. As such, Q eoj is interpreted to refer to the 
truth of fusij that may be disclosed by entities with the capacity to grasp the truth. 
Thus, Q eoj stands for the relationship between nature and sentient beings as the 
intellectual possibility of knowing: grasping the unifying ground and essence of 
fusij.849 The divine, then, is the truth of fusij: formed as a concept within the 
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relationship between sentient beings and fusij.850 In this way, fragment 78, 113, 116 
and 119, which all posit the potential divinity of human awareness, often get 
interpreted as an argument for the idea of wisdom which grasps the truth of fusij: the 
divine is another name for intellect, wisdom, and the truth found therein. Finally, then, 
Q eoj in its most universal sense signifies the truth or essence of fusij as humans may 
grasp it. 
 P ur, viewed as a naturalised notion of Q eoj, has a second dimension as the 
notion of justice or law.851 In this, again, the naturalisation of Q eoj as justice has two 
primary senses: the idea of law and the potential grasp of the idea of lawfulness 
inherent in human awareness. In the first case, then, justice signifies the intrinsic 
lawful essence of fusij as becoming. Accordingly, the lack of distinction between 
justice and injustice for the divine is interpreted to signify the idea of a natural law 
that lies under the way fusij appears to humans.852 Equally, then, justice signifies the 
underlying natural law of human existence and thus of ethics (hqoj).853 Thus, in 
general, Q eoj naturalised as justice signifies, in this interpretation, the universal idea 
of natural law intrinsic to fusij.  
 On the other hand, the general idea of justice as natural law also implies the 
potentiality of an intellectual grasp of natural law. Thus, Q eoj may also be 
characterised as a truthful relation between humans, utilising the intellect, and the 
essence of fusij as natural law. This, however, brings us to the final theme of the 
preconception of Heraclitus as a philosopher of nature, namely: the idea of log oj.  
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For the sake of expediency, this discussion of the log oj in Heraclitus (where 
he is preconceived of as a philosopher of nature) will only draw out the two primary 
themes pertinent to the log oj in brief and in general terms. Here, the notion of the 
log oj signifies, first, method and additionally, of proper method that discloses truth. 
 As the idea of method in general, two points of relevance present themselves: 
the need for method and the translation of log oj in methodological terms. The need 
for method, initially, arises insofar as humans fail to grasp the truth in being deceived 
by the senses.854 Moreover, the need for method arises insofar as nature likes to hide 
itself and only shows itself via indications.855 Thus, the origin of method lies in the 
problem of appearances.  
Equally, the point of origin for the need for method lies in the previously 
mentioned interpretation that unifies natural law for nature as a whole, including 
human nature. In this way, the dictum “know thyself” summons up the problem of 
method as the possibility of grasping one’s own nature and thus also grasping nature 
in general.856 Thus, the point of origin for the idea of method is twofold: an ethical 
ought and the requirement of certain knowledge – a requirement to comprehend the 
underlying coherence of nature.857 
Following this dual necessity for method, those that interpret Heraclitus to be 
a philosopher of nature, also translate the log oj in methodological terms. More 
explicitly, log oj tends to be translated as measure, reckoning, and proportion858, each 
of which has implicitly physical connotations. Elsewhere, log oj is translated as 
communication, or, common intelligibility and truthful disclosure.859 Here, the 
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translation fits conveniently into the pursuit of knowledge of natural law, or, how 
humans may know the unifying ground of nature.860 These translations of log oj 
within the framework of natural method are then born out in the resultant discussions 
of log oj throughout the texts. 
Log oj, accordingly, has the fully developed signification of a truthful or 
proper methodological system with regard to nature. Initially, this is posited in 
relation to log oj as wisdom: the grasping of the one, or universal unity.861 
Furthermore, log oj is also interpreted to signify the underlying coherence of 
nature862; as both knowledge of the essence of nature and the corresponding natural 
law intrinsic to nature.863 In this way, log oj is associated with both the notions of 
Q eoj and pur.864 As such, log oj signifies knowledge of the essence, ground and truth 
of nature as a unified whole.865 
Log oj, as such, is in one sense the essential character of nature: its truth. On 
the other hand, the truth of nature belongs intrinsically to the intellect, or, reasoning in 
relation to nature grounded upon a proper methodological system. Thus, log oj in this 
sense signifies wisdom: the truthful disclosure of nature as a unified and coherent 
unity in which becoming is actualised according to natural law.866 This, in fact, is the 
general consensus reached throughout the texts referred to thus far. 
Overall, then, the interpretative tendency that views Heraclitus as a 
philosopher of nature can be seen to extract three primary themes from the fragments. 
1. Nature is a unified whole that, 2. operates according to natural law, and finally, 3. 
log oj is the proper method of disclosing the essence and ground of fusij. Thus, 
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log oj is the ground of the veracity of the first two themes. In the process, the notion 
of Q eoj is either watered down or explained away in natural terms. Moreover, the 
possibility of any non-natural themes is dismissed without question. As such, any 
religious reading of the fragments is restricted to the slim chance that for Heraclitus 
the natural universe takes up some quasi-religious meaning, i.e., the universe or nature 
itself is worthy of awe and worship. 
 
Heraclitus as a Theologian: 
The task of outlining the interpretation of Heraclitus preconceived of as a theologian 
is, for the most part, straightforward insofar as this interpretative tendency utilises the 
notion of Q eoj as a hermeneutical key to understand the fragments. In this, the task is 
also made easier insofar as utilising Q eoj as a hermeneutical key produces a much 
clearer and concise interpretational structure of the fragments in comparison to the 
notion of fusij as nature. 
 The point of origin for the interpretation of Heraclitus as a theologian lies in 
the general notion of Q eoj. Here, fragment 32 plays a pivotal role, and as such, is 
worth quoting in full: “that which alone is wise is one; it is willing and unwilling to be 
called by the name of Zeus.” This fragment is of primary importance insofar as it is 
interpreted as forming the general notion of Q eoj as an intelligent agent or force that 
operates in fusij, but also in some sense, stands outside of fusij as a unifying 
ground.867 In this, the general notion of Q eoj forms a flexible conceptual unity of the 
primary themes given within the fragments. As a general notion, then, Q eoj is given 
various essential characteristics, such as: the ground of time868, in the cosmos but also 
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beyond the cosmos as a blueprint or plan869, in the element pur but also the creative 
force of pur870, called Zeus (life) but also that which steers life871, in fusij as justice 
which also binds fusij from without872, and finally, is in the kosm oi (heavenly 
bodies) but is not merely the cosmos.873 Upon the basis of this flexible utilisation of 
Q eoj the interpretation proceeds through Q eoj into the primary themes of Heraclitus’ 
fragments: pur, arc h, justice and log oj. 
 However, these primary themes are only entered into upon the basis of a 
discussion of the relationship between Q eoj and hqoj anqrwpw: the character of 
being of humans. In this, all of the interpreters are in agreement about three points: 1. 
The being of humans. 2. The character of Q eoj in comparison. 3. The potential 
relation between humans and Q eoj. 
 The first point is that Heraclitus very clearly argues that everyday life, and 
thus the hqoj/fusij of humans, is to be mortal and flawed.874 Some attributes of 
humans as such are: ignorance and delusion875, fallibility876, indiscriminate, foolish 
and evil.877  Kahn provides this argument in its most general scope as: “the underlying 
preconception (about fusij in Heraclitus) is a basic antithesis between the divine and 
humans… Human nature is thus essentially characterised by mortality and 
fallibility.”878 Equally, the de-anthropomorphic tendencies of Heraclitus’ notion of the 
divine are interpreted to reinforce this point.879 
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 In comparison, then, the divine is characterised as: discerning (nouj) and wise 
(sofia),880 just and good,881 as ever-living pur,882 lightning,883 and finally as the 
log oj (truthful discourse).884 In this, it is noticeable that the attributes of the divine 
are both personal (in reference to a sentient being) and furthermore, ethical. Thus, the 
primary signification of these attributes of the divine emphasise the sentient and 
personal in direct opposition to a mechanical idea of nature. In other words, this 
interpretation views Q eoj as an entity of sorts with personal qualities and attributes. 
 The third point of agreement is the potential divinity of humans, or, the divine 
soul of humans as sentient beings. Various fragments referring to the inherent quality 
of the human hqoj/fusij as pur are utilised to support this argument, such as Fr: 36, 
43, 77, 117, and 118. However, it is fragment 119 that stands out as the basis for this 
interpretation, translated as: human character is our d aim wn.885 Here, the word hqoj is 
translated, as with ethics, to signify the most proper or highest good. Likewise, the 
term d aim wn is translated as divine like-ness886, soul887, and divine guardianship.888 
As a result, fragment 119 reads something like this: the highest possibility of human 
existence is to be found in our divine-likeness, or, our adherence to the divine. 
 The hermeneutical key of Q eoj and the hqoj of humans are then utilised to 
interpret the primary themes of Heraclitus’ fragments: pur, arc h, dike and log oj. In 
this, the notion of Q eoj constitutes not only a hermeneutical key, but furthermore, an 
integral unifying focal point for each theme. 
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 Starting with pur, we find that the highest expression or meaning of pur is 
Q eoj.889 From this highest point, of pur aeixwon, the meanings of pur descend 
towards the physical in layers: as aiqhr (soul), to the remotest layers of air (aiqhr), 
to dark heat stuff, and then finally, to its common usage as the element fire.890 As 
such, pur is a  term that has as its primary meaning Q eoj, that then is also the ground 
of the soul, the cosmos, and in turn, the elemental. Moreover, pur is thus also given 
unity from with the notion of Q eoj wherein Q eoj is the ground and that which binds 
all of its meanings together. In this respect, pur is also the primal form of the cosmos 
and the creative force operating within fusij.891 Q eoj finally, may also be called 
pur-zwon (soul life), the intelligence that steers and reveals all things through all 
things.892 
 Accordingly, the notion of arc h is constituted as a personal attribute of the 
divine. In this, the idea of Q eoj serves as a non-physical ground of fusij. Q eoj, then, 
is an arc h that operates in fusij without being contained by fusij. As such, arc h 
as Q eoj is that which surrounds and binds fusij and thus grounds fusij as a unified 
whole.893 Equally, Q eoj as arc h is interpreted to signify guidance, steering and the 
intelligent agency that is at work in the processes of becoming, thus providing 
becoming with an ordered unified ground.894 This is also called justice in the 
fragments. 
 Q eoj, then, is interpreted to have the attribute of justice ( d ikaiosunh). Herein, 
the absolute goodness and wisdom of Q eoj guarantees the ‘justice’ (universal 
ordering) of the processes of becoming. Thus, in this sense, justice does not imply an 
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impersonal natural law, but rather, an eternal guarantor of the ethical and good 
character of fusij.895  
 Finally, in turning to the notion of log oj, this interpretation also characterises 
the log oj as an attribute of Q eoj. In this way, the log oj may be viewed as both 
intrinsic to fusij and separable from fusij as the notion of the intellect (nouj).896 
The log oj, as such, can be characterised as the unity of the following: wisdom, truth, 
divine revelation897, the eternal898, the proper of thinking899, and finally, as the 
structure of reality as it is shown to be in truthful discourse.900 
 Overall, the preconception of Heraclitus as a theologian results in a unification 
of the primary themes of the fragments under the concept of Q eoj. In this, Heraclitus 
is revealed to be a radical philosophical theologian: an oracular thinker901 for whom, 
as with Socrates later, the problem of philosophy is characterised by the questioning 
of the hqoj of human existence in relation to the divine902, and through the divine to 
the potential in humans for wisdom: to grasp the truth of fusij. 
 Unfortunately, this preconception of Heraclitus’ thinking has the tendency to 
be subsumed under metaphysics as natural theology. This tendency goes hand in hand 
with the assumption that Q eoj, as a non-physical ground, is identical with Being 
itself. For instance, both Hegel and Nietzsche interpret Heraclitus’ notion of Q eoj to 
signify Being903, thus integrating Heraclitus into the metaphysical tradition. This 
assumption, I would argue, is derived from the question of where it stands with Q eoj, 
if in this sense, Q eoj is constituted as a non-physical ground of the physical that is 
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also an entity. Here, in the philosophical tradition, the only concept that has the 
identical attributes is Being: thus we find the identity of Q eoj and Being. 
 
D. Parmenides: 
The overview of how Parmenides is preconceived and thus interpreted will differ 
slightly from the previous discussions. This is made necessary due to the fact that, 
initially at least, all three interpretative trends are in agreement about the general 
content and conceptual themes in Parmenides poem. In this, the differences of the 
interpretations occur later, in the arguments about the significance of these themes, 
and the details found therein. As such, I will outline the general themes extracted from 
the poem, showing the points of consensus and the origins of differentiation. From 
this outline, I will then briefly show how the poem is interpreted in three differing 
ways and the logical conclusions of these ways of interpretation. 
 
Themes of Consensus: 
There is a consensus among interpreters of Parmenides that the poem contains four 
primary themes: logic, est in, the identity of est in and thinking, and finally, d oxa. 
 The first of these, logic, signifies the consensus among scholars that 
Parmenides thinking prioritises logic and utilises logic as a method of attaining truth. 
In this, whatever it is that Parmenides seeks (for there is disagreement on this issue), 
he does so logically, utilising clear logical arguments to prove or disprove claims. In 
general, Parmenides logical thinking can be shown in three ways. First, logic is the 
fundamental principle of Parmenides thinking; he constitutes thinking as founded 
upon truth statements.904 Equally, it is claimed, Parmenides consistently utilises 
logical form in arguments: if x and y, they y = x or nothing at all. Furthermore, 
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Parmenides is interpreted to be consistent in the use of arguments in the form of 
mutually exclusive logical possibilities.905 Thus, in general, there is an agreement that 
Parmenides thinking is founded upon a principle of logical predication that follows a 
consistent form.  
 Even in the case where interpreters are in disagreement as to the ultimate aim 
of Parmenides’ poem, there is agreement that these aims are pursued logically. For 
instance, where Parmenides is viewed as a philosopher of nature, we find that the 
poem posits two logical possibilities: It Is (exists) and Is Not (non-existence).906 
Likewise, the argument in the fragments against the ‘Is Not’ is interpreted as the 
logical necessity of non-existence.907 On the other hand, where Parmenides is viewed 
as a theologian, we find his thinking characterised as bearing the divine log oj – as 
logic.908 Further, the divine is interpreted here to be thought of solely through logic.909 
Finally, as a theologian, Parmenides is also viewed as utilising the logical form of ‘via 
negativia’.910 
 The second point of consensus is that est in is the term upon which 
Parmenides thinking revolves. Here, three potential significations are assigned to 
est in throughout the various interpretations: as the copula (est in),911 as a derivative 
of einai (to be),912 and finally, its potential reference to ousia (Being).913 The 
disagreement arises, herein, as to which signification should be given priority, and 
furthermore, what the fundamental character of these significations is: existence or 
Being. 
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 The third point of consensus is that Parmenides identifies est in with thinking. 
In this, it is agreed that the identity of est in and thought is the primary 
methodological theme of the fragments; as the ground of the veracity of logic,914 as 
the ground of knowing via logic915, and finally, the ground of dismissing the senses.916 
 The fourth and final point of consensus, regarding d oxa, is the strongest point 
of consensus insofar as there is almost no disagreement as to what d oxa signifies. In 
this, there are four agreed upon themes of d oxa: 1. In general, d oxa is interpreted as 
the phenomenal world.917 Herein, the phenomenal world is associated with the senses; 
and their illusory character,918 the appearance of opposites and change,919 with the 
structure of mortal consciousness,920 and finally, with the untrustworthy nature of the 
senses in relation to knowing.921 2. D oxa is also constituted as the world of mortals: 
with mortal existence.922 The world of mortals, then, is associated with human life; 
belief, opinion and worldview.923 3. The realm of d oxa is characterised by confusion, 
or, the combination and mixture of the two ways of truth: two-headed.924 This is based 
upon fragment 6: “… that way along which wander mortals knowing nothing, two-
headed… by whom To Be and Not To Be are regarded as the same and not the 
same…” 4. The final aspect of d oxa agreed upon is that d oxa is essentially a mortal 
and thus flawed way of thinking that serves as the ground of the idea of fusij as 
becoming.925 In this, d oxa is characterised as thinking that posits difference,926 
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connected with the naming of things,927 the determination of things as discrete and 
individual entities,928 and thus finally, that becoming and change are real.929 
 
Natural Philosophy: 
In preconceiving Parmenides to be a natural philosopher, this interpretative tendency 
constitutes the themes of the poem as physical. In this, two primary pre-interpretative 
themes are posited: 1. What Parmenides refers to can be called physical reality, and 2. 
the key terms of the fragments therefore must necessarily have physical significations. 
As such, the aim of this overview is twofold; showing how key terms are 
translated/interpreted to have physical meanings and further, revealing the logical 
conclusion of this interpretation. 
 This interpretative tendency focuses on two features of Parmenides poem: the 
notion of logic and the term est in. Initially, the notion of logic is interpreted to 
signify the problem of method, which moreover, may be constituted as 
epistemology.930 In this, Parmenides logical method is viewed as operating primarily 
within epistemic concerns, or, the possibility of knowledge.931 Likewise, the identity 
of thinking and est in is given the character of a logical and epistemic concern as the 
correspondence of what something is and thought.932 As such, the equivalence of 
est in and log oj reveals the epistemic structure of knowing.933 Finally, then, logic 
expresses an epistemic argument against the validity of the senses.934 Thus, in this 
interpretation, the logical method of Parmenides is characterised as an 
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epistemological position as such: anything thought is necessarily a real object, and 
can be known as existent in thought.935 On this basis, Parmenides is compared with 
Descartes and Cartesian scepticism.936 
 The term est in, in general, is viewed as signifying the idea of existence,937 or, 
an existential: unrestricted existence.938 As such, three primary characteristics of 
est in are discussed: as the copula, as presence, and as eternal physical presence. In 
the first case, est in is translated as the copula (is). Herein, the primary attribute of the 
copula is argued to signify “it exists”.939 Additionally, as the copula, est in may also 
mean “It is x (something)”.940 However, this ‘x’ is assumed to be something real in 
the sense of something physical and thus existent. Thus the second, and broader, sense 
of the copula is linked to the notion of the real, that is: a real object.941  
Equally, est in is associated with existence as physical presence. In this way, 
the non-existence of something (x) is equivalent to the necessity of the non-presence 
of x.942 Accordingly, the ‘it is’ (existence) of x is equivalent to the necessity of the 
physical presence of x. As such, est in is characterised here as existence: the physical 
presence of an entity. Finally, the notion of est in is given an a-temporal character (as 
in Aristotle’s notion of ousia) as always-presence.943 Thus, the notion of est in as 
physical existence culminates in the idea of the necessity of an entity and reality as a 
whole, being always physically present.944 
The insistence, in this interpretation of Parmenides, then leads to two strange 
and paradoxical conclusions. 1. The physical universe is one undifferentiated whole, 
                                               
935
 Kirk, Op. cit. p.247 
936
 Ibid. p.241 
937
 Jaeger, Op. cit. p.90 
938
 Taran, Op. cit. pp.124-5 
939
 Kirk, Op. cit. pp.245-6 
940
 Ibid. p.246 
941
 Ibid. pp.246-7 
942
 Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, pp.160-1, 164 
943
 Nietzsche, Op. cit. pp.122-3 
944
 Ibid. p.123 
 257 
like a well-rounded sphere.945 This is the case insofar as est in is interpreted to mean 
the physically real and est in is, in fragment eight, described as uncreated, non-
divisible, and an inviolable uniform whole.946 2. Additionally, the physical universe is 
disclosed in est in as unchanging.947 Thus, if est in is interpreted to mean physical 
presence the inevitable result is that the universe must be conceived of as one big 
undifferentiated and unchanging mass: a single frozen entity. 
 
Theology: 
Turning to the second interpretative tendency there is to be found, I would suggest, an 
inversion of the problem posed by interpreting Parmenides as a philosopher of nature. 
The point of origin for this interpretative tendency is the notion of Q eoj. In this, it can 
be shown that Parmenides’ poem and the themes therein get interpreted through and 
out of the idea of the divine. As such, this discussion will provide an overview of the 
way the themes of logic, est in and the divine lead up to the inversion of the naturalist 
interpretation. 
 Logic, in this sense, is initially framed by an equivocation of the way of truth 
and the way of the goddess. Herein, logic in general is characterised as divine 
revelation.948 Equally, logic (as log oj) is equated with the divine itself: the divine is 
thought via logic and thus, is logic.949 As such, logic is the realm of the divine: the 
realm of truth and thinking.950 Finally, then, insofar as the divine is log oj, divine 
revelation logic, it follows then that the philosopher is a human who has sought out 
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the divine, who has had the truth revealed to them by the divine,951 and thus, their 
thinking has validity under the auspices of the divine.952 In this way, the interpretation 
of logic as divine, or divine revelation, posits an inherent connection between 
religious revelation and philosophy.953 Equally, logic can be constituted as truthful 
discourse.954 Therefore, logic in this sense has the character of onto-theology (the 
correspondence of truth and Q eoj) wherein the truth of est in is identical with Q eoj. 
This onto-theology is developed further in the notion of est in. 
 The interpretation of est in, here, is twofold. The primary sense of est in is 
being and the second, it follows, is existence. The primary question, with regard to 
est in, is whether Being and Q eoj are identical.955 Insofar as the identity of Q eoj and 
logic has been posited already, and the poem posits the identity of thinking and est in, 
the answer will be in the affirmative. The argument is presented in this way: 1. The 
divine is truth and thinking.956 2. Thinking and est in are identical. 3. Therefore, the 
truth of est in is identical with the divine. 
 From this point, the interpretation of Parmenides as a theologian finds itself 
able to disclose the remaining aspects of the divine within the poem. The first is to 
identify the divine with being. In this, the divine is viewed as the primary meaning of 
est in in a non-physical sense as being-itself. As such, the divine is identical with the 
real as an idea, and furthermore, as the idea of Reality.957 Accordingly, the divine has 
a secondary sense as the being of beings, that is: of existing things.958 As such, the 
divine is also the being of physical things. A third attribute of the divine is then added 
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in the idea of justice.959 As justice, the divine has the character of binding, or, that 
which enforces necessity, i.e., the eternal singularity and unity of reality.960  The 
divine, as such, holds reality as a whole in bondage as limit.961 Finally, then, the 
divine is conceived to be the supreme monotheist God that is also the one reality.962 
 At this point it becomes patently clear that the inevitable conclusion of this 
interpretation of Parmenides as a theologian is the identity of reality as an entity 
called God. For, if God is reality, then equally, everything is God. Moreover, if God is 
eternally unchanging, fixed and undifferentiated, then so also is reality a static 
singularity. As such, it becomes clear that this interpretation is an inversion of the 
interpretation of Parmenides as a philosopher of nature, for in the first reality is a 
singular physical id-entity and in the second, reality is a singular divine id-entity. So 
much for the interpretation of Parmenides as either a philosopher of nature or 
theologian! 
 
Metaphysics: 
There is, however, a third interpretative trend which for the sake of convenience I will 
call metaphysical. This third trend is similar to the previous theological one, but also 
introduces a subtle differentiation that makes more sense of Parmenides thinking. In 
the first instance, this interpretation posits the same divide between truth and opinion, 
or, the divine and human opinion.963 Likewise, this interpretation also follows that of 
theology, arguing that truth is a property of the divine and divine revelation.964 
Finally, this interpretation also corresponds to the theological in the assertion that 
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Parmenides provides being with the attributes of non-generated, indestructible, whole 
and so on…965 
 However, the notions of est in, justice and Q eoj are given subtly different 
significations with radically differing implications. First, the notion of est in as being 
is viewed to signify the being of beings rather than Being-in-general, and thus the 
divine.966 As such, the concept of the divine is given the primary character of justice. 
Herein, the divine attribute of justice is that which binds est in (the being of beings) 
from some external standpoint.967 In other words, the divine is not being in the sense 
of est in: either physical presence or the being of entities. The divine, rather, is a 
primal God; creator, governor of all things, and first of all she devised love.968 
 The radically different implication of this interpretation, then, is that it escapes 
the problem of the identity of the divine and est in. Furthermore, this interpretation 
also makes sense of Parmenides’ insistence that est in does not come into being, nor 
change. For, if est in signifies the being of beings, as Hegel asserts, Parmenides has 
moved into the realm of the ideal.969 The ideal, as such, signifies the being of a being, 
or, the unchangeable essence of an entity that makes it determinable as such. Thus, in 
this respect, we can posit the always-presence of the idea of “X” and its being as the 
same without denying changes in appearances. Rather, the priority, or, reality of a 
thing is determined by its being; its character as present. Kant’s example of 100 thaler 
provides much the same argument.970 
 In this interpretation, however, a complete or conclusive development of the 
divine does not eventuate. The question remains, herein, of how the divine may be 
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characterised if it is not a universal entity, nor identifiable with est in. The notion of 
justice, standing outside reality contains too strong an implication of a super-physical 
entity; a supernatural being. Crucially, the question must also be asked as to how the 
divine enters into reality without becoming subsumed into est in as an entity with 
being? Unfortunately, at this point, a metaphysical interpretation tends to arise as the 
conclusion. Hegel’s interpretation exemplifies this trend insofar as Q eoj ends up 
signifying absolute or pure being, which then subsumes est in within itself.971 In the 
process, the radical implications of the interpretation dissipate as again the divine 
unifies Being and Non-Being as the same.972 This is why I have name this 
interpretation ‘metaphysics’, for it results in the same onto-theological unification of 
Q eoj and Being. The question remains: How does it stand with Q eoj? 
 
23. A Brief Excursus: Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Pre-Socratics as a 
Problem 
There are two justifications for this excursus into Heidegger’s thinking. First, insofar 
as Heidegger’s thinking is central to the thesis it is necessary to provide a discussion 
of his interpretation of the Pre-Socratics as exemplifying the phenomenological way 
of interpretation to be utilised. Moreover, it is necessary insofar as I will attempt to 
break with Heidegger’s thinking in relation to the notion of Q eoj given in his 
interpretation of the Pre-Socratics. 
 This attempt to break out of Heidegger’s interpretation is brought about by the 
phenomenon sought, Religion. For, the phenomenon of Religion is not addressed 
properly in Heidegger’s thinking. Furthermore, the task is that of showing how 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics constitutes a problem with regard to 
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the phenomenon of Religion. In this, the primary question is: where does it stand with 
Q eoj in Heidegger’s interpretation? Moreover, the question is also: what is the 
relation between being-human and Q eoj in Heidegger’s interpretation? 
 The argument I will provide, with regard to these two questions, is that 
Heidegger poses the solution to both within the notion of the truth of being. This 
Heideggerian solution, then, becomes a problem for this phenomenological 
investigation insofar as it expresses a monomania for being and, furthermore, fails to 
address the phenomenon of Religion as it belongs to being-human. For Heidegger, 
instead, the problem of Q eoj stands in relation to the question of Being (for-itself, in 
general). 
 To show how this is the case, this section will place Heidegger’s interpretation 
of the Pre-Socratics within the context of his quest for Being and thus, show how the 
interpretation of Q eoj eventuates in a subsumption under Being and the problem of 
the truth of Being. As such, this section will contain four phases: An overview of 
Heidegger’s quest for Being, The way Heidegger interprets the Pre-Socratics in such a 
way as to subsume the notion of Q eoj under Being, the way in which Heidegger 
conceives Q eoj and being-human within the question of the truth of Being, and 
finally, the implications of this interpretation in relation to the phenomenon of 
Religion. 
 
A. The Quest for Being: 
In general, Heidegger’s monomania for being can be viewed as a desire to overcome 
the tradition of metaphysics, and likewise, the prioritisation of the physical sciences 
and technology that (in Heidegger’s view) goes hand in hand with metaphysics. Here, 
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Heidegger often calls the metaphysical tradition “Western thinking”, the occurrence 
of the forgetting of being, and the withdrawal of being. 
 For Heidegger, the question of being, in my view, formed a two-phased 
approach. Initially, Heidegger posed the question of the sense of being, or, Dasein’s 
sense of being. In this, the question of Being is entered into via the question of how 
Dasein understands Being. This is also the question: what is the Being of Dasein that 
is the foundation of understanding being. Heidegger’s solution, expressed in 
simplified terms, lies in the de-constructive progression of the existential analytic 
from concern to care and then temporality. Thus, the first phase of Heidegger’s quest 
for Being concludes with the finding that Dasein’s being is temporality (finitude) and, 
as such, Dasein’s sense of Being can be called Time. However, the quest for Being is 
not reached in this conclusion (of Being and Time), for, the quest is quintessentially to 
disclose Being-in-general (Being-for-itself). 
 The second phase of this quest, often called the “turn” (kehre), then pursues 
this question of Being-for-itself. On the basis of the first phase, this turn pursues the 
quest for being via such questions as: how does being communicate to humans and, 
how does being show itself? The turn, however, is also marked by a turning back to 
the pre-Socratic thinkers, behind the metaphysical thinking of Aristotle and Plato, 
albeit via thinkers like Nietzsche, evidenced by the large number of texts/lectures 
devoted to these themes in the latter part of Heidegger’s academic career. Thus, it 
may be asserted that a large part of this turn to the quest for Being-for-itself operates 
within and through Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratic philosophers. 
 However, before providing an overview of Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
Pre-Socratics, it is worthwhile to take one last look at Heidegger’s quest for being via 
his preconception of Being-for-itself. Herein, three pivotal themes are evident. 
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 As mentioned previously, the question of being for Heidegger is exemplified 
in the question of why there is something rather than nothing. Equally, this question is 
posited as a phenomenological problem of that which shows itself as itself. Herein, 
the question of being is posed as the problem of entities in their being, or, presence in 
its ground. Thus, in the first instance, the question of Being-for-itself is determined in 
advance as essentially the problem of disclosing the ground of presence. 
 Second, the quest for Being is determined an advance to be restricted to 
ontology as a way of thinking. In this, the problem may then be constituted as the 
possibility of philosopher proper, as thinking that discloses the truth of being. As 
such, the primary character of the quest for being given herein, is framed as a 
philosophical hqoj, or, a philosophical life within the truth of Being. Thus, the second 
characteristic of Heidegger’s preconception of Being-for-itself is that it is somehow 
lived, i.e., disclosed in a truthful philosophical life. Accordingly, this preconception of 
Being-for-itself posits a human potential to live in the truth of Being (for itself) 
distinct from being-for-humans. 
 Finally, the third preconception of Being-for-itself combines the previous two 
within the problem of the truth of being. In this, Being-for-itself is constituted as the 
true ground (truth) of presence, thought (presented) by a living in the truth of being. 
Thus, the truth of Being-for-itself as the ground of presence is conjoined with a 
thinking (living) within the truth of being as the identical truth (the identity of truth). 
As such, when Heidegger turns to the Pre-Socratic thinkers, the sole question asked is 
that of the truth of Being. 
 In this way, the context of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics may 
be characterised as a monomania for Being. This monomania gets expressed in three 
ways: 1. For Heidegger, the only legitimate question of philosophy is being. 2. Every 
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possible subject of philosophical questioning thus operates as secondary to, and a 
derivative of, ontology. 3. Moreover, Heidegger refuses to acknowledge the 
legitimacy or possibility of any other philosophical question other than that of being. 
For example, in A Letter on Humanism, Heidegger refutes any possibility of thinking 
about hqoj except in relation to being. Likewise, in turning to Q eoj as a question in 
the Pre-Socratics, we will find that Heidegger conceived the notion of the divine 
solely in relation to being. Thus, the monomania for being shows itself as a refusal, or 
inability, to think anything except being and except the task of thinking everything 
through being. Therefore, in effect, the monomania for being signifies the restriction 
of truth to being: the only truth is being. 
 
B. The Subsumption of Q e oj under Being: 
Two texts stand out as examples of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics: 
Heraclitus Seminar and Parmenides. These texts, as such, will serve as the content of 
this overview of the subsumption of Q eoj under being. Herein, two features will be 
sought out from the texts. First, what is Heidegger’s general interpretation of the 
meaning of Q eoj, and furthermore, what are the attributes given to Q eoj therein? In 
both texts, it will be shown, Heidegger views Q eoj within the quest for Being and 
interprets the fragments accordingly. 
 The Heraclitus Seminar begins with, and stays with, questions arising out of 
fragment 64, translated as: “Lightning steers the universe.”973 In this, Heidegger poses 
two questions: 1. What does pant a signify; every individual thing, or, everything in 
general? 2. What is the connection between pant a and lightning/pur?974 From these 
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opening questions the seminar then moves into a general discussion of various 
fragments through which the connection of pant a and lightning is construed as the 
“coming forth into appearance”, or, the ground of presence.975 Herein, the notion of 
the divine is first mentioned. The divine is conceived of as belonging to that which 
is.976 The notion of the divine, as such, is given as belonging, in some fashion, to 
Being.  
Later in the seminar, the discussion turns to the connection between 
everything and lightning via the theme of being in relation to everything.977 In this, 
the relatedness of being and everything is exemplified by the question of the gods in 
relation to humans for the Greeks.978 Accordingly, the question becomes: where and 
how do gods and humans belong (together)?979 As such, this discussion concludes, the 
gods and humans belong together with respect to pant a (all that is) as understanding 
being.980 In other words, the notion of the divine is that of entities with being981 whose 
being, furthermore, is that of understanding being.982 In this way, the notion of the 
divine signifies entities who relate to being in a certain way, eg., as understanding 
being. Thus, in the first instance, the divine is determined as a type of entity, and 
therefore subsumed under being. 
As an entity, the divine is then characterised as having three primary 
attributes: being-understanding, being immortal and lightning that steers. The seminar 
deals with the attributes of lightning that steers first. In this case, the discussion of the 
divine is provided via the initial question of the relation of “all that is” and lightning. 
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Herein, “all that is” is determined as becoming: the coming into being and thus 
presence of everything.983 This coming into presence is related to lightning wherein 
lightning is constituted as that which brings to presence.984 Lightning, as such, has 
two primary attributes: of allowing becoming to be present, and of showing the 
presence of becoming. With regard to the latter, lightning signifies the notion of light: 
of revealing that which is. On the other hand, lightning is also interpreted to signify 
steering: the ground of becoming.985  
The first sense of lightning, as ground, is discussed via steering. In this, 
steering is characterised as guidance, control, and intervention.986 The phenomenon of 
steering is then differentiated into violent and non-violent, or, human and divine 
steering.987 As such, the divine is given the attributes of non-calculative, non-coercive 
steering: of ruling effortlessly.988 The divine, therein, is determined as an entity for 
whom steering (origination of becoming) is achieved without force or violence. Thus, 
the character of steering belonging to the divine is in some fashion akin to the law of 
fusij without reference to material cause. 
Accordingly, the following discussion takes up lightning in its second sense as 
the log oj, the disclosure of that which is in its unity.989 In this, lightning and pur are 
given an association with the log oj, in Heidegger’s terms, a movement from the 
log oj to pur.990 Throughout the seminar, this correlation of lightning and log oj is 
repeated, and, with each repetition Heidegger points out the divine attributes 
therein.991 
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In turn, the characterisation of the divine as lightning in both senses turns 
implicitly to the question of thinking: of entities that think the ground and are also the 
ground of all that is.992 In this, the discussion provided attempts to interpret Heraclitus 
as a pre-metaphysical thinker via a post-metaphysical standpoint. Herein, the onto-
theological character of Being is bracketed off, resulting in the question of the arc h 
and its signification as that which stands under. As such, the pre/post-metaphysical 
conceptualisation of the arc h is determined as understanding, or, the entity who 
thinks.993 Thus, the implied conclusion is that, for Heraclitus, the question of the arc h 
and log oj refers to thinking: the being of entities who think. The culmination of this 
interpretation, therefore, is a distinction between being-human and being-divine. 
This differentiation between humans and the divine is given initially as the 
difference between mortals and immortals upon the basis of fragment 62. Herein, the 
divine is given the attribute of immortality, which somehow is in relation to the death 
of humans.994 As such, the divine is characterised as being in time as undying, but 
also conjoined with humans as having a relation to being as understanding.995 
Therefore, Heidegger states, immortality is the way the divine understands itself in its 
being.996 Thus, the differentiation within time of the divine and human ways of being 
results in the notion of the divine as a type of entity for whom existence is understood 
as perpetual. 
The belonging together of the divine and humans provides a third 
characterisation of the divine. In this, both humans and the divine are determined as 
entities whose being is that of understanding being. In relation to the divine, then, the 
way of understanding is differentiated from the human. Herein, Heidegger dismisses 
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any claim that the divine is the identity of Being, but rather, is within being as log oj 
and light: as bringing to presence.997 Accordingly, the divine understanding of being 
is connected to its attribute of lightning and immortality. In the first case, the divine 
understanding is one of steering: the divine understands steering without violence. 
Likewise, the understanding of the divine is that of light, or, an understanding that 
reveals beings in their being. Finally, then, the divine understanding is also that of 
immortality; of a non-finite but within time, presenting of entities in their being. 
These are the attributes given to the divine in Heidegger’s interpretation of Heraclitus. 
Poignantly, the divine is determined as a type of entity with a way of being 
rather than being-for-itself. Moreover, the divine is determined as belonging together 
with humans insofar as both are beings that are being-understanding. As such, the 
distinction between the divine and humans lies within the realm of being-
understanding. This distinction only becomes evident in the problem of the truth of 
being. 
There are at this stage, as such, four propositions that belong to Heidegger’s 
notion of the divine. 1. The divine is an entity with being character. 2. The divine 
must then be determined as it shows itself within being. 3. The being of the divine 
shows itself as a way of understanding being that is distinct from the human. 4. 
Finally, the notion of the divine only has validity in an ontological sense as subsumed 
under the truth of being. 
In the text Parmenides, Heidegger provides a remarkably similar interpretation 
of Parmenides to that of Heraclitus. In this, the question of understanding is drawn out 
with greater emphasis with regard to the how of understanding rather than the 
relatedness of being human/divine to all that is. Accordingly, Heidegger takes 
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Parmenides’ way of truth to signify the way of the goddess, i.e., the way of being 
divine.998 As such, Heidegger interprets fragment 1 to signify nothing more or less 
than the general notion of being divine. Thus, in general, the way of being divine is 
the truth. In the context of the Heraclitus Seminar, then, it could be said that the way 
of being-divine is essentially the truthful understanding of being. 
Putting this aside for the moment, an overview of the text reveals that 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Parmenides emphasises the way in which the divine as a 
truthful understanding shows itself within being. This is precisely, for Heidegger, the 
realm of sub-divinities or the daemonic. Here, Heidegger provides three descriptions 
of the divine: the uncanny, the looking at being, and the pointing and indicating of 
being.  
The uncanny is determined as the extraordinary: that which surrounds and thus 
grounds the ordinary.999  In this, the uncanny shows itself as the ground of the 
ordinary and presents itself in the ordinary as the extra-ordinary.1000 In other words, 
the divine shows itself as gods: the ground of presence showing itself as present 
entities. Thus, the uncanny signifies the way in which being-for-itself shows itself in 
presence as the divine. 
Further, the realm of the daimonic is determined as the way the divine shows 
itself as shining into the ordinary: the emergence from concealment.1001 In this, 
Heidegger translates Q eoj, via etymological investigation, as “the looking one and the 
one who shines into”.1002 Thus, the way of being-divine as it shows itself may be 
characterised as the entity that shows beings in their being and shows being-itself. 
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Finally, the divine way of being is also determined as pointing and giving 
signs.1003 Herein, the divine shows itself as communicating to humans as the 
disclosure of the essential: being-human and being-for-itself. This determination of 
the divine, Heidegger argues, is a claim grounded in being-itself that shows being to 
humans in the log oj.1004 
Thus, overall, Heidegger’s determination of the divine way of being as it 
shows itself contains three arguments: 1. The divine is an entity whose way of being-
understanding discloses the essence of Being. 2. The divine way of disclosure of the 
essence of being is presented as the uncanny, the shining (light) and as indicating. 3. 
The divine is not being-itself, for the divine is grounded in being. In other words, the 
divine is subsumed under being as a type of entity whose being is that of 
understanding that discloses the essential. 
 
C. The Problem of the Truth of Being: 
Heidegger’s notion of truth is central to the way in which he preconceives and thus 
interprets the pre-Socratic thinkers. In this, three pivotal themes arise in Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the Pre-Socratics: truth as the truth of being, Q eoj as the truth of 
being, and, being-human as having the potential to grasp the truth of being. I will 
utilise Heidegger’s text Parmenides to evidence these themes. 
 In this text, Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides are conceived of as 
primordial thinkers.1005 In this, the Pre-Socratics are preconceived as thinkers who 
think the beginning, or, those who think being.1006 In thinking being, Heidegger 
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asserts, Parmenides attempts to think the essence of truth (aleqeia).1007 A leqeia, 
then, is loosely translated as unconcealment1008, a term then developed and 
determined over the following one hundred pages, via critical analyses of how the 
philosophical tradition has constituted the true and false. 
 The return to the question of the essence of truth, however, immediately brings 
to the fore a relation between the essence of truth and the divine. For, in the first 
instance, the looking that shows being (the outward showing itself of being) in 
unconcealment is the divine.1009 Likewise, the ground of the relation to beings, that 
which shows the truth of beings in their being, is the daimonic; translated as soul or 
the gods.1010  
The essence of truth is determined in two ways at this point. First, the essence 
of truth is inextricably tied to being. Moreover, that which shows itself as this truth of 
being is the divine: the daimonic and the divine as truth. In this way, Heidegger views 
the essence of being and the essence of truth to be bound together in the divine. 
Correspondingly, where the essence of truth and being are forgotten, so also does the 
divine withdraw.1011 As such, Heidegger states, the primordial essence of being is 
aleqeia; truth as unconcealment.1012 Thus, the essence of truth is determined as the 
truth of being. 
Returning to the point of origin for this text, the translation and interpretation 
of Parmenides poem, we find Heidegger providing an argument that the divine is the 
truth, and thus also, the truth of being. Herein, Heidegger determines Parmenides 
goddess to be the goddess ‘truth’. The goddess, however, is not a goddess to whom 
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the truth is entrusted, but rather, is truth the divinity.1013 As such, Heidegger’s initial 
formulation of the divine is somehow an entity with a way of being that is the truth of 
being as it shows itself (to humans). 
Later, Heidegger determines the divine within the context of the ground of a 
relation between entities and thinking.1014 Herein, the ground of this relation is 
characterised as the daimonic; as that which strikes the thinker and thus allows them 
to think otherwise than the ordinary.1015 The daimonic, as such, is the uncanny or the 
astounding.1016 The astounding, therein, is determined as the visibility of being.1017 
Moreover, the daimonic is the divine as it shows itself to humans as the pointing ones 
(entities), or, the way that, through the divinities, being shows itself.1018 
Equally, then, the divine as a concept is determined as that which offers the 
sight of being.1019 In this, the essential character of the divine is posited to be “the one 
who looks and who looks as the one emerging into presence… that in the look 
presents (itself) as the unconcealed.”1020 Heidegger then relates the divine to being-
human: humans are “that being that has the distinctive characteristic of being 
addressed by being itself, in such a way that… the uncanny itself, god, appears.”1021 
In the first instance, then, the notion of the divine signifies the truth of being. 
Furthermore, in the second case, the divine is determined as the appearance of Being-
itself as a revelation to humans. Thus, in Heidegger’s interpretation, the divine is not 
merely the truth of Being (as an understanding) but is also the appearance of Being-
itself for humans. 
                                               
1013
 Ibid. p.5 
1014
 Ibid. p.99 
1015
 Ibid. pp.99-101 
1016
 Ibid. p.101 
1017
 Ibid. p.101 
1018
 Ibid. p.102 
1019
 Ibid. p.102 
1020
 Ibid. p.104 
1021
 Ibid. p.104 
 274 
What, then, can be made of Heidegger’s idea of truth as discussed thus far? It 
is evident that Heidegger determines truth as the truth of being. However, this also 
means that truth is conceived of being-true, or, the notion of truth as a phenomenon of 
being. Furthermore, through the formulation of the divine, it can also be stated that 
the notion of truth signifies true-being, or, the id-entity of truth and being. Thus, in 
general, truth and being are identical, and shows itself to humans as an identity: the 
divine. 
Finally, the question must be asked: how does it stand with Q eoj in 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics? Heidegger states his argument in its 
clearest sense wherein he differentiates the Greek notion of the divine from the God 
of Christianity. Herein, Heidegger states, the fundamental essence of the Greek 
divinities consists in their origination out of the “presence” of “present” being.1022 In 
this, the divine is not conceived of as being-itself (onto-theology), but rather, as 
being-itself looking and emerging into beings (for humans).1023 
Herein, the notion of the divine is at once not being-itself, and also being-itself 
in the way it shows itself as the truth and as entities who communicate the truth. How 
can this distinction be made? The solution Heidegger offers is something like this: 
Q eoj is and is not Being-itself solely in relation to humans. In other words, the Truth 
of being is called Q eoj or Zeus by humans and via the way being-itself shows itself to 
humans. Accordingly, being-itself communicates to humans as the divine. Thus, 
Heidegger’s final formulation of the divine is, alike to Heraclitus, that Being is 
willing and unwilling to be called the divine. 
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D. Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Pre-Socratics as a Problem 
Reflecting on Heidegger’s formulation of Q eoj provides three poignant problems for 
a phenomenology of Religion. 1. Does Heidegger impose the concept of being upon 
the Pre-Socratics? 2. Is Heidegger’s subsumption of Q eoj under being valid? 3. Is 
Heidegger’s claim that the divine is not a religious concept for the Greeks a valid 
one?1024 
 
1. When Heidegger’s interpretation of the Pre-Socratics is compared with the 
fragments, the question arises as to whether the monomania for Being effects an 
invalid reading. For instance, can Anaximander’s notion of apeiron properly called 
being? Moreover, in making this argument, does not Heidegger follow Aristotle’s 
commentary and metaphysical preconception of the Pre-Socratics? In this case, it can 
be said that Heidegger’s monomania for being is nothing more than metaphysics, 
albeit a non-physicist metaphysics. Accordingly, the question to be asked is whether 
Heraclitus utilises the term being in any technical sense? With regard to Parmenides 
also, a poignant question arises: what can Heidegger do with the divine revelation that 
non-being (the privative absence of being – the otherwise than being) is given the 
character of truth even if it cannot be thought or known. It would appear that insofar 
as Heidegger agrees with Hegel; that being and nothing are the same, he also 
contradicts Parmenides basic logical distinction of being and not-being, thus falling 
into a metaphysical formulation of a unifying ground. There are enough problems, 
here, to show that Heidegger’s monomania for being does indeed affect an invalid or 
improper reading of the Pre-Socratics. 
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 This question leads to a secondary problem with regard to Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the Pre-Socratics, namely: how different is Heidegger’s interpretation 
to Aristotle’s? They both acknowledge only being. Equally, they both determine the 
divine as the highest expression of being. The only difference to be found, herein, is 
that while Aristotle determines the ground to be ousia, Heidegger determines the 
ground as aleqeia. Thus, for Aristotle, the divine is the first cause/highest substance. 
For Heidegger, the divine is the truth of being that shows itself as an entity or entities. 
 
2. Is the subsumption of the divine under being valid? For the pre-Socratic thinkers, as 
all the interpreters and Heidegger agree, the essential attributes of the divine are found 
in such notions as the arc h, truth and justice. For those who interpret the Pre-
Socratics as pre-metaphysical thinkers these terms signify: Being, log oj and first 
cause. Note, then, that for Heidegger, these notions are formulated in metaphysical 
terms:  arc h = being and log oj = aleqeia. Thus, the question of the validity of the 
subsumption of Q eoj under being parallels the problem of translating/interpreting 
these attributes of the divine. Heidegger, in this respect, provides an entirely 
metaphysical translation of the terms attributed to the divine. Moreover, Heidegger’s 
preconception of being as it is utilised in relation to the Pre-Socratics is essentially the 
idea of being as unifying ground, or, the ground of presence – another metaphysical 
conception.  
 The critical question, then, is whether Heidegger and others are correct in 
presuming the identity of arc h and being, or, the idea of arc h as a (metaphysical) 
unifying ground of presence? I would suggest that, insofar as this metaphysical 
preconception of the Pre-Socratics has been shown to result in inconsistent and 
patently absurd formulations of reality, the id-entity of arc h, Q eoj and being must be 
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dismissed as a valid reading of Pre-Socratic thought. Thus, we must conclude that the 
subsumption of the divine under being is also invalid. 
 
3. Is the Pre-Socratic notion of Q e oj non-religious? The solution to this question is 
only found insofar as the notion of Religion is formulated in advance.1025 Insofar as 
Heidegger provides no adequate phenomenological determination of the meaning of 
Religion his argument has no proper ground nor evidence1026. Furthermore, insofar as 
Heidegger’s notion of the divine is patently metaphysical in its origin and remains 
within metaphysics therein, Heidegger’s interpretation of the notion of the divine in 
the Pre-Socratics fails to destroy, or critically analyse, the preconception of Q eoj 
belonging to the tradition of philosophy (i.e., metaphysics), and thus also fails to 
address the relationship of the arc h to the divine as it is given in Pre-Socratic 
thinking. Therefore, the question remains, even now, how does it stand with Q eoj in 
Pre-Socratic thinking? 
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Chapter 8: De-Construction 
 
24. Destruction: 
 
Destruction, in a phenomenological sense, is nothing more than the questioning and 
critical analysis of preconceptions brought to bear upon the interpretation of thinking. 
In this, destruction aims to reveal how the interpretation of thinking is predetermined 
as thinking about something. For example, as previously shown, those who interpret 
the Pre-Socratic as philosophers of nature do so having already determined that what 
is thought about is nature. A destruction, as such, initially poses these preconceptions 
as questionable.  
 Equally, a destruction seeks to address the way in which the thinking gets 
expressed. In this, the task is of ‘destructuring’, or revealing, the preconceptions and 
ways of communicating what is sought operating within the Pre-Socratic thinkers. 
This task of the destruction is purely negative, disclosing distinctions between what is 
sought in thinking and the ways in which this is expressed in the fragments. Herein, 
the task is of destructuring the modes of communication in order to show more clearly 
what the Pre-Socratic thinkers pursued in their thinking. 
 Finally, then, a destruction has as a terminal aim, the clearing away of 
preconceptions and seemingly self-evidential modes of expression and terminology in 
order to provide the foundation for a new interpretation of Pre-Socratic thought. 
Ideally, this provision of foundation gives the possibility of a proper interpretation of 
Pre-Socratic thought within the framework of an authentic grasp of what the Pre-
Socratic thinkers sought. In this, the ground provided by the destruction is no mere 
annihilation that permits any arbitrary interpretation. Rather, the destruction aims to 
reveal what the thinking cannot be about, and thus provides guidance for a new 
 279 
interpretation. Further, a destruction aims to point towards what is sought in Pre-
Socratic thinking, leaving bare the essential conceptual framework and quest without 
preconception. 
 Nor will the destruction eventuate in the absence of phenomenological 
content. For, two questions are brought to the thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus 
and Parmenides, namely: How does it stand with Q eoj and, what is the relation 
between Q eoj and being-human as it is thought therein? Thus, the destruction has the 
ultimate aim of allowing a construction of the meaning of Religion indicated in Pre-
Socratic thought, upon the ground of the clearing of preconception and self-evidence. 
 
A. Anaximander: 
In providing a destruction of Anaximander the notions of the ap e i r on and justice will 
be taken up as problems. Herein, the first task will be the questioning of these notions 
with regard to their attributes. That is, of showing how the attributes given to these 
notions refute traditional preconceptions of Anaximander’s thought. In doing so, these 
attributes will be investigated in relation to their broadest significance as a foundation 
of a proper interpretation of Anaximander. Finally, in investigating the attributes of 
the notions of apeiron and justice, the destruction will pose the question of the unity 
of the apeiron and justice in a positive, but non-traditional, sense. 
 
The A peiron 
As a general rule, the primary sign of the way in which preconception determines 
interpretation manifests itself as a failure to come to terms with the internal logical 
consistency and conceptual coherence of thinking. In this, the preconception and 
resultant interpretation attempts to bend the thinking within a text to fit the 
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preconception, forming a dissonance between the text and interpretation leading to 
paradoxical summations and conclusions about what is sought by the thinker and the 
conceptual coherence of this quest. Preconception, in this sense, denies the process of 
thinking: that what is sought in thinking determines what is found, and thus, also 
shapes the attributes and arguments posited therein. As such, the provision of 
determinate attributes and arguments, for the most part, is predetermined by what is 
sought in a logically consistent and conceptually coherent way.  
Equally, insofar as what is sought (the ultimate subject of thought) is 
determined in advance by the thinker, all of the attributes then given as a result cannot 
be construed as arbitrary determinations, but rather, specifically chosen attributes 
which indicate what is sought and how it is thought. Thus, insofar as the process of 
thinking contains (in a phenomenological sense) this consistency and coherence in 
relation to what is sought and how it is thought of, in advance, any interpretation that 
posits dissonance between what is sought and its determination immediately shows 
itself as questionable. Moreover, the interpretation in its dissonance, also reveals an 
improper preconceptualisation of what the thinker is attempting to address. 
 In order to destroy the preconceptions of what Anaximander attempts to think, 
it is first necessary to ascertain how the attributes of the apeiron and justice are given 
consistency and coherence within the fragments. 
 Initially, the notion of apeiron may be characterised as a formal title for 
ar c h. Herein, the apeiron certainly signifies the philosophical notion of arc h, but 
additionally, does so in its own way wherein the term apeiron has priority over the 
term arc h. In other words, the apeiron signifies arc h, not in a metaphysical sense, 
but rather in the sense implicit to the word ‘a-peiron’. 
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 Etymologically, apeiron means literally “lack of bounds”. A conceptually 
consistent interpretation of this term, based upon its use in the fragments, reveals the 
meaning of the apeiron to be something like absence of bounded-ness (absence of 
physical quantity), absence of physical properties (undeterminable), and further, 
absence of any physical qualities that can be thought (unknowable). In this sense, 
then, the apeiron is given an interpretation consistent with its use within the 
fragments as a name for the arc h, wherein arc h signifies the absence of physical 
characteristics or knowable attributes in relation to the physical world. 
 This general view of the apeiron is evidenced in the attributes Anaximander 
gives to it elsewhere in the fragments. Initially, the apeiron is given the attribute of 
‘surrounding’. Herein, it is not consistent to posit that there is some stuff that 
surrounds the physical, for in being physical, the apeiron could no longer surround. 
Rather, the attribute of surrounding has logical consistency as binding or holding 
together: something other than the physical that determines the physical. As such, 
surrounding belongs to some other indeterminable fusij. 
 The use of this phrase: “some other apeiron fusij” reveals precisely the 
problem Anaximander faces in what is sought and the way it is thought. For, the 
dilemma revealed therein is of how to discuss a non-physical conception of the arc h 
without utilising physically loaded terminology. This task is in one sense impossible, 
for the very term a-peiron itself points to the non-physical via the physical. The 
absence, or negation, of the physical is conceived of in apeiron as that which lacks 
boundaries. The physical therein, is posited essentially as that with boundaries; that 
which is bound. 
 An attribute associated with the apeiron through justice is steering. Herein, a 
careful analysis of the fragments reveals in justice a notion of that which stands 
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outside of the spatio-temporal order of things. Fragment one discusses the activities of 
things as just or unjust from which, by necessity, gets played out in time and 
according to the measure of time. Here, however, justice and injustice are not 
determined by the things involved nor by the measure of time. Rather, time is the 
realm through which things are subjected to justice in its effects: its judgments. Thus, 
time and fusij in their unity is the realm of the effects of justice; a realm wherein 
justice steers. 
 In this way, justice as an attribute of the apeiron shows itself as the ground of 
becoming and destruction. In this, the correlation of arc h and justice brings forth the 
notion of the proper and improper in such a way as to deny any metaphysical subject 
of thought. Initially, the idea of the proper in metaphysics signifies what something is; 
the truth of something. On this basis, the proper is construed as what something 
properly is; what it really is in its being. However, in the fragments of Anaximander, 
justice is given as effect and, as such, has no bearing on what something is in its 
being. 
 Moreover, in metaphysics the proper is associated with the idea of highest 
being; the highest, or most proper, expression of what something is. Anaximander’s 
thinking denies this interpretation, for justice does not belong to the thing in its being 
nor the spatio-temporal realm. Thus, the correlation of arc h and justice reveals itself 
somehow in the relation of the proper and becoming/destruction. Becoming and 
destruction, herein, are subservient to the proper. The proper forms a process of effect 
within time as the ground of becoming and destruction. As such, justice indicates 
something about the apeiron in the idea of the proper, referring somehow to the 
significance of things in their presence and absence. 
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 As steering, the apeiron is also associated with the attribute of Q eoj. This 
attribution of Q eoj is reinforced in fragments two and three. In this, the notion of the 
apeiron is given a number of divine characteristics: everlasting, ageless, immortal 
and indestructible. Again, these characteristics that attribute divinity to the apeiron 
are achieved through the rebuttal of the physical, or in opposition to the spatio-
temporal realm. 
 In fragment two, the apeiron is given attributes signifying non-temporality. 
Herein, the eternal (aei) is given conceptual coherence when interpreted as signifying 
the negation of time. Likewise, to be ageless signifies not having an age: the absence 
of temporal existence. In fragment three, the apeiron is characterised as non-
physical; of not ceasing and thus of never becoming. In the same way, the 
indestructibility of the apeiron only holds conceptual coherence where it signifies a 
never having become, for everything that is physical becomes towards destruction, by 
necessity within time. 
 So, the apeiron is other than the spatio-temporal and signifies Q eoj as such. 
In this, the notion of arc h in Anaximander indicates Q eoj; pointing towards arc h as 
Q eoj. Here, however, Q eoj cannot be construed as theological. For, Q eoj is not 
characterised as an always-present entity as in onto-theology (metaphysics), but rather 
is essentially an always-absence. Q eoj, as such, is not metaphysical highest being nor 
any God with predetermined or revealed characteristics. Rather, Q eoj as apeiron is 
granted only two attributes: 1. The always-absent ground that is thus unknowable, 2. 
the originary ground that has an effect within space and time called justice, or, the 
significance of things in their becoming and destruction. 
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B. Heraclitus 
In providing a destruction of the thinking of Heraclitus, the primary theme of analysis 
shows itself as a relation of arc h and being. For, the preconceptions disclosed in the 
previous discussion of the interpretation of Heraclitus gather together as the 
presupposition of arc h as unifying ground and thus being. Herein, the preconception 
arises insofar as Heraclitus in interpreted via metaphysics, wherein unifying ground 
signifies being-in-general via the being of beings. Thus, the first task of the 
destruction is the questioning of the presupposed unifying ground of being, or, the 
identity of arc h and fusij. 
 Upon this questioning the destruction will attempt to show that in Heraclitus’ 
thinking a distinction is made between being and arc h. Herein, the essential 
distinction shows itself in the fragments as that of an ordered cosmos (within divine 
justice) and a merely physical cosmos. As such, the destruction will seek to provide a 
basis for a proper interpretation of Heraclitus within this distinction. 
 In general, metaphysics conceptualises arc h as a unifying ground. The 
philosophy of nature, grounded in metaphysical thinking, tends to conceive the arc h 
as reality (the physical) as the unity of what things are and the way things are ordered 
(natural law). Likewise, traditional metaphysics has the tendency to conceive arc h as 
being-in-general: the unity of the constitution of things and the unity of everything as 
a whole. As I have shown previously, however, both of these preconceptions of arc h, 
when applied to Heraclitus’ thought, results in the identification of nature as a 
singular entity. 
 A key theme with regard to Heraclitus, and the Pre-Socratics in general, is the 
supposed lack of distinction between form and matter. In this, the Pre-Socratics are 
interpreted (as pre-metaphysical thinkers) to be seeking a metaphysical unifying 
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ground, i.e., being, but fail insofar as they cannot distinguish between form and 
matter. As such, Heraclitus’ thought gets interpreted as seeking being, or the unifying 
ground of nature, without having posited the necessary distinction between form and 
matter. Without this distinction, then, the concept of being signifies both a physical 
unity (physical entity) and formal unity (unity of law). Thus, Heraclitus’ thinking 
results in this paradoxical unity of being as a single being: reality as an entity. 
 However, the phrase ‘pre-metaphysical’ does not necessarily signify a 
precursor to metaphysics, or seeking metaphysical answers. ‘Pre-metaphysical’ may 
also signify non-metaphysical or not pertaining to metaphysics. In this, it becomes a 
question as to whether Heraclitus sought a unifying ground in a metaphysical sense. 
Rather, it is possible that Heraclitus, as a non-metaphysical thinker, sought a radically 
differing arc h. An arc h, perhaps, which does not refer to unifying ground, nor a 
meta-physical unity at all.  For, metaphysics belongs intrinsically to a ‘physics’ as an 
explanation of being as that which is the ground of physical entities and the unity of 
the physical as a whole. What if, in Heraclitus, the notion of fusij is not only 
different to fusij in metaphysics, but also secondary to the formulation of the notion 
of arc h? 
 In Heraclitus’ fragments, that which could be called being is becoming. 
Various fragments, herein, discuss becoming as a process of change either in relation 
to the mutual becoming of opposites1027 or in relation to the idea of the constant flux 
of the constitution of entities.1028 As such, the notion of becoming refers to both the 
unity of opposites and the idea of change in general. At first glance, then, the notion 
of becoming appears to signify a unity of form and matter. For, the notion of 
becoming appears to constitute both the unity of form and the unity of matter. 
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However, a closer perusal of the fragments discloses becoming as a secondary 
phenomenon. 
 In fragment one, becoming is clearly formulated as secondary to the log oj, 
for, the becoming of entities is subservient to the log oj. In this, a meta-physical 
explanation of fusij is also criticised. Herein, Heraclitus offers a critique of the 
metaphysical tendency to prioritise the constitution of entities (being) and the ground 
of constitution (being) stating: their thinking pertains to “separating each thing 
according to its fusij and explaining how it is made.”1029  It follows, then, that if 
Heraclitus criticises this prioritisation of that which constitutes an entity (its being), 
Heraclitus will also critique any meta-physical explanation of arc h: any notion of 
being as that which is the unifying ground of entities. 
 Rather, Heraclitus posits the log oj as arc h: “for all things become in 
accordance with the log oj”.1030 In this, Heraclitus provides a distinction between the 
log oj as arc h and becoming-being as that which constitutes entities and also the 
formal ground of entities. Furthermore, what could be called being is characterised by 
Heraclitus as a secondary phenomenon. A phenomenon upon which a proper notion 
of the arc h cannot be established. Thus, for Heraclitus the notion of the arc h is the 
log oj; a refutation of the prioritisation of fusij or being in a metaphysical sense. 
 An example of the distinction between arc h and being is provided via 
comparison of fragments 30 and 124. In fragment thirty, Heraclitus states that: “this 
ordered cosmos, which is the same for all, was not created by any one of the gods or 
of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living pur…”1031 The traditional 
interpretation of this fragment is, generally, that it signifies an identity of the physical 
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as a unified whole in pur. In other words, pur is the basic constituency of the 
physical cosmos. However, the cosmos as merely physical is also characterised by 
Heraclitus in fragment 124. Herein, Heraclitus states: “the fairest cosmos is but a 
dust-heap piled up at random.”1032 So, the distinction provided herein is one between 
a merely physical cosmos and a cosmos ordered and common to all. 
 Fragment 124, I would assert, is Heraclitus’ description of the cosmos as 
merely physical. Further, by extension, this fragment pertains to the conceptualisation 
of reality as merely physical and the result of thinking of reality as the unity of that 
which constitutes entities. In other words, I would argue, fragment 124 is Heraclitus’ 
view of the result and point of origin of thinking about reality with regard to the 
merely physical, and further, any thinking that prioritises the question of that which 
constitutes entities in their presence, i.e., being. 
 Fragment 30, in comparison, reveals Heraclitus’ view of the proper notion of 
cosmos. Herein, the physical and becoming (being) is characterised implicitly as 
secondary to “order”: the ordered cosmos. Accordingly, the phrase “ordered cosmos” 
signifies the priority of that which orders and that which is common to all. As such, 
fragment 30 conceptualises the cosmos in relation to that which orders it: the log oj. 
Thus, the statement “this ordered cosmos… was ever and is and shall be ever-living 
pur (pur aeizwon)”1033 does not refer to the physical constitution of the cosmos, but 
rather, names that which orders the cosmos: the log oj is named ‘pur aei-zwon’. 
 It has been uncovered, thus far, that the fragments of Heraclitus posit a 
distinction between being and arc h. Herein, being as becoming signifies that which 
constitutes the presence of entities with regard to the fusij and their ‘from whence’ 
(how they are made). Equally, Heraclitus discusses being as a secondary 
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phenomenon: a process of actualisation. In contrast, the arc h has been disclosed as 
the log oj, also named pur aei-zwon. This is the primary phenomenon sought by 
Heraclitus, and is viewed as the proper task of thinking. The question remains, then, 
of what general task Heraclitus takes up in seeking to characterise the arc h as log oj 
and pur aei-zwon. In other words, how does Heraclitus generally characterise the 
arc h? Herein, three themes arise: pur aei-zwon, lightning, and log oj. 
 
P u r  ae i -z w on 
In the first instance, pur aeizwon implicitly signifies the idea of Q eoj but also has the 
explicit signification of Zeus. The notion of ‘pur aei-zwon’, as such, can be 
discussed in relation to the general notion of Q eoj, theological thinking, and the 
identity of Zeus. Each of which must necessarily be referred back to what is indicated 
about the notion of arc h. 
 The general notion of Q eoj derived from the term pur aei-zwon contains 
three characteristics; pur, aei, and zwon. In this, pur could signify fire, aiqhr or 
soul.1034 Insofar as pur as fire is a determinate element, the signification of fire cannot 
be construed as primary in this case. For, fragment 30 is not an argument pertaining to 
the elemental constitution of the physical realm, but rather, refers to pur as the arc h 
of the ordered cosmos. Likewise, pur as aiqhr cannot be the primary sense in this 
case, insofar as it pertains to the physical and not to the arc h. Equally, both fire and 
aiqhr are shown to lack primacy in this expression ‘pur aei-zwon’ insofar as neither 
can be properly conceived of as ever living. Fire as an element is constantly 
transformed and subject to becoming and destruction. This is also the case for aiqhr 
as physical; for everything physical is subject to becoming and destruction. This 
leaves the third sense of pur; of soul or thinking. This makes a great deal of sense 
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insofar as soul/intelligence and pur are associated with the divine potentiality of 
humans and the divine in general. 
 The term ‘aei’ is also in Greek thought associated with the general notion of 
Q eoj, in this case, referring to the non-spatio-temporal character of Q eoj. I would 
argue, moreover, that ‘aei’ has a non-metaphysical signification in Heraclitus as an 
always-absence (non-presence) rather than always-presence as in Aristotle. This 
follows Heraclitus’ argument, in fragment one, that thinking about that which 
constitutes things and how they are made is an improper path of thought. If it is 
improper to distinguish between things on the basis of their constitution as present, it 
is also improper to characterise Q eoj and arc h with regard to fusij or in relation to 
being. Thus, it is not possible for ‘aei’ to signify always-present, but rather, ‘aei’ 
must signify an always-absence: an otherwise than fusij (being). 
 The term ‘zwn’ signifies life. In this, life is no mere existence or actuality. 
Life, in this sense, cannot be construed as some quantifiable living, eg, living for 50 
years. Rather, the signification of life is one of quality: of what sort of living, or, of 
what characterises the living as a life. As such, the living immediately refers to ‘aei’ 
as a way of living: a character of living that is always-absence. Thus, the general 
notion of Q eoj is formulated as an always-absent living, or, a way of life that is never 
actualised in fusij (becoming-destruction).  
 Bringing the phrase ‘pur aei-zwon’ together as a unity reveals its meaning as 
a way of living soul/thinking that is otherwise than fusij, and is never actualised in 
fusij as an entity. In this, the general notion of Q eoj shows itself as a way of living 
with the attributes of soul/intelligence and always-absence. The general notion of 
Q eoj, as such, also indicates something about Heraclitus’ notion of arc h, namely: 
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that the arc h is an always-absent intelligent/purposive life. Not an entity, but rather, a 
way of living. 
 Fragment 30 is also an anti-theological argument in relation to arc h. Herein, 
Heraclitus’ position is opposed to the traditional Greek mythological narratives and 
also, against any tendency towards a meta-physical monotheistic theologising. In the 
first instance, Heraclitus objects to any narrative in which genesis is explained via the 
Greek divinities: “was not created by any one of the gods…”1035 As such, the result of 
Heraclitus’ argument is the rejection of traditional Greek mythology, or, theological 
explanations of the cosmos. On the other hand, however, Heraclitus’ argument is not 
opposed to the notion of Q eoj in general, nor an argument against Q eoj as a creative 
force. Indeed, the general notion of Q eoj provided in this fragment is given the 
attribute of permanent genesis, or, as the originary ground of the cosmos as it’s 
ordering. Thus, the argument provided is an anti-theological argument, opposing any 
narrative of Q eoj as an entity or entities within fusij. 
 Heraclitus’ argument also curtails any potential meta-physical theologising. 
Here, a metaphysical theology identifies Q eoj as a singular highest entity which can 
also be called being-itself. Heraclitus denies this type of theology by denying the 
primacy or priority of that which constitutes the presence of entities, i.e., being, and 
by refuting the search for arc h via fusij. Thus, Heraclitus’ position denies any 
metaphysical theology (natural theology) wherein Q eoj is constituted as the unifying 
ground of presence and as an always-presence. Furthermore, this also indicates 
something about Heraclitus’ notion of arc h; that the arc h may not be constituted as a 
meta-physical unifying ground of the physical as presence. Rather, the notion of arc h 
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indicated here refers somehow to an otherwise than fusij: the arc h is somehow 
otherwise than being.   
 Finally, the phrase ‘pur aei-zwon’ is also connected to the divinity Zeus. 
Here, pur is associated with Zeus. So also is zwon of which the name Zeus ( Z hnoj) is 
a derivative. Further, Zeus is the highest Greek divinity and thus the divinity closest to 
the general notion of Q eoj; Zeus in many respects exemplifies the idea of Q eoj. In 
fragment 32, Heraclitus states, “that which alone is wise is one; it is willing and 
unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus.”1036 In this respect, then, the name of 
Zeus represents many attributes of the general notion of Q eoj, such as: pur, lightning, 
life and wisdom. Thus, the name of Zeus indicates what the notion of Q eoj properly 
signifies. However, the name Zeus is also a name of a divinity, that is, a name of an 
entity that is present in the physical realm and within time. Equally, then, the notion 
of Q eoj is also not Zeus, i.e., not an entity, nor a Greek divinity in a theological and 
mythological sense. As such, the association of Zeus with ‘pur aeizwon’ is both a 
positive and privative one. The association is positive insofar as Zeus indicates 
something about the notion of Q eoj, and privative in the sense that Zeus is an entity 
present in the physical realm. 
 
Lightning/Steering 
The second primary attribute given to the arc h is that of steering. Herein, Heraclitus 
argues that “that which is wise is one: to understand the purpose which steers all 
things through all things”1037 This, I would argue, is the sole task of Heraclitus’ 
thought; the questioning of that which steers fusij – the arc h. In this, the arc h 
sought by Heraclitus cannot be constituted as being, for, that which steers purposively 
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has no primary connection to the unity and constitution of present things (being). 
Neither does that which steers have any necessary connection to the unity of that 
which is. Rather, steering has the attributes of intent and purpose. Thus, in the first 
instance the arc h Heraclitus seeks shows itself as the arc h of intent and t eloj. The 
question as such, is not why there is something at all, but rather, what significance 
belongs to fusij in its arc h.  
 This is why, when Heraclitus gives his answer to the question of the arc h, he 
states “the thunder-bolt steers the universe.”1038 In this, the thunder-bolt signifies 
Q eoj in general. It is Q eoj, as the originary ground of ordering, i.e., purposiveness, 
that directs fusij in its significance; that makes the cosmos ordered rather than a dust 
heap piled up at random. Again, Heraclitus’ notion of arch shows itself as Q eoj: that 
purpose that steers fusij. Further, the divine lightning that steers, and thus steering in 
general, is associated with justice: “P ur, having come upon them, will judge and 
seize upon all things.”1039 Thus, the arc h sought by Heraclitus shows itself as divine 
justice. 
 I would argue that divine justice cannot be interpreted to signify merely 
natural law, nor being as that which constitutes things in their presence. Nor, I would 
assert, can divine justice be characterised in a theological sense; as the handwork of a 
divine entity. To be sure, these are possible phenomena or manifestations of divine 
justice, but they cannot be constituted as primary. The primary signification of divine 
justice, then, is the indication of arc h as significance, or, the idea of t eloj 
(purposiveness), which is the arc h of fusij. Thus, arc h does not signify any ground 
of the physical as in metaphysics, but rather, the originary ground of what, in 
metaphysics, gets called the highest or most proper being. The arc h Heraclitus seeks, 
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herein, moves ‘under’ and stands-under the concept of being as that which allows the 
distinction between proper and improper being, i.e., the significance of being.  
 The arc h as divine justice, then, is the purpose hidden within fusij as it 
shows itself. Initially, divine justice makes itself known to humans as the concept of 
right. Here Heraclitus states: “They would not know the name of right, if these things 
did not exist.”1040 Thus, divine justice shows itself as the concept of right brought 
about for humans through the experience of wrong-ness.  
 A second way in which divine justice shows itself is in the general state of 
affairs for humans and within the physical realm. Fragment 53 shows how divine 
justice, called war, reveals the measure of intelligent beings: “some as gods, others as 
men… some slaves, others free.”1041 This revelation by divine justice, as such, reveals 
the measure of intelligent beings in relation to their significance, not their physical 
presence. Likewise, divine justice shows itself in nature as: “day-night, winter-
summer, war-peace, satiety-famine”.1042 Herein, I would argue, divine justice shows 
itself as the purpose or meaning of natural phenomena, and thus the unity of such. In 
the fragment, it is not the physical presence, nor physical constitution of natural 
phenomena that designates unity. Rather, the unity is grounded upon and within 
structures of coherence and meaning associated with natural phenomena.  
 The appearance of divine justice to humans, Heraclitus asserts, shows itself 
initially as strife: “war is universal and jurisdiction is strife, and everything comes 
about by way of strife and necessity.”1043 In this respect, change brought about by 
divine justice shows itself as the appearance of violence insofar as change is violent. 
As such, the effect of divine justice in its purpose initially appears as strife.  
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 On the other hand, as Heraclitus states, “To God, all things are beautiful, good 
and just…”1044 Herein, Heraclitus characterises divine justice in its essence rather than 
appearance. For, divine justice shows itself as the proper purpose that steers 
everything, as purposiveness in general, and as the arc h (originary ground) that is 
itself the always-absent proper purpose. The appearance of right and wrong as they 
come to be named by humans is shown to be limited and to a certain degree a mere 
seeming. This is not to say that there is no such thing as injustice or evil, but rather, 
that divine justice steers everything as justice itself (proper purpose) and will also in 
this, find out injustice (human).1045 This is of crucial importance in relation to humans 
insofar as divine justice is the measure of proper justice and good for all intelligent 
beings: “for all human laws are nourished by one, which is divine. For it governs as 
far as it will, and is sufficient for all…”1046 Thus, the measure of good and justice 
refers back to the arc h of t eloj and meaning, and accordingly, human evil and 
injustice to the illusory understanding belonging to human beings. 
 Overall, the notion of divine justice discloses three aspects of Heraclitus’ 
notion of arc h. First, divine justice discloses the arc h as the originary ground of the 
meaning of human existence. In this, a secondary signification of the arc h is the law 
of the polij in its proper ground. Additionally, divine justice discloses the arc h as 
the originary ground of fusij in its significance. A secondary sense of the arc h then, 
is of natural law: the coherence of fusij as it is understood and directed by intelligent 
entities. Finally, divine justice discloses the arc h as the originary ground of purpose 
in general. In other words, the arc h signifies essentially, nothing more than meaning 
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or purpose in itself. Therefore, the arc h indicates that originary ground is a proper 
purpose belonging to what is called Q eoj. 
 
The l og oj 
The third and final theme pertaining to Heraclitus’ notion of arc h is log oj. Herein, 
the arc h is disclosed as wisdom, or, the originary ground of thinking. Initially, 
Heraclitus posits the log oj as the central theme in a comparison between humans and 
Q eoj. In this, a distinction is made between human log oj as faulty and fallible1047, 
while the divine is log oj itself.1048 Thus, Heraclitus utilises the term log oj in a 
derogatory sense in fragment 87, stating: “A foolish man is apt to be in a flutter at 
every log oj.”1049  In comparison, the log oj as divine is generally translated as 
‘law’.1050 Thus, translation issues aside, the use of log oj in association with the 
divine shows itself as a proper or necessary steering. 
 Another variation with regard to log oj its association with understanding and 
wisdom. Again, a comparison is made between the divine and human log oj. Thus, in 
fragment 78 Heraclitus states: “Humans in our being have no power of understanding; 
but the divine does.”1051 Further, in fragment 32 the divine is characterised as the only 
wise one, while fragments 28, 35, 56, 70 and 83 exemplify Heraclitus’ argument that 
wisdom is an unusual state of human existence. Thus, in fragment 83 Heraclitus 
pronounces: “The wisest human will appear an ape in relation to the divine.”1052  
 Heraclitus also discusses the log oj in itself. Here, there are three primary 
attributes of the log oj to be drawn out for examination. First, Heraclitus utilises the 
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term log oj to signify that which orders, as in fragments one and two. “The log oj is 
as here explained… all things come into being in accordance with this log oj” and 
“therefore one must follow that which is common to all… the log oj is 
universal…”1053 Herein, the log oj signifies the arc h of fusij, and further, the 
ethical arc h of human existence. The log oj, as such, turns back to the notion of 
divine justice, this time in the sense of a communication or understanding of divine 
justice. In this way, the log oj signifies the communication of the divine through 
divine law and the potentiality of the divine law to be understood by humans. 
 Additionally, the log oj also signifies proper thinking. Initially, the log oj 
signifies truth: to understand the true purpose which steers. Furthermore, proper 
thinking signifies the grasping of this purpose itself, not merely its truth. Thus, in 
fragment 50, Heraclitus appeals to the log oj as independent of human thinking: 
“When you have listened not to me but to the log oj, it is wise to agree that all things 
are one”. This one-ness or common-to-all is the disclosure of fusij in its ordering 
(truth), and moreover, the awareness of the purpose of this ordering (meaning). 
Therefore, the log oj signifies a proper thinking that discloses the truth of fusij, the 
purpose of this truth, and the purpose that directs everything. 
 The final and primary sense of log oj given by Heraclitus is as the divine 
itself. Herein, the log oj is constituted as the communication of the divine, or, the way 
the divine shows itself as the one, the common, and as that purpose that steers fusij. 
As such, the essential character of the log oj is Q eoj: “the lord whose oracle is at 
Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but indicates.”1054 Equally, this reveals the notion 
of log oj as arc h; that for Heraclitus, the originary ground – its truth and proper 
meaning – is always initially hidden from humans (always absent) and is only ever 
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uncovered by the difficult human pursuit of it and the way in which the divine 
communicates to humans via indications. In this respect, the love fusij has for 
hiding1055 refers to the always-absent ground that orders fusij rather than that which 
constitutes fusij and that which allows differentiation between things (being). 
Thus, in general, the meaning of Q eoj in Heraclitus’ thinking shows itself as 
the naming of the arc h and further, through naming, the provision of positive 
attributes of the arc h. In this, calling the arc h ‘Q eoj’ provides three positive 
indications of the meaning of arc h: 1. The arc h is truth as it shows itself, or, the 
significance and coherence of fusij as it can be grasped. 2. The arc h is hqoj: the 
ground of the proper of human existence. 3. The arc h is the proper itself, or, the 
grasping and showing itself of the arc h as purpose and meaning. 
 
C. Parmenides: 
In providing a destruction of Parmenides’ fragments I will focus upon the two 
potential ways of truth given by the goddess. Herein, the question to be addressed is 
that of the assumed primacy of the first way of truth, i.e., being in relation to the 
arc h. I will argue, moreover, that it is the second way of truth (non-being) that 
indicates the notion of arc h properly in Parmenides thinking. 
 The interpretation of these two ways of truth, for the most part, assumes that 
the first way of truth is valid, while the second is false. In this, the statement of the 
goddess: “this I tell you is a path that cannot be explored; for you could neither 
recognise that which is not, nor express it…”1056 is interpreted to signify falsity. Thus, 
almost all interpretative attempts dismiss the question of not-being and immediately 
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turn to the question of being as having primacy. The question I will pose, nonetheless, 
is why the goddess discusses not-being as a path of truth? 
 If the first way of truth is given primacy, Parmenides appears to be a pre-
metaphysical thinker par excellence, for, his thinking considers only being in a logical 
way, thrusting being-itself as unifying ground into questioning. Parmenides, as a 
metaphysical thinker, also exemplifies the problematic dimension of metaphysical 
thought, namely: the problem of unifying ground – the unity of being and the arc h. 
Herein, the problem arises in the attempt to discover an arc h of both the physical 
presence of things and the unity of everything as a whole. Furthermore, the problem 
gains additional urgency where the notion of the proper arises, i.e., justice, hqoj and 
t eloj. 
 In this respect, Parmenides thinking (viewed via the question of being) 
exemplifies the problem of metaphysical thinking that Kant puts under the tribunal of 
reason. In this, the questionable element of metaphysical thinking is the result of the 
search for a unifying ground that not only serves as a ground of physical presence but 
also is identified as the ground of the proper (called speculative reason by Kant). 
 Further, the results of interpreting Parmenides as a metaphysical thinker, via 
the question of being, are either paradoxical or entirely problematic. For, as shown 
previously, prioritising the question of being as the sole feature of Parmenides poem 
results in either a singular unchanging physical universe or a singular unchanging 
divine entity of which the physical is a constitutive element. As such, the problems 
associated with prioritising the question of being in Parmenides calls for a 
reconsideration of the fragments with regard to the ways of truth and arc h. 
 In order to address the question of the second way of truth, not-being, I will 
propose an interpretation of Parmenides that prioritises not-being in relation to arc h. 
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Herein it will be necessary to pay close attention to how the goddess frames the 
second way of truth. Equally, this analysis will attempt to show how not-being is 
implicitly associated with the notion of arc h via the attributes of justice, log oj, and 
Q eoj. Finally, this analysis will attempt to show that the notion of arc h in 
Parmenides is properly conceived of as Q eoj, or, the impossible originary ground of 
being. 
 Paying close attention to the goddess’ address to Parmenides about the ways 
of truth will provide an entrance into the notion of not-being. Initially, in fragment 
one, the goddess states that Parmenides will inquire into everything: “both the 
motionless heart of well-rounded truth, and also the opinions of mortals, in which 
there is no true reliability.”1057 Following this, in fragment two, the goddess tells 
Parmenides that there are only two potential truthful ways of inquiry: either being (it 
is) and not-being (it is not). The first, that of being, is given the qualities of credibility 
and of following truth. The second, of not-being, is a path not to be explored; 
unrecognisable and inexpressible. Two points arise here. First, the path of not-being is 
a way of truth as one of the two truthful ways of inquiry. However, the second path is 
denied insofar as it is not recognisable or expressible.  
 The sense of this denial of pursuing not-being is, in fragment three, revealed 
via the identity of being and thinking: “for it is the same thing to think and to be”.1058 
In this, the identity of thinking and being is founded upon the identity of a thing in its 
being. Thus, the idea of being that is proposed here is twofold: being is existential – 
referring to an entity in its presence and being is that which presents a thing as it is – 
the idea of presence in general. As such, wherever thinking thinks being, it thinks an 
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entity as present, or, in its presence. If not-being is then pursued via this way of 
thinking, not-being is necessarily impossible, for it is by definition not-present. 
 Fragment four reinforces this idea of thinking being as thinking presence, for 
the present physical absence of a thing does not signify not-being or always-absence 
insofar as the entity thought in its being is thought in relation to its constitution 
(presence), or, what it is when it is present. Here, in fragment four, then, there are also 
two significations of being: being is the always-presence of an entity and, being is the 
unity of reality as presented and re-presentable. Thus, to think being is to present and 
re-present the presence of an entity in its being.  
 Fragment six brings this initial conceptualisation of being to its conclusion, 
and also returns to the notion of not-being. In this, the notion of being is posited as 
that which is possible: “one should say and think that being is; for to be is 
possible.”1059 The essence of being, as such, is the possible; either in relation to 
existence (actual presence of entities) or with regard to thinking being. In the second 
case, being as being-thought shows itself as restricted to that which is possible; 
always-presence and thus re-presentable. Accordingly, the goddess debars Parmenides 
from thinking not-being, insofar as it is impossible. As impossible, not-being signifies 
two themes: always-absent and impossible to think in relation to presence.  
 In general then, the idea of being is revealed in the goddess’ statements to 
refer to the idea of always-presence. Equally, then, the idea of being is restricted to 
the being of an entity. That is, being signifies the constitution of an entity that are 
always-present, founded upon the actuality of the entity as present at some point in 
time or space. Further, being signifies a universal rule of thinking; that truthful 
thinking about an entity, thinks the entity in its being – its constitution as always-
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present. Finally, the idea of being also signifies the idea of a unified reality, 
determined and determinable as a whole solely in relation to an always-presence. 
 In comparison, or in explicit relation to being, not-being is necessarily 
impossible. Two themes are worthy of note here. First, not-being is only impossible in 
relation to being and to a thinking that thinks the being of entities. It follows then that 
not-being is impossible to think with regard to always-presence insofar as it is the 
irreconcilable other to presence as always-absence.  Does this mean that not-being 
must necessarily be relegated to illusion or falsity? I would assert, rather, that in 
restricting being to the idea of always-presence the goddess/Parmenides leaves open a 
path to not-being as the idea of the arc h of being-itself: truth, justice and Q eoj.  
 This open path to not-being originates in fragment seven wherein the goddess 
states: “For this can never predominate, that that which is not, exists.” So, this 
statement indicates two attributes of not-being: 1. that which is not cannot be thought 
of as an entity with being – an identity, 2. That which is not cannot be thought of as 
present insofar as it is always-absent. For all the negative description of not-being, 
nonetheless, the goddess’ statement indicates some positive possibility of thinking 
not-being. This positive is explored further in the fragment.  
 Initially, Parmenides denies that being, as present, springs from not-being. 
Here, the denial refers explicitly to the notion of temporal creation or becoming. Thus, 
in the first instance, being cannot be thought of as originating from not-being in a 
spatio-temporal sense, i.e., the creation of something out of nothing. In this sense, 
Parmenides denies any onto-theological explanation of the creation of the universe, 
and further, the creation of things in their being out of nothing. 
 However, the next sentence provides a positive notion of not-being in relation 
to being: “nor will the force of truth ever admit that anything should come into being, 
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beside being itself, out of not-being.”1060 So, Parmenides’ goddess affirms that being-
itself (being-in-general) originates in not-being. Herein, the positive characterisation 
of not-being is revealed as the arc h of being-itself. Thus, Parmenides has opened a 
way into thinking non-being as the arc h of being-itself, or, the always-absent 
originary ground of being.  
 Furthermore, this statement provides the crucial distinction between the ways 
of truth revealed by the goddess. Herein, the way of the truth of being signifies the 
truth of entities in their being character (presence) and the knowable structure of the 
universe as always-present. The second way of truth, as such, is disclosed as the truth 
of the arc h; the question of the originary ground of being itself as the characteristics 
of ‘that which is not’. Thus, even though these characteristics of not-being cannot be 
grasped in relation to the presence of entities nor their physical absence, not-being can 
be thought with regard to being as arc h. The goddess, then, implicitly reveals the 
arch as not-being via three themes: justice, log oj, and Q eoj.  
 The first way that not-being shows itself is via justice. In fragment 7,8, 
immediately following the previous statement, Parmenides goddess states: “so far as 
that (not-being) is concerned, justice has never released (being) in its fetters and set it 
free… but holds it fast”. Herein, not-being is given the attribute of justice: of binding 
being as being. Again, later in this fragment the goddess states: “but it is motionless in 
the limits of mighty bonds… for powerful necessity holds it (being) in the bonds of a 
limit…”1061 Thus, the arc h shown in justice is something other than being that binds 
being. I would argue, here, that the name of the arc h shown in justice is not-being, 
or, the otherwise than being. 
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 Not-being also shows itself as the arc h of log oj proper, or, truth. Initially, it 
would seem that the log oj (truth) is being; being-true, especially in light of the 
goddess’ revelation that being and thinking are the same. However, this statement 
cannot be taken literally to limit truth to thinking being, nor, that being is the arc h of 
truth. In the first case, the identity of thinking and being is only true in relation to 
thinking being (the unity of always-presence) and thinking the being of an entity (the 
always-present constitution of an entity). Further, this identity of thinking and being is 
implicitly revealed as a characteristic of human thinking in its potential for truth. This 
is evidenced throughout the fragments insofar as the goddess consistently refers this 
rule to ‘you’ (the human thinker Parmenides). 
 In this respect the communication of the goddess to Parmenides (the human 
‘you’) also reveals a distinction between the log oj proper to philosophy, in thinking 
about being, and the log oj of truth belonging to the goddess: the ground of truth. This 
distinction, I would argue, is one between the human philosophical truth; (the answer 
to the question of being and the truth as the truth of being-human - the arc h of 
philosophical truth), and the essence of truth as belonging to the goddess (the ground 
of truth). Herein, the goddess communicates to Parmenides as somehow other than the 
truths conveyed therein. For Parmenides, the goddess is the truth insofar as she 
communicates the truth, but also is the ground of truth as the one who reveals the 
truth. Moreover, the goddess reveals herself explicitly as otherwise than the truth of 
being as the one who binds Parmenides thinking of being to its truth: “come, I will tell 
you – and you must accept my log oj when you have heard it – the ways of inquiry 
which alone are to be thought…”1062 Later, in fragment two, the goddess states: “this I 
tell you is a path that cannot be explored (by you); for you could neither recognise 
                                               
1062
 Fr: 2 
 304 
that which is not, nor express it.” I would argue, here, that the goddess is binding 
Parmenides to the proper way of thinking being for humans (you) rather than stating 
its absolute truth. 
 This brings us to the third way of characterising the arc h as not-being, i.e., as 
Q eoj. Initially, this is evidenced insofar as the divine is intrinsically identified with 
both justice and truth. Justice, here, is personified in d ihe and its sub-agents. 
Likewise, Parmenides goddess is A leqeia, the goddess truth.  Furthermore, in the 
fragments the divine is disclosed as not-being, or arc h, explicitly as divine law. This 
divine law that binds being must necessarily signify the otherwise than being, for 
being cannot bind itself. As such, the goddess’ revelation of divine law as otherwise 
than being is also the self-revelation of the divine in general as otherwise than being; 
as the always-absent arc h of being.  
 It has been shown, therefore, that Parmenides is no metaphysician who 
provides a unifying ground in being. Rather, I have shown that Parmenides poem 
discloses a radical differentiation between being and what gets called not-being: 
arc h, Q eoj, the otherwise than being. In this, Parmenides can be viewed as a thinker 
opposed to metaphysics in his refusal to consider any unity of being and not-being 
and thus always-presence and arc h as always-absent. Parmenides, here, carefully 
distances being and not-being, keeping them in their radical difference and therein 
does not fall into the metaphysical trap of conjoining that which constitutes presence 
(being) and arc h as originary ground: truth, justice, Q eoj. 
 Parmenides, furthermore, is in agreement with the previously discussed pre-
Socratic thinkers and can be seen to develop this thinking to its logical conclusion. 
Thus, the distinction between being and the arc h that arises in the pre-Socratic quest 
for arc h shows itself in Parmenides as a stark and unbreachable gap between being 
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and the otherwise than being; always-presence and the originary ground of presence – 
always-absence. 
 
25. Construction: 
A construction is founded in destruction in such a way that, ideally, the construction 
begins with what the destruction discloses as foundational. In relation to the Pre-
Socratics then, the destruction provided disclosed the essence of pre-Socratic thinking 
to be the question of arc h. Upon this foundation, this construction will ask two 
questions in relation to arc h: 1. what is indicated about being-human? 2. How does it 
stand with Q eoj? These two questions, as such, will allow a construction of the 
meaning of Religion as it shows itself in Pre-Socratic thought. 
 
A. The Quest of Pre-Socratic thinking 
Whether it gets called the apeiron, log oj, or ‘that which is not’, the Pre-Socratic 
thinkers addressed in the deconstructive case studies all take as their ultimate problem 
the question of the arc h. The question of arc h, therein, is clearly not metaphysical in 
relation to what is found and further, in relation to what is presupposed in the 
questioning. In this, the question of arc h cannot be interpreted as the onto-theological 
quest for unifying ground. As such, the destruction revealed that these thinkers; 
Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, each prioritise the question of arc h in such 
a way that the philosophical notion of being recedes and moreover, is characterised as 
a derivative phenomenon. Thus, in each case, being is only considered after, or within 
the context of, a characterisation of the arc h.  
 In this quest for the arc h a radical difference emerges between arc h and 
being. Each of these thinkers, in their own ways, characterise being as essentially an 
 306 
always-presence that is bound, limited and steered by arc h. Accordingly, arc h is 
then characterised in general, as essentially an always-absence; a non-physical 
originary ground, or, the otherwise than being. The arc h the pre-Socratics found, as 
such, is impossible to grasp or disclose except through the negation of always-
presence, or, by disclosing the otherwise than being as an always-absence.  
 Nonetheless, all three are in agreement as to how this originary ground shows 
itself to humans, namely; through the concepts of binding, steering and purpose. 
Binding, herein, signifies the delimitation of being in its actualisation. Likewise, 
steering shows how the arc h shows itself as the significance and coherence within 
fusij as it can be understood. Finally, then, in purpose, the arc h is disclosed as 
purpose itself; purpose is the ground of significance and coherence. This purpose in 
itself, as such, is the essential character of the arc h as it can be thought and as it 
shows itself.  
 Poignantly, it can be seen that the quest for the arc h revealed in these pre-
Socratic thinkers discloses the logical end point of non-metaphysical thinking about 
the arc h. Here, the pre-Socratic fragments do not establish a physics first, or give 
priority to fusij, and then search for the arc h of the physics/fusij (which is 
essentially what metaphysics is – the positing of principles and causes via abstractions 
from the human experience of fusij). Rather, the pre-Socratics all constitute fusij 
only after, or within, the notion of arc h as already formulated and presupposed. Thus, 
the question of arc h itself, independent of any physics, shows itself in these three 
ways: binding, steering, and purpose. 
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B. The Indications of Being-human: 
The ways in which the arc h shows itself are intrinsically linked to what it is to be 
human, and especially to the three aspects of human thinking disclosed in pre-Socratic 
thought. If we take Parmenides’ poem as a point of origin, we find three implicit 
characterisations of human thinking.  
 The last characterisation, the realm of d oxa, is described as the realm of 
human thinking that prioritises the way fusij appears to the senses. Here, the realm 
of everyday existence is characterised as naming, or, the thinking of things as 
distinguishable. Likewise, this thinking views opposites as real or actual and measures 
the truth of things according to their appearance and seeming disappearance. The 
goddess reveals to Parmenides that the essence of this way of thinking is a two-
headedness; thinking that being and not-being are the same and not the same.1063 
Thus, the essence of this way of thinking is not simply the prioritisation of physical 
appearances, but further, thinking that prioritises the physical and thus seeks an 
abstract unifying ground of the physical. This is a poignant argument against 
metaphysical thinking, for its logical conclusion as Hegel exemplifies, is the identity 
of being and not-being. 
 Heraclitus also discusses this way of thinking via appearances, and thinking 
founded upon the prioritisation of the physical. Herein, Heraclitus provides scathing 
attacks upon thinking via appearances, and further, links this to the prioritisation of 
the physical and the question of the constitution of entities in their presence (being). 
 The second way of thinking disclosed by Parmenides is that of the truth of 
being. This way of thinking is the first revealed by the goddess, but is secondary in 
terms of priority. This second way of thinking, in Parmenides, is the proper way of 
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thinking being in relation to entities and the purely abstract idea of the being in 
general. In Heraclitus, this second way of thinking is utilised in relation to a differing 
focus, the intelligibility of fusij as a process, but nonetheless addresses being, in its 
truth, in its coherence and significance for human thought. Thus, both Parmenides and 
Heraclitus constitute this second way of thinking as the truth of being for humans, or, 
the way in which humans, in our being, grasp being. 
 The third and final way of thinking is the second way of truth in Parmenides 
poem; not-being. This way of thinking can be called the truth of the arc h and is 
characterised as entirely otherwise than human. Equally, in Heraclitus this way of the 
truth of arc h is described as entirely otherwise than human and shows itself only via 
indications. 
 These three potential ways of thinking, as such, indicates two primary 
potentialities of being-human. The first of these can be called everydayness, or, the 
thinking that prioritises appearances and thus the physical. Here, everydayness as a 
way of being-human will result in two ways of thinking about fusij. The first is 
thinking that the real is determinable by what appears to be physically present to us. 
The second, and an outgrowth of the first, is metaphysical thinking: the thinking of 
being as always-presence, and further, as the unifying ground of everything. In this 
respect, a semblance of the truth of being is thought via everydayness, but it is a 
semblance marked by a failure to grasp the arc h.  
 Thus, the first potentiality of being-human is essentially the actualisation or 
praxis of human existence (being-human). This potentiality of being-human is, for the 
most part, the way humans are in our being. In this way, the first potentiality of being-
human is both improper in relation to the arc h, and yet at the same time, the truth of 
being (being-human). The truth of being, of being-human, is thus presence, or, a way 
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of being that presents entities in their being. At the same time, the truth of being is 
also entirely improper, for as Parmenides’ goddess indicates; it is impossible for 
human beings to grasp that which is not present – the otherwise than being. 
 There is however, a second potentiality for being-human, namely; the 
potentiality to grasp the arc h or to be grounded in the otherwise than being. 
Parmenides poem exemplifies the first dimension of this potentiality of being-human. 
For, the truth of being is shown in its arc h of the otherwise than being, revealed via 
divine communication. Likewise, this potentiality of being-human is characterised by 
Heraclitus as the quest to grasp the arc h; the purpose that steers all things. The truth 
of the arc h, the potentiality in being-human to grasp the proper, is only disclosed via 
the way the arc h shows itself to humans as the revelation of indications. Further, 
Heraclitus also posits this potentiality as an actuality of human existence: hqoj (the 
proper) for being-human is our d aim wn – the divine voice presented in thinking the 
arc h. 
 The construction of the notion of being-human in the Pre-Socratics shown 
here in its twofold potentiality thus revolves around the unity and difference between 
being and originary ground. The unity of being and arc h signifies nothing more or 
less than the truth of being-human insofar as humans present being as that which 
constitutes entities and the structure of reality as a whole. In this, the human 
understanding of being and being-human produces an inauthentic unity of being and 
thinking wherein thinking is subsumed under presence – thinking that is determined 
by presence.  
 However, the proper disclosed in pre-Socratic thought is proper thinking itself, 
or, thinking the arc h. Herein, the arc h is disclosed as the proper, or, thinking the 
otherwise than being which is, essentially, thinking that has no relation to being 
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whatsoever. The problem of attempting to communicate the essence of thinking is 
insurmountable for humans (in our being), for we cannot think without thinking 
being. Nonetheless, the arc h as it is disclosed in pre-Socratic thought is essentially 
pointing towards the otherwise than being as pure thinking that shows itself as the 
truth, hqoj, and ultimately, as the arc h (the proper). This potentiality for humans, in 
our being, to grasp or to be gifted with the understanding of the otherwise than being, 
and further, to be directed by this originary ground in our living, is precisely what is 
sought in pre-Socratic thinking.  
 
C. How does it stand with Q e oj? 
From the disclosure of the twofold potentiality of being-human arises the possibility 
of also disclosing how it stands with Q eoj in the Pre-Socratic thinking of 
Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides.  Initially, then, Q eoj shows itself as the 
identity of the proper in everyday human existence. Herein, Q eoj gets called the 
divine, the daemonic, and the soul, each with determinable characteristics that relate 
to the human understanding of life. Likewise, in philosophical thinking, Q eoj shows 
itself as the name for the arc h. Herein, Q eoj as a technical title signifies the unity of 
the ways in which the arc h shows itself to the philosophical understanding of 
existence in its arc h. Thus, in pre-Socratic thinking Q eoj signifies the technical name 
of the arc h in the unity of how it shows itself. 
 Q eoj, as such, initially signifies the arc h of being-itself. The arc h of being-
itself, however, is not constituted as some meta-physical entity. Rather, as the arc h of 
being, Q eoj signifies the notion of truth. As truth, Q eoj then has two primary modes 
of showing itself. 1. Q eoj signifies the potentiality for humans to grasp the truth in 
proper thinking. Herein, proper thinking is the pursuit of the question of the arc h, and 
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furthermore, the disclosure of the truth of being. Accordingly, the truth of being may 
only be properly uncovered insofar as it is already thought through the question of 
arc h rather than fusij. 2. Q eoj also signifies divine revelation. In this, Q eoj stands 
for the arc h as it shows itself to humans in such a way that the truth of being may be 
grasped. As such, Q eoj signifies the ground of truth as truth itself; that which allows 
everything to be seen as it is rather than what it appears to be.   
 Further, Q eoj signifies the way arc h shows itself as justice. Initially, Q eoj 
stands for the ground of the human idea of justice, that human awareness, with its 
d aim wn, grasps life in reference to right and wrong. Moreover, Q eoj also signifies the 
ground of interpretation and coherence: that there is a coherent purpose or intelligent 
arc h that steers all that happens. Finally, Q eoj also has the attribute of justice itself. 
Herein, Q eoj means arc h in the sense of purpose in general. As purpose in general, 
Q eoj signifies not only good, coherence/interpretation and intelligence (thinking), but 
also the ground of interpretation and meaning itself. Thus, Q eoj as justice (steering) 
shows itself in the attributes of coherence within fusij, the actuality/possibility of 
good and further, in the potentiality of grasping coherence and the interpretation of 
human existence with regard to arc h.  
 Q eoj then, has a third attribute, namely: the proper. Herein, both the attribute 
of truth and justice are shown to be subservient to the proper, i.e., they both rely on 
the proper for validity. In this, Q eoj shows itself as the essential character of the 
arc h; it is only in the idea of the arc h as proper that allows the notions of justice and 
truth to attain meaning or validity.  
 In this way, Q eoj signifies the proper in comparison to being and being-
human, showing how the pre-Socratic quest for the arc h grasps the radical difference  
between being and arc h. The arc h, through the attribution of the proper belonging to 
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Q eoj, shows itself as otherwise than being. For instance, the truth of being does not 
belong to being (the truth is not a predicate of being) but is rather determined in 
advance via the proper. Likewise, justice is not determinable as belonging to things or 
events in fusij nor human existence (presence), but rather to the interpretation of 
coherence/good via its ground: the proper. As such, the end point reached by the pre-
Socratic quest for the arc h is the naming of Q eoj as the essence of arc h: the 
grasping of the proper and the proper as it shows itself.  
 
D. The Meaning of Religion 
The thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides through the construction of 
the potentialities of being-human and the notion of Q eoj has disclosed indications of 
the meaning of Religion in a phenomenological sense. Herein, the essence of the 
meaning of Religion shows itself as the relation between humans (in our being) and 
the arc h. This relationship can be characterised either with regard to being-human (as 
a two-fold potentiality) or with regard to the characteristics of the relationship as 
proper. 
 In the first case, the meaning of Religion is construed via what it is to be-
human. Herein, to be-human, for the most part, has shown itself as improper. The 
improper-ness of being-human is disclosed initially as everydayness, or, 
understanding that is grounded upon presence. This realm of opinion ( d oxa) has the 
characteristics of misunderstanding, misinterpretation and the improper pre-
conceptualisation  of arc h. As such, the misunderstanding results in the idea of fusij 
as the physical (nature), and being as the unifying ground of both presence and 
absence. Thus, being and non-being are thought as the same. 
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 This two-headedness described by Parmenides’ goddess also shows the 
meaning of Religion in its everyday actualisation and interpretation. Herein, the gods 
are conceived of as entities within fusij, entities with the character of being. Further, 
the relationship of being-human to the arc h as praxij in everyday life indicates the 
meaning of Religion in its improper-ness. Here, as Heraclitus shows, the meaning of 
Religion is a relating to the arc h ( Q eia) as present: “they talk to these statues as if 
one were to hold conversation with houses, in their ignorance…”1064 Thus, the 
meaning of Religion indicated (the relation of being-human with the arc h) shows 
itself initially via the improper grasping of Q eoj as an entity within being. 
 The indication of the meaning of Religion, in its improper potentiality, also 
shows itself as metaphysics (onto-theology). Herein, metaphysics as the disclosing of 
the arc h via abstractions from fusij, constitutes being and the arc h as identical. 
This, then, leads to the idea of Q eoj as unifying ground: an always-present entity in 
everything and causing everything. Thus, the meaning of Religion in the improper-
ness of being-human gives rise to a super-natural God: a God whose presence 
explains the presence of everything.  
 On the other hand, being-human also holds the potentiality of the proper. This 
potential is described in three ways: 1. The proper of being-human is the quest for the 
arc h and not-being: to understand the purpose which steers all things through all 
things. 2. The proper of being-human is also found in hqoj: the hqoj of being-human 
is our d aim wn. In this, I would argue, hqoj signifies the intrinsic potentiality of being-
human in living to ground our living upon Q eoj/arc h, i.e., the living according to the 
proper in its ground as our ground. As such, the second dimension of the proper is that 
of hqoj: adherence and pursuit of the arc h as the originary ground that shows the 
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ought of living. 3. The proper of being-human, finally, is found in what gets called (in 
pre-Socratic thought) divine revelation. Herein, the proper is disclosed insofar as the 
arc h shows itself, or communicates, to humans. As such, the third and final 
dimension of the proper potentiality of being-human signifies the showing itself (as 
communication) of the arc h to humans in existence. This showing itself, as 
Heraclitus argues, is never a presentation; becoming or being. Rather, the arc h only 
shows itself via indications; through manifestations that point to something other than 
being. Thus, the communication of the arc h is, essentially, what can be called the 
presentation of the impossible: the impossible showing itself within the possible – the 
interruption of the possible. 
 These three dimensions of the proper potentiality of being-human in relation 
to the arc h disclose three indications of the meaning of Religion.  
1. The first indication of the meaning of Religion is here disclosed as concern, or, the 
grasping of being (presence) within the quest for arc h. In this, the actualisation of the 
meaning of Religion shows itself as an approach to fusij as a secondary 
phenomenon. As such, fusij is not grasped in relation to its appearance, nor for 
itself, but rather through its significance or meaning already given by the arc h. Thus, 
the actualisation of Religion (in its proper sense) is dependent upon what is already in 
advance understood through the arc h.  
2. This understanding of the arc h, then, can be called care (as in Heidegger and 
others) or interpretation. Herein, interpretation is essentially a living in accordance to 
the arc h. A living according to the arc h, an allegiance, can also be called an 
interpretation of life in accordance with the arc h rather than in accordance with 
being/being-human. Thus, care as the meaning of Religion shows itself as an 
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interpretation of existence via a pursuit of the arc h, an hqoj grounded in the 
otherwise than being.  
3. Care as this hqoj, however, is dependent upon the showing itself of the arc h. In 
this, the arc h signifies the absolute other than being; the unfathomable, the 
unknowable and the impossible. Humans in our beings, as such, are entirely 
dependent upon the showing itself of the arc h for our idea or understanding of the 
arc h. In philosophical terminology, then, the arc h as it shows itself is called 
‘principle’; a principle that serves as a hermeneutical key through which existence 
gets interpreted and then actualised in praxij. 
 For humans in our being, the meaning of Religion as a relation to the arc h 
may be characterised as such (originary ground, principle) in two ways. First, through 
being (being-human) as the name calling of the otherwise than being. Herein, the 
arc h is related to as a negation: a calling through what it is not. As such, the arc h 
gets called such names as no-thing, the other, the name-less, and the impossible. Such 
naming, however, provides no positive characterisations of the arc h, but rather, 
excludes any character of being from it. In addition, the arc h gets characterised in a 
positive sense via the naming of principles, such as: Truth, Justice, Good and Love.  
 All of this naming, however, is dependent upon the showing itself of the arc h 
as the interruption of the everyday; the possible. This showing itself is essentially the 
advent of the impossible, or the interruption of presence through indications of non-
presence; of no-thing that can be re-presented. Both Heraclitus and Parmenides’ 
fragments provide clear examples or statements of this showing itself of the otherwise 
than being (called Q eoj). In Heraclitus, the fragments allude to this showing itself via 
the indications of the oracle at Delphi and the d aim wn (divine voice) found in 
searching one’s self. Likewise, in Parmenides, the ground of the truth provided in the 
 316 
fragments is literally the goddess, who in this case, calls Parmenides out of the 
everyday mortal world (the realm of being). 
 In general, therefore, the thinking of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides 
provides indications of the meaning of Religion (in its belonging-to being-human) as 
a relation between humans and the arc h. This relation, in essence, is no-thing other 
than a relation to the proper itself: the originary ground of meaning, coherence and 
truth.  
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Part Four: Towards an Existential Analysis. 
 
In this fourth part of the thesis, the aim is twofold: of moving towards an existential 
analysis and providing a preliminary interpretation of the meaning of Religion within 
that movement. This fourth part of the thesis will contain two chapters, the first with 
the aim of moving towards an existential analysis, while the second will provide a 
preliminary interpretation of the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon. 
 This fourth part of the thesis, however, must first be resituated in the context 
of the research as a whole. The problem of Religion, as posited in part one of the 
research, has been constituted as the question of the meaning of Religion in its 
‘belonging-to’ being-human. This way of characterising Religion, as such, is 
phenomenological; of disclosing the ontological region of Religion and seeking 
therein the ground of Religion in the character of being-human. 
 In part two of the research, phenomenology has been disclosed as a two-
phased interpretative method involving the deconstruction of preconceptions that 
reveals indications and an existential analysis – an uncovering of the existential 
structures of the phenomenon. Herein, the third part of the research provided 
deconstructive case studies of pre-Socratic thinking that disclosed indications of the 
meaning of Religion as a relation of being-human and originary ground (prot e 
arc h).  
 The horizon for this fourth and final part of the research, then, is the difficult 
and complex movement from a deconstruction to an existential analysis. Herein, the 
movement is entirely ontological and therefore, the terms and conceptual structures 
will also be entirely ontological. The basic problem of this movement is to be found in 
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disclosing the relatedness of what has been formally indicated and the existential 
character of being-human that founds the relation with arc h called Religion. 
The task of moving towards an existential analysis involves locating the 
indications of the meaning of Religion given by Pre-Socratic thinking within the 
horizon of existence. Herein, the indicated meaning of Religion as a relationship 
between being-human and originary ground must be situated in its existential 
structures; the structures of existence for being-human. The fundamental task of 
moving towards an existential analysis, as such, is the interpretation of Religion as a 
relationship that shows itself in existence (within the ontological structures of 
existence) that is grounded in the being-character of humans.  
The movement towards the existential analysis will contain two phases. 
Initially, the movement towards an existential analysis will be facilitated by a 
transitional phase that takes the indicative content obtained through the deconstruction 
of Pre-Socratic philosophy and refines this content into a number of central arguments 
pertinent to the meaning of Religion as a concept. The next phase will then utilise 
Heidegger’s three-fold structure of existence as the model for integrating this 
indicative content into an existential analysis.  
In the second chapter of part four, a preliminary interpretation of the meaning 
of Religion as a phenomenon will be provided. Herein, Religion will be interpreted in 
its modes of inauthenticity and authenticity. This interpretation will then set up the 
disclosure of the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon in its primary and originary 
sense.  
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Chapter Nine: Towards an Existential Analysis. 
Throughout the tradition of philosophical thinking there is a tendency towards what 
can be called metaphysical thinking in which, I would argue, there is a persistent 
tension or paradox. The essence of the metaphysical tendency reveals itself in the 
term itself – thinking the physical in its overarching structural unity, or, what is it that 
unifies all that is? However, metaphysics also reveals itself as a quest for the universal 
qua universal, which then also tends to become the quest for a universal notion or 
concept that covers everything present, representable or thought. Moreover, this 
unifying tendency of metaphysics shows itself as the quest for a universal question – a 
single question that encompasses and circumscribes all questions within it. The seeds 
of the destruction of metaphysics, as such, lie in the existential facticity of two 
primary philosophical questions neither of which can be adequately subsumed or 
unified with the other.   
If we take philosophy to signify the human quest to think about thinking in the 
broadest sense, i.e., the quest for understanding, for knowledge of universals and 
wisdom, two questions immediately arise.  
1. How is it that in being-human (Dasein)1065 we can understand being? This 
refers to the question of ‘what-being’: things, identity, and ‘reality’. This 
question, as such, is essentially the question of the relation between Dasein 
and the world of things (existents) and the how of being-human that 
constitutes presence (ou si a) as understood and as such, representable. Thus, 
the first question is in itself threefold: who-being (being-human), fusij (being 
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of existents) and the relation between Dasein and the being of existents (being-
for-Dasein). 
2. What is the meaning of life? This question immediately refers back to the 
question of the ground of being-human, i.e., the meaning of being-human in its 
ground.  This question is also the question of hqoj, or, of the proper life. The 
essence of this question, as such, is that of the arc h (originary ground). 
 
To gain access to the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon, it will be necessary to 
pay close attention to what has been indicated by Pre-Socratic thinking - that holds 
being and originary ground as questions in a radical difference. For it will be through 
this radical difference that the phenomenon of Religion will be disclosed in its 
meaning. The question of the meaning of Religion, as such, is necessarily founded in 
holding open the difference between ‘what-being’ and ‘who-being’, and thus 
revealing in stark contrast to ‘what-being’ the question of the meaning of life in 
relation to its ground and thus being-human. In attempting to hold open this question, 
it is first necessary to formulate the question of the otherwise than being in this radical 
difference. 
 
26. Preliminary Arguments: 
 
The Notion of Being-in-general is an illusion: 
a) The notion of being-in-general is an abstraction of the everyday character of 
being that belongs to being-human, wherein the character of Dasein is 
determined as the being who presents entities and the world as understood. In 
this, it is the character of being-Dasein to understand thought, and to think in 
 321 
reference to fusij. This tendency of Dasein’s being presents the abstraction 
called being-in-general whenever the indeterminate or non-presentable is 
thought. 
b) The notion of the identity of being-in-general and nothing is posited whenever 
being is understood in relation to originary ground – absolute genesis.1066  
Herein, the notion of being-in-general is an illusion brought to presence 
through Dasein’s sense of being as unity; the unification of being and 
originary ground in thought and as thought in its unity and ground. Further, 
the notion of being-in-general also signifies the subsumption of thinking (in its 
ground) under being within finitude and the temporal being of Dasein who 
cannot think without thinking being. 
 
The Proper Notion of Being: 
a) The everyday character of being is that which constitutes things as present (a 
unitary identity). The question of the everyday character of being, then, is that 
of Dasein: the being who presents beings as understood. 
b) The unified analogy of being, or, the analogous unity of being, is the rule of 
thinking being for Dasein. In this, everything and anything that can be thought 
will necessarily be thought of as present, representable or within presence in 
general as an abstraction. As such, the rule of being is this: for Dasein in our 
being, thinking shows itself as present or as a like-ness to presence. In the 
same way, the subject of thought is ruled by the analogous unity of being 
insofar as an object can only be thought of as present or as present-like for us. 
The tyranny of being is such that we cannot think the otherwise than being, or 
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grasp originary ground without thinking analogically; that is – positing a 
likeness to being or an “it is something like X’ – something with being. 
Therefore, when humans think, we think being and subsume all that is thought 
under being. 
c) The modalities of being are what-being and who-being. What-being or being-
for-Dasein can be called the phenomenon concern; the concern for working 
out the world in order to live ( e p i st hmh and t e c nh). In this respect the 
essence of concern is understanding that enables utility, and thus, concern is 
fundamentally a concern about that which constitutes something as an entity, 
i.e., being. Who-being, or being-human, can be called finitude; the being-in-a-
world of others and in relation to others (being-with). Who-being, then, is 
essentially a caring about something, and thus, fundamentally a meaning-
interpretative being within a world-horizon. Given the rule of being, the 
modality of who-being shows itself as a caring about things; the constitution 
of things as meaningful, and meaning as constituted through presence 
( f r onhsi j, sof i a). 
 
Being and Originary Ground (in relation to being-human) 
a) The ground of understanding being is the factical living of Dasein. This 
character of Dasein’s being is constituted by the present: the tendency of 
everyday living towards judgment, measurement, manipulation, control and 
force. Equally, this character of being-Dasein is constituted by the holding-
together of presence: unification, identification and universalisation. Thus, the 
essence of being-Dasein is literally being-present: of unification and 
determination. 
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b) The ground of being, which is always being-for-Dasein, shows itself in being-
human as a whole. Herein, being-human is grasped ‘for itself’ as a being-with 
and being-directed. Being-with signifies a being within a world constituted by 
meaningful relations, or, of constituting world relations as meaningful. 
Equally, being-directed signifies a being towards the world with purpose and 
within the world as purposive. Insofar as being-human is understood, being-
human is therefore given the being character of present-meaning (meaning of 
presence) and present purpose (the purpose of presence). 
 
c) The originary ground of being-for-humans is both understood and impossible 
to understand. In the first instance the ground of being is understood as being-
for-Dasein. Herein, the ground of being shows itself as temporality-finitude: 
the fundamental ‘how’ of human understanding. As such, temporality can be 
called the ground of being insofar as finitude is the ground of how humans in 
our being understand and insofar as grounding is an activity of being-
understanding.  
 
The originary ground of being-human as a whole, however, is impossible to 
understand: is nothing present, no-thing within presence, and no-thing to be 
identified. In this respect, the originary ground is a groundless-ground: there is 
nothing standing-under understanding. Therefore, the ground of being is not 
being, and must be thought of as otherwise than being. 
 
With regard to being-human, then, the originary ground can be thought in two 
ways: in relation to Dasein (being-human as what-being) or through being-
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human (as who-being). In the first case, the way of thinking originary ground 
can be called privation: thinking through absence and negation. The first way 
of thinking originary ground is thus essentially a determination of ‘what it is 
not’ – the negation of what-ness from thinking about the character of originary 
ground. This can also be called the negation of being. 
 
The second way into thinking about originary ground in relation to being-
human can be called the (positive) phenomenological way of indication. In 
this respect, the way into thinking about originary ground is founded upon the 
way who-being shows itself and the originary ground of the ‘who’ indicated 
therein.  
 
The phenomenological way into thinking about the originary ground via the 
notion of indication must be made transparent. Herein, the point of origin for 
interpretation is the presupposition that in the character of being-human as 
who-being, traces of the originary ground shows itself in the difference 
between ‘what-being’ and ‘who-being’ in such a way that ‘who-being’ 
indicates the otherwise than being. Thus, the primary indicative ways towards 
the originary ground of being-human are constituted through the 
characteristics of being-human called meaning and purpose.  
 
Additionally, any attempt to come to terms with a notion like ‘originary 
ground in general’ will prove illusory. First, any attempt to do so falls under 
the projection of being-in-general as an absolute abstraction: absolute 
unification. Moreover, any attempt falls under the analogy of being as a 
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projection of being-for-Dasein and the originary ground as object-like. Finally, 
the proper notion of being is being-human, that is, there is no such thing as 
being-in-general. Therefore, any representation of an originary ground of 
being-in-general proves to be privative in the everyday sense of false: a 
judgment which posits ‘that which is not, is’.1067  
 
The Radical Difference between Being and Originary Ground: 
 
a) The everyday character of this difference shows itself as the difference 
between presence and absence. Herein, being is characterised by emergence, 
presence, and within temporality (fusij). Alternatively, originary ground is 
indicated by absent-now, always-absent, and otherwise than temporality. This 
otherwise cannot be constituted as the eternal in the sense of always-present or 
necessarily present, but rather, shows itself in the difference between fusij as 
it emerges and the absent ground of Dasein that constitutes fusij. 
b) The character of this difference in thinking shows itself as a difference 
between the possible and impossible. To think being is possible for humans in 
our being. To think otherwise is impossible. 
c) The difference between being-human (identity) and our originary ground 
shows itself as a difference between unity and disunity. Herein, the unity of 
being-human is called identity, the unification of what and who we are 
subsumed within the analogy of being. 
 
                                               
1067
 Plato, Sophist, 263a-c 
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The originary ground of being-human, as otherwise than unity rather than the 
opposite of unity1068, shows itself via the disruption of identity, the 
interruption of the emergence of who-being, and the discontinuity of who-
being within fusij as an interpretation and directedness towards absence. 
Therefore, the essence of this difference can be called the projection of being 
(identity) in relation to the otherwise than being: the originary ground that 
interrupts identity through the ‘who’ of being. 
 
27. The Point of Origin for the Existential Analysis 
The point of origin for a phenomenological interpretation of the meaning of Religion 
involves a three phased consideration of the radical difference between being-human 
and originary ground. The first phase can be called the negation of Dasein. The 
second phase is the negation of being-human as understood. The third phase invokes 
indications of the originary ground of being-human as the disruption of the unity of 
what and who being, the interruption of identity as continuity, and finally, the 
otherwise that shows itself through life in meaning and directedness. 
 
A. The negation of being-for-Dasein: 
The negation of being-for-Dasein forms three logical imperatives insofar as the 
radical difference is adhered to. First, the idea that the originary ground may be 
constituted as an emergent entity must be excluded. Additionally, the idea that the 
originary ground may be characterised as within fusij in abstract form, eg., as first 
cause, unmoved-mover, or the idea of God as creator must also be excluded (originary 
ground as an ideal object/entity). Finally, the idea that originary ground may be 
                                               
1068
 Plato, Sophist, 258b-e 
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characterised via the ground of presence, eg., temporality as the ground of being-for-
Dasein, must be excluded. These exclusions are each logical imperatives insofar as 
the originary ground is not-being. Thus, the negation of being leads inevitably to the 
negation of Dasein insofar as Dasein constitutes being as presence. 
 
B. The negation of being-human as understood: 
For humans in our being understanding is characterised by thinking being. In this 
way, to think about being-human is to understand being-human as a present entity 
with being. Initially, then, being-human must be excluded insofar as the originary 
ground of being-human is not an entity with being. Furthermore, being-human is 
understood as thinking-being; the presence of who-being in thinking. Equally, then, 
the understanding of being-human must be excluded insofar as the originary ground 
of being-human is otherwise than being, and thus otherwise than thinking-being. 
Therefore, the paradox of the analogy of being lies at the epicentre of the negation of 
being-human. For, insofar as being-human is thought, being or something like being 
is thought.  
 The essence of the negation of being-human as understood is the exclusion of 
thinking as thinking being. Herein, the point of origin for an existential analysis is 
precisely indication, in the sense of a likeness of who-being as thinking and who-
being as present as thinking-being, insofar as this likeness indicates something 
otherwise than being where being is negated. 
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C. The negation of being-human – full sense: 
In arriving at the full determination of being-human in who-being, we also arrive at 
the point of complete negation of being-human in relation to originary ground. The 
full determination and complete negation of being-human originates in the question of 
Ethics – the proper. Here, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics serves as a pertinent point 
of orientation. 
 The full determination of being-human within the horizon of who-being is 
only possible insofar as the question of hq oj (a good or proper life) is addressed. 
Herein two questions arise: Are humans in our being good? What is meant by good? 
The first question involves determining the character of being-human in relation to 
goodness, and moreover, predetermining goodness as an inherent character of who-
being.  The second question, accordingly, involves the attempt to think-though the 
meaning of goodness in its ground for humans.  
 Let us start, then, with the assertion that humans in our being are not 
intrinsically good (1106a7-10).1069 Further, following Aristotle, let us assert that to be-
human is to tend towards pleasure as a ground for and end of our living (1109a15-16). 
This assertion corresponds with the formulation of being-human as understood, i.e., 
subsumed under being, insofar as pleasure is inherently related to the priority of 
fusij. These two assertions, as such, destabilise the tendency to preconceive the 
good, the proper, and being as equivalent terms. Thus, a difference appears between 
being and good. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that in some fashion good is a 
potentiality of human existence. This potentiality, insofar as it does not belong to 
being-human, must have its ground in some otherwise than being-human that shows 
itself in who-being as a question.  
                                               
1069
 the notion of evil is not relevant to this point 
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 Elsewhere, Aristotle argues, and Heidegger’s translation/interpretation of 
Aristotle suggests,1070 that being-human is the being who may always also be 
otherwise than itself (1140a30-1141a1).  To be-human, in a strict sense, is to be 
bound by presence – to be finite. We cannot say, in this regard, that to be human is to 
be good. So in fact, we must say rather: good is the otherwise of being-human. 
Therefore, goodness is a potentiality of human existence only insofar as we are not 
ourselves.1071 
 Aristotle then goes on to make two points: the intellect is that which most 
resembles the good (1178a1-8) and additionally, goodness in humans is a result of 
some otherwise than being-human, originary ground (1179b20-23). Therefore, it can 
be seen that the notion or actuality of goodness as a question leads to three primary 
outcomes. First, the notion of goodness in relation to being-human leads to the 
necessity of negating being-human. Further, the originary ground of goodness is 
otherwise than being. Finally, goodness shows itself as indications and traces through 
the intellect (nou j) as a ‘who’ that is otherwise than being-human. The opening into 
this otherwise than being, as such, can be found in the complete negation of being-
human and in the traces called the good. 
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 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, p.97 (Heidegger’s interpretation and translation of Aristotle’s Nic.Eth. 
VI, 9) 
1071
 This is precisely, in my interpretation, what Aristotle means when he refers to the life of f il o -
s o f ia (1177b26-34): “But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not insofar as he is man that 
he will live so, but insofar as something divine is present in him…” 
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D. The propositions of Complete Negation: 
1. Being-human is not being-proper. Good does not belong to humans in our being, 
and as such, good is absent from being-human. 
2. Caring about good is intrinsic to human existence, and may be constituted as the 
essential character of who-being in existence. Thus, the character of the ‘who’ of 
being-human can be called: ‘the being who may always also be otherwise than itself’. 
As such, the facticity of caring about life indicates something about this ‘who’ that is 
otherwise than being.  
3. This ‘who’ of caring completely negates being-human insofar as it is not being-
human that shows itself as good, but rather, the potentiality of being-human to be for-
given good through living somehow otherwise than being. This for-given-ness of the 
good shows itself as the traces of a ‘who’ in human existence in three primary ways: 
thinking the ‘who’, historical revelation of the ‘who’, and the ‘who in us’.  
 
28. Indications of the ‘Who’: 
 
A. Indications via who-being as intellect ( n ou j):  
According to Aristotle, the intellect is that rational part of the soul that serves as the 
ground of human thinking (1139a1-17). Herein, the intellect is characterised in three 
primary ways: as that which epitomises the potential good of humans, as that which 
serves as the ground of proper knowing (the truth), and further, as that which shows 
itself as the ‘who’ of being-human that most resembles the otherwise (1178b8-32). 
Thus, the intellect is characterised as the showing itself of the ‘who’ ( d aim wn) of 
being-human that most resembles originary ground. 
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 The resemblance of the intellect to the otherwise cannot be construed with 
regard to the knowing presented therein, the eternal (1177a7-b26), insofar as this 
knowing forms the absolute abstraction of the everyday being-character, and further, 
the illusion of being-in-general.  Rather, the primary characteristic of the intellect in 
resemblance is the intuitive grasping and for-given-ness of the originary ground in the 
questioning of hqoj (1143a19-24).1072 As such, life is grasped as somehow purposive, 
and already in advance means something for humans. The primary question of the 
intellect is of the good: of a living within proper purpose and true meaning. Thus, the 
showing of the ‘who’ of being-human in the intellect indicates the character of 
originary ground in the question of proper purpose and meaning within the negation 
of being-human. 
 Further, the resemblance of the intellect to the otherwise may be constituted as 
a trace of the character of originary ground. The intellect, as intuitive, gives some 
indication of the character of the ‘who’ deprived of being. That is, the intuition of 
purpose and meaning without regard to being(s). In this way, principles grasped in 
relation to purpose and meaning indicate something about the character of the ‘who’ 
in a positive sense (eg., good, love, friendship…).  
 Moreover, insofar as the intellect shows itself as some capacity for choice and 
action (being-human may always also be-otherwise than ourself) the ‘who’ is 
indicated by its for-given-ness to the intellect as a potentiality. In other words, the 
presence of choice is presupposed by a capacity to chose, and this is further 
presupposed by the for-given-ness of ways to chose (being and originary ground). 
Therefore, in this capacity for choice belonging to the intellect, an indicative trace of 
the otherwise must necessarily for-give the ‘who’ to humans.  
                                               
1072
 See footnote for this paragraph in Jonathan Barnes’ Revised Oxford Translation of Aristotle’s 
works regarding etymological relation of judgment and forgiveness. 
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B. Indications of Originary Ground in Factical Existence:  
There are three basic ways in which the otherwise is indicated in factical existence: 
the historical, revelation, and the teleological. The first of these, the historical, is how 
temporality has been disrupted in such a way that traces of the otherwise become 
embedded in the historical conscience of human beings. These interruptions of the 
temporal form narratives of impossibilities (mu q oj) through which demands are made 
upon human existence. These demands, then, form a hermeneutical system in relation 
to hqoj as the historical disclosure of the purpose and meaning of human existence. 
Thus, the essence of the historical indications of originary ground can be called 
l og oj: the communication that discloses the meaning and purpose of living as ‘who-
being’. 
 The second way, of revelation, is how the personal experience of factical 
existence becomes disrupted in such a way that way traces and questions form in 
relation to life. Herein, revelation marks the impossible disruption of being-human as 
a factical experience through which the security of human existence is negated. This 
experience, as such, is essentially the l og oj that negates being-human: that reveals an 
absence of good, meaning and purpose. 
  The final way, of teleology, disrupts the future driven understanding of being-
human as not-yet and being in control. Herein, indications of the originary ground 
emerge in the impossible future that cannot be controlled nor measured. The absence 
of being that beckons from the future confronts human existence in such a way that 
t eloj becomes the impossible “to what end and what meaning is life grounded 
originarily”? 
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C. The Originary Ground in Us: 
The Originary ground is indicated insofar as it lives through us. Herein, the living 
through us of the originary ground shows itself as the ‘good’, or, the proper that 
comes to presence in us through the negation of being-human. As such, this way of 
indication is both the most immediate – as the impossible that comes to presence – but 
also the most paradoxical – for even present is impossible to understand. Nonetheless, 
the originary ground in us forms positive indications insofar as being-human is not 
merely negated, but also discloses positive phenomena that communicates. 
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Chapter Ten: The Meaning of Religion as a Phenomenon. 
 
The meaning of Religion as a phenomenon is intrinsically located in the relation of 
being-human and originary ground. As such, the meaning of Religion must 
necessarily be characterised in two ways: as a relationship constituted within 
existence, and as a relationship presupposed in the ‘who’ of being-human. Within the 
first characterisation, the meaning of Religion will be addressed as a relation within 
existence that is both inauthentic and authentic; as belonging to being-human and the 
otherwise of being-human. In the second characterisation, the meaning of Religion 
will be outlined in its base ontological structures. In both characterisations, I will 
utilise Heidegger’s threefold determination of being-human previously set out: 
concern, care and directedness.  
 
29. Religion as a Phenomenon of Existence: 
The analysis of Religion as a phenomenon of existence begins within the context of 
the determination of the character of being-human, and further, in the light of the 
predetermined character of Religion as a human relation with originary ground. The 
former, then, discloses the character of being-human as a being who may always also 
be otherwise than itself. Herein, this characterisation signifies that the analysis of 
Religion as a phenomenon of existence must disclose how Religion shows itself as 
both an inauthentic and authentic life. Further, the latter signifies the way in which 
Religion may be determined as either improper or proper as it shows itself. Herein, 
the delineation between proper and improper lies in the difference between the 
otherwise and being in the showing itself of Religion. Insofar as being-human as 
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existence tends towards the improper the analysis will first outline the existential 
meaning of Religion as a phenomenon that shows itself as improper.  
 
A. Religion as Improper: An Object Oriented Belief System. 
The essence of the improper showing itself of Religion constitutes the human relation 
with originary ground as a knowledge system with regard to an object that serves as 
the originary ground; an object that stands under being. As such, the improper of 
Religion is essentially the way Religion shows itself within the realm of 
understanding and fusij. Thus, Religion as improper is nothing other than the 
meaning of Religion belonging-to Dasein.  
 
Concern:  
Herein, the actualisation of Religion shows itself as an improper concern for working 
out and understanding the originary ground as an object or entity. Initially, then, this 
concern is actualised as a science of abstraction; concerned with the truth about this 
object/entity as present, representable, and within presence in general. Thus, the 
actualisation of Religion in concern shows itself initially in the tendency towards 
metaphysical thinking and theologising wherein Religion is constituted as concern for 
understanding the entity that is first cause or Being-in-general (the truth of being). 
 Moreover, the actualisation of Religion as an improper showing itself 
constitutes the relationship with originary ground to be a ‘holding-to-be-true’ within 
the realm of understanding in the sense of ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’. In this way, 
the relationship that constitutes Religion is improperly conceived of as a relationship 
of understanding; that the object/entity related-to can be understood and is understood 
within the realm of being-true and true-being. Accordingly, Religion becomes 
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actualised as the understanding of being-truth: the actualisation of true-belief in what 
could be called the modes of orthopraxis or orthodoxy.  
 In the first case, orthopraxis, Religion is understood as a being-true of human 
existence in relationship with the object/entity of belief. In other words, Religion 
shows itself in ortho-praxis as an understanding of being-good that humans may be-
true to in existence. Orthopraxis, as such, is essentially the constitution of Religion as 
a being-good that belongs as a possibility to being-human in relation to the object of 
belief. Thus, being, truth and good are the same. 
 In the second case, of orthodoxy, Religion shows itself as an understanding of 
being-true as emergent to humans. Herein, belief is essentially an understanding of the 
entity/object constituted as the Truth. Moreover, insofar as belief is a relation 
characterised by understanding, the being-true of belief becomes manifest as a 
relation to a universal (always present) entity/object that is both determinable and 
unifying. Finally, then, in orthodoxy Religion shows itself as a being-true towards 
which humans believe, and in belief, understand as the Truth (objective being). Thus, 
in the mode of orthodoxy Religion shows itself as the human understanding of Truth 
as an object/entity that is-there (Da-Sein) and stands under presence.  
 
Care: 
There are three primary dimensions to the improper showing itself of Religion in care: 
the interpretative horizon of existence as causal (within judgment), the interpretation 
of life as ‘spiritual’ and the interpretation of life as ‘metaphysical’. The first pertains 
to the hqoj of human existence, while the second and third pertain to the 
interpretation of the entity/object of the religious relation as present.  
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 The interpretation of existence as causal is grounded in Dasein’s being: to 
think presence (to understand) is to judge.1073 Likewise, the interpretative horizon 
belonging-to the everyday showing itself of Religion is one of judgment and 
causality. Herein, the everyday concern for truth is disclosed in its foundations; of 
universal law and an hqoj of judgment.  
 The improper manifestation of Religion as an interpretation of life shows 
itself, in the first instance, as a caring about universal law, eg., a singular cause that 
serves as the unifying ground of being. This caring about of everyday Religion, as 
such, cares about presence and constitutes the interpretation of life via presence. Thus, 
the caring about universal law manifests as an interpretation of life that constitutes the 
relation of being-human and originary ground as an always-present living under 
judgment. Further, the originary ground appears as present; present to humans as 
universal law and as that which poses universal judgment. 
 Intrinsic to this interpretative horizon, then, is the constitution of hqoj (proper 
living) as a living within judgment (moral law). Herein, the relationship of humans 
and originary ground discloses life as a being-t/here (Da-Sein) under judgment. 
Accordingly, hqoj is characterised by the human ability to adhere to this moral law as 
both a universal law of being and determinate laws for humans. As such, the essence 
of the interpretative dimension of the improper showing itself of Religion is both an 
interpretation of reality via an entity/object that is universal law and a subsequent 
interpretation of human living within the horizon of presented moral laws.   
 The interpretative horizon of hqoj as moral law, then, projects two primary 
ways of constituting originary ground as present to humans; as an object and/or entity.  
The latter, which can be called the ‘subjective’ or ‘spiritual’ constitutes originary 
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ground as an entity with being who is personally present to humans in a supra-
physical/spiritual realm. Herein, life gets interpreted via the projection of a spiritual 
realm that is understood in everydayness as the cause of good and evil, and further, 
the cause of physical experiences in general. The spiritual realm, as the ideal 
abstraction of everydayness in a ‘subjective’ sense, serves as an interpretative horizon 
wherein causality is personified, and thus, all experience can be attributed to 
spiritual/personified causes. Thus, the essence of what I have called ‘spiritualism’ is 
an interpretation of life that constitutes cause as personified and thus, the originary 
ground as a person with the attributes of first-cause; the personality of universal law.  
 In the second case, life is interpreted upon the basis of a metaphysical realm of 
being-in-general. Herein, the interpretative horizon of life is constituted in the abstract 
ideal of being as an object: always-present, binding (unifying), ruling and steering. As 
such, hqoj is grounded in the ability to adhere to an interpretation of life within the 
horizon of ‘objective’ universal law, through a being-likeness of humans to the object 
being-in-general or through an imitation of the universal natural law.1074 The meaning 
of Religion, herein, is the necessary presupposition of an object that serves as the 
foundation of physical presence, i.e., the religious relation is constituted by the 
rational explanation of existence.1075  
 
Directedness: 
The meaning of Religion as an intrinsic directedness of Dasein towards originary 
ground, with regard to everydayness, has three primary characteristics. First, 
directedness towards originary ground belonging to Dasein constitutes originary 
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 Heidegger’s notion of Religion serves as an example here: the emergence of the truth of being as an 
entity which also becomes an eschatology (predetermination) of being through time.  
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ground as a being with-in being. The presence of the originary ground, herein, is an 
always-presence; a presence with-in everything that works out though everything. The 
being of originary ground is that of highest unifying being; of universal law, always-
genesis and the presence of Truth. 
 Likewise, the directedness towards originary ground belonging-to Dasein 
constitutes belief as a mode of understanding.1076 As such, the primary character of 
belief is truth; the truth of what can be understood in relation to originary ground. 
Herein, true-belief is restricted to the realm of presence and the ways in which 
originary ground is understood therein, e.g., via Reason or revealed religion(s). 
 The meaning of Religion in an everyday, improper sense, is the self-projection 
of being-for-Dasein in relation to originary ground, characterised for the most part, by 
what gets called a subjective or objective relatedness. Herein, the subjective 
relatedness of Dasein to the originary ground projects a who-being as understood; a 
personality that serves as the ground of presence. The subjective, then, is inherently a 
theologising of the personality of who-being; the divinisation of the identity of who-
being.  
 The objective  relatedness of Dasein to the originary ground projects what-
being as understood; a being that is an objective unifying ground understood as 
necessarily presupposed in the reality of presence. The objective, then, is inherently 
an onto-theological thinking that projects being-for-Dasein (everydayness) as a 
unifying ground called being or something like being. Being-for-Dasein, as such, is 
theologised; the divinisation of understanding towards that which stands-under all that 
is.  
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 See Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul’s faith as pneuma in Introduction to the ‘phenomenology of 
religion’ 
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B. Religion as a proper phenomenon of existence:  
Concern: 
There are two primary dimensions of the showing itself of Religion with regard to the 
proper of concern; the negation of concern and chairological temporality. The former 
signifies the negation of Dasein’s concern and the latter, the potential of the otherwise 
of being-human in existence.  
 The negation of concern belonging-to the proper of Religion in existence is 
inherently the negation of the identity of Dasein (the ‘I’) wherein the primacy of 
concern about the present is reversed. In the first instance, then, the negation of 
concern is characterised by a denial of the primacy of an individual’s concerns about 
living. Further, this denial extends to the negation of concern as a motive for directing 
living. As such, the negation of concern takes on two forms: the negation of the ‘I’ of 
Dasein and the negation of the primacy of presence. 
 The negation of the ‘I’ of concern is the threefold denial of self. Herein, the 
denial of self is given as the denial of selfishness – that ‘my’ concerns are of primary 
importance (primary meaning) and the prime motive for ‘my’ living. Additionally, the 
denial of self is given as the denial of the ‘they’; the projection of a general 
selfishness of humans as motive. Finally, the denial of self is given as the denial of 
‘not I’; the concern about others as differing identities present to the ‘I’.  
 The negation of the primacy of presence negates the primacy of concern as a 
concern about the present and presence in general. Herein, the negation of the 
primacy of presence is given as the threefold denial of the meaning of presence. 
Initially, this is given as the denial of the tendency belonging to Dasein to think 
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meaning and purpose as a property of present things (things in their being). Further, 
the denial of the primacy of presence is given as an overcoming  the tendency of 
Dasein to constitute meaning and purpose as belonging to ‘who I am’; meaning and 
purpose as an integral aspect of being-human.  Finally, this denial of the primacy of 
presence is given as the denial of the meaning of abstraction; that the world of 
presence has as a property inherent meaning and purpose. Thus, in general, the 
negation of the primacy of presence signifies an active overcoming of the tendency to 
subsume meaning/purpose under presence and, moreover, the tendency to understand 
presence as standing-under meaning/purpose.  
 The potentiality of being-human to be otherwise can be called the actualisation 
of chairological temporality given as a concern for the absent. Herein, chairological 
temporality constitutes existence as a positive absence: the primacy of 
meaning/purpose as an impossible-possibility. As such, two primary modes of 
chairological temporality are given within existence: hope and expectation.  
 Hope signifies a concern for meaning and purpose that cannot be understood, 
nor shows itself in presence. Hope, then, constitutes the meaning and purpose of 
living as an avowal that meaning and purpose lives through us: the actualisation of 
originary ground through human living. Hope, as such, is essentially a choosing to be 
concerned for originary ground, and signifies a for-given-ness of originary ground 
without presence.1077 The actualisation of chairological temporality, therefore, is the 
for-given-ness of hope for a proper life living through us.  
  The concern for the absent of chairological temporality may also be called 
expectation. Herein, life is constituted by the expectation for the interruption of 
presence and the disruption of understanding via meaning/purpose. As such, the 
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expectation of chairological temporality awaits the disruption of temporality; the 
overcoming of presence by originary ground. This is not, then, an expectation for the 
future, for the present, nor the past, but rather, an awaiting the advent of the proper of 
living that comes to presence as the dissolution of temporality. Thus, the significance 
of expectation belonging-to chairological temporality is the for-given-ness of 
originary ground that overcomes temporality and presence via meaning and purpose. 
This is no more or less than the overcoming of Dasein’s being, or, of being-Dasein. 
 
Caring – Faithful Dwelling:  
The meaning of Religion as a phenomenon of existence, in the sense of the proper, 
shows itself as a caring characterised by faithful dwelling. As with concern, the for-
given-ness of care is both a negation of given-ness and the positive for-given-ness of 
the potentiality of the otherwise of being-human in existence.  
 Initially, care shows itself as a negation of interpretation that holds open the 
radical difference between being and originary ground. Herein, the character of care is 
such that life is not interpreted via being and accordingly, that the interpretation of life 
is held open to originary ground. As such, the initial given-ness of care can be called a 
faithful dwelling within the question of originary ground. Further, care shows itself as 
an intentional interpretation of life remaining within meaning and purpose; as 
indicating remnants of the proper. Herein, care shows itself as intentional: seeking the 
originary ground as a way of interpreting life. As such, the showing itself of care may 
also be called a faithful dwelling that remains within the indications of originary 
ground.  
Finally, care shows itself as a hermeneutical horizon. Hermeneutics, then, is 
characterised by a meaning-forming founded upon the indications of originary 
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ground. Initially, this hermeneutical horizon holds faithfully to the relation of being-
human and originary ground through the interpretation of the analogy of being as 
indicative of the otherwise than being. Further, through the hermeneutical horizon, 
life is interpreted via indicative principles of originary ground. That is, life is 
interpreted via principles such as: good, love, friendship… which form a meaningful 
life within the implications of response-ability.1078 Thus, the essential character of 
care as a hermeneutical horizon shows itself as a potentiality belonging-to being-
human called responsibility constituted in the holding faithful to principles as 
indications of the proper ‘how’ of living. 
These principles of interpreting life belong intrinsically to the relationship 
between being-human and originary ground. Herein, the hermeneutical horizon 
exceeds the given-ness of indicative principles through the for-given-ness of originary 
ground as the potential otherwise of being-human. This excessive for-given-ness of 
originary ground may be called log oj in so far as, somehow the originary ground for-
gives the proper as discourse within the relation between being-human and our 
potential otherwise than being. This for-given-ness of the log oj, as such, shows itself 
as a hermeneutic key that founds the possibility of a proper interpretation of life. 
Thus, care shows itself as the potential otherwise of being-human; a relationship with 
originary ground wherein the proper is communicated to being-human as a proper 
interpretation of life.  
 
Directedness: Religion as a meaning oriented life. 
The meaning of Religion in its sense of the proper arises within the dissonance 
between life and meaning: being and originary ground. Herein, Religion signifies in 
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its most general sense, the potentiality belonging-to being-human of an hqoj that is 
otherwise than being-human. As such, a fundamental meaning of Religion is the 
potential of faithful dwelling: a living within an authentic relationship with originary 
ground. This faithful dwelling, however, is presupposed by the potentiality of being-
human to be oriented towards originary ground as indicated in life. This potential of 
orientation can be called belief.1079 
 Belief initially signifies the general ability to be-oriented towards originary 
ground. Further, insofar as originary ground discloses the proper meaning and 
purpose of living, belief may be characterised as a general being-directed towards a 
meaningful life, or, meaning and purpose in general. Accordingly, belief signifies a 
being-directed towards the originary ground as proper. Herein, the orientation towards 
the proper forms the potentiality belonging-to being-human of the otherwise, insofar 
as the otherwise becomes a potentiality of existence upon the ground of a directedness 
towards the proper and originary ground. Belief, as such, is the ground of being-
human as the being who may also be otherwise than itself. 
 The fundamental character of belief is the potentiality of being-directed 
towards originary ground that belongs-to being-human in existence. Herein, belief 
initially shows itself as a being-towards nothing: a directedness towards that which 
cannot be understood or known. Further, belief also shows itself as a being-towards 
the otherwise of being-human: a directedness towards the question of meaning and 
purpose. Finally, however, belief  exceeds both insofar as the being-directed of belief 
forms the potentiality of a relationship  between being-human and originary ground 
upon which the indications of meaning and purpose are dependent. The primordial 
meaning of belief, as such, is the potentiality belonging-to being-human of 
                                               
1079
 See Glossary: belief 
 345 
directedness towards originary ground that forms an authentic relation. Therefore, the 
meaning of Religion as a proper phenomenon of existence is essentially belief: the 
potentiality of forming an authentic relationship with originary ground. What remains, 
then, is the complete formulation of the meaning of Religion as belonging-to being-
human. 
 
30. The Meaning of Religion as Belonging-to being-human: 
The primary difficulty in attempting to come to terms with the fundamental meaning 
of Religion as a phenomenon lies in the twofold potentiality of being-human. Herein, 
it is not simply a matter of disclosing the meaning of Religion within a binary 
opposition; either authentic or inauthentic, nor the disclosure of these potential 
meanings of Religion as ‘equiprimordial’. Rather, the problem lies in disclosing the 
meaning of Religion within the horizon of two ways of saying the proper and the 
aporia of the co-existence of these ways of the proper in being-human. Therefore, the 
disclosure of the primary meaning of Religion will begin with a discussion of the 
ways of saying the proper. 
 
A. Ways of Saying the Proper: 
As Aristotle notes in his Ethics, there are as many ways of saying the proper (or good) 
as there are ways of actualisation (1094a3-10). With regard to Religion, however, the 
ways of saying the proper are delimited to two primary possibilities: being-human and 
the potential otherwise of being-human. Herein, the proper of being-human, or the 
proper of being, is a legitimate how of characterisation. As such, the first way of 
saying the proper for our purposes signifies being: that this is properly the character of 
being belonging-to being-human. However, the proper also signifies the potentiality 
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of the otherwise of being-human, which, with regard to Religion signifies the 
possibility of an authentic relation of being-human with originary ground. But this 
possibility is only given in the negation of being-human. Thus, the second way of 
saying the proper signifies an authentic relation with originary ground only in the loss 
of the proper being of being-human. We have, then, an aporia of saying the proper 
with regard to Religion for both ways coexist even in the fundamental meaning of 
Religion as a phenomenon. The task of disclosing the fundamental meaning of 
Religion must therefore begin with the aporia of the ways of saying the proper and 
ascertaining how this aporia shows itself.  
 It becomes immediately apparent, insofar as the aporia of the proper belongs 
inherently to the realm of the showing itself of Religion, that the way of addressing 
the aporia will be found within a characterisation of Religion-for-Dasein, i.e., the how 
of understanding Religion as a phenomenon. This is the realm of concern; the realm 
of showing itself in which Dasein understands. Thus, the way of addressing the 
aporia of the proper lies within concern and the ways of constituting the proper as 
understood in existence. Further, we must seek within concern, the ways of saying the 
proper pertinent to the fundamental meaning of Religion.  
 
B. Concern:  
In concern, the actualisation of being-human as Dasein, there are three primary ways 
of saying the proper. Initially, the proper may be said with regard to being, which is 
equally the intrinsic inauthenticity of Religion as a phenomenon. Further, the proper 
shows itself within the analogy of being as a resemblance of originary ground in the 
understanding of an authentic relationship between being-human and originary 
ground. Finally, the proper may also be said as the proper relationship of being-
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human and originary ground as it shows itself as an aporia: the negation of the proper 
of being.  
 
Bad Faith 
Initially, the proper meaning of Religion as it shows itself in concern can be called 
‘bad faith’ in the sense of the actualisation of existence solely within a concern about 
being. Herein, the meaning of Religion shows itself as a living faithfully in 
accordance with being-human as proper, and as the only possible proper subject of 
understanding. As such, the meaning of Religion shows itself essentially as the 
understanding of life wherein being-human is reified and being-human constituted as 
universal law. The proper meaning of Religion, in the first instance, can therefore be 
called ‘bad faith’ insofar as it shows itself as a relationship with originary ground 
wherein the originary ground is negated or denied. The phenomenological content of 
‘bad faith’ is as follows: 
1. The ground of the meaning of Religion as bad faith is located in Dasein’s 
being concerned with being as it is understood. The ground of understanding 
being, it follows, is nothing other than being-human as understood. Thus, the 
intrinsic meaning of Religion as it shows itself is the relation of understanding 
being with the ground of understanding, i.e., temporality/finitude.  
2. Accordingly, the meaning of Religion as bad faith is actualised in a concern 
for proper being. Herein, the proper is reduced to the singularity of being, i.e., 
the proper is a property of being. As such, Religion shows itself as a concern 
for being-properly-human and constitutes the proper as belonging-to being-
human therein.  
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3. Further, this is actualised in a concern for proper understanding (Dasein) 
wherein the projection of understanding called ‘Truth’  becomes the primary 
character of Religion as it shows itself. Herein, the meaning of Religion is 
actualised as a proper holding-to-be-true within the possibilities of being-
truly-human and/or being-truly-understood by humans. In the former, Religion 
is actualised as a concern for the subject: ‘truly-human’ while in the latter, 
actualised as a concern for an understanding of the Truth that belongs to 
being-human. In either case, Religion essentially shows itself as a concern for 
the proper belonging to Dasein’s being.  
4. The primary character of understanding that belongs to Dasein is judgment. 
Bad faith discloses the meaning of Religion, as such, to be the judgment of 
truth belonging to being-human. Herein, the actualisation of Religion shows 
itself in two interrelated modes: the self-understanding of being-human as the 
being who judges the truth (constitutes the truth and thus the proper) and/or 
the self-understanding of being-human as the being who properly understands 
the Truth (the projection of understanding as the Truth). The former 
constitutes being-human as universal law: to be human is to be the originary 
ground of purpose and meaning of life. Accordingly, the latter constitutes 
being-human as the being who properly understands the true meaning and 
purpose of human life.  
 
Religion as Morality: An authentic relation with originary ground subsumed within 
the analogy of being. 
The second way of saying the proper of Religion as it shows itself in concern can be 
called ‘morality’. Herein, Religion shows itself as an authentic relation with originary 
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ground that is actualised as a concern for Dasein’s grasp of originary ground as it is 
understood. Accordingly, the meaning of Religion shows itself as a living faithfully 
within the law: that which is understood to be the laws of the proper given by 
originary ground. Thus, the essential meaning of Religion as morality is an authentic 
relationship of being-human with originary ground as it shows itself in the laws of the 
otherwise than being-human. The phenomenological content of the meaning of 
Religion as morality as such is as follows: 
1. The ground of the meaning of Religion as morality is located in Dasein’s 
concern for the showing itself of originary ground. The ground of this concern, 
herein, is an authentic relation with originary ground insofar as it shows itself 
within Dasein’s understanding. Thus, the fundamental meaning of Religion as 
morality is an understanding of originary ground within the analogy of being. 
2. Accordingly, the meaning of Religion as morality is actualised as a concern 
for the proper of being-human given by the relationship with originary ground 
as it is understood subsumed under the analogy of being. Herein, the proper is 
grasped as originary ground (otherwise than being-human), but is nonetheless 
understood as a likeness to being. As such, Religion shows itself as a concern 
for the proper wherein the proper is grasped as a likeness to being-human and 
thus understood in the sense of law.  
3. The grasping of the proper as likeness is first and foremost dependent upon the 
way in which the originary ground shows itself to Dasein in our concern for 
the proper. Herein, the meaning of Religion as morality is actualised as a 
negation of concern. That is, the negation of human concerns and the denial of 
the primacy of presence. Within this negation of human concern and the 
corresponding human foregrounding of purpose and meaning, the potential 
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relation with originary ground arises. This relation, then, presents Religion as 
the human understanding of purpose and meaning in judgment or under law.  
4. Religion in this sense, is constituted by the showing itself of originary ground 
as log oj understood by humans as laws. This is the case insofar as, for 
Dasein, understanding is always characterised by judgment and the grasping 
of causality. Herein, the meaning of Religion as morality is actualised in two 
interrelated ways: grasping originary ground as proper judgment and 
understanding the log oj of originary ground as law. With regard to the 
former, the meaning of Religion is an authentic relation with originary ground 
grasped within the analogy of being. With regard to the latter, the proper given 
by the log oj is grasped as laws for the potential proper (otherwise) of being-
human. 
 
Religion as the aporia of existence: 
The third way of saying the proper of Religion can be called aporia. Herein, Religion 
shows itself as an authentic relation with originary ground that is actualised as a 
concern for the radical difference between being-human and originary-ground. 
Accordingly, the meaning of Religion shows itself as a living faithfully in the aporia 
(question/dilemma) of this difference. As such, the meaning of Religion has the 
character of a faithfulness to faith itself; a relation of faith. The phenomenological 
content of the meaning of Religion as this aporia is as follows: 
1. The ground of the meaning of Religion as aporia is located in Dasein’s 
concern for originary ground as radically different to being-human. The 
ground of this concern is the groundless-ground of being-human: the 
unfathomable, unknowable ground of the potential otherwise of being-human.  
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2. The meaning of Religion as aporia, then, is actualised as a concern for the 
potentiality of an authentic relation with originary ground given by the 
otherwise of being-human. Herein, the originary ground is grasped as radically 
different to being-human and given in indications of the otherwise. As such, 
Religion shows itself as a concern for the proper belonging-to the otherwise of 
being-human.  
3. This concern for the proper as indicated, then, is given as a potentiality only 
insofar as originary ground communicates to Dasein within existence. The 
actualisation of this concern, as such, is twofold: of negation and indication. 
The former signifies the actualisation of a negation of human concerns and 
human understanding. The latter signifies a concern for indications of 
originary ground given in chairological temporality: the constitution of human 
existence within the hope and expectation of an overcoming of being-human. 
4. The meaning of Religion in this sense is constituted by the log oj of originary 
ground that discloses indications. Religion, in this, is actualised in two primary 
ways: grasping the given-ness of the log oj as principles that indicate the 
proper of hqoj and grasping the for-given-ness of originary ground as the 
advent of the overcoming of being-human. The grasping of originary ground 
as the overcoming of being-human, then, discloses the meaning of Religion as 
an authentic relation that overcomes human existence as improper (the for-
given-ness of human existence as proper).  Further, in indicative principles, 
the meaning of Religion is disclosed as the given-ness of the how of a proper 
human life. These two ways of the actualisation of Religion disclose the full 
sense of the proper meaning of Religion as it shows itself in concern.  
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C. Care: The ‘who’ belonging-to being-human as a potentiality. 
The task of disclosing the meaning of Religion in care contains two interrelated 
dimensions: the character of care as the foundation of concern, and the formulation of 
care within the context of a disclosure of the fundamental meaning of Religion. 
Herein, the character of care is predetermined as the dimension of being-human that 
forms an interpretative horizon upon which concern is founded. Therefore, in the first 
instance, care shows itself as the interpretative horizon that forms the ways of 
concern.  
 With regard to Religion, then, care signifies an interpretative horizon that 
forms the ways of actualising the given-ness and for-given-ness of originary ground. 
Further, insofar as the task is the disclosure of the primary meaning of Religion, care 
will only be analysed with regard to the proper of the relation of being-human and 
originary ground. For, the primary meaning of Religion  is an authentic relationship 
with originary ground. Moreover, this potentiality of an authentic relation must be 
constituted as primary insofar as the privative meanings of Religion are dependent (as 
actualisations of concern) upon the potentiality of the otherwise of being-human. Care 
in this sense contains two primary structures: 
1. The meaning of Religion disclosed in care is constituted by the proper relation 
of being-human and originary ground within the horizon of log oj: the given-
ness of communication by originary ground to humans. Herein, the log oj 
gives meaning and purpose to human existence as a life; the provision of 
meaning and purpose that forms an interpretative horizon called living. As 
such, the proper meaning of Religion in care is a meaningful life – the given-
ness of log oj through human living.  
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This log oj of care is given in two primary ways: the content of the log oj and 
the who of the log oj. The content of the log oj is given as the way of 
interpreting life wherein the log oj contains principles that indicate the proper 
interpretation of life. Herein, the interpretative principles do not form or 
present rules, reasons or explanations about how to live, but rather, forms an 
interpretative horizon for life to be lived. In other words, the content of the 
log oj gives an interpretative horizon as a life rather than content through 
which life is understood. The log oj of care, as such, essentially forms the 
horizon of life.  
 
The ‘who’ of the log oj is the ‘who’ of the potential otherwise of being-
human. In this way the character of the log oj is life in the sense of the proper 
living through us. The potential otherwise of being-human, however, is only 
given as a life insofar as the log oj lives through humans. Thus, the meaning 
of Religion in care signifies a life in which the log oj lives, and through 
which, a life is formed.  
 
2. The meaning of Religion as care is also constituted by the ability of being-
human to be otherwise. In this respect, the character of care forms an 
interpretative horizon of intentionality in its belonging to being-human. 
Herein, intentionality is grounded in what could be called ‘responsibility’; the 
ability to respond to originary ground. Responsibility through intentionality 
projects choice, but it is not choice in the usual sense of freedom or free 
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will.1080 Rather, responsibility is the character of care that resonates with and 
echoes the potential otherwise of being-human as an interpretative horizon. In 
other words, responsibility is like conscience: traces of originary ground given 
by the log oj in existence as a potentiality.  
 
Responsibility, as the character of care, forms an interpretative horizon called 
hqoj. Herein, hqoj signifies the dwelling of being-human in a life that 
resonates with the way-traces and call of the proper as absent and as an 
indicated potentiality. As such, the proper meaning of Religion as care also 
signifies hqoj: a faithful dwelling within the interpretative horizon of the 
traces of originary ground to which humans are given the responsibility of 
choosing the proper.   
 
D. Directedness: Belief as the fundamental meaning of Religion as a 
phenomenon. 
Insofar as we are seeking the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon, the final task of 
the test of a phenomenology of Religion is that of uncovering the fundamental 
(foundational) meaning of Religion as it belongs-to being-human. The question, as 
such, is how humans in our being can be religious and what the proper meaning of 
Religion signifies therein? Insofar as Religion has already in advance been given as 
the authentic relation of being-human and originary ground, uncovering the meaning 
of Religion as a phenomenon intrinsically involves the disclosure of the character of 
being-human that may be directed towards originary ground. This potential 
directedness will be called belief. Herein, there are three ways of saying belief: 
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1. Belief signifies the directedness of being-human towards originary ground that 
negates presence as primary. Herein, belief gives existence meaning in its 
‘towards which’ and discloses being-human as essentially an existence within 
the question of meaning and purpose. Insofar as being-human is this existence 
within the question of meaning, Religion is therefore disclosed as belief: the 
for-given-ness of a way towards originary ground.  
2. Belief signifies the directedness of being-human towards originary ground that 
gives life. This directedness is an essential character of being-human that 
constitutes existence as a horizon in which life occurs and discloses being-
human as fundamentally a dwelling within the questionability of life as 
improper or proper.  Religion, as such, signifies belief: the for-given-ness of 
life as proper.  
3. Finally, belief signifies the directedness of being-human towards originary 
ground that gives absence. Herein, the essential character of being-human is 
disclosed as the being-towards the absent-ground of the ‘who’ of being-human 
and the fundamental questionability of being-human in our ground. Religion 
as such signifies belief: the for-given-ness of being-human in our ground.  
 
Therefore, the meaning of Religion as a phenomenon is belief: the threefold for-
given-ness of being-human as an authentic relation with originary ground. 
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Conclusion 
Having baldly, and perhaps brashly, provided an interpretation of the meaning of 
Religion as belonging to being-human I would like to conclude by placing two 
primary conditions upon the validity of this study.  
 The first of these is to acknowledge the background of the study; a broadly 
Christian and ‘Western’ heritage that undoubtedly informs what has been written in 
various ways. This Christian heritage has at least three themes that require 
acknowledgement. First, my heritage is Christian, and more explicitly; Protestant. 
Herein, there can be no doubt that this heritage forms the general horizon for this 
study and additionally, some of the terminology utilised therein. Moreover, I am as a 
person, someone who would call myself ‘religious’. In this respect, the motive and 
impetus for the study is founded in what could be called a ‘religious’ way of 
encountering and interpreting life. In fact, a large part of the impetus for this study 
originates in my personal questioning of the meaning of life and my resistance to 
various theoretical positions that reduce Religion to a merely human projection. 
 Further, the philosophical position and phenomenological-hermeneutical 
method of this study is both Christian and ‘Western’. Herein, it must be 
acknowledged that the way that Religion is addressed, and even the term itself, is 
located within the horizon of a particular ‘history of being’. As such, the whole study 
can be viewed as a questioning and interpretation of a notion bounded by and bound 
to the particular horizon of modernity, Enlightenment, Christianity and the Christian 
interpretation of the Hebrew, Greek and Latin traditions.  
 The second primary condition requiring acknowledgement is the particular 
way of philosophy called phenomenology. Herein, the study is delimited to the style 
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of phenomenology posited in the thinking of Martin Heidegger. In this way, 
phenomenology as philosophy imposes further conditions on the study. First, 
phenomenology is a way of thinking that questions preconceptions, and as such, the 
study is bound by the questioning of preconceptions. Moreover, phenomenology is a 
way of thinking about methodology; a questioning of ‘how’ a particular problem can 
be addressed properly. As such, a primary condition of the study is its relation to 
methodological concerns within the field of studies in Religion; the problem of 
providing a genuine foundation for the study of religion(s). Equally, this study is 
bound to the formulation of phenomenology as ontology. This signifies that the study 
approaches the question of the meaning of Religion via one of many possible ways, 
namely: through the presupposition that being-human is the ground of Religion.  
 This study has attempted to put forward a test of the possibility of a 
phenomenology of religion that is ontological. In this respect, the study has drawn out 
some possible meanings of Religion as a phenomenon of existence, and then 
attempted to disclose the fundamental characteristics of being-human that found these 
meanings. I hope that whether these efforts were successful or not, the study has 
shown that a phenomenology of religion is possible in this sense. Moreover, I hope 
that this study has shown the poignancy and importance of such an effort. 
 Within the context of the aforementioned conditions of the validity of the 
study, the research has provided two central arguments. First, I have argued that the 
general meaning of Religion as a phenomenon is the potential relation of being-
human and originary ground. Additionally, I have posited that insofar as the meaning 
of Religion is a ‘belonging-to being-human’, Religion in its ground signifies what I 
have called belief. Belief, in this sense, is a name for the character of being-human 
upon which the relation of Religion becomes possible for humans as a potential 
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directedness towards originary ground that is intrinsic to being-human. With respect 
to both arguments, this study has only attempted to provide the barest outlines of the 
ontological structures that found the meaning of Religion.  
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Appendix: Heidegger on Religion 
This appendix has two primary tasks: 1) providing an interpretation of Heidegger’s 
notion or preconception of Religion and 2) outlining the difference between 
Heidegger’s notion of Religion and that of the thesis. These tasks are themes left to an 
appendix insofar as Heidegger’s phenomenology as ontology is the method of the 
research, and yet, his conceptualisation of Religion is neither central nor acceptable to 
this research. Moreover, this appendix is the space for distinguishing the arguments of 
the thesis from Heidegger’s path of thinking. This gains poignancy in the inevitable 
question: why utilise Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology as ontology without 
utilising his corresponding notion of Religion? Thus, the following will be an outline 
or sketch of Heidegger’s notion of Religion, and though juxtaposition, an explanation 
of why this notion of Religion is unacceptable to this research.  
 
31. Heidegger on Religion:  
A. Religion as ‘Factical Life Experience’: 
It is a generally accepted fact that Heidegger’s exposition of primal Christianity 
expresses an attempt to found phenomenology within the notion of ‘factical life’ and 
‘authenticity’, or, of uncovering the basic characteristics of Dasein’s being in 
existence.1081 Thus, the notion of Religion is developed implicitly within Heidegger’s 
grounding of phenomenology. The notion of Religion is, as such, preconceived within 
the two priorities of Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology: the question of 
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being (the seinsfrage) and the prioritisation of Dasein’s being.1082 Insofar as 
Heidegger actually poses the phenomenological question of the meaning of Religion, 
there can be no doubt that the notion of Religion is already in advance subsumed 
within the question of being and the prioritisation of Dasein’s being.  
 Heidegger poses the question of Religion as: the explication of fundamental 
religious experience and the task of understanding this experience in connection to all 
religious phenomena.1083  In other words, the question is: what is the meaning of 
religion as a factical experience – what is the phenomenological content of this 
experience? Already then, the meaning of religion is constituted within factical 
experience.  
 Factical life experience is posited as the human being towards the world, the 
prioritisation of content, and the indifference to the ‘how’ of experience.1084 Equally, 
factical life experience is the performative ‘what gets encountered in living’ and the 
concern of Dasein.1085 Religion, as factical life experience, is therefore 
undifferentiated from the everydayness of human existence in general, and further, 
already constituted as ‘inauthentic’ as a phenomenon non-essential to Dasein’s 
being.1086 In general, Heidegger’s initial exposition discloses the meaning of Religion 
as a phenomenon of everyday concern that is grounded in Dasein’s being.1087  
 The exposition of the meaning of Religion is then phenomenologically 
formalised – securing the originary character of enactment – via three dimensions of 
the factical: the originary what (content), the originary how (relation), and the 
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originary how (enactment).1088 Heidegger posits these dimensions in relation to 
Religion as: law/faith (content), salvation (relation) and life towards God 
(enactment).1089 That which differentiates primal Christian experience from the 
concern of Dasein in general, is the concern for opposing Christian faith (experience) 
to the surrounding life-world.1090 For Heidegger, the essence of this distinction – the 
primary task of a phenomenological exposition of Religion – is the original Christian 
experience of its object (God) that constitutes enactment.1091 At this stage, there are 
three implicit formalised conceptualisations of the meaning of Religion:  
1. Primal Christianity = primal factical experience belonging to and grounded in 
Dasein’s being. 
2. Primal Christianity = experience – the everyday concern of Dasein for 
existence – implicitly inauthentic – the fallen-ness of Dasein from being-
Dasein. 
3. The meaning of Religion is religious experience as an everyday relation of 
concern to an object – positum – positing objectivity – abstraction from 
everydayness – theology – metaphysics.  
 
B. Religion – The Factical Experience of the Truth of Being as an Entity: 
The essence of Religion is thus everydayness – concern – a relation to an object of 
concern. The object of Christian factical experience is God. This distinction of 
concern – a concern for God, operates as an un-modified having become that is not 
distinct from worldly facticity.1092 In other words, religious experience does not 
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modify being (human) but rather, presents a non-worldly knowing.1093 This knowing 
(pneuma) is distinct as a non-human understanding of temporality (the eternal)… an 
understanding of the being of God that emerges from Christian experience… and 
thus, a knowing grounded on neither Dasein’s being nor being (in general).1094 
 This distinction of primal Christian facticity (as a kind of faith-knowing) and 
worldly facticity revolves around knowing as the ground of enactment. Here, 
Heidegger interprets the distinction in Paul’s epistles of worldly (sarx – fleshly) and 
spriritual (pneuma) life to be a distinction between an authentic facticity belonging to 
Dasein (sarx) and living in the spirit (of God) that does not belong to Dasein.1095 As 
such, Heidegger’s notion of Religion becomes: the grounding of enactment (life as 
understanding within temporality - Dasein) on an object (God) that is not Dasein. 
 Heidegger’s exposition of Religion as factical life experience forms the 
inevitability of the doubled inauthenticity of Religion: 
1. As belonging to Dasein’s being as concern – everyday enactment in relation to 
objects. 
2. The understanding of being (Dasein) that is grounded on something not-
Dasein.  
 
C. Theology – The ontical science of faith: 
Religion as factical life experience is theorised – religious thinking about faith. 
Insofar as this thinking addresses faith, theology is a positive science: a science of a 
being.1096 Accordingly, theology contains two primary characteristics: 1) that a being 
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is already disclosed as the subject of objectification, 2) founded on the prescientific 
manner of approaching that being.1097  
 Theology is thus, for Heidegger, the positive science of the religious – the 
study of faith/belief as an object.1098 Insofar as theology is the science of Christian 
religion, and thus for Heidegger, the science of religious factical life experience in 
general… theology indicates the meaning of religion as faith. Faith: a way of 
existence of human Dasein that is founded, not from Dasein or through Dasein, but 
rather, that which is revealed… from what is believed – the object of belief.1099 
 The notion of Religion formulated in Heidegger’s thinking is only validated in 
a positive sense as an ontical science of the religious. For, the philosophical 
(ontological) interpretation of Religion discloses Religion as a secondary, non-
essential expression of Dasein’s existence. The non-faith of Dasein ontically and 
ontologically precedes faith.1100 Thus, inasmuch as faith arises from something other 
than Dasein (through everyday actualisation and understanding) religion has no 
genuine meaning with respect to being(Dasein).    
 
D. Theology – Metaphysical Ground: 
Theology thinks not only about faith, but also about the object of faith. Theology, as 
an expression of religious factical life, engages with that which is believed… what do 
I love when I love you?1101 Heidegger takes St. Augustine’s answer – the truly happy 
life is truth (veritas) – to signify that the ‘towards which’ of faith/religious experience 
is God – the truth of being as an entity.1102  
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 There are two drawbacks to the religious experience of the truth of being: 
1) Factical life experience is intrinsically concern and thus does not pertain to 
any genuine understanding of being. Factical life experience cannot form any 
genuine understanding of its own ground – its own ‘how’.  
2) As concern, factical life experience, the religious experience of the truth of 
being formulates this experience in terms of an entity – the objectification of 
the truth of being as an entity (or) the abstraction of the idea(l) of the truth of 
being from pre-scientific understanding.  
The foundation of the mortal feud between religion and philosophy lies precisely in 
this formulation of the truth of being – for philosophy, the truth of being belongs to 
the “free appropriation of one’s whole Dasein.”1103 For religion, the truth of being (in 
Heidegger’s interpretation) is founded on faith – on something not-Dasein.1104  
 The locus of this feud is metaphysics as onto-theology. Here, theology enters 
into metaphysics insofar as the ‘deity’ enters philosophy.1105 The deity enters 
philosophy via everyday concern where it emerges as the truth of being and as 
ground.1106 The deity as being and ground is constituted as highest ground1107: an 
account of first cause, being as generative ground and original matter.1108 
 Heidegger’s notion of religion, then, ultimately centres on the problem of 
metaphysics – that religious belief is identified with the metaphysical idea(l) of first 
cause. There are, as such, three primary dimensions  to the conceptualisation of 
religion therein: 
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1. Religion – the experience of being as an entity and the ground of the 
metaphysical explication of Q eoj as first cause.1109 
2. Religion – the experience of being as the appearance of the ought – the idea(l) 
of being.1110 
3. Religion – the historical valuing of the super-sensory realm – non-human 
ground and non-human values.1111 
Religion is therefore constituted as the mortal enemy of philosophy – the entirely 
inauthentic experience of the truth of being. For example: 
• The Last God 
- “The totally other over against gods who have been, especially over 
against the Christian God.” 
- Redemption: the subduing of “man”. 
- Awaiting God: the most insidious form of godlessness.1112  
• The God of Religion: 
- something extant 
- Expedient of “man”.1113  
• Faith (religion) 
- A holding to be true that does not pertain to the question of the truth of 
being. 
- Intrinsically inauthentic.1114 
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32. Diverging from Heidegger on Religion: 
In general, the fundamental distinctions between Heidegger’s notion of Religion and 
that of the thesis follow out of a relation and confrontation with metaphysics as onto-
theology constituted as an intrinsically problematic way of thinking. The distinctions 
arise, herein, between Heidegger’s quest for philosophy proper (thinking as ontology 
– thinking the truth of being) and the thesis’ attempt to approach that which is 
fundamentally religious – the ground of being-human as a life. There are, as such, 
four fundamental differences between Heidegger’s approach to metaphysics and that 
of this thesis. 
 
A. The Question of ‘Why’ 
When Heidegger approaches metaphysics he does so on the basis of the preconception 
that there is only one proper question worthy of thought – the question of why there is 
something rather than nothing. Within this preconception the theological component 
of metaphysics must necessarily be framed as an improper attempt to think being 
motivated by the everyday understanding of both causality (that causality signifies an 
infinite regress without the idea of first cause) and et hoj – as highest/ideal 
potentiality of being. To give Heidegger due credit, his interpretation is generally 
valid within the tradition of metaphysics. 
 On the other hand, it is the task of the research to address, in a 
phenomenological way, the meaning of Religion. Here, the task forms a 
fundamentally different challenge with respect to metaphysics, and thus, a differing 
appreciation of the theological dimension of metaphysics. The research has taken the 
concept of ‘what-being’ and ‘who-being’ as distinct problems with distinct 
foundational questions. Herein, ‘what-being’ as ontology forms the horizon for the 
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question of why there is something rather than nothing. Alternatively, ‘who-being’ 
forms the phenomenological-theological horizon of the question: ‘why are we alive? 
Who is the ground of life with respect to purpose/meaning?’ 
 This distinction then forms the horizon for an alternative critical 
(deconstructive) relation with metaphysics insofar as the problem becomes the 
philosophical quest for unifying ground – that unifies two distinct fundamental 
questions of thinking. The problem of Aristotle’s metaphysics, as constituted via this 
research, is that Aristotle subsumes the notion of originary ground under being as a 
being.  
 From this deconstructive relation with metaphysics, the thesis aims to draw 
out the meaning of Religion as intrinsically interconnected with the second 
metaphysical-ethical question: ‘who’ is the ground of life with respect to 
meaning/purpose, i.e., being-human as a life? Herein, the implicit criticism of 
Heidegger’s notion of Religion is the improper subsumption of this religious question 
under ‘what-being’ - ontology. Further, the engagement of the thesis with Religion 
also, I would argue, points out a delimitation of Heidegger’s thinking – the inability to 
properly address either religion or ethics as valid philosophical questions. This is the 
first juxtaposition of Heidegger and thesis on the notion Religion. 
 
B. Dasein & Being-human: 
For Heidegger, Dasein is given ontological priority – forming a prioritisation of 
being-understanding with respect to the notion of humans. This prioritisation is 
arguably necessary for any proper formulation of fundamental ontology in relation to 
the traditional notion of being. However, in the same moment, the prioritisation of 
Dasein also operates within the horizon of a monomania for the question of being, and 
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therein, covers up other senses of being-human and other ways of thinking 
ontologically about human existence. Equally, there can be no doubt that the term 
Dasein is a reformulation of the term ‘rational’ that is prioritised throughout the 
philosophical tradition in relation to the being of humans.  
 Initially, the research attempts to engage with this covering over of human life 
– this restriction/reduction of life to understanding – by using the term being-human. 
This term is not used as a means of signifying ‘humanism’ (as Heidegger’s posited 
alternative to ontology) but rather, as a means to open up the question of the ground 
of human existence in the sense of life. In this way, being-human signifies something 
analogous to Heraclitus’ statement: the ethos of humans is our daimonion – in the 
sense of the character of human life in its purpose. The use of the term ‘being-human’ 
aims at two formal distinctions: a) in a negative sense – the limit of Dasein to being-
understanding, and b) in a positive sense as a more general term that allows of the 
uncovering of existence as a ‘who’ of life.  
 
C. Authenticity: 
For Heidegger, the concept of authenticity signifies the truth of being, truly being-
Dasein, or, living/seeking the truth of being. In this regard, the notion of authenticity 
is restricted to the strictly ontological – to being. This blocks any way into the 
phenomenon of religion insofar as Religion signifies: grounded in Dasein’s being 
without any intrinsic truth/essential identity to being-Dasein. Religion, as such, is an 
aporia of human identity as Dasein.  
 The research formulates two ways of saying ‘authenticity’ within the two 
primary questions of thought – one pertinent to being (as with Heidegger), the other 
pertinent to life. In other words, authenticity refers to both the truth (being) and the 
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proper (arc h of life). In this way, the thesis aims to show that authenticity cannot be 
constituted as a simple identity (truly-being-Dasein and the truth of being). 
 
D. Ground 
For Heidegger, insofar as the only question is that of being, the concept of ground 
necessarily signifies being. Ground is either ‘being the ground’ or 
grounding(Dasein’s-being)… being as the in-between ground and the ab-ground of 
Dasein’s freedom for grounding. Aside from the questionability of Heidegger’s notion 
of freedom as a groundless-ground – a self-grounding-ground – his notion of ground 
has nothing to say on how to live or the ground of living.  
 For the thesis, the notion of ground signifies nothing less than the ground of 
being-human: as a life and as a being. Herein, the thesis excludes Heidegger’s notion 
of ground (aside from the early methodological aspect of grounding phenomenology) 
as invalid – for being is not the ground unless we are thinking about being-human as 
Dasein: the ground of the sense of being of entities. Rather, for the purposes of the 
thesis, I take the notion of ground to signify the prot h arc h – the originary ground of 
being-human in relation to being-alive (a meaningful/purposive existence). Here, the 
idea of being as ground can be equated with Dasein – the everyday concern for 
physical existence. The proper notion of ground, however, is the unknowable, the 
impossible, the otherwise than being that for-gives life.  
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Overall, the juxtaposition between Heidegger’s thinking and that of the thesis centres 
on the debate (within the metaphysical tradition) about being.  Heidegger sees and 
thinks only being. The thesis constitutes being as a secondary problem – the entrance 
point to the question of being-human – but, nonetheless – restricted to Dasein as the 
concern for our ‘daily bread’. The primary question of thought revealed by Religion, 
although not restricted to Religion, is the question of ground – the originary ground of 
being-human as a life upon which all regions of being-concerned are founded. 
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Glossary: 
 
• Authenticity: (i) I interpret authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking to signify the 
phenomenon of truth in relation to Dasein’s being, i.e. truly being-Dasein, (ii) 
authenticity also signifies the phenomenon of truth in relation to human 
existence, i.e. the grasping of truth, (iii) For Heidegger, the terms 
‘authenticity’ and ‘proper’ are used synonomously… while I use these terms 
as radically different: authenticity = truth/being, proper = et hoj/originary 
ground, (iv) I also use the term authenticity in a non-Heideggerian sense – to 
signify the proper in a lived sense, see especially part four of the research.  
• Being-human: (i) a term used to signify the being of humans in a complete 
sense, (ii) a term utilised in distinction to Dasein insofar as I would argue that 
Dasein is delimited to signifying ‘being-understanding’ and thus too limited 
for use in relation to the phenomenon of Religion. 
• Belief:  (i) an ontological term signifying the ground of Religion in being-
human, (ii) the intrinsic directedness of being-human towards the question of 
originary ground. 
• Belonging-to: (i) the essence of the phenomenological-ontological notion of 
phenomenon, (ii) that a phenomenon intrinsically signifies a ‘belonging-to’ the 
being of humans, (iii) the notion of phenomenon pertinent to Religion as an 
ontological problem. 
• Dasein: (i) the term Dasein is often used through reference to Heidegger’s 
thinking ,(ii) I interpret Dasein to signify the being of humans as being-
understanding, or, the being who understands being in existing, (iii) Dasein is 
a term derived from Kant’s term existence – Heidegger’s play on  Dasein as 
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being-understanding: ground of presence, the entity who presents, t/here-
being, the emergence of beings in their being.  
• For-given-ness: (i) used in the research to signify the relation of originary 
ground and humans in our being – an ontological concept signifying the 
‘given-ness’ of originary ground ‘for’ humans, (ii) a play on Heidegger’s 
terminology, translated into English as ‘fore-given’ or ‘fore-having’ – this 
term signifies something about Dasein that grasps being in a temporal sense – 
My play with this term is meant to break with Heidegger’s prioritisation of 
Dasein, (iii) drawn from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics – the play on the 
related terms judgment and forgiveness, (iv) also used to emphasise and 
prioritise Religion and its connection to ethics – the intrinsic connection of the 
proper and originary ground, the proper as otherwise than human. 
• Given-ness: (i) analogous to ‘showing itself’, signifying the way the 
phenomenon Religion is given to humans in existence, (ii) derived from Jean-
Luc Marion’s Being Given – a way to discuss the notion of phenomenon with 
respect to Religion and of avoiding the term ‘showing itself’ that tends 
towards abstraction and objectification. 
• Indication: (i) a foundational methodological concept within deconstruction – 
that which remains essential within the ‘destruction’ and that which founds the 
‘construction’, (ii) in the broadest sense: the essential of the phenomenon – 
that which indicates the ontological, (iii) indication is derived from both 
Heidegger’s and Husserl’s formulations of phenomenology (see: Martin 
Heidegger, ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’). 
• Originary ground: (i) my translation of the traditional notion of arc h, 
especially prot h arc h, (ii) used to emphasise the ‘active’ sense of the notion 
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of the ground of being-human (as et hoj) in opposition to the static physical 
notion of first cause, (iii) signifies in general, the ground of being-human as 
otherwise than being, (iv) partially derived from the translation of Heidegger’s 
term ‘originarily’, ‘originary’ and ‘primal’. 
• Preconception: (i) central to the phenomenological destruction – signifying 
the way in which humans pre-conceive or understand a phenomenon as an 
object via concern, (ii) the basic problem of thinking with respect to 
abstraction from experience or objectification from concern - thus signifying 
the improper use of the terms: phenomenon, phenomena, phenomenal, (iii) 
derived from various related terms/translations of Heidegger – ‘everyday 
understanding’, pre-scientific, pre-ontological and fore-conception. 
• Presupposition: (i) signifying the improper pre-supposing or formulation of 
ground on the basis of objectification/abstraction wherein ground becomes 
either being or the entity Being, (ii) intrinsically related to Heidegger’s term 
‘un-grund’ – the necessary appearance of ground.  
• Principle: (i) translation of arc h, (ii) used generally in an ontological sense – 
the interpretative horizon of life in relation to originary ground, (iii) also given 
an existential sense – the formulation of interpreting life through the human 
relation with originary ground given as log oj – communicated principles 
(grounds) of interpreting life and thus the grounds of actualisation.  
• Proper: (i) a phenomenological term that signifies the proper way of thinking 
or methodology, (ii) a philosophical concept signifying the question of et hoj 
– the good, (iii) an ontological concept signifying the question of the ground 
of human life, (iv) a theological concept signifying the ‘who’ of the originary 
ground, (v) the motive for the use of this term is to distinguish between the 
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concept of ‘being’ as truth or authenticity and the concept of ‘being-human’ in 
relation to ‘life’ – the proper refers to the question of the ground of life.  
• Religion, religion(s), religiosity: (i) ‘Religion’ signifies the universal 
‘ontological’ notion of Religion as a phenomenon, (ii) distinguished from 
religion(s) as religious traditions and (iii) religiosity – the personal lived 
experience of humans as religious. 
• Response-ability: (i) a conceptual expression of the character of being-human 
that enables and demands an active response to the question of originary 
ground and the problem of the meaning/purpose of life, (ii) an ontological 
concept that emphasises the active constitution of being-human with respect to 
living, (iii) a play on Heidegger’s use of the terms ‘conscience’ and the 
‘freedom to ground’, (iv) a term that is somewhat analogous to the traditional 
notion of freedom, except constituted within a relation of humans with 
originary ground… not an intrinsic property of humans as rational beings, (v) 
the term is derived in part from Derrida’s word-play in relation to religion (see 
especially: Jacques Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge’). 
• The Impossible: (i) signifies the traditional notions of no-thing or not-being 
as impossible in various senses: to grasp, to understand, to experience, to 
think, (ii) in an existential sense, the impossible signifies the limits and 
finitude of being-human and how the no-thing/not-being becomes an 
existential issue for us, (iii) derived from Derrida’s interpretations of religion 
(see especially: Jacques Derrida, Circumfession) 
• Unifying Ground: (i) the metaphysical and ontological tendency to posit 
being as an overarching or singular ground, (ii) the improper tendency of 
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human thinking to unify thought and the matter of thought within a singular 
conceptual system; see the critique of the unified analogy of being.  
• What & Who-Being: (i) what-being signifies the general realm of fusij, 
Dasein and the question of why there is something rather than nothing, (ii) 
what-being is intrinsically connected to Heidegger’s term Dasein, (iii) who-
being: the general realm of being-human in terms of life and thus the question: 
why are we alive, what is the meaning/purpose of life?, (iv) ‘who-being’ – the 
question of the ground of being-human, (v) the motive of using ‘who-being’ 
lies in a disagreement with Heidegger’s use of such terms as ‘care’ (from 
caritas) subsumed within the notion of Dasein.  
• Working Out: a concept signifying the trace from preconception to 
presupposition – the justificatory process of objective/abstract theorising.  
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